DRAFT 2001 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR NIGERIA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 25 ABUJA 002709



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SUBJECT: DRAFT 2001 COUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR NIGERIA



1. Sensitive but Unclassified--NOFORN--entire text.





2. Following is the 2001 Country Report on Human Rights for

Nigeria





3. Introduction





Nigeria is a federal republic composed of 36 states and a

capital territory, with an elected president and a bicameral

legislature. On May 29, 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo of

the Peoples Democratic Party was inaugurated to a 4-year term

after winning elections in February 1999 that were marred by

fraud and irregularities perpetrated by all contesting

parties, but most observers agreed the elections reflected

the will of the majority of voters. These elections marked

the end of 16 years of military-led regimes. On May 5, 1999,

the Abubakar Government signed into law a new Constitution

based largely on the suspended 1979 Constitution; the new

Constitution entered into effect on May 29, 1999. The

Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,

in practice the judicial remains susceptible to executive and

legislative branch pressure, is influenced by political

leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffers

from corruption and inefficiency.





The Federal Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is tasked with law

enforcement. The Constitution prohibits local and state

police forces. Internal security is the duty of the State

Security Service (SSS). The SSS's profile remained poor

under the Obasanjo regime. Until the advent of the civilian

administration in May 1999, special paramilitary anticrime

squads called "Rapid Response Teams" operated in every state.

Under Obasanjo, the military personnel dispatched to these

units returned to their barracks, but the units remained

intact in most states, staffed by regular policemen and with

a reduced role and a less menacing presence. The Obasanjo

Government increased its reliance on the army to quell

internal disorder. The degree of civilian control over the

Rapid Response Teams and the national police force improved

during the course of the year. Despite these new controls,

members of the security forces, including the police,

anticrime squads, and the armed forces committed numerous,

serious human rights abuses.





The economy has declined for much of the last three decades.

Most of the population of approximately 120 million was rural

and engaged in small-scale agriculture. Agriculture accounted

for less than 40 percent of gross domestic product but

employed more than 65 percent of the work force. The

agriculture and manufacturing sectors deteriorated

considerably during the oil boom decades. The collapse of

market agriculture contributed significantly to the country's

urbanization and increased unemployment. Although the great

bulk of economic activity is outside the formal sector,

recorded gross domestic product per capita was $250. Much of

the nation's wealth continued to be concentrated in the hands

of a small elite mostly through corruption and nontransparent

government contracting practices. During the year, petroleum

accounted for over 98 percent of the country's export

revenues, most of the government's revenues, and almost all

foreign investment. During the year economic growth was

modest, with growth still impeded by inadequate

infrastructure, endemic corruption, and general economic

mismanagement. The Obasanjo Administration inherited ports,

roads, water, and power infrastructure in a state of

collapse. Both the Federal Government and various states

have focused on improving infrastructure with some success.

Chronic fuel shortages which afflicted the country for

several years have been alleviated. Food production has

improved, due in part to record rainfalls, but post-harvest

loss remains a significant problem due to poor transportation

infrastructure. An estimated two-thirds of the country's

population live in poverty and are subject to malnutrition

and disease. In 2001, the Government has made progress in

reducing controls on the private sector, and increasing

expenditures for key social sectors.





The Government's human rights record was mixed; although

there were improvements in several areas during the year,

serious problems remain. While the national police, army,

and security forces continued to commit extrajudicial

killings and used excessive force to quell civil unrest and

ethnic violence, the frequency of these abuses has declined

as compared to the record under the previous military

governments. The military was called on to restore order in

four incidents of civil unrest or conflict--Jos, Tafawa

Balewa, Kano and in the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Benue, Nasarawa

and Taraba states. The containment of severe ethnic conflict

has been important to restoration of order in these areas,

and the military has done so without many of the excesses

seen in previous military regimes. Nevertheless, Army,

police, and security force officers regularly beat

protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted

prisoners; however, there were no reports of torture of

political dissidents. The Government took steps to curb

torture and beating of detainees and prisoners, including the

dismissal and arrest in 2000 of senior officials known for

such practices. Shari'a courts sentenced persons to harsh

punishments including amputations and death by stoning. Of

many amputation sentences, only two were carried out, and the

sentences for stoning have not been implemented. Prison

conditions were harsh and life threatening, and along with

the lack of food and medical treatment, contributed to the

death of numerous inmates. At different times in the year,

the Government released several hundred prisoners in an

attempt to ease prison congestion. In May 1999, the

Government repealed the State Security (Detention of Persons)

Decree of 1984 (Decree 2),which allowed arbitrary detention

without charge; however, police and security forces continued

to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Prolonged pretrial

detention remains a major problem. The judiciary is subject

to political influence, and is hampered by corruption and

inefficiency. The judicial system was incapable of providing

citizens with the right to a speedy, fair trial. The

Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights;

however, there were no reports of members of the armed forces

looting property, destroying buildings, or driving persons

away from their homes. The Government generally respected

freedom of speech and of the press; however, there were some

exceptions. The Government continued to relax its

restrictions on the rights of freedom of association and

assembly. The Government occasionally restricted freedom of

movement. The Government generally respected freedom of

religion, however, the expansion of Shari'a law in the North

raised regional and ethnic tensions and threatened religious

freedom for minority religionists. The

Government-established Human Rights Violations Investigation

Panel (HRVIP),continued its work throughout the year

reviewing cases of human rights violations since 1966.





Domestic violence against women remained widespread and some

forms were sanctioned by traditional, customary, or Shari'a

law. Discrimination against women remained a problem.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widely practiced,

and child abuse and child prostitution were common.

Localized discrimination and violence against religious

minorities persisted. Ethnic and regional discrimination

remained widespread and interethnic, religious, and regional

tensions increased significantly. Thousands of persons were

killed in various local ethnic and religious conflicts

throughout the country. Some members of the Ijaw ethnic

group in the oil-producing Niger Delta region who seek

greater local autonomy continued to commit serious abuses,

including killings and kidnappings. The police often could

not protect citizens from interethnic, interreligious,

communal, and criminal violence, and, due to the inability of

the police, the Government called upon the army to restore

order following unrest in three cities during the course of

the year. The Government took steps to improve worker

rights; however, some restrictions continued. Some persons,

including children, were subjected to forced labor. Child

labor continued to increase. Trafficking in persons for

purposes of forced prostitution and forced labor was a

problem and collusion of government officials in trafficking

was alleged. Vigilante violence increased throughout the

country, particularly in Lagos and Onitsha, where suspected

criminals were apprehended, beaten, and sometimes killed.





Respect for Human Rights





Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including

Freedom From





a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing





National police, army, and security forces committed

extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell

civil unrest under the Obasanjo Government, although their

record of managing civil unrest improved from last year and

was much better that under the military regimes of the past.

The Government did not use lethal force to repress

nonviolent, purely political activities; however, lethal

force was used when protests or demonstrations were perceived

as becoming violent or disruptive, or in the apprehension and

detention of suspected criminals. There was marginal

improvement in security force accountability as misconduct

was investigated in a few instances. However in most cases,

neither the state anticrime task forces, the police, nor the

armed forces were held accountable for excessive, deadly use

of force or the death of individuals in custody. They

operated with impunity in the apprehension, illegal

detention, and sometimes execution of criminal suspects.

Since taking office, President Obasanjo largely resisted

pressure to call in military troops to quell domestic unrest,

which reduced the risk that the armed forces would overreact

or harass civilians. Instead, Obasanjo preferred to let the

police deal with civil disturbances, only sending in military

reinforcements when the police were unable to restore order.

Inter-ethnic clashes in June and July in Nasarawa, Bauchi and

Taraba States were handled with a police response. In

September the military was deployed in Plateau State to quell

a major outburst of ethno-religious violence between

Christians and Muslims. By October army troops were

responsible for maintaining order in Kaduna, Jos, Tafawa

Balewa, Kano and a significant part of eastern Benue, eastern

Nasarawa and western Taraba states. Nigerian military unit

commanders were briefed that international humanitarian laws

must be respected, &except when the security of troops is in

jeopardy.8 Multinational oil companies and Nigerian oil

producing companies subcontract police and soldiers from area

units particularly to protect the oil facilities in the

volatile Niger Delta region. A significant portion of the

strong upsurge in violent crime during the year was

attributable to criminal freelancing by current or former

security forces.





Police and military personnel used excessive and sometimes

deadly force in the suppression of civil unrest, property

vandalization, and interethnic violence, primarily in the oil

and gas regions of the Delta States. Confrontations between

increasingly militant "youths" (who tend to be unemployed

males between the ages of 16 and 40),oil companies, and

government authorities continued during the year. In June

mobile police in Khana local government area fatally shot an

Ogoni man who was allegedly unarmed at the time. In July a

police officer protecting oil contractors in Bayelsa State

killed a local youth, reportedly after he tried to disarm a

police officer.





In February Police attempts to disperse Muslim protesters

outside the main mosque in Gombe resulted in violence with

protestors damaging buildings and attacking the police

barracks. Reports of fatalities varied between three and

eight killed.





On many occasions during the year the Government authorized

the use of deadly force to combat crime, and police,

military, and anticrime taskforce personnel committed

numerous extrajudicial killings in the apprehension and

detention of suspected criminals. Police were instructed to

use deadly force against suspected vandals near oil pipelines

in the Niger Delta Region, against the Oodua Peoples Congress

(OPC) vigilante group in Lagos State and, allegedly, against

participants in the Jos and Kano riots that took place in

September and October, respectively. In a widely publicized

case, a police raid aimed at apprehending armed robbers

resulted in the death of at least four unarmed Igbo traders.

Violence and lethal force at police roadblocks and

checkpoints was reduced during the year; however, some

instances of such violence continued. During the year an

upsurge in violent crime in Lagos led to an increase in the

number of roadblocks and checkpoints at major intersections,

without an increase in police misconduct or violence.





Harsh and life threatening prison conditions and denial of

proper medical treatment contributed to the death of numerous

inmates (see Section 1.c.). Criminal suspects died from

unnatural causes while in official custody, usually as the

result of neglect and harsh treatment.





By the end of the year the case concerning a member of Lagos

Deputy Governor's security detail had yet to be transferred

to a court of competent jurisdiction. The individual

allegedly killed a young woman in May, 2000 when she

obstructed the Deputy Governor,s motorcade.





The Government continued to investigate and detain former

Abacha government officials and family members. The Lagos

High Court prosecution of Hamza al-Mustapha, Mohammed Abacha,

Mohammed Rabo Lawal, Lateef Shofalan, Mohammed Aminu and

Sergeant Rogers Mshiella for the 1996 murder of Kudirat

Abiola, a prominent prodemocracy activist and the wife of

Moshood Abiola, was adjourned pending a ruling from the

Supreme Court on an application by defense lawyers. Colonel

Ibrahim Yakassai, was being held for alleged involvement in

the death of Shehu Musa Yar,Adua, a case which has not yet

been formally been brought before a court. In addition to

the above Hamza Al Mustapha, Muhammed Rabo Lawal, Lateef

Shofolahan, Mohammed Aminu, Col. Yakubu, Ishaya Bamaiyi,

James Danbaba and Rogers Mshiella were in detention, charged

with the attempted murder in 1996 of Guardian newspaper

publisher Alex Ibru. The Ibru case was postponed when

Bamaiyi and Mustapha were summoned to appear before the Human

Rights Violations Investigation Panel (HRVIP).





