C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000191

SIPDIS


NSC FOR MCLEAN
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OSD-PA FOR AFIS (BERNATH)


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2012
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR KPAO NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
CONTINUES TO IMPROVE

REF: 01 ABUJA 2072


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b/d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: While problems remain in the U.S. bilateral
military relationship with Nigeria, significant signs of
improvement are evident. The relationship between the
Embassy and Ministry of Defense has improved as a result of
the February 2001 creation of Minister of State positions for
each Service. Closer coordination between the Ministry and
the Services appears to be the result, leading to fewer
instances of bureaucratic inertia hindering bilateral
efforts. The new Service Chiefs are more open and available
than the old, and at least on the face of it, appear to
closely follow the directions and intent of the civilian
government. The MPRI team has had greater success in recent
months in working with their counterparts and senior
officials. The different levels of cooperation seen between
Phase 1 and Phase 3 of Operation Focus Relief epitomize these
changes. END SUMMARY.


=====================================
SLOW CHANGE, BUT CHANGE JUST THE SAME
=====================================



2. (C) We have seen real progress in our military
relationship with Nigeria in a number of areas. This is in
part due to the level of engagement over the last year,
through OFR, MPRI and our general security assistance (SA)
programs. It is also due to the key input of some new
cooperative players (the Army Minister and new Service
Chiefs), and the removal of some others (particularly the
testy former Chief of Army Staff).



3. (C) Even so, problems remain in the bilateral military
relationship with Nigeria, and will not go away quickly.
Civilian authority over the military is still being
established, bureaucratic inertia and slipshod coordination
between the MOD and Services remains problematic, and the

desire among many to shrug off assistance in favor of
contracts where kickbacks are available continue to hamper
assistance efforts. Emerging from a history of military
governments where the Chief of Army Staff was essentially
number three in the national decision-making
chain-of-command, and often appointed Ministers (including
the Minister of Defense), Nigeria is working to establish
civilian control of the military. This is a sensitive area,
and the GON is proceeding cautiously. The Services resist
accountability to the Ministry, and some Ministry officials
remain focused on money-making from contracts rather than
genuine reform. Furthermore, real engagement between the MOD
(read Federal Government) and the National Assembly remains
tenuous. This hinders national defense planning and force
development.


================================
DEFENSE COOPERATION - BABY STEPS
================================



4. (C) A biweekly defense cooperation meeting between the
Office of Defense Cooperation, Ministry of Defense and
Services, was created by the DATT to improve defense
cooperation communication (Reftel). The biweeklies, used to
discuss FMS/FMF cases, IMET and other assistance programs,
have brought about progress in SA and have improved Nigerian
understanding of SA programs. Additionally, a week-long
DISAM security assistance workshop has begun for Ministry of
Defense and Service members. Initial attendance at the
workshop is around 30 people, a number that reflects genuine
interest within the Ministry and Services.



5. (C) At a November biweekly meeting, while reviewing
upcoming IMET courses with members of the MOD and Services,
it was revealed that one Army course had been cancelled, and
that three other Army slots were at risk, for lack of
nominees. Expressing profound dissatisfaction, the Army
representative demanded to know why MOD was sending Army
nomination letters to the office of the Chief of Defense
Staff, rather than to the Army. (COMMENT: Normally, proper
procedure dictates that a written letter is delivered to the
Army Staff from the Joint Services Department (JSD) through
the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), and the reply to ODC must
go through the CDS and DIA. If this procedure is not
followed, the Army will not take action for fear of the CDS's
wrath. Previously, these meetings could not occur, as the
Acting ODC Chief, like the DATT, was not allowed direct
contact with the Ministry or Services without DIA approval,
which often took weeks to receive. END COMMENT.)



6. (C) General dissatisfaction was expressed at the lack of
timely action by the Office of the CDS. After some hand
wringing over "proper procedure," the group decided that all
course offerings would be sent directly to the Service for
action, with an info copy to the CDS. In subsequent
meetings, this decision was reversed, but the spirit of
speeding the process by bypassing delays remained.
Additionally, the DATT has suggested to the Services that a
biweekly meeting be held at their level to discuss
Service-specific issues. Thus far, only the Air Force has
responded favorably.


