S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002855

SIPDIS


NOFORN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, 1.6X6
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINS PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UPDATE ON BENUE CRISIS


REF: A. ABUJA 2708

B. ABUJA 2750

C. ABUJA NI 2776

D. IIR 7 800 0052 02

E. IIR 7 800 0065 02

F. IIR 7 800 0064 02

G. ABUJA 2827

H. IIR 7 114 0027 02

I. ABUJA 2832

J. IIR 6 871 0511 02


Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.6X5 and 1.6X6.



1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa states, the
military was called to do what the police could not --
contain civil unrest. As with Odi in 1999, the tragedy that
occurred in Benue demonstrates the problems associated with
asking often poorly-led soldiers to assume law enforcement
duties for which they are not trained. There were two
massacres in Benue, the initial killing of soldiers by ethnic
Tiv militia, and the revenge killing of Tivs by soldiers.
The Benue massacres will force Obasanjo to walk a fine line
between the rule of law, on one hand, and political
exigencies, which include his relationship with the military,
on the other. Obasanjo must investigate but take care not to
further estrange the military, which happens to be the
mainstay of security in several key areas of the country.
End summary.


====================================
WHAT WE KNOW OF BENUE - WHAT WE HEAR
====================================



2. (S/NF) Accounts we have heard about what happened in Benue
vary somewhat in their details. However, the general picture
provided by most accounts is similar. Paras 2 - 7 contain
what we have been able to piece together thus far. The 19
dead soldiers were in Benue as part of the military
deployment to defuse a long-standing feud between Tivs and
Jukuns. While on patrol, the soldiers were ambushed by Tiv
militia on or about October 10. (NOTE: One contact informed
Poloff that 24 soldiers were captured, but five of the
soldiers, ethnic Tivs, were released. We cannot confirm this
claim. END NOTE.) According to previous reporting (Ref G),
after attempting to turn the soldiers over to the police and
local leaders, the militia members brutally murdered the
soldie

rs and dismembered their bodies.



3. (S/NF) While most contacts state the soldiers were
ambushed, there also is a different version of events being
circulated. While the Army contended that soldiers gave up
without a fight, Tivs retort that the soldiers were in league
with the Jukun militia. In this rendition, a firefight took
place where the soldiers and Jukun exhausted their
ammunition, enabling Tiv fighters to capture them. At this
point, local officials refused to get involved. Worse, the
Tiv captors got word that the band of Jukun and soldiers had
attacked other Tivs earlier that day. Hearing this, the Tivs
executed 19 of their military captives, giving the five Tivs
a reprieve. The Tivs also killed a larger but unspecified
number of Jukun.



4. (U) Attributing comments to the Presidential Villa, the
media reported not-so-veiled threats to local Tiv leaders in
Benue to turn over the responsible militia members or face
the consequences. Media reports of comments from unnamed
Defense Headquarters "sources" were even stronger. However,
during the October 22 funeral for the 16 soldiers whose
bodies had been recovered, President Obasanjo rejected
"provocation" and emphasized the responsibility of the
Federal Government to protect its citizenry. He said that
his administration would not be deterred from this objective.
He also tasked the "security agencies" to track down the
killers.



5. (S/NF) On 24 October, soldiers apparently from a unit
other than those killed (Refs E and H) entered eastern Benue
from Taraba state, and carried out attacks against the local
population. It is impossible to state a specific number of
casualties. However, 58 people were reportedly killed in one
village, and roughly 14 villages were destroyed, as well as
most of the town of Zaki Biam. The death toll is likely
between 100 and 250. In one village, according to press
reports, adult males were separated from the others then
executed. Retired Chief of Army Staff LTG Malu (who headed
the Army at the time of the Odi incident), had his house
destroyed and members of his family killed in the reprisals.