On August 19 Rivers State House of Assemblyman Monday Ndor

was shot and killed by unknown actors outside his residence.





On October 4, violent clashes between the APP and the PDP in

Gusau, Zamfara State left four dead and 19 critically

injured.





During the year, lethal interethnic and intra-ethnic violence

escalated. In September, rioting broke out between the

Muslim Hausa and various predominantly Christian ethnic

groups in to Plateau State. Explanations for the initial

cause of the riot vary. Approximately 2,300 people may have

lost their lives in the disturbances, with many of the

victims buried in mass graves. Religious and ethnic violence

resulted in deaths in other communities as well. In June,

ethnic clashes in Nassarawa State between Tivs, Jukuns,

Hausa-speakers and Kwala led to several hundred deaths and

the displacement of approximately 40,000 people into

neighboring Benue State. This conflict resulted in the

kidnapping and murder of 23 army soldiers who were patrolling

the area to enforce the peace between the ethnic groups. In

Taraba State a dispute between Fulani herders and Tiv farmers

reportedly resulted in eight deaths. Hours after a peaceful

demonstration against U.S. military action in Afghanistan,

rioting broke out on 12 October in Kano, resulting in over

100 dead and significant property damage





The scale of communal violence in the Niger Delta area

lessened but ethnic rivalries and disputes between local

communities over resources still led to deadly clashes. In

July, serious fighting took place between the Akaeze and Osso

Edda communities in Ebonyi State. Reports indicated that 27

people had been killed.





In the Kalabari region of Rivers State, fighting between

three Ijaw communities: the Ke, Bille and Krakrama, led to

the reports of the deaths of between 20 and 100 people.

Violent border disputes between Cross River and Akwa Ibom

states continued.





Organized vigilante groups in large cities, particularly

Lagos and Onitsha, committed numerous killings of suspected

criminals. These vigilante groups engage in lengthy and

well-organized attempts to apprehend criminals after the

commission of the alleged offenses.





In Anambra State, the state government supported the

extrajudicial activities of the vigilante group known as the

Bakassi Boys. Like most vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys

kill suspected criminals rather than turn them over to

police. The Bakassi Boys tortured and then executed between

25 and 36 suspected criminals at main intersections in

Onitsha on May 29th.





In Lagos State, the vigilante group known as the OPC clashed

repeatedly with the police over their protection of Yoruba

neighborhoods and over political issues. The organization

continued to function as a vigilante anti-crime force despite

the continuing operation of a &shoot-on-sight8 order issued

against them by President Obasanjo in November of 1999. The

number of vigilante killings of suspected criminals carried

out by OPC was less than in recent years. Among the more

prominent incidents, in August, the OPC reportedly beheaded

four suspected robbers in Lagos before burning the bodies.

The crucifixion of a man in the Surelere district of Lagos

was also attributed to the OPC by the local community.





There were occasional killings in several universities

carried out by rival student organizations, commonly referred

to as &cults8.





Extrajudicial killing carried out by organized gangs of armed

robbers remained commonplace throughout the year. Multiple

sources reported that a gang of at least 30 armed robbers

killed 22 residents of the town of Awkuzu, allegedly as

revenge for Bakassi Boy executions of suspected criminals

earlier in the year.





There also were numerous reports of street mobs apprehending

and killing suspected criminals. The practice of "necklacing"

criminals (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around a victim's

neck or torso and then igniting it, burning the victim to

death) caught in the act occurred in several cities.





b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated

disappearances. Members of minority ethnic groups in the

oil-producing areas kidnapped foreign and local oil company

employees to press their demands for more redistribution of

wealth generated by joint ventures with the state-controlled

petroleum corporation and for specific projects in their

areas. In all instances the victims were released unharmed

after negotiations between the captors and the oil firms; the

firms usually paid ransoms and promised improved conditions.

In addition to the political rationale for kidnapping, there

were numerous instances of strictly criminal kidnapping, in

which the perpetrators' sole objective was ransom for the

release of the victims. During the year, kidnappings by

criminals to extort money were more numerous than those

perpetrated for " political" reasons. There were also

several reports of different ethnic groups in the Delta

kidnapping rivals of other ethnicities as part of ongoing

disputes over resources. Due to limited manpower and

resources, the police and armed forces rarely were able to

confront the perpetrators of these acts, especially in the

volatile Delta region. A lack of resources prevented

judicial investigations from taking place so that kidnappings

were routinely left uninvestigated.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment

or Punishment





The Constitution prohibits torture and mistreatment of

prisoners, and the law provides for punishment for such

abuses; however, although there were no reports of torture of

political dissidents during the year, army, police, and

security force officers regularly beat protesters, criminal

suspects, detainees, and convicted prisoners. Police

regularly physically mistreated civilians in attempts to

extort money from them. Detainees often were kept

incommunicado for long periods of time. The 1960 Evidence

Act prohibits the introduction into trials of evidence

obtained through torture.





With different versions of criminal Shari'a law now in place

in 12 Northern states, Shari'a courts delivered "hadd"

sentences such as amputation for theft, caning for various

offenses, and death by stoning. The courts have yet to

decide whether such punishments conflict with the

constitutional provision banning "torture or... inhuman or

degrading treatment." Caning, a punishment available under

Nigerian common law, the Northern Nigerian Penal Code, and

Shari'a law, does not appear to conflict with the

Constitution and has not been successfully challenged in the

court system as a violation of the constitutional provision

banning "torture or... inhuman or degrading treatment."

Stoning and amputation also have not been challenged under

the 1999 Constitution. There were only two amputations

carried out in 2001, despite a much larger number of

sentences. Lawal Isa had his right hand amputated in Zamfara

on May 3 for stealing 3 bicycles. Umaru Aliyu suffered the

same punishment in Sokoto on July 6, for stealing a goat.

Bariya Ibrahim Magazu, a 17-year old girl, was given 100 cane

strokes, following her conviction of fornication and slander.

Baobab, a Nigerian human rights NGO, had filed an appeal on

her behalf prior to the execution of the sentence. The case

generated a great deal of attention among international human

rights organizations, and the execution of a reduced

sentence, underscored likely political intervention to

dispose of the case. In 2001 Shari'a courts handed down the

first death sentences. Attahiru Umar was sentenced to death

by stoning for sodomy by a Kebbi Shari'a court. In Sokoto,

Safiya Hussaini, was convicted of adultery because she could

not prove who was responsible for her pregnancy. The Federal

Government has instituted a panel of legal scholars to draft

a uniform Shari'a criminal statute for all Northern states,

to replace hastily drafted, unconstitutional and often

self-contradictory Shari'a statutes adopted by the states.





In the numerous ethnic clashes that occurred throughout the

year, hundreds of persons were beaten and injured severely.

Police and security forces failed to respond to most criminal

acts in a timely manner. During a year that saw a

significant increase in criminal activity and civil unrest in

Lagos, Kano and elsewhere, police generally were outgunned

and outmaneuvered by criminals, or overwhelmed by mobs trying

to foment civil unrest. (See sections 1.a and 1.b).

Security forces occasionally beat and/or detained journalists

(see Section 2.a.).





Prison and detention conditions remained harsh and life

threatening. Most prisons were built 70 to 80 years ago and

lack functioning basic facilities. Lack of potable water,

inadequate sewage facilities, and severe overcrowding

resulted in unhealthy and dangerous sanitary conditions. Many

prisons held 200 to 300 percent more persons than they were

designed to hold, and many of the pretrial detainees held

without charge had been detained for periods far longer than

the maximum allowable sentence for the crimes for which they

were being held. Disease was pervasive in the cramped,

poorly ventilated facilities, and chronic shortages of

medical supplies were reported. Prison inmates were allowed

outside their cells for recreation or exercise only

irregularly and many inmates had to provide their own food.

Only those with money or whose relatives brought food

regularly had sufficient food; petty corruption among prison

officials made it difficult for money provided for food to

reach prisoners. Poor inmates often relied on handouts from

others to survive. Beds or mattresses were not provided to

many inmates, forcing them to sleep on concrete floors, often

without a blanket. Prison officials, police, and security

forces often denied inmates food and medical treatment as a

form of punishment or to extort money from them. Harsh

conditions and denial of proper medical treatment contributed

to the deaths in detention of numerous prisoners. A

reputable human rights organization estimated in 1999 that at

least one inmate died per day in the Kiri Kiri prison in

Lagos alone. According to Prisoners Rehabilitation and

Welfare Action (PRAWA) a nongovernmental organization (NGO),

dead inmates promptly are buried on the prison compounds,

usually without their families having been notified. A

nationwide estimate of the number of inmates who die daily in

the country's prisons is difficult to obtain because of

record keeping by prison officials. PRAWA alleged that prison

conditions were worse in rural areas than in urban districts.





PRAWA and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

have regular access to the prisons and publish newsletters on

their work. The Government admits that there are problems

with its incarceration and rehabilitation programs and worked

with groups such as these to address those problems.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile





The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention;

however, the Government rarely observed these prohibitions

and the police and security forces continued to use arbitrary

arrest and detention.





Police and security forces were empowered to make arrests

without warrants if they believed that there was reason to

suspect that a person had committed an offense; they often

abused this power. Under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement

Procedures Rules of the Constitution (based on those of the

1979 Constitution),police may arrest and detain persons for

24 hours before charging them with an offense. The law

requires an arresting officer to inform the accused of

charges at the time of arrest and to take the accused persons

to a station for processing within a reasonable amount of

time. By law police must provide suspects with the

opportunity to engage counsel and post bail. However, police

generally did not adhere to legally mandated procedures.

Suspects routinely were detained without being informed of

the charges, denied access to counsel and family members, and

denied the opportunity to post bail for bailable offenses.

Sheik Yakubu Musa, a Katsina-based Islamic scholar, was

arrested and detained by security agents for 27 days without

being charged until he was ordered released by the Abuja High

Court. There was no functioning system of bail, so many

suspects were held in investigative detention. If family

members attend court proceedings, an additional payment is

often demanded by police.





Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem.

According to the Constitution, persons charged with offenses

have the right to an expeditious trial; however, in practice

this right was not respected (see Section 1.c.). Serious

backlogs, endemic corruption, and undue political influence

continued to hamper the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).

In January the Minister of State for Internal Affairs was

quoted in the press as saying there were 45,000 inmates of

the Nigerian prison system, seventy-five percent of whom were

awaiting trial. Police cited their inability to securely

transport detainees to trial on their scheduled trial dates

as one reason why so many of the detainees were denied a

trial.