===============================
OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF -
A BILATERAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE
===============================



7. (C) The positive change in the relationship is perhaps
most visibly exemplified by Operation Focus Relief (OFR).
Planning and executing Phase 1 of the program, which trained
and equipped two Nigerian battalions, were extremely labor
intensive and difficult. While the units themselves,
grudgingly at first, accepted the training and benefited
tremendously, the civilian GON had a difficult time driving
the program forward. Although approved by the President
himself, and supported (with varying degrees of enthusiasm)
by Minister of Defense Danjuma, National Security Advisor
Aliyu Mohammed and Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Ibrahim
Ogohi, the Army hierarchy, controlled by (then) Chief of Army
Staff, Lieutenant General S. Victor Malu, did everything
possible to block successful execution. Pressure was placed
on brigade and battalion commanders by the Army Chief to
cause delays in the program. In fact, the relationship
during Phase 1 was so difficult that Nigeria was not included
in Phase 2. A high-level meeting between senior USG and GON
Officials in April 2001 was required to settle numerous
issues raised by the Chief of Army Staff in his effort to
derail engagement.



8. (C) However, after each Service got its own Minister of
State (Deputy Minister) in February and the retirement of the
three Service Chiefs in June 2001, cooperation between the
Embassy and GON on defense-related programs improved
tremendously. Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi
acted like a weathervane. Ogohi, who had been reasonably
supportive of engagement when not in Malu's presence but
whose support went south when Malu was around, became a
strong supporter with the appointment of the new Deputy
Ministers and Service Chiefs. Execution of Phase 3 became a
cooperative venture between the GON, Nigerian military and
USG. The new Chief of Army Staff, LTG Alexander Ogomudia,
warmly welcomed the 3SFG 3 Battalion Commander during his
initial visit, approved the Program of Instruction (POI),
addressed concerns of his staff, and even suggested a joint
U.S.-Nigerian Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
visit to the Phase 1 troops in Sierra Leone. After stating
he had not approved participation of one of the three
battalions selected for Phase 3, he immediately reversed
course and approved their inclusion when he learned that camp
construction had already begun. Public Affairs coordination
between the Embassy and the Defense Headquarters bloomed soon
after Minister Danjuma's assent to a public affairs workshop
that exposed the senior Public Relations Officers of the
Nigerian Services to conventional military public affairs
doctrine.



9. (C) Throughout OFR Phase 3, the GON and Nigerian Army were
supportive and flexible. In response to September 11, the
Army increased force protection to the U.S. trainers. The
Air Force provided space for a logistics and administrative
Forward Operating Base (FOB) and was responsive and
supportive of medical evacuation contingencies. The Army
opened its doors to the DATT in ways not seen in Nigeria for
at least a decade.


==========================
COMMENT: A WHOLE NEW WORLD
==========================



10. (C) COMMENT: While these changes perhaps appear small
from an outside perspective, they are significant for defense
cooperation in Nigeria. For almost two years, all
correspondence had to go through Nigerian DIA. This blockage
was removed by Army Minister Batagarawa (reftel). When the
office of the CDS was not acting in a timely fashion on IMET
courses, mid-ranking officers and MOD staff sought to
circumvent the blockage. For mid-ranking officers to bargain
for slots and usurp the province of the CDS is unheard of in
this "big man" culture. The biggest stakeholders in this
process, the Services, now appear to be taking a stand, to
the benefit of the IMET program.



11. (C) COMMENT CONT: Many problems, such as the MOD's
inability to complete the OFR MOI (until very near the end of
OFR Phase 3) or pay the remaining FY01 MPRI amount in a
timely manner, remain and are visible reminders of the need
for further significant reform. However, there is a
beneficial aspect to security assistance and programs like
OFR that should not be overlooked. Years of military rule,
ironically, caused the Ministry and Services to atrophy. By
pushing U.S. defense cooperation programs through the
Nigerian bureaucratic process, the pipes are being cleared of
blockages. Moreover, the MOD and the Services are starting
to see and respond to the benefits of U.S. assistance. Graft
is difficult with U.S. programs. This was a disincentive to
those who might have supported engagement with the U.S.
However, the qualitative improvement in capabilities (as seen
with OFR) appears to have convinced many in the MOD and
Services to reassess the costs and benefits of engagement.
They appear to have come to the conclusion that, even with
the loss of graft, engagement with the United States is
worthwhile.



12. (C) DAO COMMENT: Despite the new era of cooperation, the
security assistance program, the largest in sub-Saharan
Africa, is behind schedule. This is due to the earlier
problems and lack of access and information exchange.
Basically, the FMF program is one year behind schedule.
However, since the majority of these assistance cases have
been designed by the DATT to be "roll-over" year-to-year
cases, the LOAs can be extended rather than regenerated.
Such cases include: C-130 technical assistance, spare parts,
safety and other publications and training; U.S. Coast Guard
Balsam-Class Buoy Tenders exchange; MPRI; and the combat
simulation center. Given the improving relationship, it
would be unfortunate and counter-productive if the Nigeria
FMF budget were redirected. END DAO COMMENT.
Jeter