Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01ABUJA2832
2001-11-06 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
GOVERNOR THINKS NIGERIA HAS HIT A CRUCIAL PERIOD
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002832
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2011
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS NI
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR THINKS NIGERIA HAS HIT A CRUCIAL PERIOD
REF: LAGOS 2787
Classified by CDA Andrews for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002832
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2011
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS NI
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR THINKS NIGERIA HAS HIT A CRUCIAL PERIOD
REF: LAGOS 2787
Classified by CDA Andrews for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: During an October 31 meeting with Polcouns
and Poloff, Kaduna State Governor Ahmed Makarfi cited recent
civil disturbances as very disquieting. In order to prevent
further political turbulance, the Governors were assembling
in Abuja that day to discuss means to cool down the internal
security situation. As an outgrowth of that meeting, a
smaller group of Governors would meet legislative leaders to
massage differences and egos bruised by the electoral law
controversy. He predicted greater PDP cohesion and a
resumption of the convention schedule after a meeting of
party leaders also slated later that day. While usually
supportive of the President, Makarfi attributed much of the
recent problems to Obasanjo's lack of domestic policy
direction, an imperial leadership style that spurs Obasanjo
to shun advice and crush dissent, and his surprising
lassitude in bringing known instigators of unrest to book.
End summary.
--------------
National Security
--------------
2. (C) The usually reserved and pro-Obasanjo Makarfi
incisively criticized President Obasanjo for his frequent
sallies into the arena of international diplomacy while
paying inadequate attention to the brushfires in his own
backyard. Obasanjo should stay home more, Makarfi bluntly
declared. The Governor asserted Obasanjo was lethargic in
moving to prevent simmering tensions from hitting the boiling
point. The crux of Makarfi's complaint was Obasanjo's
failure to aggressively prosecute known perpetrators of civil
unrest. Immediately after the Kaduna disturbances in February
2000, Makarfi recalled that Obasanjo went to Kaduna to insist
the State establish a Judicial Commission of Inquiry instead
of immediately prosecuting suspects already under arrest.
Obasanjo said that prosecuting people so quickly after the
rioting would "overheat the political system." Makarfi said
Obasanjo cajoled and arm-twisted the Council of State to
follow his wishes. The Judicial Commission was established
with the explicit promi
se that the Federal Government would toss the book at the
culprits identified by the Commission. Although the
Commission completed its report in September 2000, the
President has failed to act on its findings, observed
Makarfi. In fact, the only thing Obasanjo did with the
report was to write notes in the margins and return it to
Kaduna, shrugged Makarfi. This set a bad precedent, sending
a message that people could bestir trouble with impunity, he
commented.
3. (C) After 100 Hausa were killed in the OPC Ajegunle riot
of October 2000 in Lagos, the FG seemed powerless to arrest
Gani Adams, the OPC ringleader. (Comment: Adams finally was
arrested this August, but was released October 31. Adams is
a bogeyman for many Northerners, and his release will, at a
minimum deepen their sense of alienation. See reftel. End
comment.) During ethno-religious clashes which killed over
2300 in and around Jos in September, the President idled. No
one was arrested. The Federal government merely set up a
Commission of Inquiry weeks later. It took Obasanjo a week
to visit the place, Makarfi complained. President Obasanjo
erred in telling the press that the FG "knew" something would
happen in Kano this October, yet took no action to preclude
the violence. The President's remarks implied a dereliction
of duty, Makarfi chided.
4. (C) Makarfi said the Government's ineptitude in dealing
with these repeated crises created an atmosphere where
"troublemakers" thrive. The recent Tiv-Jukun upheaval was
particularly disturbing. He said Benue Governor Akume bore
some responsibility for the blow-up, adding that the
governors were going to address this issue with Akume. While
asserting that soldiers responsible for killing innocents
must be punished, Makarfi nonetheless believed the military
was compelled to send a strong deterrent message to those who
would attack soldiers. The military had become the police
force of last resort, Makarfi thought. "If people see the
military as vulnerable, if militias think they can touch the
military, the country could fall apart."
5. (C) Comment: Most Nigerians believe that the military
had to send a clear message to the Tiv militia and others who
might imitate them. Military bases have been traditional
zones of refuge during bloody communal clashes. While there
is a considerable debate over whether the military (or
renegade elements of the military) went "too far" by killing
over 200 in Benue recently, there is little dissent from the
tenet that Nigeria's stability and integrity depend on strict
maintenance of the taboo on attacking soldiers. End comment.)
--------------
Election "Reform"--Background
--------------
6. (C) The House and Senate have passed two competing
bills-both with provisions that safeguard incumbency--which
seek to restructure upcoming elections. Currently, local
government elections are scheduled for April 13, 2002,
followed by gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2003.
