NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR RIMI IS COMING TO TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001485 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR RIMI IS COMING TO TOWN REF: A. ABUJA 852 ¶B. ABUJA 882 ¶C. ABUJA 1068 ¶D. ABUJA 1159 CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a May 3 meeting with Ambassador Jeter, PDP maverick and long-shot Presidential aspirant Mohammed Abubakar Rimi claimed he had heard a rumor that the Embassy was warning American visitors not to see him because of his alleged ties to terrorism. After the Ambassador dismissed this misperception, the loquacious Presidential-hopeful got off on another wrong track by requesting USG blessing of his Presidential aspirations. The Ambassador told Rimi that we were not in the business of endorsing Presidential candidates in Nigeria, or elsewhere. However, we were concerned that the upcoming Presidential elections be as free, fair and non-violent as possible. Rimi plans to visit Washington, and asked for our help in setting up meetings with USG officials. Rimi's assistant Ujudud Shariff and PolMilOff sat in on the meeting. END SUMMARY. ============= NOT A BAD MAN ============= ¶2. (C) Rimi explained he wanted to see the Ambassador to counter a rumor that he, Rimi, had heard. According to Rimi, a source he would not name, had told him the Embassy was warning AmCits not to meet with him, allegedly because Rimi supported terrorism and Bin Laden. Countering these stories of his alleged anti-American leanings, Rimi stated strong support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and condemned the events of September 11. The Ambassador assured Rimi that at no time had the Embassy blacklisted him, nor did we have any basis to question his opposition to terrorism. ===================== FACING OFF AGAINST OO ===================== ¶3. (C) Rimi then turned to the 2003 Presidential election. Challenging Obasanjo for the PDP ticket, Rimi said that Obasanjo had done little for development in the North while projects in the South were numerous and moving forward. Despite the resources Obasanjo was investing in the South, Rimi predicted the President still could not claim much support in his own home region in the Southwest. According to Rimi, the Southwest believed Awolowo had won the election in 1979, but then military Head-of-State Obasanjo declared the North's Shehu Shagari the winner. Many Yoruba consider this an act of ethnic treason. Rimi also complained that Obasanjo had put Yorubas into most of the senior security services positions and the majority of Ministerial posts, an affront to Northerners who had overwhelmingly supported him in the 1999 election. Rimi caviled that the Director General of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and the Director General of the Federal Radio Commission of Nigeria (FRCN) had joined Obasanjo's campaign publicity team, giving Obasanjo an unfair media advantage over non-incumbents. (COMMENT: In an act of singular political ineptness that won Rimi support and sympathy he otherwise would never have, FRCN pulled Rimi's paid political announcements from the air earlier this year. END COMMENT.) ¶4. (C) When asked what he would do differently than Obasanjo if he were President, Rimi said that first of all, he would respect the constitution. He contended President Obasanjo had shown disregard for both the constitution and the National Assembly. Under a Rimi Presidency, consultation with the legislature would be the watchword. Moreover, Obasanjo had spent vast sums on the ID card project and the national stadium; in contrast, Rimi said that he would focus on agricultural and industrial development. (Rimi quoted N10b and N30b, approximately USD100m and USD300m respectively for the ID card and stadium. In reality, the full cost of stadium project is probably more than that.) When asked about privatization, Rimi, the Chairman of the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company, which is on the block to be privatized, dismissed the effort. "Most parastatals are profitable," he said, implying that that factor was sufficient reason for maintaining state control despite the inefficiencies and inability to deliver reliable and affordable services characteristic of most parastatals. (COMMENT: By any commercial yardstick, most parastatals are not profitable. END COMMENT.) ================ BLESSINGS SOUGHT ================ ¶5. (C) Rimi declared that he believed the U.S. would not interfere in the elections, but he also "knew" the U.S. supported Obasanjo in 1999. Ambassador Jeter corrected Rimi, making sure he did not leave the meeting still harboring this perception. The Ambassador unambiguously told him that the US strongly backed the democratic process, but did not endorse any particular candidate. In any case, Rimi replied that he "wished to come closer" to the USG, and planned to travel to Washington soon and wanted to meet with some of our officials. "I want Washington to know me," he stated. Rimi then asked if the Embassy could help arrange meetings in Washington for the first or second week of June with the State Department, the CIA, and the White House ("President Bush, if possible"). Ambassador Jeter replied that a meeting with the President was not in the cards, however; calls at State and the NSC might be possible. Jeter also suggested Rimi meet Nigerian-Americans while in the U.S. ======= COMMENT ======= ¶6. (C) Rimi came looking for both "a rumor disclaimer" and "an electoral nod." We could give the former but Rimi almost certainly knew that we could not and would not give the latter. This is not the first time Rimi has sought U.S. support; during Abacha's phony transition, Rimi asked for money to back his candidacy. This unfortunate habit shows his lack of understanding of the USG and his over-inflated sense of his political gravity. Articulate and capable of energizing a crowd, Rimi makes good copy and is a favorite of the press. However, he is little more than a political gadfly, known for his unguarded statements. Rimi's chances of upsetting President Obasanjo for the PDP nomination are slim. It is well known that Rimi is angry both about not being given the Foreign Ministry and about not getting lucrative contracts in return for his support to Obasanjo in ¶1999. Although his candidacy has little chance of gaining traction outside of the Kano area, Rimi has become a symbol of strong opposition to Obasanjo in the North. Rimi's continued public sniping at the President will make it difficult for Obasanjo to make inroads in this very key region. JETER