NIGERIA: THREE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES--OLD WINE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002202

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2007
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THREE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES--OLD WINE IN
NEW BOTTLES

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: INEC registered three new political parties
June 22, bringing the total of approved parties to six.
However, this doubling of the number of parties does not
represent liberalization of the political landscape. At least
two of the three parties, the NDP and the UNPP, are tied to
former Head of State Babangida. The AGPA is more of a
mystery. There is some indication of Babangida's involvement,
as some believe the party is the former general's bridge to
the Southeast. Still others think President Obasanjo's
strategists registered the party to divide the Southeast in
order to douse the prospect of a North-Southeast alliance
against Obasanjo's presidential candidacy. In any event, the
new parties are laden with former military officers as well
as civilians who had attained comfortable niches under
various military regimes. INEC did not register any of the
less establishment-oriented parties that could have injected
fresh blood into the electoral contests. In the end, the
decision to register only these parties will assure that
closed shop, politics-as-usual will be the dominant force
during the upcoming election season. End Summary.



2. (U) The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
completed the party registration exercise on June 22, by
certifying three new parties: the All Progressives Grand
Alliance (APGA),the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the
United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP). Among the 24 parties
that failed to make the cut were the NCP, led by veteran
pro-democracy advocate Gani Fawehinmi and the PRP headed by
progressive Northern political veteran, former Kaduna State
Governor Balarabe Musa.



3. (C) The registration of the NDP and UNPP is not surprising
but the AGPA validation was unexpected. Both the UNPP and the
NDP have been linked to Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) and power
structures of both groups are peopled with his acolytes. The
UNPP has several retired senior military officers and former
military Vice-President under Babangida, Augustus Aikhomu, is
the Chairman of the UNPP's Board of Trustees. Both the UNPP
and NDP have significant numbers of South/South political
personalities and some Southeasterners. The NDP seems to have
more Northerners in the formal party hierarchy than the UNDP.
The AGPA appears to be heavily Igbo influenced but none of
the Igbo major leaguers are formally involved. It is not
immediately clear who are the heavy hitters, if any, behind
the APGA.



4. (C) Discussions with UNPP and NDP members reveal strong
attachment to IBB. Former Senator Dangana Ndayako, a
founding member of the PDP and now a charter member of the
NDP, told Polcouns that he and most party organizers
supported an IBB candidacy. Two veteran reporters of the
Nigerian political scene told the Ambassador that the
euphoria in front of INEC headquarters when the approval of
the three parties was publicly announced resembled a
Babangida pep-rally. Appearing in equal numbers with party
banners were those calling for IBB to run in 2003. UNPP and
NDP party members spent as much time vocalizing their support
for Babangida as celebrating their parties' successful
registration. APGA members were much more restrained.




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The UNPP - A Party and One-Half
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5. (C) Ironically, by the time it was formally registered,
the UNPP should have ceased to exist; it had previously
merged with the APP to form the ANPP. However, that merger
was de facto not de jure. With its successful registration,
the UNPP is not only united with the APP in practice; it also
retains its own distinct corporate existence as well. Unless
INEC abrogates the merger on the basis that the UNPP had no
legal existence at the time of the merger, the UNPP will
enjoy the political equivalent of having its cake and eating
it too. While unique, this duality is also causing tension
within the UNPP. Some UNPP members, who did not benefit from
the merger, are claiming that the merger was a nullity and
that, by their very actions, those UNPP members who favored
the union have exited the party.





6. (C) Babangida allies who participated in the UNPP-APP
merger into the ANPP are working to block former Head of
State Buhari from capturing the ANPP nomination. Thus, in
addition to influencing ANPP positions, the UNPP can still do
its own thing as an independent party. One member of the APP
before the merger told Polcouns in early July that
Babangida's influence in the party has risen due to the UNPP
influx and that Babangida will be one of the major factors
determining who gets the party's nomination.


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The AGPA- A Babangida Ploy, an Obasanjo Ruse, or Both?
-------------- --------------



7. (U) Taken at face value, the AGPA represents Igbo
agitation for an Igbo President in 2003. In the end it
probably will not be a major factor unless allied with
another party. A Southeastern-based party with a one-issue
platform (the ethnic identity of the President) does not have
sufficient gravitational pull to stand alone. The situation
changes if the party is allied with a Northern-oriented
group, recreating the old North-Southeast axis.



