NIGERIA: A SLIDE IN THE BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 001597

SIPDIS


KAMPALA FOR AID - DAWN LIBERI; RIYADH FOR POL - R. HANKS


E.O.12958: DECL: 5/23/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN EAID NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A SLIDE IN THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5
(B) AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: The return of democratic government in
Nigeria brought relief and great expectations in both
Abuja and Washington. Visions of a strategic
partnership between the world's preeminent republic
and Africa's largest democracy tantalized policymakers
in both capitals. Committing to significant diplomatic
support, two successive Administrations in Washington
labeled Nigeria one of the continent's two most
important countries. In addition to rebuffing military
rule, Abuja pledged allegiance to economic reform,
promised to create conditions to attract American
investment and committed itself to vigorous
cooperation on transnational issues such as drug-
trafficking and financial crime. Both nations agreed
to collaborate in promoting regional stability and
helping to resolve Africa's conflicts. However, after
three years, the euphoria of 1999 has worn off, with
an unvarnished realism taking its place. While the
overall relationship is still very good, differences
in perception, substance and developments extraneous
to the bilateral relationship have created frictions
not there before.



2. (C) Summary Continued: Dissatisfied with the pace
and scope of reform here, Washington seems to see
Nigeria as a strong regional actor but a weak domestic
player with a government reticent or unable to face
responsibility for problems such as communal violence
that are not easily resolved yet cannot be ignored.
Nigeria believes the USG expects too much, too fast
and does not provide the types of assistance that
would accelerate reform and help rescue Nigeria from
its current morass. As Nigeria moves into electoral
gear, bilateral strains will increase. To quiet
criticism that he has reaped little from courting the
US, Obasanjo pines for high visibility USG assistance,
e.g. debt relief. Conversely, Washington has little,
if any, appetite for special debt treatment for
Nigeria. Yet, Nigeria is too important to let the
relationship slide. We need to engage the Nigerians
even more actively on key bilateral issues to develop
more realistic expectations on both sides and improve
mutual understanding by broadening the channels of
communication. While the relationship probably could
not and should not return to what it was in 1999,
active policy dialogue can place the relationship on a
sustainable, pragmatic keel that recognizes common
interests as well as manages the differences that may
divide us. We should engage the British in this
effort. End summary.


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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US
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3. (C) Well-wishers on both sides of the Atlantic
hoped the inauguration of the Obasanjo Government also
ushered in an era of good feeling in the bilateral
relationship. Neither government was immune to this
optimistic view. Up from the nadir of the Abacha days,
Nigeria was a country of great potential, promise,
resources and a highly energetic and gifted
population. No longer bridled by military rule,
Nigeria could now gallop toward political and, more
importantly, economic reform, Washington hoped.
Through the provision of technical assistance we would
help them see the "way" and thus effectuate reforms we
wanted them to make. The subtext of this assumption
was that the advent of democracy would quickly make
the Nigerians begin to think and behave like us.



4. (C) Nigerians had a different view. They saw the
return of democracy as the political equivalent of
sprinkling holy water on the Government of Nigeria.
Because of their size and rich and expanding resource
base (oil and gas),they felt that diplomatically
Nigeria should be among the upper echelon of nations,
a nation that deserved a "special relationship" with
the United States. Yet, because of their developmental
challenges, Nigeria wanted to be the recipient of
massive doses of tangible assistance. Partly due to a
prickly national pride, Nigerians believed this
assistance should be given with few conditions and
minimal oversight. Psychologically, they were self-
important to the extent of believing that we needed to
give them assistance more than they needed to receive
it.



5. (C) We believed the relationship might become
special if Nigeria achieved significant reforms.
Nigeria, on the other hand, believed the relationship
should be inherently special because of its own of
Nigeria's place in the world and the region, reform or
lack thereof notwithstanding. These different outlooks
and mutual misperceptions initially were concealed by
the celebration that accompanied the return of
democracy. Over time, however, these differences have
become more visible as celebration yielded to the
limitations, constraints and frictions of the daily
workings of the bilateral relationship.



6. (C) We discovered that reform would be slow
everywhere, and glacial in some areas. This languor
confirmed that many high-level GON officials were not
truly committed to reform nor were they governing
according to our democratic precepts. But how could
they? Many senior GON officials have spent nearly 30
years in government service but only seven of those
years under civilian rule; meaning, they have spent
nearly a quarter century working and, indeed,
prospering under different military governments.
Almost half of all Nigerians never experienced
democracy before 1999. All Nigerians are more familiar
with the obtuse workings of military rule than the
openness of democratic governance. Some key political
operatives in the Obasanjo Government were one-time
apologists for military rule. A single round of
elections was insufficient to change deeply ingrained
behavior that had been positively reinforced by
acquisition of wealth and power on the part of these
officials over the years.