Persons who happen to be in the vicinity of a crime when it

is committed normally are held for interrogation for periods

ranging from a few hours to several months. After their

release, those detained frequently are asked to return

repeatedly for further questioning. Police continued the

practice of placing relatives and friends of wanted suspects

in detention without criminal charge to induce suspects to

surrender to arrest, although this was done much less often

than under the Abacha regime (see Section 1.f.). Security

forces occasionally beat and detained journalists (see

Section 2.a.).





Many students have been detained for allegedly taking part in

cult or criminal activities on university campuses.

The 1999 Constitution prohibits the expulsion of citizens,

and the Government does not use forced exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial





The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;

however, in practice, the judiciary remained subject to

executive and legislative branch pressure, was influenced by

political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and

suffered from corruption and inefficiency. Understaffing,

underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption continued to

prevent the judiciary from functioning adequately. Citizens

encountered long delays and frequent requests from judicial

officials for small bribes.

Under the Constitution, the regular court system is composed

of federal and state trial courts, state appeals courts, the

Federal Court of Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court.

There also are Shari'a (Islamic) and customary (traditional)

courts of appeal for each state and for the federal capital

territory (Abuja). Courts of the first instance include

magistrate or district courts, customary or traditional

courts, Shari'a courts, and for some specified cases, the

state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines

which court has jurisdiction. In principle customary and

Shari'a courts have jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and

defendant agree. However, in practice fear of legal costs,

delays, and distance to alternative venues encouraged many

litigants to choose the customary and Shari'a courts over the

regular venues. Shari'a courts have begun to function in

thirteen northern states.





Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of

arraignment for most categories of crimes. Understaffing of

the judiciary, inefficient administrative procedures, petty

extortion, bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between

police and prison officials, and inadequate transportation

continued to result in considerable delays, often stretching

to several years, in bringing suspects to trial (see Section

1.d.).





Trials in the regular court system are public and generally

respect constitutionally protected individual rights,

including a presumption of innocence, the right to be

present, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to

be represented by legal counsel. However, there is a

widespread perception that judges easily are bribed or

"settled," and that litigants cannot rely on the courts to

render impartial judgements. Most prisoners are poor and

cannot afford to pay the costs associated with moving their

trials forward, and as a result they remain in prison.

Wealthier defendants employ numerous delaying tactics and in

many cases used financial inducements to persuade judges to

grant numerous continuances. This, and similar practices,

clogged the court calendar and prevented trials from

starting.





Some courts are understaffed. Judges frequently fail to

appear for trials, often because they are pursuing other

means of income. In addition court officials often lack the

proper equipment, training, and motivation to perform their

duties, again due in no small part to their inadequate

compensation.





There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups

from testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less

weight; however, the testimony of women and non-Muslims is

usually accorded less weight in Shari'a courts (see Section

5).





There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or

Correspondence





The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with

privacy, family, home, or correspondence; however, although

government authorities generally respect these prohibitions,

authorities continued at times to infringe on these rights.





Police and security forces continued the practice of placing

relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without

criminal charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest,

although this was done much less frequently than under

previous military regimes. There were calls by human rights

groups for the police to end the practice.





Unlike in several previous years, there were no reports of

members of the armed forces looting property, destroying

buildings, and driving persons away from their homes.





Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

Freedom of Speech and Press





There is a large and vibrant private domestic press that is

frequently critical of the Government as well as Government

-owned and controlled publications.





On May 26, 1999, in the last days of Abubakar regime, Decree

60 was signed into law and created the Nigerian Press Council

which was charged with the enforcement of professional ethics

and the sanctioning of journalists who violated these ethics.

The Nigerian Press Council immediately criticized it as "an

undisguised instrument of censorship and an unacceptable

interference with the freedom of the press." Decree 60

attempted to put control of the practice of journalism into

the hands of a body of journalists who were appointed by and

received payment from the Government. In 1999 the NUJ, the

professional association of all Nigerian journalists, and the

Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) rejected

the creation of the Press Council. The NPAN called the

decree unconstitutional and a violation of press freedom,

because there were already enough laws concerning the

operation of the press. The decree, which virtually made

members of the council employees of the Government, also

contained a number of provisions inimical to the operation of

a free press. Among other provisions, Decree 60 gave the

Press Council the power to accredit and register journalists

and the power to suspend journalists from practicing. Decree

60 required publications be registered by the council

annually through a system entitled "Documentation of

Newspapers." In applying for registration, publishers were

expected to submit their mission statements and objectives

and could be denied registration if their objectives failed

to satisfy the Council. The penalties for practicing without

meeting the Council's standards were a fine of $2,200

(250,000 Naira) or imprisonment for a term not to exceed 3

years. The decree also empowered the Council to approve a

code of professional and ethical conduct to guide the press

and to ensure compliance by journalists. Under the decree,

publishers were expected to send a report of the performance

of their publications to the Council; failure to do so was an

offense that carried a fine of $900 (100,000 Naira). The

Council has set up office and hired staff in Abuja, but is

yet to taken any official action. Many journalists believe

that the existence of the decree and council create a

significant limitation on freedom of the press in Nigeria.





During the year there were a few cases of threats against and

attacks on the press. In June, Nnamdi Onyeuma, editor of a

weekly magazine Glamour Trends was arrested and detained for

libel in connection with a story alleging that President

Obasanjo received a $1 million allowance for each of his many

foreign trips. Onyeuma is on bail awaiting court action.





In May, Imo State security personnel raided newsstands where

they seized and burned publications that carried stories on

activities of the Movement for the Actualization of the

Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB),an Igbo youth group

advocating the revival of the break away Biafran Republic

that was defeated in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70.





In April, Police beat a photographer and destroyed the film

in his camera when he attempted to photograph a suspect

leaving the Lagos High Court.





The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC),the body

responsible for the regulation and monitoring of broadcast

media, threatened to take private television and radio

stations off the air in a dispute concerning the regulatory

body,s demand that the private stations pay 2.5 per cent of

their gross income to the NBC. The Independent Broadcasters

Association of Nigeria (IBAN) challenged the fees in court

and in October, President Obasanjo interceded, setting the

annual fee for the broadcasters at Naira 150,000 or U.S.

$1,300. During the course of the year, the NBC also

prevented the commissioning of the Here and There television

station in Oyo State claiming the original license had

expired. The NBC is challenging expansion plans by African

Independent Television (AIT),a part of Daar Communications,

claiming that AIT,s global and terrestrial licenses do not

allow them to act as a network. This year the NBC again

issued no new private radio or television licenses. Ten

applications pending from 1999 are still awaiting NBC

approval.





State Governors from Kano, Imo, and Zamfara States became

embroiled in disputes with journalists and publicly

threatened the media. A journalist temporarily lost his

accreditation to cover the State House in Imo State because

of an article critical of the Governor,s wife.





There are two national, government-owned daily newspapers in

English, the New Nigerian and the Daily Times. The New

Nigerian publishes an additional Hausa edition. Several

states own daily or weekly newspapers that also are published

in English. They tend to be poorly produced, have limited

circulation, and require large state subsidies to continue

operating. Several private newspapers and magazines have

begun publication since the inauguration of the civilian

government.





Because newspapers and television are relatively expensive

and literacy levels are low, radio remains the most important

medium of mass communication and information. There is a

national radio broadcaster, the Federal Radio Corporation of

Nigeria, which broadcasts in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo,

and other languages. Fifty-one state radio stations

broadcast in English and local languages. For many years, the

Government prohibited nationwide private radio broadcasting,

but the Abacha regime granted broadcasting rights to local

and regional private radio stations in 1994. There were six

private radio stations operating at the beginning of the

year. International broadcasters, principally the Voice of

America (VOA) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),as

well as Deutsche Welle and others, broadcast in English and

Hausa and represent an important source of news for

Nigerians.





The National Television Station, NTA, is federally owned,

while 30 states also operate television stations. There are

nine privately owned television stations that broadcast

domestic news and political commentary. There are two

private satellite television services. The 1993 Press Law

requires local television stations to limit programming from

other countries to 40 percent. The 1993 Press Law also

restricts the foreign content of satellite broadcasting to 20

percent, but the Government does not restrict access to, or

reception of, international cable or satellite television.

The Government did not restrict Internet access, although

unreliable and costly telephone service limited access and

hindered service providers. NITEL, the Nigerian PTT,

competed with dozens of privately owned Internet service

providers.





While private television and radio broadcasters remained

economically viable on advertising revenues alone, despite

the restrictions that the Government imposed on them,

government-sponsored broadcasters complained that government

funding and advertising were inadequate for their needs.





Even though editors report that government security officers

sometimes visit or call to demand information about a story

or source, journalists and editors no longer fear suspension

or imprisonment for their editorial decisions. State

broadcasters and journalists remain important tools for

civilian governors; these officials use the state-owned media

to showcase the state's accomplishments and to promote their

own political fortunes.





Since the May 1999 elections, foreign journalists who sought

to enter the country to cover political developments

generally have been able to obtain visas, and many of the

obstacles that previously frustrated foreign journalists were

removed. Officials within the Ministry of Information became

more accommodating to requests from foreign journalists.





Under Obasanjo's government, concrete steps have been taken

to address the problems in the education sector and to

restore academic freedom. In 1999, Obasanjo approved the

establishment of four new private universities. Student

groups alleged that numerous strikes, inadequate facilities,

and the rise of cultism (or gangs) on campuses continue to

hamper educational progress. On several occasions during the

year, protests by students resulted in harassment and arrest

by police forces.





Twenty-five wounded soldiers were sentenced to life

imprisonment for "mutiny" and "disobedience" by a court

martial after publicly protesting their treatment by military

officials. The soldiers had alleged medical neglect,

substandard treatment and non-payment of allowances after

they returned wounded from serving in the Nigerian contingent

of ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone.





Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association





The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to

assemble freely; and the Government generally respected this

right, although some limits remained.

Throughout the year, the Government nominally required

organizers of outdoor public functions to apply for permits,

although both government authorities and those assembling

often ignored this requirement. The Government retained

legal provisions banning gatherings whose political, ethnic,

or religious content might lead to unrest. Open-air

religious services away from places of worship remained

prohibited in most states due to religious tensions in

various parts of the country. For example, various Northern

states, including Plateau, Kano, Zamfara and Kaduna

instituted bans on public gatherings immediately following

periods of violent unrest. This was done in consultation

with a number of religious and traditional groups, and local

governments in order to prevent a recurrence of unrest.

Kaduna state government extended its ban on processions,

rallies, demonstrations, and meetings in public places in

order to prevent repetition of the violence that followed the

establishment of Shari'a law (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.). A

political rally in Zamfara State degenerated into violence in

September, prompting a temporary ban on public political

rallies. Because of heightened inter-ethnic, inter-religious

and purely political tensions in 2001, various state

governments balance requests for public gatherings with their

potential for creating unrest, and generally permit them to

go forward when possible.





Generally, the police do not break up or cancel scheduled

meetings unless there is a compelling security reason.

