Agreement on Strengthened Cease-fire in Sierra

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000959

SIPDIS


E.O. 12598: 5/3/11
TAGS: PREL PINS NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: Agreement on Strengthened Cease-fire in Sierra
Leone

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER, REASONS 1.5(B/D)



1. (SBU) Summary. On May 2 the ECOWAS Committee of Six,
the UN, and the Sierra Leone Government reached a
reaffirmation of the November 10, 2000 cease-fire agreement
in Sierra Leone with RUF representatives lead by Omrie
Golley. According to sources at ECOWAS, The RUF committed
itself to the dismantling of road blocks, a pull back from
tense areas of the border with Guinea in the Kambia area,
and the hand over of seized weapons, all by the end of May.
The Committee of Six and the GOSL agreed to allow the RUF
to conduct a regional fund-raising tour for political party
organization, subject to "cooperative behavior" and the
lifting of the UN travel ban. The parties also re-
committed themselves to the DDR process. End summary.



2. (U) The ECOWAS Committee of Six (Ghana, Nigeria,
Liberia, Mali, Togo, Guinea not present) together with
representatives of the GOSL, the UN, and the ECOWAS
secretariat, met with representatives of the RUF on May 2

SIPDIS
in Abuja. After an approximately eight-hour session at the
ECOWAS Secretariat, the parties agreed upon several
concrete provisions to strengthen the November 10, 2000
cease-fire. The RUF agreed to the dismantling of
roadblocks, a RUF pull back from tense border areas near
Kambia, and a hand-over of seized weapons stocks, all by
the end of May. The parties recommitted themselves to the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
program. Troops pulled back from the Kambia area were to
enter DDR camps. An overall timetable for this would be
determined at a meeting between the RUF and the GOSL in
Freetown on May 15. An "internal memorandum" has been
signed in accordance with the agreements reached on May 2,
but will not be distributed to the public. ECOWAS
personnel would not release this document to us or to other
diplomatic personnel, but were willing to discuss its
provisions, as noted above.



3. (C) The negotiations at ECOWAS by all accounts occurred
in a "cordial" and productive atmosphere. The RUF
representatives, according to Colonel Dixon Dikio, ECOWAS
military advisor, were "surprisingly conciliatory."
Henrietta Didigu, staff attorney in the Office of the Legal
Advisor at ECOWAS, who helped draft the new agreement,
termed the RUF behavior a recognition that the May 2 ECOWAS
talks were "the only game in town." ECOWAS Director of
Information Adrienne Diop noted that, "The RUF realizes the
war could go on forever and they are tired of it; that
makes them more reasonable." Even the GOSL delegation
expressed satisfaction with the talks, appearing relaxed
and optimistic in the hallways of the ECOWAS secretariat at
the end of the long evening.



4. (SBU) The RUF did raise some issues not strictly linked
to the November 10, 2000 cease-fire agreement, including
release of RUF prisoners, the presence of "foreign troops"
on Sierra Leone soil (a reference to British training
assistance to the GOSL armed forces) and their need to
transform themselves into an active political party. The
Committee of Six and the GOSL reportedly agreed to a
regional fund-raising trip by the RUF to fund political
party organization, this contingent on RUF "cooperative
behavior." The GOSL would issue a public call for the
lifting of the UN travel ban, should such "cooperative
behavior" result, and work to remove "legal impediments" to
the RUF registering as a political party.



5. (SBU) The cooperative atmosphere at the May 2 talks
mirrored May 1 meetings convened by ECOWAS to prepare for
the RUF sessions, in which the Committee of Six, the GOSL,
the UN and ECOWAS staff participated. Well aware that the
RUF had not been in compliance with many provisions of the
cease-fire, the parties sought ways to encourage RUF
compliance and establish concrete time-frames, rather than
simply document violations and accord responsibility.
However, the unwillingness of ECOWAS to release the agreed-
upon text signed late on the evening of May 2 may signal
some sensitivity concerning lack of compliance with the
original cease-fire agreement, or perhaps the existence of
other agreement elements not disclosed by ECOWAS personnel
in conversations with us.



6. (C) Comment. The cease-fire in Sierra Leone does
appear to be the only game in town. Now we shall see if
the rules of the game, as reconfigured by the original
signatories to the November 10, 2000 agreement, will be
obeyed by the RUF. They have gained some further measure
of recognition of their status as a negotiating partner of
the GOSL, as sanctioned by ECOWAS and the UN in Abuja this
week. Whether the RUF can seize this latest opportunity to
act as a real partner in securing the cease-fire, and move
beyond it to constructing a lasting peace in Sierra Leone,
should be revealed in the next few weeks. Guinea's
apparent absence was unfortunate but need not necessarily
diminish significantly the week's accomplishments. End
comment.



7. (C) In a May 3 meeting, NSA Aliyu Mohammed told
Ambassador Jeter that President Obasanjo had had breakfast
with RUF members and GOSL Ministers that morning. The NSA
added that the group would be returning to Freetown on May
4, all on the same plane. According to Mohammed, the RUF
and GOSL Ministers had said that President Obasanjo "had a
mandate" to mediate the conflict in Sierra Leone, that
three-quarters of the conflict was solved, and that all
that remained to be done was to demobilize and reintegrate
combatants.
JETER