7. (C) Nigerians did not get the type of assistance
they desired or expected. While we moved to provide
technical and advisory assistance aimed at
institutional and policy reform, the Nigerians wanted
tangible "stuff" -- money, equipment and goods and
services -- not advice and feasibility studies.
Realizing they were not getting what they wanted,
those Nigerians who hoped for a "special relationship"
became disillusioned. This sentiment provided
ammunition to those who sought a correct but not close
bilateral relationship. For a variety of reasons
ranging from the enmity generated during the years of
military rule to different cultural and global
perspectives, a vocal, at times, very influential
minority sought to keep us at arm's length. This group
internalized our disputes with the former military
regimes, misconstruing them as signs of inherent USG
antipathy toward their country. These hard-liners
wrongly sense ulterior motives in whatever we do. They
were reactionary and distrustful -- some just did not
like us. With the visible exception of General Victor
Malu's public opposition to Operation Focus Relief,
these die-hards basically receded into the background
after Obasanjo's inauguration. However, the more other
Nigerians voiced frustration at the perceived lack of
tangible aid from the USG, the more the USG-bashers
gloated -- "We told you so."


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TIME TO TAKE STOCK
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8. (C) This has fed into a stream of thought that the
USG is not forthcoming with aid because it sees
Nigeria as marginal to its interests and therefore is
indifferent to Nigeria's plight. In public and private
statements about NEPAD, Zimbabwe and debt relief,
Obasanjo discharged several anti-Western shots that he
would not have sounded before. During a May 18 meeting
with Ambassador Jeter, a plaintive Obasanjo remarked
the U.S. "would not be my friend for long" unless it
does something about debt relief. Recently, the
British Deputy High Commission recounted a protracted
anti-American diatribe he had heard from a highly
placed official in the Presidency. These anti-American
outbursts are disconcerting; however, we also imagine
this scenario has probably been mirrored in Washington
with an USG official excoriating Nigeria to fellow USG
officials or diplomats of a friendly country.
Statements like these, even though not introduced into
the public domain, foul the air in the absence of
concrete measures and alternatives to tackle the
issues underlying the criticisms.



9. (C) Gleaned from recent conversations with GON
officials and other reliable contacts, here are some
observations and thoughts about the bilateral
relationship from the Nigerian perspective:


-- Overall, Nigerians believe the relationship is
beginning to slide and the USG is increasingly
indifferent. "The U.S. does not really care what
happens here," a Presidential insider told a visiting
American recently.


-- Debt Relief: This is the centerpiece of GON foreign
policy toward the US and other Western donors, so much
so that Obasanjo put enormous amounts of his time and
prestige on the line. However, Obasanjo has not been
able to deliver and is frustrated that Washington does
not seem to attach political importance to the issue.
Nigerians think Washington has treated debt relief
bureaucratically -- a "technical issue" -- not the
major issue it is for Obasanjo and his Administration.
If the Paris Club declares Nigeria in default at its
June meeting, the malaise felt here will only deepen.


-- Obasanjo was incensed when the debt/environment
swap fell through. First, it was a policy setback.
Second, he trumpeted our proposal when he returned
home from Washington only to hear subsequently through
public channels that the deal had fallen through. "
You did not even have the courtesy to tell me," he
lamented. For Obasanjo, this was a significant loss of
face that mocked his reliance on and belief in the
United States.


--Zimbabwe: This has been highly emotional. Most
Nigerians, in and out of government, see land
redistribution as the real basis of the UK's
opposition to Mugabe. Believing the UK was upset
because most affected farmers were white, the
Nigerians viewed UK policy as racially motivated and
biased. They thought the UK raised the red flag on
elections not so much out of concern for democracy but
to indirectly thwart GOZ land redistribution to
previously dispossessed blacks. The GON also felt the
USG was too closely aligned with the perceived UK
attempt to scuttle land ownership by blacks in
Zimbabwe.


-- Obasanjo bristled at our linkage of support for
NEPAD to Zimbabwe. He felt we condescendingly tried to
give him instructions about the mandate of an
organization he helped to create through consensus
with other African leaders.


-- The GON sees us as a tireless "demandeur"; we are
constantly presenting demarches and raising issues
when we want something from them. The UNHRC CUBA
resolution is a recent case-in-point. After we had
presented a series of demarches and requests on
several different topics over the course of a few
weeks, a senior Presidential Advisor half-jokingly
began a meeting with the Ambassador stating, "What do
you want now?"


