NIGERIA: TRYING TIMES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 002938

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2011
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: TRYING TIMES


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d)



1. (C) Summary: Nigeria has entered a period of unease.
During the past several months, the country's political elite
has been more attentive to political intrigue than the
demands of responsible governance. As a result, civilian
government faces multiple challenges. Communal clashes have
engendered a general sense of insecurity and doubts about GON
competence. Proposed electoral reform has pitted state
governors against national lawmakers and could lead to a
constitutional showdown over election scheduling. In the
lead up to the PDP national convention, internecine guerilla
politics threatened to balkanize the ruling party. It took
last minute deal-making to produce an orderly convention that
has helped reduce the political heat; yet fissures remain in
the ruling party. On the economic front, with unemployment
and inflation high, people are looking hard to find their
promised democracy dividend. President Obasanjo's critics
cast these problems at his feet, claiming his heavy-handed
leadership style and
inattention to domestic matters have helped spark dry
tinder. Many Nigerians have voiced concern about the
sustainability of civilian government if the resulting
brushfires are not extinguished. It will take sustained
effort and political acumen to walk Nigeria out of its
current rough patch. Since returning from the U.S., President
Obasanjo has demonstrated more attention to internal security
in meetings with state governors and local leaders. End
summary.


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POLITICS WITHOUT PURPOSE
--------------



2. (C) As the end of 2001 draws near, Nigeria is
significantly more tense than it was a year ago. If forced to
render an honest appraisal, the country's political elite
would have to blame itself for this diminution of Nigeria's
political stock. Competition for position and influence in
local, state and federal governments and within the political
parties has been destabilizing. Electioneering, with an eye
toward the 2003 polls more than eighteen months away, began
months ago and consumes the full attention of most
politicians. With too many politicians jockeying for position
while trying to derail real and perceived opponents, the
electoral season has become perpetual and frenetic. The media
fuels the competition with a lively but indistinguishable mix
of factual and fictional reporting. Not a day passes without
front-page reports of the latest Machiavellian intrigue and
political deadlock. Relishing this partisan fare,
politicians and the media give scant substantive attention to
the issues of the day: p
ublic security, communal unrest and economic development to
improve the lives of the majority of Nigerians, who survive
on less than one dollar a day.





3. (C) Instead of travelling a new, higher road under
President Obasanjo's expected moral guidance, politics
continue to be driven by money, greed, personal connections
and the all consuming ascriptive considerations of ethnicity,
region and religion. Policy formulation and platforms on
issues have become orphaned in the process. Injected with
daily doses of this coarse politicking and perceiving no real
improvement in their lives, the public is increasingly
cynical and government is losing its relevance. The growing
perception is that democratization is becoming a misnomer --
that the political process is too top heavy and that
incumbents will hijack democratic processes for their own
benefit and that of their patrons and proteges.


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A GROWING SENSE OF INTERNAL INSECURITY
--------------



4. (C) While politicians fiddle, civil disturbances have
flared with devastating impact during the past several
months. An estimated three thousand are dead in the wake of
communal conflicts in Jos and Kano, as well as portions of
Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba and Benue states. In each instance,
the police have been overwhelmed and unable to quash the
unrest. The military was summoned to restore order or to
help the police to do so. By our count, the military
controls internal security or provides significant assistance
to the police in parts of 15 of Nigeria's 36 states (The
British High Commission's count is 18 states). The deterrent
presence of military units in Kaduna may have prevented
violence in the state capital when Shari'a criminal law was
formally introduced November 2. That Kaduna authorities felt
the need for a visible military presence demonstrates the
level of tension lurking in many areas of the country.
Moreover, troops in Kaduna City did not prevent a gruesome
incident (at least ten dead)
in the southeast corner of the state.