Both bills presume the Assembly has the constitutional
authority to extend the tenure of local governments to 2003
and delay local elections to that date. The proposed
legislation has created a political logjam. The Governors
don't want local elections delayed. Delay would prevent them
from strengthening their political base among local
government area chairmen and councilors prior to the
gubernatorial elections in 2003. Incumbent LGA chairmen, the
National Assembly, and the President favor the changed LGA
election date for their own parochial reasons.
7. (C) Makarfi lamented that the legislation pitted
Governors against the National Assembly, the Executive and
LGA chairmen. This controversy, coupled with the recent
civil violence, created the appearance that the civilian
government could not manage the affairs of state, he
remarked. Makarfi feared the security situation and
political logjams (including the internal PDP brouhaha) were
being watched "closely" by elements in the military. Clearly
worried, Makarfi commented that six of his gubernatorial
colleagues had moved out of their official residences in
anticipation of a deteriorating security environment. Since
the President had not acted, Makarfi said all 36 governors
were gathering in Abuja to hash out a compromise with the
Assembly leadership on the electoral reform issue. Makarfi
believed the gathering would also strike an informal
agreement
to eschew confrontational public statements that only roil
the water and complicate resolution of delicate issues. Once
the agreement had been reached on these issues, a smaller
group of Governors and Assembly leaders would meet the
President, Makarfi stated.
--------------
PDP Crisis
--------------
8. (C) Makarfi predicted progress in resolving the PDP
leadership squabbles that threaten to scuttle the party's
convention. A party official had obtained a court injunction
to suspend ongoing Party congresses and the upcoming PDP
National Convention. Despite the injunction, some states
held their local government congresses on October 27, while
others did not. This inconsistency only added to the air of
confusion. (Comment: There is some speculation that
Barnabas Gemade and Okwesilieze Nwodo, PDP Chairman and
National Secretary, respectively, secretly instigated the
suit for injunctive relief in order to forestall their
probable ouster from party leadership at the upcoming
National Convention. End Comment.)
9. (C) The Governor's prediction was partially correct. An
"inner caucus" of Governors, the VP and the President met on
October 31. That meeting produced agreement on lifting the
injunction. Party congresses and the National Convention
have been rescheduled. Presidential favorite, Works Minister
Tony Anenih, who had been expelled from the party by Gemade
for opposing the injunction, was also reinstated. However,
the suddenly irascible Nwodo, who did not attend the October
31 "caucus," issued a public statement that the caucus was
improper and its decisions were nullities. The party remains
an untidy affair. State congresses were held the November
3-4 weekend. While most transpired without major problems,
there were parallel congresses set up by rival party factions
in several states. In Enugu, a national assembly member was
kidnapped. Moreover, there is still no sign that Gemade and
Nwodo have accepted the decision of October 31. More
intransigent statements attributed to Gemade appeared in
major ne
wspapers November 6. Thus, additional suits and injunctions
are possible.
10. (C) Makarfi remarked that non-performing governors and
those who face serious opposition for the PDP nomination were
supporting Gemade in his bid to retain the Party
Chairmanship. He said Gemade, a corrupt, ex-Abacha man,
would attempt to guarantee those governors the PDP nomination
in their states. Audu Ogbeh, according to Makarfi, would not
intervene for any candidate but would be more concerned about
the fairness of the process.
--------------
OBASANJO REFUSES TO LISTEN
--------------
11. (U) Makarfi believed the political situation would not
have become so dense if Obasanjo would listen to objective
advice. Instead Obasanjo allowed himself to be manipulated
by an inner circle of advisors, some of whom do not have
Obasanjo's best interests at heart. Vice President Atiku is
Obasanjo's worst enemy, Makarfi claimed. Atiku persistently
coaxes Obasanjo into standoffs with the party, the National
Assembly and the Governors, asserted Makarfi. Atiku's wants
the Presidency and his strategy is to weaken Obasanjo by
estranging him from important constituencies. Makarfi
remarked that Obasanjo plays the willing dupe in this game.
He recalled that Obasanjo once relayed to Atiku a warning
Makarfi had given the President about the Vice-President.
Because Obasanjo betrayed his confidence that once, Makarfi
swore he would not advise Obasanjo about Atiku's duplicity
again.
12. (C) Comment: Clearly concerned that the ship of state
had the appearance of being rudderless, Makarfi said a lot
during the meeting. The different sessions between the
Governors, National Assembly and President seemed to have
reduced tensions for the time being. Whether this is
permanent will become known soon enough. Makarfi placed
responsibility for a large share of the current tumult at
Obasanjo's feet. He believes Obasanjo will have to change
his leadership style and pay more attention to domestic
security matters if the spirit of compromise and dialogue
engendered by the sessions of October 31 meeting is to stick.