Following the APP/PDP riot in Gusau, a PDP rally for the

Northwest Zone, scheduled to take place in Sokoto October

4-5, was cancelled by police for security reasons. A group

known as the Fourth Dimension, led by former Vice President

Augustus Aikhomu, was prevented from meeting in July because

of violence that occurred at a prior meeting in Benin City.

Police also cancelled a planned meeting of southern governors

in Enugu, called to counter a meeting of the 19 northern

governors, because it was "capable of creating disharmony."

Police regularly disrupt meetings of the OPC, and maintain a

ban on the organization.





C. Freedom of Religion





The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including

freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom to

manifest and propagate one's religion or belief in worship,

teaching, practice, and observance; however, the Government

restricted these rights in practice in certain respects.

Respect for religious freedom remained limited during the

year due to the implementation of an expanded version of

Shari'a law in a total of 13 northern states, which

challenged constitutional protections for religious freedom

and occasionally sparked interreligious violence.





The Nigerian Constitution prohibits state and local

governments from adopting an official religion. The

Constitution also provides that states may elect to use

Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. Federal, state

and local governments fund various religious activities,

including pilgrimages to Mecca for Muslims and Jerusalem for

Christians, as well as requiring Christian or Islamic

religious knowledge to be taught in public schools. About

half of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent Christian,

and about 10 percent practice traditional indigenous religion

or no religion. Since independence, the jurisdiction of

Shari'a courts has been limited to family or personal law

cases involving Muslims, or to civil disputes between Muslims

and non-Muslims who consent to the courts' jurisdiction.

However, the Constitution states that a Shari'a court of

appeal may exercise "such other jurisdiction as may be

conferred upon it by the law of the State." Some states have

interpreted this language as granting them the right to

expand the jurisdiction of existing Shari'a courts to include

criminal matters. Several Christians have alleged that, with

the adoption of an expanded Shari'a law in several states and

the continued use of state funds to fund the construction of

mosques, teaching of Alkalis (Muslim judges),and pilgrimages

to Mecca (Hajj),Islam has been adopted as the de facto state

religion of several northern states. However, state funds

also are used to fund Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In

general states with a clear Christian or Muslim majority

tailor state-funded services to favor the majority faith.

The Constitution also provides that the Federal Government is

to establish a Federal Shari'a Court of Appeal and Final

Court of Appeal; however, the Government had not yet

established such courts by year's end.





The Government continued to enforce a ban on the existence of

religious organizations on campuses of primary schools,

although individual students retain the right to practice

their religion in recognized places of worship. Many states

allow the teaching of Kuranic or Biblical knowledge in

primary and secondary schools; however, in almost all states

with religious minorities, there are reports that students

are forced to take classes that violate their religious

principles. Islamic religious knowledge (IRK) is a mandatory

part of the curriculum in public schools in the North, while

Christian religious knowledge (CRK) is mandatory in the

South. State authorities claim that students are permitted

to decline to attend these classes or to request a teacher of

their own religion to provide alternative instruction. In

practice, where the population of a state is evenly divided,

CRK and IRK are equally available. Where there is a

predominant faith, the minority faith may or may not be

offered in the schools. For example, in many southern states

CRK is taught in the schools and IRK is not offered to Muslim

students in the public schools. Conversely, the opposite is

true in northern states with an overwhelming Muslim majority.









The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, reports

were common that government officials discriminated against

persons practicing a religion different from their own,

notably in hiring or awarding contracts. Christians in the

northern, predominantly Muslim part of the country accused

local government officials of attempting to use zoning

regulations to stop or slow the establishment of non-Muslim,

usually Christian, churches. Muslims in parts of the South

have suffered similar discrimination.





Purdah continued in parts of the country leading to continued

restrictions on the freedom of movement of women (see Section

5).





In October 1999, the governor of Zamfara state signed into

law two bills aimed at instituting Islamic Shari'a law in his

state. Implementation of the law began on January 22.

Zamfara's law adopted traditional Shari'a in its entirety,

with the exception that apostasy was not criminalized.

Following Zamfara's lead, other northern states began to

implement varying forms of expanded Shari'a; by year's end 13

states had adopted variations of Shari'a law: Sokoto, Niger,

Kano, Kebbi, Jigawa, Yobe, Zamfara, Katsina, Borno, Bauchi,

Gombe and Kaduna states. Previously, Shari'a law had been

practiced in the north in the areas of personal law, only if

both litigants agreed to settle their disputes in Shari'a

courts. Elements of Shari'a also had been present in the

northern penal code, which had been applicable in the north

since independence.





As the result of ethnic and religious violence attendant to

the expansion of Shari'a criminal law in various Northern and

Middle-Belt states, (see Section 5),several northern state

governments banned open air preaching and public religious

processions. (#) Katsina and Plateau state governments have

enacted and maintained a ban on public proselytizing for

security reasons. Kaduna has maintained a ban on all forms

of "processions, rallies, demonstrations, and meetings in

public places." Such bans were viewed as necessary public

safety measures after the deaths of thousands in

predominantly ethno-religious conflicts, sparked in part by

the expansion of Shari'a since 2000, in Kaduna, Plateau,

Kano, Gombe and Bauchi. However, large outdoor religious

gatherings continued to be quite common, especially in the

southern part of the country.





The Federal Government has tacitly acknowledged the ability

of states to implement criminal Shari'a. However, the

Federal Government has instituted a committee charged with

the responsibility to draft uniform Shari'a criminal and

procedural laws that could be adopted by all states, instead

of the current state-drafted statutes that differ in many

respects (see Section 1.c.).





Although the expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply

to Christians, the Christian minority in some states has been

subjected to many of the social provisions of the law,

primarily the ban on the sale of alcohol. Consumption of

alcohol by Christians has not been criminalized, however, its

sale and public consumption have been restricted throughout

most of the North, except on Federal Government installations

such as military and police barracks. All Muslims were

subjected to the new Shari'a provisions in the states that

enacted them. Various human rights groups have challenged

the constitutionality of criminal Shari'a, but these suits

have failed for lack of a plaintiff with adequate legal

standing. Safiya Hussaini, a divorcee who was convicted of

adultery and sentenced to death by stoning, has indicated her

intention to appeal, challenging the constitutionality of the

conviction (see Section 1.c.).





Distribution of religious publications remained generally

unrestricted, however, the Government continued to enforce

lightly a ban on published religious advertisements. There

were reports by Christians in Zamfara State that the state

government restricted the distribution of Christian religious

literature. Many Christians in the North complain that they

are not provided adequate radio time on state-owned radio

stations while Islamic religious programs are aired without

charge. Six Pakistani Muslim scholars were arrested in Benue

State September 23 without being charged, and were later

questioned by Federal Government officials in Abuja.





Following violence in relation to the expansion of Shari'a

laws in Kaduna in February 2000, several northern state

governments banned any type of proselytizing, in spite of the

fact that it is permitted by the Constitution. With

Shari'a-attendant violence recurring in Plateau, Bauchi and

Gombe states, such bans have remained in place. In Jos,

Missionaries reported that law enforcement officials harassed

them when they proselytized outside of majority Christian

neighborhoods. Proselytizing did not appear to be restricted

in the southern part of the country.





The Federal Government continued to settle property claims by

Muslim Brotherhood leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky for compensation

for his home and mosque, which were razed by law enforcement

in 1997. All 96 of the Muslim Brotherhood followers jailed

under the previous regime were released during the year.









Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,

Emigration, and Repatriation





The Constitution entitles citizens to move freely throughout

the country and reside where they wish, and in general, the

Government respected this right; however, police occasionally

restricted this right by enforcing curfews in areas struck by

civil unrest, setting up roadblocks and checkpoints. These

are routinely used by law enforcement agencies to search for

criminals, and to prevent the transport of bodies from areas

of conflict to other parts of the country where their

presence might instigate retaliatory violence.

Unfortunately, security and law enforcement officials often

used such checkpoints to engage in extortion and occasional

violence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Unlike last year,

there were no reports of government officials restricting

mass movements of individuals fleeing ethnic unrest. In

March 2000, however, the Governor of Niger State instructed

state police to install roadblocks to prevent southerners

from returning to their homes. In that incident,

southerners, particularly Igbo traders, were attempting to

return home because they feared violent reprisals in response

to the deaths of Hausas in Aba and Owerri (see Section 1.a.).





Violent clashes between ethnic Hausa and various non-Muslim

ethnic groups in Jos, Tafawa Balewa, and Kano resulted in the

imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfew following the deaths of as

many as 50 persons (see Sections 1.a. and 5). In September

and October, Tiv youths set up roadblocks in eastern Benue to

harass and kill ethnic Jukuns (see Section 1.a.).





The Constitution also prohibits the denial of exit or entry

to any citizen, and the Government generally respected this

law; however, the law also provides that women are required

to obtain permission from a male family member before having

an application for a passport processed. Some men take their

wives' and children's passports and other identification

documents with them while traveling abroad to prevent their

family from leaving the country (see Section 5). General

Jeremiah Useni, a retired general and former Minister of the

Federal Capital Territories under the Abacha regime, was

prevented in August from traveling outside Nigeria and his

passport was confiscated. No reason was given by the FG for

this action.





Prominent human rights and prodemocracy activists who fled

the country during the regime of General Sani Abacha

continued to return to the country as did many economic

refugees. There were no reports that the Government denied

passports to political figures or journalists or interrogated

citizens who were issued visas to foreign countries; however,

there have been sporadic reports that persons still were

questioned upon entry or exit to the country at Murtala

Muhammed international airport. These persons, all of whom

were opponents of the Abacha regime, were identified in

immigration computer systems as individuals to be questioned

by immigration or security officers. For example, Dr. Olua

Kamalu, deputy president of MOSOP, reported that the SSS

seized his passport on July 25, 2000. Dr. Kamalu was

planning a trip to Ghana to attend a visa interview at a

foreign embassy. 2001 example available.





During periods of civil unrest, numerous persons were

displaced from their places of residence. Thousands of

persons, both Christian and Muslim, were displaced internally

following the Kaduna riots in February and in May, 2000.

Most had returned by 2001, and in fact, Kaduna became a place

of refuge for people of all ethnic groups fleeing violence in

Jos, Tafawa Balewa and Kano. Up to 500,000 persons were

displaced following the ethnic conflict between Tiv, Jukun

and Hausa in Nasarawa State (see Section 2.c.). Several

thousand Hausa families fled Tafawa Balewa after what was

essentially a pogrom by the predominant Siyawa ethnic group

in southern Bauchi State. Bauchi Governor Mu'azu admitted

that essentially the entire Hausa community in Tafawa Balewa

had either departed or had been killed in the conflict (see

Section 1.a.). Following civil unrest created largely by

criminal opportunists in Kano in October, many Igbo and

Yoruba residents sent their families south.





Typically, only the head of household returned to areas of

unrest after authorities regained control. Most returnees

remained apprehensive about continuing to work in these areas

and returned only to finish business contracts or to sell

their homes in order to arrange a more organized departure.