5. (C) There have been other disturbances with death tolls
directly related to partisan politics or political
manipulation of ethnic and religious differences in parts of
the country. October street battles between rival PDP and
APP hoodlums in Zamfara State were bloody. Communal and
political flare-ups in Delta state (Warri) and the South
East region have cost lives and could easily rekindle. Other
areas are simmering and could erupt as well. A bitter
struggle between Kwara State Governor Mohammed Lawal and
political kingmaker Olusola Saraki exists alongside ethnic
muscle-flexing between partisans of the Hausa-Fulani emirate
system (established traditional rulers) and the Yoruba in
Ilorin. The Yoruba (aspiring traditional rulers),who
probably now comprise a majority of the city's population,
want an Oba of Ilorin to be installed. The ruling
Hausa-Fulani see this as an encroachment. Complicating
relations between Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba everywhere is the
recent release in Lagos of the OPC's violent
street general Ganiyu Adams, whom Northerners blame for the
October 2000 Ajegunle riots that left scores of Hausa-Fulani
dead in Lagos.



6. (C) The frequency and intensity of the clashes, coupled
with the multiple military deployments throughout the
country, generate the impression that civilian politicians
cannot maintain order without the military's help. In the
public mind, the question has turned from whether there will
be future communal violence to where and when that violence
will occur. Politicians reinforce this sense of insecurity
by publicly bickering over the causes of the unrest and
assigning blame to their opponents. For instance, Benue
Governor Akume has accused former PDP Chairman Gemade of
helping to stoke the violence there. Minister of Defense
Danjuma, in turn, has reportedly accused Akume of spending
state funds to enlist former military personnel in Tiv
militia. In turn, Danjuma has been accused of suborning his
Jukun brethren in their confrontation with the unpopular Tiv.



7. (C) Some Nigerians are making negative comparisons,
stating that previous military governments were more adept at
preventing civil disorder than the current Administration.
Comparisons with Nigeria's last elected government - the
short-circuited Shagari Administration - are making the
rounds. While the vast majority of Nigerians prefer
democracy and want to avoid a return of the military, they
also want a democracy that works. At the very least,
civilian government should not be seen as undermining public
security and the economy. The growing chorus of those who
say their lives were better during the Abacha years should
sound a disturbing alarm at Aso Villa. Even if the chorus is
misguided and looking backward through rose-colored glasses,
perceptions are often more important than objective reality.


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ELECTORAL REFORM - COLLISION OR COMPROMISE?
--------------



8. (C) The controversy over the proposed electoral law also
makes politicians appear so concerned with their own
preservation that they cannot adequately guide the ship of
state. The reform would extend the tenure of incumbent local
governments. This would make local government elections, now
slated for April of 2002, contemporaneous with Presidential,
National Assembly and Gubernatorial elections scheduled for

2003. This sounds like a simple technical fix. However,
such a change could alter political power relationships in
the states. If local elections remain in 2002, governors and
state assembly members can better influence these elections,
laying solid ground work for their 2003 campaigns. On the
other hand, the Presidency and national legislators will gain
greater influence at the local level and, thus, over the
governors' re-election prospects if local elections are
delayed.



9. (C) The constitution is unclear whether the National
Assembly can change election dates. Governors have publicly
scorned the proposed measure as unconstitutional. National
Assembly leaders likewise have chastised governors in their
public statements. Meeting in mid-October, speakers of state
assemblies agreed to dissolve their local governments in

2002. This would leave a one-year void at the local
government level should the proposal become law. Since
electoral registers are to be compiled by the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC),INEC could refuse to
provide registers to the state-level commissions that are
supposed to run the local government elections. The
state-level commissions might compile their own registers and
hold elections in defiance of INEC, or the governors might
appoint "care-taker" local government councils (that would
doubtless be firmly under gubernatorial control).



10. (C) President Obasanjo has met with governors and key
federal lawmakers to seek a resolution. While the talks
might have succeeded in reducing the public rhetoric, there
is no sign of an agreed fix to this problem as of yet. Unless
the sides can find compromise, this issue becomes one of
constitutional interpretation for the courts. But Nigeria's
discredited judiciary lacks adequate moral authority and
arbitrating such a high stakes political game would expose
the weak court system to intense political heat. If the
politicians toss such a highly charged issue into the courts,
there will likely be rulings and counter-rulings, injunctions
and counter-injunctions as few would be willing to accept a
ruling adverse to their interests. Similar antics in the
past have led to such confusion that the entire political
process bogged down. Nigeria's elected politicians know
this, but they seem intent to seek to maximize their personal
advantage with little regard for the effect their pursuits
have on the overal
l system.