Andrews
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2011
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS NI
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR THINKS NIGERIA HAS HIT A CRUCIAL PERIOD
REF: LAGOS 2787
Classified by CDA Andrews for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: During an October 31 meeting with Polcouns
and Poloff, Kaduna State Governor Ahmed Makarfi cited recent
civil disturbances as very disquieting. In order to prevent
further political turbulance, the Governors were assembling
in Abuja that day to discuss means to cool down the internal
security situation. As an outgrowth of that meeting, a
smaller group of Governors would meet legislative leaders to
massage differences and egos bruised by the electoral law
controversy. He predicted greater PDP cohesion and a
resumption of the convention schedule after a meeting of
party leaders also slated later that day. While usually
supportive of the President, Makarfi attributed much of the
recent problems to Obasanjo's lack of domestic policy
direction, an imperial leadership style that spurs Obasanjo
to shun advice and crush dissent, and his surprising
lassitude in bringing known instigators of unrest to book.
End summary.
--------------
National Security
--------------
2. (C) The usually reserved and pro-Obasanjo Makarfi
incisively criticized President Obasanjo for his frequent
sallies into the arena of international diplomacy while
paying inadequate attention to the brushfires in his own
backyard. Obasanjo should stay home more, Makarfi bluntly
declared. The Governor asserted Obasanjo was lethargic in
moving to prevent simmering tensions from hitting the boiling
point. The crux of Makarfi's complaint was Obasanjo's
failure to aggressively prosecute known perpetrators of civil
unrest. Immediately after the Kaduna disturbances in February
2000, Makarfi recalled that Obasanjo went to Kaduna to insist
the State establish a Judicial Commission of Inquiry instead
of immediately prosecuting suspects already under arrest.
Obasanjo said that prosecuting people so quickly after the
rioting would "overheat the political system." Makarfi said
Obasanjo cajoled and arm-twisted the Council of State to
follow his wishes. The Judicial Commission was established
with the explicit promi
se that the Federal Government would toss the book at the
culprits identified by the Commission. Although the
Commission completed its report in September 2000, the
President has failed to act on its findings, observed
Makarfi. In fact, the only thing Obasanjo did with the
report was to write notes in the margins and return it to
Kaduna, shrugged Makarfi. This set a bad precedent, sending
a message that people could bestir trouble with impunity, he
commented.
3. (C) After 100 Hausa were killed in the OPC Ajegunle riot
of October 2000 in Lagos, the FG seemed powerless to arrest
Gani Adams, the OPC ringleader. (Comment: Adams finally was
arrested this August, but was released October 31. Adams is
a bogeyman for many Northerners, and his release will, at a
minimum deepen their sense of alienation. See reftel. End
comment.) During ethno-religious clashes which killed over
2300 in and around Jos in September, the President idled. No
one was arrested. The Federal government merely set up a
Commission of Inquiry weeks later. It took Obasanjo a week
to visit the place, Makarfi complained. President Obasanjo
erred in telling the press that the FG "knew" something would
happen in Kano this October, yet took no action to preclude
the violence. The President's remarks implied a dereliction
of duty, Makarfi chided.
4. (C) Makarfi said the Government's ineptitude in dealing
with these repeated crises created an atmosphere where
"troublemakers" thrive. The recent Tiv-Jukun upheaval was
particularly disturbing. He said Benue Governor Akume bore
some responsibility for the blow-up, adding that the
governors were going to address this issue with Akume. While
asserting that soldiers responsible for killing innocents
must be punished, Makarfi nonetheless believed the military
was compelled to send a strong deterrent message to those who
would attack soldiers. The military had become the police
force of last resort, Makarfi thought. "If people see the
military as vulnerable, if militias think they can touch the
military, the country could fall apart."
5. (C) Comment: Most Nigerians believe that the military
had to send a clear message to the Tiv militia and others who
might imitate them. Military bases have been traditional
zones of refuge during bloody communal clashes. While there
is a considerable debate over whether the military (or
renegade elements of the military) went "too far" by killing
over 200 in Benue recently, there is little dissent from the
tenet that Nigeria's stability and integrity depend on strict
maintenance of the taboo on attacking soldiers. End comment.)
--------------
Election "Reform"--Background
--------------
6. (C) The House and Senate have passed two competing
bills-both with provisions that safeguard incumbency--which
seek to restructure upcoming elections. Currently, local
government elections are scheduled for April 13, 2002,
followed by gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2003.