A few hundred residents of the Odi village, razed by soldiers

in 1999, have returned to the area; however the federal

Government has not provided them with assistance to

reconstruct their village (see Section 1.a.).





Nigerian law contains provisions for the granting of refugee

and asylum status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention

Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

The Government cooperated with the Lagos office of the U.N.

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian

agencies in assisting refugees through the National

Commission for Refugees and its Federal Commissioner. The

Eligibility Committee established under Decree 52 of 1989,

which governs the granting of refugee status, asylum, and

resettlement, reviews refugee and resettlement applications.

A representative from the UNHCR participates in this

committee. The issue of the provision of first asylum has

not arisen since the establishment of the National Commission

for Refugees under Decree 52.

At year's end, there were 6,933 recognized refugees: 13 from

Angola; 23 from Benin; 4 from Cameroon; 1,703 from Sierra

Leone; 3,194 from Chad; 74 from Sudan; 1,561 from Liberia; 69

from Cote d'Ivoire; and 292 from other countries. The

Government also resettled in the country 3 Cameroonians, 3

Chadians, 5 Sudanese, 13 Liberians, and 17 persons from other

countries.





There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a

country where they feared persecution.





Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of

Citizens to Change Their Government





In 1998 and 1999 citizens had the opportunity to exercise

their right to change their government. General Abdulsalami

Abubakar oversaw a transition to civilian rule that included

elections for local governments (in December 1998),state

governors and assemblies (in January 1999),and national

legislators and the president (in February 1999). Voter

apathy and widespread fraud marred the legislative elections;

however, the turnout increased for the presidential race,

which proceeded peacefully with reports of only a few violent

incidents. The Independent National Electoral Commission

(INEC) certified former President Olusegun Obasanjo's victory

over Chief Olu Falae with a reported 62 percent of the votes.





Irregularities occurred at each stage of the electoral

process, particularly the presidential nominating convention

and election where, for example, large sums of money were

offered by both political camps to delegates to vote against

political opponents. During the presidential election,

international observers and foreign diplomats witnessed

serious irregularities in procedures. All three parties

engaged in the local purchase of false ballots and fraudulent

tally sheets so that there were vast discrepancies between

what observers saw and inflated tallies in some areas. In

addition there were administrative problems such as late

delivery of voting materials at a large number of polling

stations. Those areas with the worst problems were the

southern tier of states in the Niger Delta region, several

states in Igboland, and a handful of north central states.

The production of "ghost votes" in these states amounted to

as much as 70 or 80 percent of the total reported votes.

Although all parties engaged in attempts to rig the vote, the

PDP machine in the Delta and Igboland was responsible for the

worst excesses. These votes may have added an estimated 15

percent to Obasanjo's total figure; however, observers

believe that even if they were thrown out, he still would

have maintained roughly a 15 percent lead over Falae's total.

International observers confirmed the results and stated

that, despite widespread fraud, Obasanjo's victory reflected

the will of most voters. Although Falae initially protested

the election results, eventually he dropped his legal

challenge. INEC issued a report on the conduct of the

election in July 1999 that documented the fraud. Obasanjo,

109 senators, 360 members of the House of the National

Assembly, and 36 governors and state assemblies assumed

office on May 29, 1999. The President, Vice President, and

other national and state officials serve 4-year terms. The

next state and national elections are scheduled for 2003,

while local government elections are scheduled for 2002.

INEC is working with several international electoral

assistance organizations to help improve the process in 2003;

however, no INEC officials have faced disciplinary action as

result of their involvement in corrupt activities in the 1999

election. The Constitution outlaws the seizure of the

government by force and contains provisions for the removal

of the President, Vice President, ministers, legislators, and

state government officials for gross misconduct or medical

reasons. In November 1999, Senate President Evan Enwerem was

removed after another credentials scandal. His replacement,

Chuba Okadigbo, was removed in August after an internal

Senate investigation on contracting procedures resulted in

his indictment. Several other public officials were

subjected to close scrutiny by the press, public, and

legislative investigators.





The political system remains in transition. The three

branches of the new government acted somewhat independently

during the Administration's third year in office. The

President was instrumental in removing former Senate

President Chuba Okadigbo in 2000, and continued to fight to

remove Speaker Ghali Na'abba in early 2001. He abandoned

this approach after evidence came to light of widespread

fraud and corruption in the attempt to buy votes for

Na'abba's removal. The Senate and the House of

Representatives legislative responsibilities such as budget

review and oversight, the election reform initiative and

resource allocation seriously. Obasanjo created several

commissions to investigate past government contracts and

human rights abuses, which were overwhelmed with applications

to present evidence of wrongdoing (see Section 4). However,

the judicial branch remained weakened by years of neglect and

politicization.





Abubakar's military Government, which consulted with a

selected group of constitutional and legal experts around the

country to revise the 1979 and 1995 Constitutions,

promulgated the 1999 Constitution on May 5, 1999. The

constitution-writing process was criticized for not being

open to enough participants and for not being subjected to

wider debate on the country's federal structure, revenue

allocation and power-sharing formulas, and minority ethnic

groups' rights. Complaints about the Constitution persisted

and there were continued calls for a national conference,

many from groups in the southwest. A bill for a national

conference was introduced in the Senate late in the year.

They looked instead to the constitutional reform committee in

the Senate.





Special Advisor to President Obasanjo on Constitutional

Matters Dr. Maxwell Gidado heads a process which gathered

information from citizen groups in various parts of the

country on reform of the 1999 Constitution. His findings

will be presented by the President to the National Assembly

for consideration. (I am not sure of exact process or

whether findings have been presented yet.)





Although the Constitution allows the free formation of

political parties, only three parties were registered with

the INEC. The Constitution requires parties to have

membership in two-thirds of the country's 36 states. In

anticipation of the 2003 election INEC began preparing a

draft electoral law for the National Assembly to consider in

the next legislative session. In 2000, public fora were held

during the year in all 36 states and the federal capital

territory of Abuja to solicit citizens' views on the draft

law. Over 10,000 citizens participated, however, the draft

law was not subject to much public debate outside of this

exercise. The proposed law seeks to regulate the timing of

elections and the eligibility of independent parties to

register. Because of the propensity for violence and unrest

during elections, and in order to prevent an unfair advantage

accruing to incumbents, there is substantial pressure to

reschedule local government elections, currently set for

April 2002, so that presidential, gubernatorial and local

government occur in 2003. Conflicting bills regarding both

timing of elections and eligibility of new parties are

pending in the Senate and House.





Women are underrepresented in government and politics,

although there were no legal impediments to political

participation or voting by women. Men continued to dominate

the political arena. NGO's continued to protest the

underrepresentation of women in the political process, and

women were underrepresented in the new civilian government.

Only 6 women were appointed as ministers out of a total of 56

positions. There were 3 women among the Senate's 109

members, and only 12 women were elected to the 360-member

House of Representatives. Women's rights groups pushed

local, state, and the Federal Government (and local levels as

well) to adopt a 30 percent affirmative action program;

however, these efforts were unsuccessful.





There are no legal impediments to participation in government

by members of any ethnic group. The Constitution requires

that government appointments reflect the country's "federal

character." However, there are more than 250 ethnic groups,

and it is difficult to insure representation of every group

in the Government. The federal- and state-level ministers

generally are selected to represent the country's and the

individual State,s regional, ethnic, and religious makeup.

President Obasanjo attempted to create an ethnically

inclusive Government. The 56-member Cabinet and 109

ambassadorial slots were allocated to an equal number of

candidates from each state to achieve a regional balance.

Despite this effort, northerners and southeasterners

criticized the Government for favoring westerners or ethnic

Yorubas, while the southwesterners criticized the Government

for relying too heavily on northern and southeastern

appointments.

Middle-belt and Christian officers dominate the military

hierarchy. Military retirements in 2000, few in number,

appeared to reflect normal political and military

decision-making, and appeared to be based on the perceived

needs of the military and country, without reflecting an

ethnic or religious bias. Due to the retirement of many

"political" officers in 1999, there is a perception among

some in the north that the historical northern Hausa

influence on the military has been reduced to the point where

the North is now underepresented.





Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and

Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human

Rights





The Government permitted local human rights groups to operate

and did not interfere with their activities; nor did it

detain, intimidate, or harass their members. Criticisms of

the Government's past human rights record were abundant in

various media. High-level government officials noted that the

human rights community assisted in the advancement of

democracy. In June President Obasanjo, along with a number

of cabinet members and National Assembly members, met with a

number of prominent human rights representatives for

discussions.





The Catholic Secretariat, a local sectarian interest group,

continued to hold a monthly open forum in Lagos on various

subjects relating to past and present human rights issues.

Discussion panels have included a number of NGO's, media, and

religious leaders. Each session ended with recommendations

to the Government on how best to resolve these issues. The

Government had not responded to any of these recommendations

at year's end.





The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is

active, with offices in Abuja and Lagos under the direction

of a regional delegate. Its primary human rights activities

during the year involved the training of prison officials on

human rights, sanitation, and prisoner health.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established

by Decree 22 in 1995 and tasked with monitoring and

protecting human rights in the country, enjoyed greater

recognition by and coordination with NGO's. The NHRC is

chaired by retired Justice Uche Omo and includes 15 other

members. The NHRC is establishing zonal affiliates in each of

the countries six political regions. The NHRC is supposed to

work closely with NGO's that are devoted to human rights

issues. Since its inception, the NHRC has been denied

adequate funding to do its job properly. At year's end, the

NHRC had created a strategic work plan through 2002, and was

in the process of developing a national action plan to be

deposited with the UNCHR. In 2001, it began actively to

assist in appealing extreme Shari'a verdicts in the North.





The HRVIP, commonly known as the Oputa panel, was established

in June 1999 by President Obasanjo to investigate human

rights abuses dating to 1966 and the time of the first

military coup. The Oputa panel can recommend courses of

action to the justice system for perpetrators of past abuses,

something the NHRC does not do. According to Justice Oputa,

the chair, the panel's primary goal is to provide the country

with a systematic examination of past human rights abuses to

develop a national consensus on the boundaries of acceptable

behavior by government entities as well as individuals. The

panel has heard cases throughout the year, mostly involving

allegations of unlawful arrest, detention, and torture as far

back as the 1966 Biafran War. The panel has also heard cases

in which the rights of groups were violated. The Oputa Panel

has held extensive hearings in Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt,

and Kano throughout the year, and has taken evidence in the

claims of over 10,000 petitioners. The work of the Panel has

produced some controversy when former Heads of State, Ibrahim

Babangida, Abdulsalami Abubakar, and Salisu Buhari refused to

appear to answer questions about human rights abuses under

their respective regimes. The Panel will conclude its

hearings by the end of the year, and will proceed to draft a

report and issue its findings.





Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,

Disability, Language, or Social Status





The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to

freedom from discrimination based on "community, place of

origin, ethnic group, sex, religion, or political opinion."