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PDP - PUTTING THE TEMPEST BACK IN THE TEAPOT
--------------



11. (C) Obasanjo's desire to eject PDP national chairman
Gemade (his hand-picked and expensively-purchased candidate
in 1999) and countless, unseemly turf battles at the local
level have undermined the credibility of the ruling party and
further whittled an already waning internal cohesion. As the
party held local and state congresses, in preparation for the
National Convention, competition turned white hot.
Allegations of cheating and intimidation were common. In
some states, rival factions held separate congresses, picking
competing slates of delegates for the National Convention.
Trying to postpone the National Convention that would have
ousted Gemade from party leadership, pro-Gemade PDP officials
filed suit for an injunction. Rumor has it that Gemade paid
the judge to issue the injunction. Rumor also has it that
Obasanjo ordered that the same judge be paid even more to
lift the order.



12. (C) After several late night sessions of party leaders,
including the President, Gemade relinquished his claim to the
Chairmanship, reportedly in exchange for a fistful of Naira
and a promised Cabinet position. Gemade's deal paved the way
for creation of a slate of unopposed candidates for all key
national party positions. This slate was selected by
acclamation at the November 9 convention. What had the
makings of a genuine donnybrook turned into a Nigerian-styled
garden party due to eleventh hour deal making and movement of
money. Despite its flaws, that the convention did not
denigrate into an untidy affair has helped reduce overall
political tensions. However, the party is sorely divided in
several states and the grumbling has not subsided completely.
Many people are dissatisfied with the undemocratic manner
in which the national officials were selected and presented
as a fait accompli to the convention delegates. Moreover,
the continuous running to the courts and crying in the press
to resolv
e what were essentially political disputes left a sour taste
in the public's mouth which the contrived sweetness of the
convention could not remove. People see the PDP ructions not
as a principled fight but as a contest to see who wrests
control over the party for personal reasons that have little
to do with bringing democracy or better leadership to the
electorate.


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WHERE'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID?
--------------



13. (C) While political competition has been in overdrive,
the government's stewardship of the economy has been focused
on short-term fixes to long-term problems. The maxim that
civilian government runs an economy better than the military
has not provided much comfort thus far. The Presidency
micro-manages economic policy, with either Obasanjo or Vice
President Abubakar making decisions even on routine matters.
At the local, state and national levels, most officials are
seen as venally dipping their hands into governmental
coffers. Unemployment remains high; manufacturing
productivity remains low. The national government has said
the right things but shown little ability to actually
implement policies that would spur direct investment and
create jobs. Due primarily to budgetary indiscipline and
failure to rationalize exchange rates, the government missed
important targets in the IMF Stand-By-Agreement (SBA),which
has now expired. Fortunately, the government is negotiating
an informal agreement with the
IMF which, if successful, may result in a new SBA down the
line. However, due to the SBA expiry, Nigeria no longer
meets Paris Club terms and will have to renegotiate debt
repayment with its creditors.



14. (C) On a positive note, privatization has gone fairly
well. Complex transactions like NITEL, though behind
schedule, have moved faster than most experts anticipated.
The bidding to privatize NITEL was successful and generated
significantly more revenue than expected. A bumper
agricultural crop and higher than expected oil revenues this
year will partially moderate negative perceptions of the
government's economic performance. However, economic strains
may be more pronounced in 2002. Following the slump in oil
prices, oil revenue likely will fall; Nigeria also cannot
completely insulate itself from the overall global downturn.
Meanwhile, there will be political pressure to engage in
deficit spending as elections approach.


