C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002817

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2012
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PINS IV NI UV
SUBJECT: MGIV01: ALLEGATION OF BURKINABE INVOLVEMENT


REF: A. ABIDJAN 3334

B. LOME 1309


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason: 1.5(d)



1. (C) Summary: Former Nigerian FM Kingibe alleges that the
September 19 coup plot was hatched in Ouagadougou by Guei and
Burkina's Interior Minister. Kingibe has good connections
across the region, but his version of events might be
influenced by his role as a political consultant to the GOCI.
End Summary.



2. (C) Baba Gana Kingibe is a former Foreign Minister (and
Interior Minister) of Nigeria. He makes his living today by,
among other things, political consulting. Kingibe told DCM
October 3 that the Gbagbo government had been a client early
in its tenure. Kingibe claimed that he had helped the GOCI
warm its relations with Nigeria and convinced Pretoria to
release a shipment of ARMSCOR products ordered by Bedie that
had been frozen following Guei's coup. The late Interior
Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Emile Boga Doudou, had been an
acquaintance whom Kingibe had met through "Francois," a
business associate and mutual friend.



3. (C) At a point in the past Kingibe did not specify, Guei
reportedly met in Ouagadougou with the Burkinabe Interior
Minister (possibly a reference to Security Minister Bassole)
at the home of an exiled Guei Minister to plot Gbagbo's
overthrow. However, the former Guei subordinate let it be
known that he did not want to participate in the plot. He
was, Kingibe said, quickly "eliminated," but not before
Gbagbo got wind of the scheme against him.



4. (C) Consequently, Gbagbo arranged for Boga Doudou to meet
his Burkinabe counterpart in Paris to smooth things over
between the two countries. The meeting ended, amicably Boga
Doudou thought. He returned to Abidjan September 18 to be in
place while Gbagbo went to Rome.



5. (C) Kingibe said "Francois" later told him that Boga
Doudou, realizing fairly early on the 19th what had been set
in motion by the rebel forces, jumped his back wall into the
compound of a French expat to escape rebels who would soon be
at his front door. He called "Francois" from that compound
and during the conversation reportedly said, "Francois they
are coming in. I am shot."



6. (C) Kingibe opined that Campaore was probably aware of
his Interior Minister's (Security Minister's) activities.
Kingibe suggested that Campaore thought such machinations
might impress Libya.



7. (C) Kingibe said he believed Liberia's denials of
involvement in this particular effort to destabilize Cote
d'Ivoire.



8. (C) Comment: Kingibe is smooth and articulate and
capable of being manipulative. The story he tells is not
inconsistent with what we know of pre-coup attempt events.
Kingibe could be telling the unvarnished truth as he
understands it, or he might be shading it to achieve a
desired objective. The mention of Libya was obviously
intended to pique USG interest. One assumes Kingibe
continues to work for Gbagbo as a political consultant
(Kingibe did not claim the contrary), and Gbagbo would
benefit from the USG believing that Campaore was behind the
rebellion. Kingibe did not claim Campaore knew what his
Minister was doing, but he strongly suggested it by saying
that Campaore was constantly meddling in the affairs of
neighboring states.



9. (C) The picture Kingibe paints of Burkinabe instigation is
troublesome. It would mean that Campaore's attempt at
rehabilitation by cutting his partnership with Charles Taylor
is pure subterfuge. It also suggests that Campaore had not
tired of Taylor's antics but had tired instead of playing
second fiddle and was ready to embark on destabilizing
misadventures where he was the leading man. If so, this would
make him as equally dangerous to sub-regional stability as
his former friend in Monrovia.
JETER