NIGERIA: VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU -- DISTANCING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002862

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 1.6X1, 1.6X6
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU -- DISTANCING
HIMSELF FROM OBASANJO?


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS
1.6X1, 1.6X6.



1. (S) SUMMARY: During an October 10 meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, Vice President Atiku Abubakar
admitted his relationship with President Obasanjo was
on the shoals, attributing the deterioration to
Obasanjo's poor political skills and reliance on
malevolent, imprudent advisors. Atiku stated Obasanjo
had alienated Ibrahim Babangida, former military ruler
Abdulsalami Abubakar and NSA Aliyu Mohammmed, the men
most instrumental in Obasanjo's 1999 election. Atiku
disavowed supporting the impeachment drive but was not
working to quash it. The Vice President claimed
control of PDP party machinery, with only a small
faction loyal to Obasanjo. He saw reconciliation with
Obasanjo as unlikely. Yet, leaving an opening, Atiku
said that he, Babangida, Abdulsalami, and Aliyu would
meet the President that evening to see if fences could
be mended. Atiku spoke like a man fed up with a boss
he considered unskilled in the calling that he has
mastered. Candid about how his relationship with
Obasanjo had soured, Atiku did not reveal next steps,
but gave the impression that he was both able and
willing to contest for the Presidency. Atiku seemed to
be measuring whether the political aperture created by
Obasanjo's failings and the urging of others (such as
Babangida) for Atiku to step forward, was really the
opportunity of a lifetime or a trap to destroy him
politically. Some pundits and Babangida associates
claim that IBB may be setting Atiku up, in an effort
to destroy him politically, once and for all. Septel
will provide Embassy's analysis of Atiku's current
role in Nigerian politics and his prospects for the
future. End Summary


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HOW IT BEGAN
--------------



2. (C) During a ninety minute October 10 meeting at
the Vice President's residence, VP Atiku Abubakar told
Ambassador Jeter that his relationship with Obasanjo
was in tatters. Although tired and under the weather
due to the strain and pace of the last few weeks,
Atiku provided a detailed chronology of his
relationship with the President. Atiku said that he
and Obasanjo were relative strangers before the 1998
prelude to the 1999 elections. Their nexus was the
late Shehu Yar A'dua. Yar A'dua was second-in-command
during Obasanjo's stint as military Head of State. Yar
A'dua was also Atiku's political mentor. Atiku
inherited leadership of Yar A'dua's political machine,
the PDM, when the general died in detention, likely at
the sinister hand of the late Sani Abacha.



3. (S) Atiku recalled not only working for Obasanjo's
release from prison but also assisting in his ascent
to the Presidency. Atiku stated that he along with
former Heads of State Babangida and Abdulsalami and
current NSA Aliyu Mohammed were the four men most
responsible for Obasanjo's successful climb. Seeking
to redeem his image after the 1993 electoral debacle,
Babangida convinced Obasanjo to run, then placed his
considerable clout and money into the "Obasanjo
Project." While Babangiba pulled the strings from
Minna, General Mohammed performed the much of the
legwork while also drumming up other support. Then
Head of State Abdulsalami backdated Obasanjo's pardon,
an act that allowed him to be eligible to contest in
the election. Abdulsalami also funneled money into the
campaign and steered the considerable powers of
incumbency to Obasanjo's favor.



4. (C) Atiku's contribution was political. Exploiting
the PDM machinery, Atiku successfully engineered
Obasanjo's primary victories in the PDP. Along with
Babangida and the others, he recalled working hard to
ensure Obasanjo's nomination at the convention. It was
at that point, Obasanjo asked Atiku, already Adamawa
State's governor-elect and very content with that
status, to be his Vice-Presidential running mate.
Atiku accepted. On paper, Obasanjo had the credentials
of a perfect leader -- a perceived detribalized Yoruba
with ties to the North, a former military leader with
a good record, and good standing in the international
arena; but, in practice, he had fallen far too short
of the mark, Atiku lamented. (Comment: Atiku's version
of his selection differs from common lore. Most
accounts have a reluctant Obasanjo being pressured to
take Atiku because of need to cement the support of
the PDM faction of the party and to balance the ticket
with a running-mate from the North. End comment)


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THINGS BEGAN TO SOUR -- ANENIH TO BLAME
--------------



5. (C) Although they did not know each other well,
Atiku recalled that the two quickly melded. However,
there was an early premonition that foreshadowed
today's troubles. Atiku recounted having agreed with
Obasanjo on whom they would back for the Senate
leadership. Shortly thereafter, Atiku went to the
United States only to discover Obasanjo had changed
heart, selecting another person for the Senate
President. According to Atiku, the shift was
precipitated by presidential advisors warning Obasanjo
that an Atiku loyalist should not be Senate President
because Atiku already had too much influence in the
Lower House. With one of his men as Senate President,
they warned that Atiku could engineer Obasanjo's
impeachment. Atiku stated that he acquiesced in the
change in order to avoid a confrontation with Obasanjo
so early in the Administration.



