Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA2727
2002-09-23 15:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: KANO GOVERNOR ON OBASANJO PERFORMANCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002727 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: KANO GOVERNOR ON OBASANJO PERFORMANCE


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (B &
D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002727

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: KANO GOVERNOR ON OBASANJO PERFORMANCE


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (B &
D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a September 5 call on Ambassador
Jeter, Kano State Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso offered his
assessment of the Obasanjo Presidency and urged continued
USG support for Nigerian democratization. Kwankwaso,
Nigeria's youngest state governor and at the helm of the
nation's largest state in population and territory, was
confident of his own standing and appears well-positioned
for the upcoming round of elections. End Summary.



2. (C) Kano State Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso,
accompanied by the Special Advisor for Metropolitan Affairs
Akilu Indabawa and the state's Health Commissioner, paid a
call on Ambassador Jeter on 5 September during one of the
Governor's visits to Abuja. Responding to Ambassador
Jeter's questions, Kwankwaso and his companions expounded
on the current POLITICAL problems facing the Obasanjo
Presidency.



3. (C) Kwankaso said that many of Nigeria's problems
stemmed from the pace of transition from military to
civilian rule. Obasanjo had been out of touch with
politicians since stepping down as military ruler in 1979
and that fact, coupled with his incarceration and possible
torture late in the Abacha regime, meant that he was not
sufficiently involved in politics and was thus ill-prepared
to assume leadership of the country.



4. (C) Further, Kwankwaso noted, the pot was boiling
because Nigeria had never successfully had a transition
between two democratically-elected civilian governments.
In some ways, conducting credible elections in 2003 will be
more difficult than in 1999. Moreover, the failure of past
democratic experiments has dissuaded many able people from
political participation. This has had a leveling effect on
the quality of governance and POLITICAL discourse in the
country. In Kwankwaso's assessment, the 2003 elections and
the subseqquent round in 2007 will likely continue to
attract the self-interested politicians who dominate
Nigerian politics today. For instance, the genesis of the
impeachment crisis is the lack of understanding among
relatively inexperienced politicians of the appropriate
relationship between POLITICAL parties and the government.
Kwankwaso said that the presidential system lessens party
control over the workings of government and was radically
different from the parliamentary system, where party
loyalty is a necessity in defining and directing the
government's goals. Rather than building civil society,
the USG focus its assistance on fostering a deeper
understanding of the role of the parties in a presidential

system, the Kano Governor explained.



5. (C) Kwankwaso believed Obasanjo was a sincere patriot
with Nigeria's best interests at heart, but the uneven
wisdom of his appointments and the structure of the
Presidency "reflects on the quality of his leadership."
The Governor rightly pointed out that some among the
Cabinet were "losers in their own districts," unable to be
elected on their own merits. Others were appointed by
Obasanjo to balance the myriad competing political,
regional and ethnic interests in Nigeria. Unfortunately,
in Kwankwaso's opinion, Obasanjo's assessment of these
interests was off the mark, based on his own incomplete
understanding of POLITICAL developments in Nigeria in
recent years. Kwankwaso identified the most serious
problem for the Presidency as communications, both
domestically and with the outside world.



6. (C) The Health Commissioner commented the number of
Ministers and Special Advisors in the Presidency, which he
figured at about 100, created an uncontrollable
bureaucracy. With each person pursuing his own interests,
no one was looking out for the interests of the President.
Kwankwaso asked rhetorically, "Where have the Ministers and
Advisors been while the Legislature was calling for
Obasanjo's impeachment? Invisible!" While each one should
be selling the merits of Obasanjo's leadership and
highlighting his accomplishments, they have all gone
aground, waiting for the air to clear and figuring how to
maximize their own individual interests in the aftermath.



7. (C) Communications with the public has been no better.
In Kano, Kwankwaso complained, it was Kano State personnel
who identified projects initiated by Federal authorities in
order to publicize them to the voters. "The Ministers
should be touting the government's accomplishments to the
electorate in order to improve the image of their boss,"
Kwankwaso lamented. Instead, when anyone gets credit, it
is usually the Minister rather than the Administration.



8. (C) On the upcoming elections, and despite his
criticism of the President, Kwankwaso was confident that he
could deliver Kano to Obasanjo, regardless of who runs
against him. The Health Commissioner commented, however,
that Obasanjo was making a serious mistake by ignoring the
North. "Kano is the most populous state in the country,
and the Hausa-Fulani are the most populous tribe," he said.
He was perplexed by Obasanjo's perceived inattention to the
political needs of this important region. When Ambassador
Jeter asked whether press reports that the President was
losing support in the north because of his prosecution of
Mohammed Abacha, Kwankwaso sniffed, "Keeping him in jail
bothers no one." Contending that Kano indigenes had no
love for the Abacha family, he said that, conversely,
letting Abacha out could be a blow to Obasanjo's popularity
and credibility. And in response to Ambassador's question
about House of Representatives Speaker Na'abba's chances
for reelection, Kwankwaso pointedly asked, "Do you want him
to return?" The implication that the Governor could derail
Na'abba's POLITICAL career was seconded by Indabawa, who
commented that anyone supported by Kwankwaso was virtually
assured of election.



9. (C) COMMENT: Kwankwaso appeared relaxed and confident
about his future POLITICAL prospects and prowess. Like
other Northerners who back Obasanjo, Kwankwaso is not
enamored with the President and is full of criticism of his
Administration; however he likely views the President as a
known quantity and the lesser evil among the many possible
candidates. His assessment of the weaknesses of Obasanjo's
Administration is telling and tracks with our own: a
Presidency staffed with too many uncoordinated Special
Assistants and Advisors, most with no clear mandate about
their respective portfolios, no vision or clear message,
and an extraordinary inability to sell the man who leads
the nation from Aso Rock.
ANDREWS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -