NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S THREATENED IMPEACHMENT --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002788

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 09/23/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S THREATENED IMPEACHMENT --
WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT


REF: ABUJA 2763


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Efforts to impeach Obasanjo seem to be
losing steam, but the ultimate outcome still remains
uncertain. Many protagonists may not want to remove
Nigeria's President from office, but rather to weaken
him politically to the point that he fails to get the
PDP President nomination or voluntarily withdraw from
the race. While constitutional issues abound as the
catalysts for current action, political machinations
drive events. When pulled into state-level political
disputes, Obasanjo typically stands with governors.
Many National Assembly members have concluded (often
correctly) that Obasanjo opposes their re-election.
Somebody has to go, and political survival drives the
current impeachment drama. Corruption and greed also
play as huge role. Obasanjo derides Nigeria's
legislators, and he has had little time for
cultivating them or attending to their concerns,
legitimate or otherwise. Obasanjo's foes feed
legislative anger. While Obasanjo likely will keep
his job, he clearly will emerge from this
confrontation weakened and perhaps terminally wounded.
End Summary.



2. (C) The National Assembly has chafed under
Obasanjo's imperial style, resenting his ability to
use Nigeria's long tradition of a strong Executive to
govern essentially as he pleased without having to
court their favor or pay more than cursory attention
to Constitutional requirements. Obasanjo's operatives
openly campaigned for the removal of Assembly leaders
not to the President's liking, and they enjoyed
considerable success. Most Members were prepared to
ignore an overbearing Executive branch, as long as
they received certain perquisites (hefty allowances,
cars and Federal contracts benefiting them
personally). But during late 2001 and into early
2002, Obasanjo took three critical steps that jolted
the legislators. First, he refused to implement
"constituency projects" of 500 million Naira per
Senatorial district. Second, he launched an
investigation and audit of National Assembly spending
and even dared Assembly Members to publish their
salaries and emoluments. Third, Obasanjo transitioned
from a tendency to support governors in their frequent
disputes with senators and representatives into a
virtual policy of doing so. The legislators saw their
chance to direct money to their campaigns and into
their pockets evaporating and Obasanjo turning more to
their adversaries, the already well-funded governors.
It all added up to one thing in their minds: Obasanjo
wanted to stop them from being re-elected. Meanwhile,
Obasanjo's unsuccessful efforts to unseat Ghali
Na'Abba had turned the House Speaker into an
implacable foe, and the once-pliable Senate President
had become bitter over Obasanjo's refusal to back him
in a power struggle with the Governor of Ebonyi State.



3. (C) Across broad swaths of the North and in parts
of the South, political actors dependent on Federal
largesse had grown increasingly concerned about two
issues. First, Obasanjo was not directing enough
Federal money their way. Second, some Obasanjo
associates were discussing plans for a clean sweep
following the President's anticipated re-election;
there would be a concerted post-election attack on
crony contract awards and rent-seeking behavior. At
the same time, public annoyance over Obasanjo's high-
handed governing style was spreading from the
legislature into society at large, unhappiness over
steadily increasing prices was growing, and the
President's love of foreign travel was being ridiculed
in the face of his inability to obtain debt
forgiveness, the centerpiece of his foreign policy.



4. (C) Influential players and especially antagonists
from the North began to urge a very willing National
Assembly to challenge Obasanjo -- to force him to
recognize their prerogatives and to play the
corruption game as it has always been played. Having
faced down all previous impeachment threats, Obasanjo
did not take this one seriously, refusing a list of
Assembly demands that notably included:


-- Addressing a joint session of the National
Assembly;
-- Replacing his detested legislative liaison
officers; and
-- Implementing the constituency projects.



5. (C) Obasanjo soon regretted his hard line, as the
calls for his impeachment grew, and his backers in the
National Assembly dwindled. In recent days he has:


-- Offered to address a joint session;
-- Agreed to replace his combative House Liaison
Officer;
-- Decided to hire more liaison officers so that each
of Nigeria's geo-political zones is represented;
-- Submitted a supplemental 2002 budget reinstating
the constituency projects;
-- Given a conciliatory Independence Day speech that
attributed the legislative-executive stand-off to a
communications gap; and
-- Submitted to the Assembly a bill that would resolve
the contentious oil resource allocation dispute by
eliminating the offshore/onshore dichotomy.



6. (C) Behind the scenes, Obasanjo's advisors have
embarked on a campaign to convince Assembly Members
from their respective states to drop from the ranks of
impeachment supporters. Presumably, funds are also
changing hands to get key Assembly Members to abandon
the impeachment drive. The PDP National Secretariat
has also been active, but its interventions have met
with mixed success. Former Heads of State Gowon and
Shagari and other influential individuals have been
enlisted to plead for Obasanjo to be permitted to
finish his term.



7. (C) From meetings with numerous players in this
game, we conclude that the impetus behind the
impeachment threat is weakening but that its momentum
remains substantial. While the number of House
Members supporting impeachment appears to have fallen
from just over the required 240 to something under it,
many senators and representatives will continue to
press for the President's removal, not because they
expect to succeed but because their own political
survival depends on weakening Obasanjo to the point of
becoming a political lame-duck, incapable of
successfully contesting for re-election.



8. (C) One of the reasons impeachment will not succeed
is that it threatens the very fabric of Nigerian
politics, as well as the fragile unity of Nigerian
society. The Yoruba Southwest, which voted heavily
for Obasanjo's opponent and co-ethnic, Olu Falae, in
1999, is now strongly behind the President. The
impeachment drive, whose symbol is Speaker Na'Abba, a
Northerner from Kano, is increasingly portrayed in the
Southwest as a continuation of the 1993 election
annulment and Northern efforts to recapture power
without having to win an election (Vice President
Atiku Abubakar would be the Constitutional successor).
Fred Fasehun, a leader of the militant Oodua Peoples
Congress (OPC) recently stated publicly that
impeachment of Obasanjo was an impeachment of Nigerian
democracy that could result in the disintegration of
the country. Obasanjo's impeachment, Fashehun said,
would shatter Nigeria's unity. While Fashehun is prone
to hyperbole, the sentiment behind his statements
resonates in the Yoruba Southwest and may have gotten
the attention of the political elite.



9. (C) Notwithstanding, many Northern political
leaders continue to express support for impeachment,
and Igbos clamoring for one of their own to be
President in 2003 have joined the bandwagon. But for
neither of these groups is Obasanjo's actual removal
from office desirable. That would turn the Vice
President, a smooth politician with plenty of money
and formidable machinery into an incumbent President
and complicate their calculations, which stress the
importance of an "open field" for 2003. Obasanjo's
opponents will likely continue to inflict non-fatal
wounds, such as pushing various alternative candidates
to announce campaigns, in order to keep the President
off balance, under pressure and unable to regain
momentum in time to win his party's nomination.


JETER