6. (C) Atiku stated that the relationship with
Obasanjo assumed its current negative momentum in
April, during preparations for Obasanjo's reelection
announcement. Pointing the finger at Works and Housing
Minister Tony Anenih as the main culprit, Atiku
accused Obasanjo's "handlers" of purposefully
misinforming the President that he was angling to
announce his presidential bid before Obasanjo's was
announced. Obasanjo came to believe these innuendoes
when Atiku refused to participate in Anenih's
convoking of party figures at Obasanjo's farm in Ota
to "request" that Obasanjo run again. Atiku claimed
that his absence did not signal opposition to the
President; instead, it underscored his distaste for a
procession he claimed was too reminiscent of the late
Sani Abacha's effort to succeed himself by casting
himself as a consensus candidate for civilian
President.



7. (C) Atiku contended that Anenih attempted to keep
him ignorant of preparations for Obasanjo's reelection
announcement and tried to schedule the event when
Atiku was abroad. After talking to Obasanjo and
disavowing intentions to break the ticket, Atiku said
that Obasanjo ordered Anenih to stop his antics and
have Atiku participate in the reelection event. Still,
Atiku identified these machinations as causing a split
that in the intervening months has only worsened.


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NO HAND IN THE IMPEACHMENT; NO HAND IN STOPPING IT
-------------- --------------



8. (C) On the current impeachment crisis, Atiku
claimed the President was the victim of his own
hubris. Because of Obasanjo's suspicions of his
influence in the Lower House, Atiku assiduously
avoided contact with its Members, letting the
President's other advisors work both Chambers. The
President's men quickly antagonized the
Representatives. Early on, Atiku remembered telling
Obasanjo that a close relationship with the Senate was
essential since his advisors had spoiled his
relationship with the House. Obasanjo erred in getting
involved in Senate President Anyim's tussle with the
Ebonyi State Governor over control of the party
machinery in that State; in doing so, Obasanjo lost
hold of the Senate. With both Houses alienated,
impeachment became possible.



9. (S) Atiku felt the overall aim was not to impeach
Obasanjo but to render him unelectable. He disavowed
supporting the move. With Obasanjo finally realizing
seriousness of the threat by late August, the
President asked Atiku to use his influence to calm the
waters at the National Assembly. Atiku responded that
he would meet House leaders provide Obasanjo's
advisors not savage him by claiming Atiku's meetings
with House leaders were signs of betrayal. Obasanjo
promised his advisors' best behavior. Atiku met with
House leaders; as he feared, however, Obasanjo's
people accused him of backing the House rebellion.
Since then, Atiku claimed to have washed his hands of
the affair, leaving Obasanjo and his men to their own
devices.


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OBASANJO IN DIRE STRAITS IN THE PARTY
--------------



10. (C) Because of his lack of political skills,
Obasanjo has severely compromised his position in the
party. Atiku measured his strength in the PDP as
vastly superior to Obasanjo's, clearly suggesting that
Obasanjo would have a difficult time securing the
party nomination without him. At the PDP's most recent
National Executive Committee meeting, Obasanjo
suffered an embarrassing defeat when his proposal for
the sequencing of the party primaries was roundly
defeat by Atiku loyalists. Atiku claimed to have
passed a message to Obasanjo's men that they would
suffer more defeats if they tried to bypass him again
on preparations for the party convention and
primaries. Atiku boasted that he held the loyalty of
most PDP governors, who generally control their state
party machines. He also contended that he controlled
the party NEC and that most PDP National Assembly
members were loyal to him.



11. (C) Atiku downplayed the potentially negative
effect of Obasanjo not gaining the party re-
nomination. Obasanjo, he asserted, did not have a
large constituency of his own. Thus, his ouster would
not convulse the party. Moreover, Obasanjo was not
very popular with his own ethnic kinsmen so the
Southwest would not erupt as it did with the annulment
of the 1993 election.


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THE BIG THREE ARE ALSO MAD AT OBASANJO
--------------



12. (S) Perhaps more fatal to Obasanjo's chances than
his anemic support within the party, is the anger of
Babangida, Abdulsalami and Aliyu. Atiku claimed to be
in regular contact with the other three whom he
described as very disenchanted with Obasanjo.
Babangida has sworn off any association with a second
"Obasanjo Project," an allusion to their cooperation
to elect Obasanjo in 1999. Abdulsalami was miffed when
he came to ask Obasanjo for a favor and the
President's response was to show him the door.
Realizing Obasanjo was digging a hole for himself,
Atiku once asked the President if he really understood
how he had won office. He warned Obasanjo that it was
akin to political suicide to insult these men by
telling them they had made a "bad investment" if they
expected favors due to their contributions to his
election. When Obasanjo pleaded ignorance as to the
role of the Big Three in his election, Atiku proceeded
to summarize the contributions they and he had made.
When the President continued to feign ignorance and
asked how he could reconcile with the others, Atiku
said he admonished the President for being ungrateful
and he knew very well that he had to make amends for
past behavior.



