ROLE OF VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARIAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 001308

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, INR/EAP
NSC FOR EAST ASIAN DIRECTORATE
SECDEF ALSO FOR ISA/EA/LSTERN
CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/11
TAGS: PGOV VM DPOL
SUBJECT: ROLE OF VIETNAM'S COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARIAT


(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DENNIS G. HARTER. REASONS 1.5
(B) & (D)


1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A LEADING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH LONG EXPERIENCE IN PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE STAFF WORK, THE NEW PARTY
SECRETARIAT IS IN FACT A DECISION-MAKING BODY WHICH

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WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY. IT DOES NOT
SIMPLY PROVIDE POLICY STUDIES AND PAPERS FOR BROADER
REVIEW BY THE POLITBURO. THE POLITBURO ITSELF IS
APPARENTLY MORE A SYMBOLIC INSTITUTION REPRESENTING
CONSTITUENCIES WITH TOO INFREQUENT A MEETING SCHEDULE
FOR IT TO BE AN EFFECTIVE DETERMINANT OF DAY-TO-DAY
ACTIONS FOR THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. THIS SAME SOURCE,
WHILE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE ROLE PARTY GENERAL
SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH WILL PLAY IN DIRECTING THE

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PARTY, BELIEVES MANH HAS NOT YET BEEN TESTED AS A
LEADER CAPABLE OF BRIDGING THE DIFFERING VIEWS OF
VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE PARTY. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DURING THE COURSE OF A SEPARATE DISCUSSION ON
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH NGUYEN THU DO, SENIOR EXPERT
ON AMERICAS ISSUES IN THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT,
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DCM ASKED DO.ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
SECRETARIAT WHICH WAS RE-ESTABLISHED AT THE NINTH

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PARTY CONGRESS. HE ASKED IF THIS BODY HAD ANY
"POLICY" ROLES OR WHETHER IT WAS MERELY AN EXECUTIVE
BODY ASSEMBLING AND COORDINATING PAPERS TASKED BY OR
FOR THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.


3. (C) DO BEGAN HIS REMARKS BY INDICATING HE
PREVIOUSLY HAD WORKED FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AS A
STAFF EXPERT FOR ABOUT A DECADE AND SAID THE PARTY
STRUCTURE HAD BEEN EVOLVING OVER THE YEARS,
PARTICULARLY SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES. DURING
THE EARLIER PERIOD, THE SECRETARIAT HAD
RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO COORDINATING ACTIVITIES
WITH OTHER COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. THERE WAS A
REGULAR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, PLANNING OF
COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES, AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY-TO-
PARTY RELATIONS. INSIDE VIETNAM AT THAT TIME, PARTY
POLICIES WERE PARAMOUNT AND THE GOVERNMENT WAS SIMPLY
AN EXECUTIVE ARM FOR THE PARTY WITH VIRTUALLY NO
AUTHORITY OF ITS OWN. HE NOTED THAT THE LATE PM PHAM
VAN DONG HAD SAID HE WAS THE LONGEST SERVING PRIME
MINISTER IN THE REGION, BUT HE HAD LESS POWER THAN
ANYBODY ELSE BECAUSE OF THE LIMITED ABILITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT TO ACT WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY.


4. (C) WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTHER COMMUNIST
REGIMES, THE SECRETARIAT BECAME MUCH MORE OF A
COORDINATING ARM OF THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL
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COMMITTEE. IT DID, HOWEVER, GRADUALLY ASSUME A POWER
ROLE LINKED TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY. IT BECAME LESS
AND LESS RESPONSIVE TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO.


5. (C) BECAUSE IT WAS ISOLATED FROM THE COMMITTEE
AND HAD BECOME A POWER BASE IN ITS OWN RIGHT, THERE
WAS INCREASING CRITICISM OF THIS BODY FROM OTHER
ELEMENTS OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND FROM WITHIN THE
GOVERNMENT. (DO REFERRED TO THE PREVIOUS SECRETARIAT
AS A BUNCH OF OLD MEN FOCUSED ON THE PAST AND TIED TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY.) DOI MOI REFORMS IN THE LATE
1980'S HAD GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT MORE RESPONSIBILITY,
AND THERE WAS MORE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF MINISTRIES
AND EVEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE IDEA TO CREATE A
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITBURO AT THE PREVIOUS
CONGRESS IN 1996 WAS THE RESULT OF DISSATISFACTION
WITH THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT AND A BELIEF THAT
THERE NEEDED TO BE A BROADER, MORE INDEPENDENT BODY
OPERATING AT THE TOP.