However, customary and religious discrimination against women

persisted, occasional religious violence was a problem,

social discrimination on the basis of both religion and

ethnicity remained widespread, and ethnic and regional

tensions continued to contribute to serious violence both

between groups of citizens and between citizens and the

security forces.





Women





Reports of spousal abuse are common, especially those of wife

beating. Police normally do not intervene in domestic

disputes, which seldom are discussed publicly. The Penal

Code permits husbands to use physical means to chastise their

wives as long as it does not result in "grievous harm," which

is defined as loss of sight, hearing, power of speech, facial

disfigurement, or other life threatening injuries. A women's

rights group has estimated that spousal abuse occurs in 20

percent of adult relationships. In more traditional areas of

the country, courts and police are reluctant to intervene to

protect women who accuse their husbands formally if the level

of alleged abuse does not exceed customary norms in the

areas. Rape and sexual harassment continue to be problems.

Prostitution is rampant, particularly in urban areas. A

number of states, including most northern states which have

begun the enforcement of Shari'a law, have begun to enforce

existing laws or to introduce new laws to combat

prostitution. All states that have adopted Shari'a have

criminalized prostitution, which is enforced with varying

degrees of success. Prostitution is not illegal in Lagos

State; however, authorities can use statutes that outlaw

pandering as a justification for arresting prostitutes (See

Section 6.c). The adoption of Shari'a-based legal systems by

northern states has led to the strong enforcement of laws

against prostitution for both adults and children (see

Section 2.c.). Southern states, like Edo, also are

criminalizing prostitution and raising the legal age for

marriage from 16 to 18. There is an active market for

trafficking in women to Europe, and elsewhere (see Section

6.f.). In some parts of the country, women continue to be

harassed for social and religious reasons.





Purdah, the Islamic practice of keeping girls and women in

seclusion from men outside the family, continued in parts of

the far north.

Women experience considerable discrimination as well as

physical abuse. There are no laws barring women from

particular fields of employment; however women often

experience discrimination because the Government tolerates

customary and religious practices that adversely affect them.

The Nigerian NGO's Coalition expressed concern about

continued discrimination against women in the private sector,

particularly in access to employment, promotion to higher

professional positions, and in salary inequality. There are

credible reports that several businesses operate with a "get

pregnant, get fired" policy. Women remain underrepresented

in the formal sector but play an active and vital role in the

country's important informal economy. While the number of

women employed in the business sector increases every year,

women do not receive equal pay for equal work and often find

it extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or to

obtain tax deductions or rebates as heads of households.

Unmarried women in particular endure many forms of

discrimination.





While some women have made considerable individual progress,

both in the academic and business world, women remain

underprivileged. Although women are not barred legally from

owning land, under some customary land tenure systems only

men can own land, and women can gain access to land only

through marriage or family. In addition many customary

practices do not recognize a women's right to inherit her

husband's property, and many widows were rendered destitute

when their in-laws took virtually all of the deceased

husband's property. Widows are subjected to unfavorable

conditions as a result of discriminatory traditional customs

and economic deprivation. "Confinement" is the most common

rite of deprivation to which widows are subjected, and it

occurs predominately in eastern Nigeria. Confined widows are

under restrictions for as long as 1 year and usually are

required to shave their heads and dress in black garments.

In other areas, a widow is considered a part of her husband's

property, to be "inherited" by his family. Shari,a personal

law, in contrast to traditional law and practice in many

English common law cases, protects widows property rights.

Polygamy continues to be practiced widely among all ethnic

groups and among Christians as well as Muslims and

practitioners of traditional persuasions. Women are required

by law to obtain permission from a male family member to get

a passport (see Section 2.d.). The testimony of women is not

equal to that of men in criminal courts. If one woman

testifies, a second woman must also to provide testimony to

equal the weight of the testimony of one man.





Women have been affected to varying degrees by the adoption

of Shari'a in the North. In Zamfara state, local governments

instituted laws requiring the separation of Muslim men and

women in transportation, health care, and primary educational

services (see Section 2.c.). Separate transportation and

health facilities for men and women already have been

implemented there. In 2000, a non-Muslim woman was pulled

from a motorcycle and injured by vigilantes for breaking the

new rule requiring separate transportation for women in a

local government area of Zamfara State. In January, an

unmarried 17-year-old woman was given 100 strokes of the cane

lashes for fornication and false testimony (see Sections

1.c,). While humiliating, the caning did not appear to cause

serious injury, and the woman was reported to have walked

home after the execution of the sentence without aid. Safiya

Hussaini was convicted of adultery in Sokoto State because

she could not prove who was responsible for her pregnancy.

Procedural irregularities were noted in her case. In

apparent violation of traditional Shari'a jurisprudence, some

Alkali judges appear to deny Shari'a criminal protections to

women that they provide to men. This tends to subject women

to harsh punishments for fornication or adultery based solely

upon the fact of pregnancy, while men are not convicted

without the requisite number of witnesses.





A national network of women's rights NGO's described the

Government's 1998 report on the implementation of the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (CEDAW) for the period 1986-94 as "inaccurate"

in its positive portrayal of the status of women. The NGO

Coalition for a Shadow Report on the Implementation of CEDAW

(NGO CEDAW Coalition) issued its alternative report in March

1999, which was critical of the Government's failure to

remove legal impediments and social discrimination faced by

women. During the year, there reportedly was not much

progress made to rectify the problems described in the NGO

report.

Children

Public schools continued to be inadequate, and limited

facilities precluded access to education for many children.

The Constitution's general provisions call for the

Government, "when practical," to provide free, compulsory,

and universal primary education; however, despite the

President's commitment to compulsory education, compulsory

primary education rarely was provided, particularly in the

north (see Section 6.d.). Girls are discriminated against in

access to education for social and economic reasons. The

literacy rate for males is 58 percent but only 41 percent for

females. Rural girls are even more disadvantaged than their

urban counterparts. Only 42 percent of rural girls are

enrolled in school compared with 72 percent of urban girls.

In the north, Muslim communities favor boys over girls in

deciding which children to enroll in secondary and elementary

schools. In the south, economic hardship also restricts many

families' ability to send girls to school and, instead, they

are directed into commercial activities such as trading and

street vending. While the Government increased spending on

children's health in recent years, it seldom enforced even

the inadequate laws designed to protect the rights of

children.





Cases of child abuse, abandoned infants, child prostitution,

and physically harmful child labor practices remained common

throughout the country (see Sections 6.c and 6.d.). Although

the law stipulates that "no child shall be ordered to be

imprisoned," juvenile offenders are incarcerated routinely

along with adult criminals. The Government only occasionally

criticized child abuse and neglect, and it made little effort

to stop customary practices harmful to children, such as the

sale of young girls into marriage (see Section 6.f.). There

were credible reports that poor families sell their daughters

into marriage as a means of supplementing their income.

Young girls often are forced into marriage as soon as they

reach puberty, regardless of age, in order to prevent the

"indecency" associated with premarital sex.





A number of states have adopted Islamic (Shari'a) law in

varying degrees. While most schools in the north

traditionally have separated children by gender, it is now

required by law in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kebbi state schools

(see Section 2.c.).





There was evidence of trafficking in children (see Section

6.f.).





The Federal Government publicly opposes Female Genital

Mutilation (FGM),which is widely condemned by international

health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological

health; however, it has taken no legal action to curb the

practice. (#) A federal law banning FGM is currently before

the National Assembly. Because of the considerable problems

that anti-FGM groups faced at the federal level, most are

refocusing their energies to combat FGM at the state and

local government area (LGA) level. Edo State banned FGM in

October. Ogun, Cross River, Osun, Rivers, and Bayelsa states

banned FGM during the year. However, the punishments imposed

are minimal, in Edo state the punishment is a $10.00 (1,000

Naira) fine and 6 months imprisonment. In addition once a

state legislature criminalizes FGM, NGO's have found that

they must convince the LGA authorities that state laws are

applicable in their districts.





The Women's Centre for Peace and Development (WOPED)

estimated that at least 50 percent of women are mutilated.

Studies conducted by the U.N. Development Systems and the

World Health Organization estimated the FGM rate at

approximately 60 percent. However, according to local

experts, the actual prevalence may be as high as 100 percent

in some ethnic conclaves in the south. While practiced in

all parts of the country, FGM is more predominant in the

southern and eastern zones. Women from Northern states are

less likely to be mutilated; however, those affected are more

likely to undergo the severe type of FGM known as

infibulation. WOPED believes that the practice is

perpetuated because of a cultural belief that uncircumcised

women are promiscuous, unclean, unsuitable for marriage,

physically undesirable, or potential health risks to

themselves and their children, especially during childbirth.

The National Association of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives, The

Nigerian Women's Association, and the Nigerian Medical

Association worked to eradicate the practice and to train

health care workers on the medical effects of FGM; however,

contact with health care workers remains limited.

Nevertheless, most observers agree that the number of females

who are currently subjected to FGM is declining.





Indigenous forms of FGM vary from the simple removal of the

clitoral hood or labia minora to excision of the clitoris and

the most dangerous form, infibulation. The age at which

females are subjected to the practice varies from the first

week of life until after a woman delivers her first child.

The Ministry of Health, women's groups, and many NGO's

sponsored public awareness projects to educate communities

about the health hazards of FGM. The press repeatedly

criticized the practice.





People with Disabilities





While the Government called for private business to institute

policies that ensured fair treatment for the disabled, it did

not enact any laws requiring greater accessibility to

buildings or public transportation, nor did if formulate any

policy specifically ensuring the right of the disabled to

work.





Religious Minorities





The law prohibits religious discrimination; however private

businesses frequently are guilty of informal religious

discrimination in their hiring practices and purchasing

patterns.





Religious differences often correspond to regional and ethnic

differences. For example, the northern region is

overwhelmingly Muslim, as are the large Hausa and Fulani

ethnic groups of the region. Many southern ethnic groups are

predominantly Christian, although the Yoruba are roughly

fifty percent Muslim. Consequently, at times it is difficult

to distinguish between religious or ethnic/regional

discrimination or tension, both of which are pervasive.

Religious tensions underscored what were predominantly ethnic

confrontations throughout the year. The Middle Belt, because

of its particular historical circumstances, has suffered

recurring inter-religious and inter-ethnic violence during

the past two years.





The crisis in Kaduna in February and May 2000 was the first

major Muslim-Christian conflict during Obasanjo's tenure.

Viewed through the ethnic prism, there were numerous

conflicts in Southern Kaduna between smaller ethnic groups

and the Hausa-Fulani who occupied towns, whose names are now

synonymous in Nigeria with the conflicts that occurred there:

Zangon-Kataf, Kachia, and Kafanchan. There has not been a

similar flare up of violence this year due in part to the

government sponsored dialogue between the different faiths

and ethnic groups. For example when two small churches were

partially burned in the northern part of Kaduna city in

October, the fires were put out through the efforts of

Christian and Muslim neighbors, and the State Government

promised funds to repair them.





