ECOWAS: KOUYATE TOUR D'HORIZON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003219

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RA
EUCOM FOR DCINC AND POLAD LADESMA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2011
TAGS: PREL MASS NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: ECOWAS: KOUYATE TOUR D'HORIZON

REF: A. STATE 210672

B. FREETOWN 1559

C. FREETOWN 1568

D. ABUJA 3207


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 7 meeting with Ambassador
Jeter, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate provided a
tour d'horizon of sub-regional issues, including Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and the upcoming ECOWAS Summit. While noting
recent hiccups on disarmament, Kouyate was optimistic about
Sierra Leone. He was less sanguine about reconciliation in
Liberia. He expressed strong concern about Guinea-Bissau's
President Yala, and hoped to convene a mini-Summit on
Guinea-Bissau on the margins of the ECOWAS Summit in Dakar.
Kouyate stated that his initial concern about Wade's
ascension to the ECOWAS Chair had been allayed. Other major
issues on the Summit agenda include terrorism, human
trafficking, and sub-regional harmonization. His remarks on
his own future are reported septel (Ref D). END SUMMARY.


============
SIERRA LEONE
============



2. (C) Kouyate expressed some concern about reports of
recalcitrance in carrying out disarmament in the diamond
producing areas; he ventured that the foot-dragging was born
of uncertainty. If the RUF disarms, they have an uncertain
future. Electoral prospects are nil because the RUF is
singularly unpopular. Kouyate was unsure if the recent
hesitance was a major tear in the disarmament process or a
last-gasp attempt to wrench more assistance from the
international community before disarming (see also Ref B and
C). Unsure of the magnitude of the foot-dragging, Kouyate
planned to speak with President Kabbah and SRSG Adeniji. He
also noted some concern that, because of the intensified
fighting in Lofa County, Taylor might press the RUF to slow
down the DDR process.



3. (C) SPECIAL COURT: The temporal jurisdiction of the Court
had been discussed during his recent visit to New York, but
without resolution. Kouyate was unconcerned about the delay,
believing it serendipitous. He asserted that the disarmament
process should be completed before the Court starts its work.
Otherwise, the prospect of looming criminal prosecution
would cause many RUF combatants to balk at disarmament.
(COMMENT: Kouyate did not seem to be aware of the recent
decision by the GOSL, bringing closure to this issue. END
COMMENT).



4. (C) RUF LEADERSHIP: The RUF appeared to be fragmenting as
the peace process moved forward. According to Kouyate, this
fragmentation was in some ways a good sign, although it
complicated dialogue with the RUF. Issa Sessay, since he led
the largest group of fighters, was the most important person
in the hierarchy but seemed incapable of consolidating the
RUF. Omre Golley had resigned his role as the spokesman, but
this was only a game to garner funds and attention, Kouyate
said. As soon as money was dangled, Golley's ambition and
avarice would compel his return to the fold.



5. (C) RUF AND AL-QAIDA: Kouyate said ECOWAS simply did not
have the intelligence capabilities to investigate the
Washington Post article. Guinea's Conte called the report
true, but Conte's response was visceral and not likely based
on fact, Kouyate chuckled. The Post article probably would
be discussed at the Summit by Obasanjo, Kabbah, Konare and
Conte. Kouyate asked the USG to share information on this
issue with ECOWAS; without it, there was little ECOWAS could
do. He did note that if Ibrahim Bah were involved in illicit
transfers of diamonds, the center of the operation was
Ouagadougou.


======================================
LIBERIA - SANCTIONS AND RECONCILIATION
======================================



6. (C) Kouyate recalled a recent meeting where President
Taylor had agreed to participate in an all-Liberia Conference
outside of the country. The non-Liberia site was needed to
attract key Liberian political figures who had been charged
with treason by Taylor, including Ellen Sirleaf Johnson and
Alhaji Kromah, who were too uncomfortable to return home
despite the dismissal of the charges against them. Taylor
agreed to free more political prisoners before the conference
began. As a result, Kouyate had sent Taylor a missive
outlining a two-day conference. The first day would be among
opposition parties, and the second day would involve
everyone, including Taylor, Konare and Obasanjo. Only a few
days ago, Foreign Minister Monie Captan had called, saying
that Taylor, despite his earlier acquiescence, now furiously
objected to an all inclusive conference outside of Liberia
because it would give implicit recognition to those fighting
in Lofa County. Captan was embarrassed.