13. (S) While in Abuja for the September 23
Commonwealth meeting on Zimbabwe, South African
President Mbeki expressed concern about Nigeria's
internal politics. Previously, Obasanjo had dismissed
his troubles as a teapot's tempest; this time, he
admitted to Mbeki that he was in serious trouble.
However, when Mbeki tried to meet Atiku, Obasanjo
invited himself to the session and placed Mbeki and
Atiku in an uncomfortable and embarrassing situation
Atiku said that he choose to leave. However, before
Mbeki departed, he and Atiku managed to talk outside
of Obasanjo's earshot, with the VP speaking frankly
about the President's political mistakes. Atiku told
us that Mbeki wanted to talk to Babangida as well. In
the end, Babangida traveled to South Africa with
Obasanjo's consent. Mbeki's apparent motive was to
patch what was broken but Atiku did not give the
venture much chance, particularly given Babangida's
position.



14. (S) Atiku said the President's Chief of Staff had
admitted that Obasanjo was desperate. In fact, the
meeting with Ambassador Jeter was interrupted by
several phone calls from the President's Office to
arrange a dinner that evening for Obasanjo, Atiku and
the Big Three, with Babangida having returned that day
from South Africa. Atiku said that for months he had
kept the Big Three from breaking openly with Obasanjo.
He reminded them that they had enlisted his support
for Obasanjo. He then told them that since they had
backed Obasanjo together, they all must stick with him
or leave him together. While that argument held things
in abeyance, the day of decision was near. In a recent
conversation, Abdulsalami cautioned Atiku about
hitching his political future to Obasanjo's, the Vice
President explained. (Comment: It seems unlikely that
Obasanjo would have been in haste to hold the dinner
without a signal from his friend Mbeki that what
Babangida would say would not be too difficult to
swallow. However, Mbeki could have misread Babangida.
It would not be the first or last time someone
misinterpreted Babangida's next steps. End Comment.)



15. (S) Atiku stated his rumored antagonisms with
Aliyu and Babangida were media fabrications. He
stated Aliyu respected his political clout; in any
case, the two operated in different spheres with Aliyu
more at home on foreign policy and national security
issues. As for Babangida, the former Head of State was
encouraging him to run. Atiku, however, would not
reveal his next moves, but did tell the Ambassador
that he could "put two and two together." He
acknowledged the potential turmoil and paralysis of
government that could result should he and Obasanjo
battled for the PDP nomination. Atiku cryptically said
he would do all he could to avoid these negative
developments but stopped far short of disavowing
presidential ambitions.



16. (S) As the meeting ended, Atiku informed the
Ambassador the meeting with Obasanjo was confirmed for
that evening. Before going to the Presidential Villa,
he and the Big Three would huddle to determine whether
to walk away from Obasanjo or give him one more
chance, spelling out concrete conditions for keeping
their support.


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COMMENT
--------------



17. (S) While definitely shaped by his own biases,
many of Atiku's observations ring true. Obasanjo is
crippled politically, having alienated many of his
former supporters. From almost all accounts, Atiku
does command more loyalty within the party than
Obasanjo. However, Atiku's self-portrait as a loyal
but unjustly accused and wounded subordinate is
exaggerated. There have been constant and credible
reports for nearly a year that have Atiku testing the
Presidential waters. He considers himself a much
better politician that Obasanjo, and he most certainly
is. Atiku also believes that Obasanjo has sufficiently
fouled his own nest with little chance and dwindling
time to rehabilitate his status. First, to win the
re-nomination, Obasanjo needs the Big Three to
exercise benign indifference if they can no longer
support him. Additionally, Obasanjo will need Atiku's
active support, something that Atiku currently appears
more than content to withhold. It appears that Atiku
is standing by watching Obasanjo progressively weaken
and gauging the best time to make an aggressive move.



18. (C) However, before laying his cards on the table,
Atiku must decide whether the encouragement given by
Babangida and others is real or are they simply using
his own ambition to entice him into a battle with
Obasanjo in hopes that they will neutralize each
other. Interestingly, in a private meeting on October
15, the APP Governor of Gombe State, an IBB loyalist
and former Minister in Babangida's government, told
the Ambassador that Babangida had been working for
almost two years to drive a wedge between Obasanjo and
Atiku. Atiku, he said, would probably run for the
Presidency and Babangida would destroy him; once and
for all. Perhaps the Machiavelli-like "evil genius"
has struck again. We shall see.
JETER