6. (C) THE SET-UP OF THE FIVE-PERSON STANDING
COMMITTEE WITH LE KHA PHIEU AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
1997 DID NOT BRING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM EITHER. THE COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP, PARTY
GENERAL SECRETARY, PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN, AND DIRECTOR OF THE FATHERLAND
FRONT WHICH OVERSEES OFFICIAL MASS ORGANIZATIONS,
ITSELF BECAME TOO ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IT WAS EMPOWERED TO ACT IN THE
ABSENCE OF THE POLITBURO BEING CONVENED BUT IT LACKED
A STRONG CONSENSUS OF ITS OWN. IT HAD POWER, HE SAID,
BUT IT RARELY SEEMED TO USE THAT POWER EFFECTIVELY.
THIS IN PART, HE ARGUED, RESULTED IN VERY LIMITED
CREATIVITY IN DECISION-MAKING DURING THE LE KHA PHIEU
ERA.


7. (C) DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE NINTH PARTY
CONGRESS, DO SAID, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF DEBATE
ABOUT RECREATING THE SECRETARIAT AND DISCUSSION ABOUT
ITS ASSUMPTION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE TOP PARTY
CIRCLES. DCM ASKED IF THE NEWLY RE-CREATED
SECRETARIAT THEN WAS SLATED TO BECOME A STAFF UNIT

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PREPARING MATERIALS FOR THE GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF
THE POLITBURO AT LARGE, THEREBY TRANSFERRING THE
DECISION-MAKING ROLE OF THE FIVE-MEMBER STANDING
COMMITTEE TO THE LARGER GROUP FOR ACTION. DO SAID
THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AT ALL. THE POLITBURO, HE
ASSERTED, IS JUST "A BUNCH OF HATS." THEY REPRESENT
"CONSTITUENCIES" WITHIN VIETNAM. "THE INDIVIDUALS
HAVE STATUS AND PRESTIGE, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE
CHIEF POWER," HE SAID. "THEY MEET AT BEST ONCE A
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WEEK, MORE LIKELY ONLY ONCE A MONTH OR SO." REAL
"DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY" IS IN FACT VESTED "IN THE
SECRETARIAT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY" WITHIN THE

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BROADLY ESTABLISHED PARTY GUIDELINES SET DOWN BY THE
POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. "THIS IS WHY,"
HE SAID, "VU KHOAN'S ROLE (AS HEAD OF THE SECRETARIAT)
IS SO IMPORTANT TODAY." SECRETARIAT MEMBERSHIP IS
ALSO REFLECTIVE OF CONSTITUENCIES, BUT THE GENERALLY
YOUNGER FIGURES OCCUPYING THOSE POSITIONS MEANS A MUCH
MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO POLICY WILL BE POSSIBLE IN
THE FUTURE. (COMMENT: DO PROBABLY IS REFLECTING HERE
MORE THE HOPE OF WHAT THE SECRETARIAT MIGHT BECOME,
BECAUSE OF ITS COMPOSITION, THAN THE ACTUAL POWER ROLE
IT HAS CURRENTLY ASSUMED. END COMMENT)


8. (C) DCM ASKED DO IF HE SENSED THERE HAD ALREADY
BEEN SIGNS OF CHANGE IN THIS RESPECT SINCE THE NEW
GROUP HAD ASSUMED POWER. DO SAID HE FELT THE SIGNS
WERE OPTIMISTIC AND HE HAD "GOOD FEELINGS" ABOUT THE
LEADERSHIP OF NONG DUC MANH. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION
OF THE ROLE OF MANH IN LEADING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
TO BE A MORE ASSERTIVE BODY IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, DO CONCLUDED THAT MANH WAS
CLEARLY A "GOOD LISTENER." HE IS "OPEN TO A WIDE
RANGE OF IDEAS," HE SAID, "BUT WE HAVE YET TO SEE
ENOUGH OF HIM AS A DECISION-MAKER TO BE ABLE TO DECIDE
HOW WELL HE WILL DO." WHEN HE WAS RUNNING THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THERE WERE NOT A LOT OF TRULY BIG
ISSUES THAT HAD TO BE RESOLVED. "THERE ARE STILL A
LOT OF GROUPS AND CONSTITUENCIES WHICH MUST BE HEARD
AND THEIR VIEWS BALANCED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP THEM
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ALL PART OF THE CONSENSUS ON PARTY POLICIES." DO
IMPLIED THIS WOULD NOT BE AN EASY TASK AND, WHILE HE
IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT MANH'S ABILITIES, HE REMAINS
UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW WELL MANH WILL BE ABLE TO PULL THE
VARIOUS ELEMENTS TOGETHER.

PETERSON