8. (C) Here is where intrigue knocks at the door. Professor
Ukandi Damachi, an intelligent, information peddler and
consummate Babangida strap-hanger, recounted to Ambassador
Jeter a July 5 meeting Damachi had with Babangida. Damachi
jokingly told the former Head of State that with the
registration of the UNPP and the NDP, Babangida had fathered
twins. The former Head of State corrected Damachi, saying
with a grin that he had "triplets," adding the APGA to the
parties under his wing. However, an opposite spin on the
APGA's pedigree was offered by Gani Fawehinmi. Fawehinmi, a
staunch Obasanjo critic who has repeatedly called for the
President's resignation, believes the APGA is Obasanjo's
artifice to divide the Southeast and the Igbo vote. He
claimed Obasanjo will try to bully and buy off APGA party
officials so that the group will nominate him, thus
undermining the solidarity of the call for an Igbo president.
(Comment: Due to the convoluted nature of politics here,
plausibly both Damachi and Fawehinmi are partially right. In
that so much of what happens in determining the control of
the party depends on who is the highest bidder, both the
Obasanjo camp and Babangida may be trying to woo the AGPA for
divergent reasons: IBB wants to build the North-Southeast
Axis while Obasanjo seeks to prevent it. End Comment.).



9. (C) During a July 17 call on the Ambassador,
representatives from the APGA (5 members of the National
Executive Committee, including one-time presidential
candidate Sarah Djibril) claimed that AGPA was the only party
with no ties to the military elite. The APGA leadership
disavowed that it was an Igbo dominated body, but with half
of its leadership from the Southeast, that argument was not
convincing. We do note that the second-in-command hails from
Niger State, Babangida's home. This may be happenstance, but
it gives rise to suspicions that IBB has access to APGA.




--------------
The Losing Side of Party Registration
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10. (U) Ostensibly to advance the constitutional requirement
that new parties reflect "federal character" (ethnic and
regional diversity),INEC developed criteria to validate
party registrations. The requirements included having
offices in 24 states, filing affidavits that no members
belong to any other party, establishing a transparent process
for the election of national representatives and holding
party membership open to all Nigerians.



11. (C) The goal of achieving "federal character" collided
with the goal of opening the political space so that people
with alternative ideas might compete in the electoral
process. One disgruntled human rights activist caviled that
someone who had creative ideas for improving his local
community in Lagos was faced with a Hobson's choice. Either
that person would have to form a party and accumulate
sufficient funds to "establish an office in Bauchi" and other
far-flung places or, alternatively, join an existing
political party. While the latter option would save money,
the person would still have to bribe existing party officials
to win the party's nomination. By committing that initial
transgression, the person would be steadily infected by the
politics of corruption. An isolated individual is no match
and will be engulfed by Nigeria's system of moneyed politics,
the activist lamented.



12. (C) Human rights activists not only bemoan the fact that
the registration did not create more opportunities for
political participation, many believe the registration
process was retrogressive. These Nigerians point to the fact
that IBB is bankrolling the UNPP, the NDP and perhaps the
AGPA while also having placed a firm down payment to buy
influence in the ANPP. Meanwhile Obasanjo's team is trying to
strengthen control of the PDP and perhaps the APGA.
Additionally, while attempting to fortify their positions
within the various parties they influence, both likely will
spend money to weaken each other and cause dissent in the
heart of the others' camp.


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COMMENT
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13. (C) Many cynical Nigerians believe that INEC is not a
free agent and the approval of the three parties was
engineered by Obasanjo to fragment the strongest pockets of
his opposition. For example, by registering the NDP he drives
a wedge in the North and upper Middle Belt between the older
Northern politicians in the ANPP and the younger ones in the
NDP. Although the APP and UNPP have announced their merger
creating the ANPP, a formal union has not yet taken place.
Obasanjo's team will work hard to scuttle the union, in order
to keep his opposition as divided as possible. As earlier
stated, registering the AGPA may also be Obasanjo's way of
keeping the Igbo's from gathering under one tent.



14. (C) Under a more charitable analysis, INEC did a credible
job registering the parties that satisfy the guidelines. As
one INEC official put it, "We know which parties are
serious." However, pro-democracy activists counter that the
electorate, not INEC should determine whether a party is
"serious" or not. This criticism carries some merit. While
INEC may have been pursuing the laudable goal of "federal
character", its decision may have paid inadequate attention
to political openness. For example, none of the
"progressive" parties based in the Southwest or North were
approved. While these parties have no chance of taking the
election, their campaigns would have likely been more
issue-based than the campaigns of the larger parties. As
such, they might have put modest "peer pressure" on the major
parties not to reside totally in the arena of power politics,
but give some, albeit limited, attention to key economic and
social issues facing the average Nigerian. However, these
parties also would have chipped into some of the votes
Obasanjo would likely win.
JETER