Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA2872
2002-10-18 12:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES COUNTERNARCOTICS,

Tags:  PREL SNAR PGOV MOPS MASS IV NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002872 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2007
TAGS: PREL SNAR PGOV MOPS MASS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES COUNTERNARCOTICS,
THE ICC AND COTE D'IVOIRE WITH NSA MOHAMMED


REF: STATE 192375


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (B) AND
(D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002872

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2007
TAGS: PREL SNAR PGOV MOPS MASS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES COUNTERNARCOTICS,
THE ICC AND COTE D'IVOIRE WITH NSA MOHAMMED


REF: STATE 192375


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (B) AND
(D).



1. (C) Counternarcotics: During a brief October 10 meeting
with NSA Aliyu Mohammed, Ambassador Jeter underscored our
concern regarding the modest funding the GON had provided its
NDLEA this year. The Ambassador noted that last year, NDLEA
funding was supplemented toward the end of the year, there
were no signs of a similar infusion now. Ambassador Jeter
told Mohammed the NDLEA funding levels would be a factor in
the upcoming USG narcotic certification process.



2. (C) Saying that he understood our position, NSA Mohammed
attributed the NDLEA/Presidency problem to the current
political bickering between the President and the National
Assembly. The Executive-Legislative impasse had choked the
flow of funds for many Ministries and agencies, he asserted.
The NSA stated that he would raise the issue with President
Obasanjo and the Justice Minister at their next meeting.
(Note: Ambassador gave this same demarche to Attorney General
Agabi. End note.)



3. (C) ICC-Article 98: Ambassador Jeter made reftel
demarche, underscoring that Nigeria's interests dovetailed
with ours, given the country's active role in African and
international peacekeeping missions. Unlike Foreign Minister
Lamido who had registered strong opposition when we broached
the subject on an Article 98 agreement with him, Mohammed
took on board our arguments and seemed interested in
exploring possibilities. He suggested that we send the draft
agreement to him so that he can confer with the Minister of
Justice and Minister of Defense. The NSA also suggested that
the Ambassador also demarche these senior officials. He did
not include the name of FM Lamido among those he would
consult. (Note: The draft agreement has been sent to the
NSA. End note.)



4. (C) Cote d'Ivoire: Mohammed stated Nigeria supported the
Gbagbo government but stressed the only solution was to
negotiate. Nigeria shared our concern that the attempt at a
military solution could further destabilize Cote d'Ivoire and
drag its immediate neighbors into the fray. Already Charles
Taylor was offering the use of his territory to counterattack
the rebels. Mohammed stated President Obasanjo remained
engaged and recently held telephone conversations with
Chirac, Annan and Kufuor.



5. (C) When asked whether Obasanjo's offer to provide
"safehaven" to the rebels still stood, Mohammed explained the
offer was not to extract all the rebels, only the leadership.
Nigeria did not know how many rebels there were, so it would
not make an open-ended commitment to take them all, he said.
Inviting several hundred rebellious Ivorians to Nigeria would
only turn Abidjan's headache into Abuja's, the NSA concluded.
JETER