--Military Assistance: Overall, OFR has been
successful but the failure to carry out OFR-II was a
disappointment. While Obasanjo still supports MPRI,
even he is becoming disillusioned to a degree. Many
senior military officers resent the program for
attempting to reshape their military institution and
its culture without providing concrete assistance in
the form of equipment or weapons. Some dislike the
program because contract funds were not being used to
pay Nigerians but U.S. contractors. Some see the
program as condescending and a spike at Nigeria's
national honor. We have even heard complaints about
Avid Recovery because funding for the RONCO contract
was not passed through Nigerian hands.


-- The GON believes it has made achievements on
privatization and anti-corruption but feels we have
underestimated the economic and political constraints
it faces.



10. (C) Some things the GON sees as commendable, we
see as demerits or flaws. This is particularly true on
corruption and economic reform, including
privatization. Despite what the GON professes, there
have been no major breakthroughs and Nigeria could have
and should have done more on these and other fronts.
Additionally, the way business is conducted in Nigeria
has not changed much with the Obasanjo Administration.
It still disadvantages U.S. firms trying to enter the
Nigerian market or obtain government contracts.
Repeated losses to European, Japanese and Chinese
concerns on commercial advocacy compound the
impression that the door is not open to American
business and that the distance between our two nations
is growing. Now, elections are imminent and the rigors
that occasion them promise to place added strain on
the bilateral relationship. In his quest to show the
public he can deliver, Obasanjo will more actively
cadge us for debt relief. Due to his own weaknesses
with the electorate, Obasanjo may face a formidable
challenge. The stiffer the competition, the more he
will be occupied with protecting his political flank.
He will be less inclined toward reform or responding
to our requests for GON alignment with us on important
issues in multilateral fora. Obasanjo knows that many
positions he has staked out, e.g. supporting USG
action in Afghanistan, are not popular in the far
North, the region where opposition to his reelection
is perhaps the strongest. Consequently, electoral
considerations also may compel him to distance himself
from us.


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CONCLUSION, COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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11. (C) Nigeria is too important to let the
relationship slide. Because it involves so many
important issues and due to our cultural and historic
differences, the relationship will not always be
easily managed. Yet, it can be an effective
partnership that advances USG interests in Africa and
beyond. To do this, we need to broaden and formalize
bilateral dialogue on the most significant issues.
This will help identify areas of commonality and
minimize differences. It will foster better
understanding while diminishing misperceptions.
Greater senior-level engagement from Washington would
help. Concrete steps that can be taken are:


-- A visit by A/S Kansteiner in September to meet
President Obasanjo and other key political players.


-- After the Kansteiner visit, we should meet
discreetly in London with the British and perhaps the
Canadians to discuss Nigeria. We envision two
meetings: the first a "political meeting" at the A/S
level to discuss our collective and individual
interests in Nigeria; the second, a heads of
assistance agencies (USAID and its equivalents)
session to discuss and coordinate assistance to
Nigeria, particularly for elections and poverty
alleviation. Measures that we are prepared to take in
the immediate post-elections period to help
consolidate democracy also should be examined. How
these meetings might be shaped will be the subject of
a separate message; at a minimum our participation, in
addition to State and AID, should include Treasury,
NSC and representatives from the Embassy. We
understand the British would endorse the proposed
meetings. Still to be decided is whether Canada would
or should participate.


-- The "post-JEPC" mechanism needs to be initiated.
This has been stalled for months; however, it
represents a solid opportunity to link discussion on
economic reform with cooperation on developing
concrete trade and investment initiatives. Wedding our
push for reform with the Nigerians' desire for
concrete results, this mechanism could provide a
practical demonstration of the benefits of close
cooperation and reform. The more Nigerians see a
tangible outcome, the more readily they will listen to
our mantra of reform.


-- High-level discussion on debt relief is needed.
President Obasanjo plans to visit Washington in mid-
June for the Sullivan Memorial Dinner and will
participate at the G-8. We should be prepared to
respond to his expected entreaties on debt relief
beyond stating that this is a Paris Club issue. We
need to provide a blueprint that could lead to an
eventual package of debt relief. Moreover, we need to
listen to him and show a willingness to be flexible
and creative while also linking debt relief to genuine
reform at home.


-- We need to have a formal consultation with the GON
to broadly discuss foreign policy interests. What are
the fundamental interests and issues for the United
States and how do these compare with those of Nigeria?
Most importantly, how do we reconcile differences
between the two in order to prevent damage to the
bilateral relationship? This should take place after
the London consultations mentioned above.



12. (C) Post appreciates Washington's quick response
to the proposals stated in paragraph 11.
JETER