A violent ethnic crisis erupted in July between the Sayawa

ethnic group and Hausa/Fulani residing in Tafawa Balewa in

southern Bauchi State. Tafawa Balewa is similar to Kafanchan

or Zangon Kataf in Kaduna state in that it is inhabited

primarily by the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, while the indigenous,

non-Muslim, Sayewa ethnic group dominates the land and

villages surrounding the town. It is unclear how the

violence in Tafawa Balewa commenced, but it may have been

related to the proposed introduction of Shari'a law by Bauchi

State. Most casualties--up to one hundred dead and

significant property loss--were Hausa-Fulani. State

authorities acted quickly to prevent a reprisal by

Hausa-Fulani against the Sayewa by calling in the military to

maintain order, but tensions in Tafawa Balewa persists. By

mid-September, most of the Hausa-Fulani had left Tafawa

Balewa.





During the weekend of September 7, violence erupted in the

Jos that eventually claimed more than 2300 lives. It is

unclear how the unrest began, but tensions had risen over the

appointment of an ethnic Hausa to the chairmanship of a local

Poverty Alleviation Program, and earlier violence between

Christian Sayewa and Musim Hausa-Fulani in Tafawa Balewa,

Bauchi, only 60 kilometers away. There were also several

reports of Hausa-Fulanis being summarily killed in outlying

villages. Roughly eighty-percent of the casualties in Jos

were Hausa-Fulani Muslims, who constitute a significant

minority in Jos. The military was able to restore order, but

thousands of Hausas fled Plateau state for Kaduna, Kano,

Jigawa and Bauchi. This conflict appears to have been

primarily ethnic, and secondarily religious. Christians of

different sects were reported to have attacked each other,

and Yoruba Muslims reportedly joined in the killing of their

Hausa co-religionists. The Jos conflict produced

approximately 11,600 internally displaced persons according

to the Nigerian Red Cross.





In October 12, 600 to 1000 Muslims peacefully demonstrated in

Kano against U.S. and allied air strikes against Afghanistan.

However, several hours after the demonstration two small

churches were burned. The following morning, a mob of

predominantly Hausa youth began attacking shopkeepers and

looting shops in city,s major market. The military was

called in to restore order and did so successfully. The

violence appeared to be primarily opportunistic and

criminally inspired but with religious and ethnic overtones,

with gangs trying to foment unrest in order to loot. Churches

and three mosques were reportedly burned during the fighting.

After order was restored, Governor Kwankwaso held a series

of meetings with local ethnic and religious leaders to stem

further outbreaks and to rebuild trust between the

communities.





National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities





The country's population of about 120 million is ethnically

diverse, and consists of more than 250 groups, many of which

speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated

geographically. There is no majority ethnic group. The

three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani of the north,

the Yoruba of the southwest, and the Igbos of the southeast,

together make up about two-thirds of the population. The

Ijaw of the South Delta area, the fourth largest group, claim

a population of 12 million, roughly the same as the Kanuri

population in the far northeast and Tiv population in the

south. Because of the lack of reliable statistics, it is

difficult to determine the populations of the various ethnic

groups.





The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the

Government. In addition the Constitution mandates that the

composition of the federal, state, and local governments and

their agencies, as well as the conduct of their affairs,

reflect the diverse character of the country in order to

promote national unity and loyalty. This provision was

designed as a safeguard against domination of the Government

by persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups.

These provisions were included in response to previous

domination of the Government and the armed forces by

northerners and Muslims. In fact, many argue that the

informal, though immutable rules of regional and ethnic

"zoning" substantially outweigh the Constitution, because

they are the implicit rules by which Nigerians agree to

remain in one nation. The Government of Olusegun Obasanjo

was an example of this diversity. Obasanjo is a Yoruba from

the southwest, the Vice President is a northerner, and the

Senate President is an Igbo. President Obasanjo assiduously

followed the unwritten rules of zoning in making key

appointments: essentially, each state must have at least gets

one minister and one minister of state. While this makes for

an unwieldly cabinet and can make geographic or ethnic

provenance outweigh considerations of competence, this system

can not be dispensed with easily. The political parties also

engaged in "zoning," the practice of rotating positions

within the party among the different regions and ethnicities

to ensure that each region and ethnicity is given adequate

representation. Nonetheless, claims of marginalization by

members of southern minority groups and Igbos continued. The

ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in particular, continued

their calls for high-level representation on petroleum issues

and within the security forces. Northern Muslims, who lost

previously held positions within the military hierarchy,

accused the Obasanjo Government of favoring Christians from

the Middle Belt for those positions. Traditional linkages

continued to impose considerable pressure on individual

government officials to favor their own ethnic groups for

important positions and patronage.





Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is widely

practiced by members of all ethnic groups and is evident in

private sector hiring patterns, de facto ethnic segregation

of urban neighborhoods, and a continuing paucity of marriages

across major ethnic and regional lines. There is a long

history of tension among the diverse ethnic groups (see

Section 1.a.)





Significant inter-ethnic clashes were reported in Delta,

Anambra, Bauchi, Plateau, Nassarawa, Rivers, Benue, Bayelsa,

Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Ebonyi States, often resulting in

fatalities (see Sections 1.a, 5.d).





Competing economic aspirations among smaller ethnic groups

related to the control and powers of subnational governments

occasionally led to violent conflict. This competition is

often expressed in terms of "indigene" versus "immigrant."





The crisis in Jos, despite its religious overtones, was

partially precipitated by indigenous ethnic groups in order

to drive out or deny Hausa-Fulani "immigrants" access to the

resources of Plateau State--even though immigrant Hausa

settlers originally founded Jos.





A recurring conflict over land rights and status continued

for several months between the Tiv, the Kwalla, the Jukun and

the Azara ethnic groups. These groups all reside in or near

the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue and Taraba states. The

Tiv, who are thought to have originated in the East African

highlands, migrated to central Nigeria hundreds of years ago.

Tivs are regarded as interlopers by the "indigenous" ethnic

groups, except in parts of Benue State where the Tiv

predominate. The conflict began in southeastern Nasarawa

state June 12 when Alhaji Musa Ibrahim, a chief of the

Hausa-speaking Azara ethnic group, was assassinated by a

group of local Tiv. Hundreds may have been killed in the

ensuing conflict, which was eventually stopped by the

military, with nearly 30,000 Tiv migrating south to Benue

State. In July, the conflict spread to Taraba State and

involved the Jukun ethnic group attacking the Tiv.

Twenty-five people were reported killed and 25,000 Tiv fled

Taraba for camps on Benue and Nasarawa. Tensions in Makurdi,

Benue State, rose over the influx of Tiv, and nearly resulted

in ethnic conflict there in September.





Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers,

Bayelsa, and Akwa Ibom states, have echoed the Ogoni ethnic

group's claims of environmental degradation and government

indifference to their development in the Delta. Groups such

as the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, and Isoko continued to express

their unhappiness about their perceived economic exploitation

and the environmental destruction of their homelands, and

incidents of ethnic conflict and confrontation with

government forces increased in the delta area, particularly

after the Ijaw Youth Council issued the Kaiama Declaration in

December 1998 (see Section 1.a.). Other ethnic groups saw

the Kaiama Declaration, which claims the entire Delta the

property of the Ijaw, as threatening their rights. Disparate

organizations of youths from a variety of ethnic groups

continued to take oil company personnel hostage in the delta

region (see Section 1.b.). For example, in June, an Ijaw

group took around 60 people hostage at an oil facility at

Bonny Island, Rivers State. The group alleged that the land

where the facility was situated had been obtained illegally.

As a result of this ongoing violence, many oil companies

continued to employ local police, and in some cases military

troops, to protect their facilities and personnel. Local

youths claimed that these "militias" engaged in extrajudicial

killings and other human rights abuses, in some cases with

the support of foreign oil companies (see Section 1.a.).





The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC),an entity

created in October 2000 to increase government resources

committed to the area and grant more local autonomy over

expenditure of these resources, achieved little while plans

to source its financing remained contentiously debated.





Section 6. Worker Rights

The Right of Association





The 1999 Constitution gives all citizens the right to

assemble freely and associate with other persons, and to form

or belong to any trade union or other association. However,

several statutory restrictions on the individual's right of

association, and on trade unions, remain in effect despite

repeals of most military-era anti-labor decrees. These

restrictions include: permitting only a single central labor

federation (the Nigerian Labour Congress); requiring trade

unions to be formally registered by the Federal Government;

requiring a minimum of 50 workers to form a trade union;

recognizing only 29 trade unions; preventing non-management

senior staff from joining registered trade unions; and,

denying senior staff associations a seat on the National

Labor Advisory Council (NLAC). Several of these restrictions

were cited by an ILO committee of experts in 1999. The

government has yet to amend these laws, but has conducted

discussions with senior staff associations concerning formal

recognition and their accession to the NLAC.





Certain categories of Nigerian workers are not permitted to

join trade unions, including members of the armed forces, and

government employees in the police, customs, immigration,

prisons, federal mint, central bank, and telecommunications.

Certain workers engaged in an "essential service" are

required to provide advance notice of a strike. Essential

services include banking, postal services, transportation,

public health, and utilities. Employees working in a

designated export-processing zone may not join a union until

ten years after the start-up of the enterprise.





According to figures provided by the Nigerian Labour

Congress, total union membership is approximately four

million. Less than ten percent of the total work force is

organized. With the exception of a small number of workers

engaged in commercial food processing, the agricultural

sector, which employs the bulk of the work force, is not

organized. The informal sector, and small and medium

enterprises, remain largely unorganized.





Since 1978 the government has mandated a single trade union

structure with service and industrial unions grouped under

the NLC. The trade union movement is composed of two groups

consisting of junior and senior staff workers. The single

trade union structure and segregation of junior from senior

staff were intended by government to dilute labor's

bargaining strength. Junior staff workers--primarily

blue-collar workers--are organized into 29 industrial unions

with a membership of approximately four million persons and

are affiliated with the NLC. Twenty-one associations make up

the senior staff associations of Nigeria, which have renamed

themselves the trade union congress (TUC). The TUC has a

claimed membership of approximately 400,000 to 600,000. The

TUC -- primarily white-collar workers--has not been

officially sanctioned by the government, is prohibited by

statute from affiliating with the NLC. Although it lacks a

seat on the National Labor Advisory Council, the government

has commenced discussions concerning its accession to the

body. Sescan has begun to lay the political groundwork to

achieve government recognition, which will require formal

action by the national assembly.





Strikes occurred in May and June by the doctors and

university professors over wages, working conditions, and

government investment in infrastructure. Both actions were

resolved following lengthy negotiations with the relevant

government ministries, and are significant in that labor

extracted government commitments to budget greater funds for

development of the nation's moribund health and education

infrastructures.





Smaller strikes plagued the oil sector, particularly in the

areas of operation in the Niger delta. The principal issues

raised by NUPENG (National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas

Workers) and its senior staff counterpart PENGASSAN

(Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of

Nigeria) are the increasing use of contract labor and the

number of indigenous workers in management positions.