Both bills presume the Assembly has the constitutional
authority to extend the tenure of local governments to 2003
and delay local elections to that date. The proposed
legislation has created a political logjam. The Governors
don't want local elections delayed. Delay would prevent them
from strengthening their political base among local
government area chairmen and councilors prior to the
gubernatorial elections in 2003. Incumbent LGA chairmen, the
National Assembly, and the President favor the changed LGA
election date for their own parochial reasons.
7. (C) Makarfi lamented that the legislation pitted
Governors against the National Assembly, the Executive and
LGA chairmen. This controversy, coupled with the recent
civil violence, created the appearance that the civilian
government could not manage the affairs of state, he
remarked. Makarfi feared the security situation and
political logjams (including the internal PDP brouhaha) were
being watched "closely" by elements in the military. Clearly
worried, Makarfi commented that six of his gubernatorial
colleagues had moved out of their official residences in
anticipation of a deteriorating security environment. Since
the President had not acted, Makarfi said all 36 governors
were gathering in Abuja to hash out a compromise with the
Assembly leadership on the electoral reform issue. Makarfi
believed the gathering would also strike an informal
agreement
to eschew confrontational public statements that only roil
the water and complicate resolution of delicate issues. Once
the agreement had been reached on these issues, a smaller
group of Governors and Assembly leaders would meet the
President, Makarfi stated.
--------------
PDP Crisis
--------------
8. (C) Makarfi predicted progress in resolving the PDP
leadership squabbles that threaten to scuttle the party's
convention. A party official had obtained a court injunction
to suspend ongoing Party congresses and the upcoming PDP
National Convention. Despite the injunction, some states
held their local government congresses on October 27, while
others did not. This inconsistency only added to the air of
confusion. (Comment: There is some speculation that
Barnabas Gemade and Okwesilieze Nwodo, PDP Chairman and
National Secretary, respectively, secretly instigated the
suit for injunctive relief in order to forestall their
probable ouster from party leadership at the upcoming
National Convention. End Comment.)
9. (C) The Governor's prediction was partially correct. An
"inner caucus" of Governors, the VP and the President met on
October 31. That meeting produced agreement on lifting the
injunction. Party congresses and the National Convention
have been rescheduled. Presidential favorite, Works Minister
Tony Anenih, who had been expelled from the party by Gemade
for opposing the injunction, was also reinstated. However,
the suddenly irascible Nwodo, who did not attend the October
31 "caucus," issued a public statement that the caucus was
improper and its decisions were nullities. The party remains
an untidy affair. State congresses were held the November
3-4 weekend. While most transpired without major problems,
there were parallel congresses set up by rival party factions
in several states. In Enugu, a national assembly member was
kidnapped. Moreover, there is still no sign that Gemade and
Nwodo have accepted the decision of October 31. More
intransigent statements attributed to Gemade appeared in
major ne
wspapers November 6. Thus, additional suits and injunctions
are possible.
10. (C) Makarfi remarked that non-performing governors and
those who face serious opposition for the PDP nomination were
supporting Gemade in his bid to retain the Party
Chairmanship. He said Gemade, a corrupt, ex-Abacha man,
would attempt to guarantee those governors the PDP nomination
in their states. Audu Ogbeh, according to Makarfi, would not
intervene for any candidate but would be more concerned about
the fairness of the process.
--------------
OBASANJO REFUSES TO LISTEN
--------------
11. (U) Makarfi believed the political situation would not
have become so dense if Obasanjo would listen to objective
advice. Instead Obasanjo allowed himself to be manipulated
by an inner circle of advisors, some of whom do not have
Obasanjo's best interests at heart. Vice President Atiku is
Obasanjo's worst enemy, Makarfi claimed. Atiku persistently
coaxes Obasanjo into standoffs with the party, the National
Assembly and the Governors, asserted Makarfi. Atiku's wants
the Presidency and his strategy is to weaken Obasanjo by
estranging him from important constituencies. Makarfi
remarked that Obasanjo plays the willing dupe in this game.
He recalled that Obasanjo once relayed to Atiku a warning
Makarfi had given the President about the Vice-President.
Because Obasanjo betrayed his confidence that once, Makarfi
swore he would not advise Obasanjo about Atiku's duplicity
again.
12. (C) Comment: Clearly concerned that the ship of state
had the appearance of being rudderless, Makarfi said a lot
during the meeting. The different sessions between the
Governors, National Assembly and President seemed to have
reduced tensions for the time being. Whether this is
permanent will become known soon enough. Makarfi placed
responsibility for a large share of the current tumult at
Obasanjo's feet. He believes Obasanjo will have to change
his leadership style and pay more attention to domestic
security matters if the spirit of compromise and dialogue
engendered by the sessions of October 31 meeting is to stick.
Andrews