7. (C) Liberians were tired of suffering because of Taylor's
venal leadership. Kouyate added that fighting in Lofa County
was growing, with some of it not attributed to the LURD.
Clashes between the army and Taylor's Anti-Terrorism Unit
(ATU) had also intensified. The army was incensed about
having to fend for itself, and not being paid, while the ATU
was relatively flush with money and equipment.



8. (C) SANCTIONS: Kouyate stated that the Liberia sanctions
were having an effect. First, Taylor did not like anything
that diminished his self-perception before other Heads of
State. The psychological impact was telling. Second, the
Liberian dollar had precipitously declined against its U.S.
counterpart. Finally, the travel ban was having a
significant impact. Most states were enforcing the measure,
Kouyate said. Ghana was going a step further, even sending
back suspicious Liberians although their names were not on
the list.


=============
GUINEA-BISSAU
=============



9. (C) Kouyate expressed strong concern about the situation
in Guinea-Bissau. President Yala was becoming increasingly
erratic and irrational. Yala had arrested numerous perceived
opponents in what appeared to be a contrived coup threat.
President Konare had sent an envoy to restore some balance,
but the emissary was rebuffed by Yala. Wade and Obasanjo
were also concerned, and had offered to send envoys. Kouyate
had asked Obasanjo and Konare, who had planned a "drop in"
visit on Yala, to wait. He believed that a mini-Summit on
the margins of the ECOWAS Summit might provide a better forum
for a discussion, and appear less of a threat to Yala.
Kouayte underscored the need to calm Yala and harness
tensions in Guinea-Bissau -- lest the distemper spill into
Cassamance to everyone's chagrin.


=======================================
DAKAR SUMMIT DATES, TOPICS, AND OUTCOME
=======================================



10. (C) Kouyate explained the Summit schedule: the technical
level meetings would take place on December 15-16, followed
by the Ministerial on December 17. Heads of State would
assemble on December 20-21. In addition to sub-regional
security issues, the Summit would also address human
trafficking, further harmonization between ECOWAS and UEMOA,
and terrorism. Ambassador Jeter passed the Executive
Secretary a list showing the implementation status of the

SIPDIS
dozen major counter-terrorism conventions by all sub-regional
states. Kouyate reviewed the document carefully, noting that
it would be a useful basis for discussions on terrorism at
the Summit.


============================================= ====
THE NEXT CHAIRMAN - NO LONGER AN UNGUIDED MISSILE
============================================= ====



11. (C) Kouyate acknowledged that Wade would take the ECOWAS
Chair. Wade was selected despite initial apprehension by
some, including Kouyate himself. Kouyate was convinced that
Wade could do well for ECOWAS. Describing Wade as an
"unguided missile" at times, Kouyate explained that he had
recently met the Senegalese leader, who had not been
adequately informed of ECOWAS efforts towards regional
economic integration. After briefing him privately for two
hours, Kouyate was no longer concerned that Wade would
short-change ECOWAS in favor of the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UEMOA). According to Kouyate, Wade's
reluctance to fully embrace ECOWAS was understandable in
part. In ECOWAS, Senegal is not primus inter pares given the
presence of Nigeria and Ghana. In UEMOA, Senegal is the
heavyweight. "It is better to be the head of a cat than the
tail of a tiger," Kouyate quipped. As long as the ECOWAS
Secretariat maintained close contact with Wade, Kouyate said,

SIPDIS
he would do fine. In fact, Wade's leadership of ECOWAS may
be very timely. Wade is singularly positioned to provide the
leadership that bridges the gap between ECOWAS and UEMOA and
to eliminate redundancy between the two organizations.



12. (C) Kouyate showed Jeter a Note from the Russian Embassy
requesting accreditation to ECOWAS for Russia's Ambassador to
Nigeria, and sought Ambassador Jeter's reaction. Ambassador
Jeter thanked Kouyate, noting that the U.S. also hoped to
present its request for accreditation to ECOWAS in the very
near future.



13. (C) COMMENT: Kouyate was open and relaxed, clearly close
to the end of his very successful tenure as ECOWAS Executive
Secretary. As he heads off, Kouyate believes ECOWAS is

SIPDIS
stronger now than when it was handed to him. We agree.



14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Now that the Konare-Kouyate duo is
preparing its exit from the ECOWAS epicenter, it will be
imperative to engage Wade and the new Executive Secretary --
who will be selected at the Summit -- as early as possible.
The U.S. worked well with Konare and Kouyate and we got good
mileage from our efforts. We must now seek an even stronger
relationship with those who are taking charge. END COMMENT.
Jeter