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OBASANJO -- THE MAN IN THE MUDDLE
--------------



15. (C) Many critics blame President Obasanjo for the tense
state of affairs. They lambaste him for assuming the image
of an international statesman while neglecting pressing
matters at home. Also, they claim that he has been
unprepared to engage in the dialogue and give-and-take
necessary for democratic politics to take hold. Many
observers expected Obasanjo to expend significant effort
developing a political culture and the "informal
constitution" key to ensuring that the relationships between
the executive and the legislature and between the national
and state governments are cooperative and do not fall below a
certain level of propriety. Instead, Obasanjo has been
described as too eager to choke dissent and differing
opinions. He has meddled in the internal affairs of the
National Assembly and tried to make the PDP and the National
Assembly subservient to Executive will. He has also tried to
undermine governors who have shown too much independence or
who displeased him. What should be accomplished
by dialogue, Obasanjo often attempts by edict, his
detractors' claim. In short, he has alienated many previous
supporters while garnering few new adherents; yet, many of
his past supporters recognize there are currently few viable
alternatives to Obasanjo's leadership.



16. (C) Some of this criticism of Obasanjo comes from the
sour grapes of people disappointed that Obasanjo has not
given them the benefits or access they expected, or has not
been as malleable as they thought he would be when elected
two years ago. However, much of the criticism is justified.
Obasanjo's coarse performance might not be so pronounced had
the National Assembly or governors compensated with good
leadership at their respective levels. Unfortunately, too
many lawmakers and local executives have been masters at
enriching themselves while novices at governing.
Consequently, their failures have only served to aggravate
the impact of the President's lack of political skills.



17. (C) Recently, Obasanjo has taken a few tentative steps
toward defusing political tension. On October 31, he
formally inaugurated a national security panel. The panel's
mandate is to examine the underlying causes of communal
violence and develop recommendations to prevent further
outbreaks. If the panel is active and not another ad hoc
creation that does not function well or produces a report
that gathers dust, Obasanjo may recoup lost points. He also
has met with the Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba state governors
and traditional rulers of the three states to defuse the
Tiv/Jukun violence in the area. The President held a
November 11 meeting with all 36 governors to discuss internal
security. These moves indicate recognition by the Presidency
that internal security must receive high priority. The
meetings may also help narrow the political distance between
the President and some governors while also showing average
Nigerians that he is becoming engaged on an issue that means
a lot to them. However, the
measure of success will not be in the number of meetings
held but in re-establishing a general sense of public
security. Given the complexity of many of these localized
disputes, reaching the objective will take sustained
attention and political will.


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PROSPECTS
--------------



18. (C) Civilian politicians, in general, and Obasanjo, in
particular, have managed to steer the country into the roiled
waters between shore and shoal. Insecurity is a pervasive
sentiment. Ethnic, religious and regional tensions are more
pronounced than at the beginning of the year. Much of the
goodwill Obasanjo enjoyed at the outset of his mandate has
been expended, often with few positive results to show. Hard
decisions that might inflict pain but are needed to
jump-start the economy will be increasingly difficult to take
as elections draw nearer. Every group feels it is on the
wrong end of the political give- and-take, and zero sum
politics are omnipresent. This sense of insecurity and loss
has also produced an unfortunate strain of selective amnesia
-- some people are starting to remember the days of military
rule as days of stability and order, rather than long years
of repression and suffering.



19. (C) Meanwhile, civilian politicians are so concerned
about maintaining themselves in office that they seem not to
give appropriate weight to the public's lack of confidence in
their collective performance. They risk creating the
impression that civilian government is the sole reserve of
the elite rather than the only system of governance capable
of arbitrating competing demands in a diverse society without
resort to repression. The political class could enhance its
stock by finding reasonable solutions to the electoral law
squabble and by softening the many jagged edges of party
politics. More importantly, government at all levels -- but
most especially the federal government - needs to be seen as
getting a better handle on security issues. Prudent economic
management would also take the sting out of some
anti-government criticism. If politicians do not show a
degree of statesmanship in these areas, next year promises to
prove more challenging than this one has turned out to be.
Jeter