6. (C) It remains unclear how many new IDPs there are in
Benue as a result of this latest violence. National Assembly
members from Benue have claimed as many as 500,000, other
reporting (Ref G) places the number near 190,000. The ICRC
estimates around 100,000 new IDPs in Benue. The 190,000 and
100,000 figures are not incompatible, since perhaps 90,000
IDPs had already been created as a result of fighting earlier
this year. Approximately 70,000 of the "new" IDPs are
staying with relatives or friends. The remaining 30,000 are
temporarily housed in 14 camps in the state.

7. (C) Instead of trying to calm the situation, several
political figures have increased tensions by publicly
accusing each other of complicity in the violence. Benue
Governor George Akume blamed embattled PDP chairman Barnabas
Gemade for fueling violent student protests against the
military attacks. Minister of Defense Danjuma has blamed
Akume for supporting former Tiv soldiers in an effort to
destabilize the area. President Obasanjo even got into the
act. He told the press that Akume requested military help in
Benue, which suggests that Akume should be prepared to take
the bad with the good regarding the soldiers and their
transgressions. Many have accused Danjuma, raised as a
Jukun, of privately supporting the Jukun militias with arms.
Others have linked Malu with arming the Tivs, and Malu has
lashed out at almost everyone. Despite these recriminations,
there is no real evidence yet of high-level involvement thus
far in either the deaths of the 19 soldiers or the military's
response.



8. (C) A number of meetings have taken place at State House
to discuss the crisis. On November 7, the President conferred
with the Governors from Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa to discuss
ways to end the ethnic violence and reduce the political
attacks. This meeting may have helped reduce the political
vituperation, but it is too early to tell whether the
governors and President developed a workable game plan to
reduce the violence. Obasanjo reportedly will hold a repeat
meeting with the governors, joined by ten elders from each
state, on November 11.


====================
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS
====================



9. (S/NF) After the 19 soldiers were killed, statements
emanating from the Presidential Villa pointed to serious
consequences if the militia members responsible were not
surrendered to authorities. These statements might have been
viewed as tacit approval by angry soldiers who did not need
much encouragement to avenge the deaths (Ref D and E). While
we do not have evidence pointing to senior officers, it seems
unlikely, from what we know of the Nigerian military, that
these actions were taken without the knowledge of some senior
officers (Refs D,E,F). On the other hand, if an element of a
battalion did act without senior approval, then this
indicates a loss of control in some elements of the Nigerian
military, something equally troubling.



10. (S/NF) Thus far, extensive press coverage has not been
translated into a sustained public outcry (Ref G). Frankly,
the commonly held prejudice that Tiv are an aggressive people
who "take over" lands belonging to others has played a role.
There is also a degree of understanding for the Army's
conduct in many quarters of the Nigerian populace. This is
partially due to the gruesome nature of the 19 executions.
It is also due to the realization that the military is the
last wall between order and unrest. Should the Army be seen
as susceptible to attack with impunity, it is feared the
security situation would rapidly worsen (Ref I).
Consequently, while many do not approve of the Army's
actions, they see these actions as the high but necessary
premium that must be paid to ensure the Army can effectively
play its role as security's guarantor.



11. (S/NF) Obasanjo and his government will now have to
strike the right balance between assuring human rights and
these vital security imperatives. Obasanjo realizes he must
do something to bring the guilty into the dock. If he does
nothing, his image as a statesman will be sullied. Dealing
with the killers of the soldiers will be relatively easy.
But handling the soldiers who ran amok will be a different
matter, particularly if their actions were condoned at a high
level of the Army or of the Ministry of Defense.



12. (C) These events show that Nigeria is difficult soil in
which to cultivate an abiding respect for the rule of law.
We are trying to urge this process forward, however. The
Embassy press release calling for an impartial investigation
into the situation is part of this effort, and we will
continue to raise the importance of transparency and rule of
law with the GON. That said, these events also reinforce the
importance of continued engagement with and training of
Nigeria's police and the military. Providing the benefits of
sustained and well-targeted training to those who do respect
human rights is the best way to advance the process of
inculcating in the entire military an appreciation for the
rule of law as well as for democratic civilian rule.
Andrews