Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA2787
2002-10-03 18:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA MIGHT IGNORE UNFAVORABLE RULING ON

Tags:  PBTS MOPS PGOV PREL PREF EPET NI CM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002787 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/02
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PGOV PREL PREF EPET NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA MIGHT IGNORE UNFAVORABLE RULING ON
BAKASSI


REF: USDAO ABUJA 2023


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5
(B) and (D)


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002787

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/02
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PGOV PREL PREF EPET NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA MIGHT IGNORE UNFAVORABLE RULING ON
BAKASSI


REF: USDAO ABUJA 2023


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5
(B) and (D)



1. (C) Summary: Nigerian Minister of State for Defense
(Army) Batagarawa told us on September 27 said that
Nigeria would disregard an unfavorable ICJ ruling on
Bakassi. International pressure could be withstood.
That evening, DCM heard a second report of Minister of
Defense Danjuma's warning to the French to stay
neutral should hostilities break out. End Summary.



2. (C) DCM and POLMILOFF met September 27 with
Minister of State for Defense (Army) Malam Lawal
Batagarawa to discuss the ROE for Nigerian forces
deployed to Abidjan (septel). Batagarawa commented
that Nigeria did not want "ECOMOG 3" because of
concerns "about the situation on our eastern border"
and potential requirements to maintain domestic order
during the imminent election season.



3. (C) Batagarawa mused that Cameroon had much to lose
by not working towards a negotiated settlement. If
the ICJ ruled against Nigeria, the GON would disregard
the ruling, he declared. Batagarawa thought the loss
of goodwill in the international community would be
short-lived and that within five years everyone would
have moved beyond Nigeria's continuing presence in
Bakassi.



4. (C) As an alternative to possible confrontation
with Cameroon, Batagarawa suggested that the two
countries could reach an arrangement similar to the
one Nigeria has with Sao Tome and Principe. The
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) would
develop Bakassi's hydrocarbon resources (onshore and
offshore) while sharing the revenue with Cameroon.
This, he argued, would allow Cameroon to benefit from
the petroleum reserves in the Bakassi while allowing
Nigeria to safeguard the interests of its
predominantly Nigerian population.



5. (C) COMMENT: It was not clear if Batagarawa
understood that most of Cameroon's existing oil
production comes from waters off Bakassi or had given
thought to how that might be factored into his joint
exploitation concept. We chose not to explore this
with him. Batagarawa thought the USG was being
helpful to Nigeria with respect to the Bakassi dispute
while the GOF was being duplicitous. He peremptorily
dismissed France's provision of the venue for the
September 5 meeting with a wave of his hand and, "We
could have paid for a room ourselves." END COMMENT.



6. (C) At the September 27 Chinese National Day
reception, German Ambassador Dietmar Kreusel told DCM
the same story reported reftel: That Minister of
Defense T.Y. Danjuma had informed French Ambassador
Jean-Marc Simon that Nigeria would view "France also
as its enemy" if France were to intervene in support
of Cameroon should hostilities break out between
Nigeria and Cameroon.



7. (C) COMMENT: The German Ambassador seemed taken
somewhat aback by Danjuma's statement; he should not
have been. The Franco-Nigerian relationship in West
Africa has always been edged with tension arising from
overlapping, sometimes competing, senses of hegemony.
Further reporting on Danjuma's discussions with the
French follows septel. END COMMENT.



8. (C) At a September 25 reception Embassy held for
members of the National Assembly and State liaison
officers, several Senators and Representatives
discussed Bakassi with Emboffs. Views of how Nigeria
would respond ranged from positions similar to
Batagarawa's to the superficially more cooperative,
"We will faithfully implement the ICJ decision, but we
know it will favor us."



9. (C) COMMENT: Whether it is Batagarawa's cynical
viewpoint or the Assembly Members' insistence that
Nigeria will win at the Hague, Nigerian leaders still
have not come to grips with the distinct and imminent
probability that the ICJ will rule against them. END
COMMENT.


JETER