There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers

and strike leaders. Lagos State Government terminated an

important local union leader in Lagos, ostensibly for

nonperformance, following an extended and acrimonious strike

by state government workers. Strikers who believe that they

are victims of unfair retribution may submit their cases to

the industrial arbitration panel (IAP),with the approval of

the Labor Ministry. The IAP's decisions are legally binding

on the parties but may be appealed to the Nigerian Industrial

Court (NIC). In practice the decisions of these bodies

infrequently carry the force of law. Union representatives

describe the arbitration process as cumbersome and

time-consuming, and an ineffective deterrent to employer

retribution.

B. The right to organize and bargain collectively





The labor laws provide for the right to organize and to

bargain collectively. Collective bargaining occurs

throughout the public sector and organized private sector.

Complaints of anti-union discrimination may be brought to the

Ministry of Labor for resolution. The Labor Minister may

refer unresolved disputes to the IAP and the NIC (see Section

6.a.). Union officials have questioned the effectiveness and

independence of the NIC in view of its refusal in previous

years to resolve various disputes stemming from the

government's failure to fulfill contract provisions for

public sector employees. The NIC was reconstituted this year

with several new members, including a formerly imprisoned

trade unionist, Milton Dabibi. Union leaders have criticized

the arbitration system's dependence on the labor minister's

referrals. The Labor Minister typically makes few referrals

to the IAP. The IAP and NIC are now active following the

government's appointment of new members, but sorely lacking

in resources.





Under the law, a worker under a collective bargaining

agreement may not strike unless his union has met the

requirements of the Trade Disputes Act, including mandatory

mediation and referral of the dispute to the Government. The

act allows the Government in its discretion to refer the

matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel, board of

inquiry, or the National Industrial Court. The Act forbids

any employer from granting a general wage increase to its

workers without prior government approval. In practice,

however, the law is widely ignored. Public and private

sector strikes are widespread, and private sector wage

increases are not submitted to the government for prior

approval.





The government retains broad legal authority over labor

matters and often intervenes in disputes seen to challenge

key political or economic objectives. But the era of

government domination of unions through handpicked "sole

administrators" is now over. The labor movement is

increasingly active and strident on issues affecting the

ordinary worker. During 2001 the Nigeria Labour Congress in

particular has spoken out often on issues ranging from

economic reform, fuel price deregulation, privatization,

globalization, tariffs, corruption, contract workers, and

political issues.





The labor movement in February gathered in Abuja to form a

"civil-society-based" political party, which would feature

strong labor representation. Although the event generated

much interest and attracted senior government attendance,

funding for the party remains a sticking point.





The government has directed each state administration to

establish its own salary structure based on its ability to

pay and in accord with the national minimum wage (see section

6.e.). The government's decision, taken without broad

consultation, caught several states by surprise. Many state

governments have found it difficult to pay the approximately

$60 (6500 Naira) monthly minimum wage to their employees,

without massive layoffs, and the elimination of "ghost

workers."





An export-processing zone (EPZ) is being developed in

Calabar, Cross River State, and a second is planned for Port

Harcourt, Rivers State. Workers and employers in such zones

are subject to national labor laws, which provide for a

ten-year amnesty on trade unions from the startup of an

enterprise. This feature of Nigeria's EPZ framework

attracted negative comment from the ILO.

c. Prohibition of forced or compulsory labor





The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit

forced or compulsory labor. However, trafficking in women

and children for purposes of forced prostitution and forced

labor is a problem (see section 6.f),and enforcement of the

law is not effective.





Although employment of persons under 18 years of age

generally is prohibited, except for agriculture and domestic

work, the government does not specifically prohibit forced

and bonded labor by children. There are occasional reports

of forced child labor, including child slavery rings

operating between Nigeria and neighboring countries (see

sections 5 and 6.f). The reports suggest that Nigerian

children are exported to other African countries for domestic

and agricultural work. Children from neighboring countries

are also imported to Nigeria for work as domestic servants.

d. Status of child labor practices and minimum age for

employment





The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children less

than 15 years of age in commerce and industry, and restricts

other child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic

work. The law states that children may not be employed in

agricultural or domestic work for more than 8 hours per day.

The decree allows the apprenticeship of youths at the age 13

under specific conditions.





Primary education is compulsory, although this requirement

rarely is enforced. Studies indicate declining school

enrollment due to deteriorated public schools and increased

economic pressures on families. The lack of sufficient

primary schools and the high cost of school fees limits many

families' access to education, inducing them to place their

children in the labor market. Economic hardship leads to

high numbers of children in commercial activities aimed at

enhancing meager family income. Children are frequently

employed as beggars, hawkers, and bus conductors in urban

areas. The use of children as domestic servants is common.

According to an ILO statement in 1998, and data from UNICEF,

the incidence of child prostitution is growing (see section

5).





The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1999 constitution prohibit

forced or compulsory labor, a prohibition that extends to

children, although they are not mentioned specifically in the

laws. There continue to be cases of trafficking in children

as indentured servants or for criminal activities such as

prostitution (see section 6.f.).





Private and government initiatives to stem the growing

incidence of child employment exist but are ineffective,

given the size of the problem, and the need for a

well-functioning legal system. UNICEF operates programs that

remove young girls from the street hawking trade and relocate

them to informal educational settings. UNICEF believes it is

only scratching the surface of the problem.





In conjunction with the ILO, the government is building a

national program of action in support of child rights,

survival, protection, development and participation.





The labor ministry has an inspections department whose major

responsibilities include enforcement of legal provisions

relating to conditions of work and protection of workers.

There are less than 50 inspectors for the entire country.

The ministry conducts inspections only in the formal business

sector, in which the incidence of child labor is not

significant.

E. Acceptable conditions of work





The 1974 Labor Decree set a minimum wage, which is reviewed

from time to time. Private sector minimum wages increased

this year to match the 2000 increase in the public sector

wage scale. However, the statutory private sector minimum

wage is irrelevant because real private sector wages greatly

exceed the minimum wage. In early 2001 the national police

went unpaid for several months.





The 1974 Labor Decree calls for a 40-hour workweek, two to

four weeks annual leave, and overtime and holiday pay. The

1974 Labor Decree sets out general health and safety

provisions, some of which are aimed specifically at young or

female workers. It requires that the factory division of the

Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect factories for

compliance with health and safety standards, but this agency

is greatly understaffed, lacks basic resources and training.

In addition, the labor ministry often fails to reimburse

inspectors for expenses incurred in traveling to inspection

sites. Consequently, safety oversight of many enterprises is

widely neglected and safety standards are quite low for

indigenous enterprises.





The Decree requires employers to compensate injured workers

and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial

accidents. The Labor Ministry, which is charged with

enforcement of these laws, has been ineffective in

identifying violators. The government has failed to action

various ILO recommendations since 1991 to update its program

on inspection and accident reporting. The Labor Decree does

not provide workers with the right to remove themselves from

dangerous work situations without loss of employment.

F. Trafficking in persons





No specific law makes trafficking in persons a crime. There

is an active and growing market for trafficking in women and

children within the region and to Europe for illicit

purposes. The full nature and scope of the trade remains

unknown, but is considered extensive. Immigration and police

officials throughout Europe report a steady flow of Nigerian

women entrapped and sold into prostitution in Europe,

particularly Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the Czech

Republic. Italian authorities deported several hundred sex

workers to Nigeria during the year. Other European countries

deported smaller numbers of Nigerian trafficking victims.

Nigerian Police officials claim that Nigerian women, though

seeking emigration for economic reasons, are often recruited

and trafficked to Europe through well-organized trafficking

syndicates run by Nigerian criminals. Evidence shows that

these Nigerian trafficking syndicates use indebtedness,

threats of beatings and/or rape, and threats of violence to

the victim,s family back in Nigeria to keep the trafficked

girls and women enslaved in European sex markets and to

discourage them from seeking assistance from European police

agencies or NGOs.





Nigerian police report that the families of girls and women

often condone their entry into the sex trade. During the

past year, there was at least one documented case of

trafficking in children reported in the Lagos metropolis,

though incidents of trafficking in Lagos and other major

Nigerian cities are suspected to be commonplace. The

absence of more documented reports is believed to be the

result of ineffective enforcement mechanisms, lack of

resources, and weak government commitment. There is evidence

of trafficking of children to the United States and Europe,

mostly for the reunification of children with their

undocumented parents abroad.





Basic economic incentives often underlie child trafficking.

Generally, families who employ children as domestic servants

(a widespread practice in West Africa) also pay their school

fees. Child traffickers receive a monthly payment from the

employer, part of which is to be remitted to the parents of

the indentured child servant. These traffickers take

advantage of a cultural tradition of child fostering, under

which it is culturally acceptable to send a child to live and

work with a more prosperous family in an urban center in

return for educational and vocational advancement.





According to ILO reports, there is an active and extensive

trade in child laborers, some of whom are exported to

Cameroon, Gabon, Benin and Equatorial Guinea to work in

agricultural enterprises. Other children are coerced into

prostitution. Authorities have identified a trade route for

traffickers of children for labor through Katsina and Sokoto

to the Middle East and east Africa. The eastern part of

Nigeria and some southern states such as Cross Rivers and

Akwa Ibom have been the sites of trafficking of children for

labor and, in some cases, human sacrifice. Nigeria remains a

destination for the trafficking of Togolese children. The

ILO issued a report on child trafficking in the region that

identified Nigeria as a source area, destination and transit

area for children trafficking within and the region.





The government has conducted few investigations into the

alleged involvement of government officials in trafficking,

though this involvement reportedly is widespread.





There is draft legislation now under review in the National

Assembly that would make trafficking a crime. There is

government and societal acknowledgement that trafficking in

women is a continuing problem, particularly to Europe.

Police attempts to stem the trafficking of persons are

inadequate and too often focus on the victims of trafficking,

who are often subjected to lengthy detention and public

humiliation upon repatriation to Nigeria. In contrast,

traffickers are almost never identified and punished.





Awareness campaigns, often conducted by spouses of prominent

politicians or non-governmental entities, have only recently

begun to garner widespread attention. There are few

statistics with which to determine if progress is being made

with these campaigns. The development of a reliable,

statistically-valid base for assessing the child trafficking

problem has only recently begun under ILO auspices.





A rare and high-profile arrest of a suspected trafficker

occurred in mid-2001. Bisi Dan Musa, a prominent Lagos

businesswoman and wife of a former Presidential aspirant, was

arrested and charged with 19 counts of &child stealing8

(kidnapping) and slave dealing after 16 children aged between

one and four years old were found in her custody.





In August, 33 Nigerian women and children intercepted in

Conakry, Guinea, were repatriated to Nigeria following the

personal intervention of President Obasanjo. As of this

writing, the Nigerian Government is planning to extradite and

prosecute in Nigeria 15 Nigerian traffickers arrested by

Guinean authorities in connection with the 33 trafficked

women and girl.

Jeter