TFUS01: NIGERIA: DANJUMA'S CONDOLENCES, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002653

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF/RA:BITTRICK
NSC FOR FRAZER AND MILLER, MCLEAN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2011
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR CG BY NI
SUBJECT: TFUS01: NIGERIA: DANJUMA'S CONDOLENCES, THE
MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP AND AFRICA PKO OPERATIONS


REF: ABUJA 2562


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by DATT,
PolMilOff and DOD Colonel Terry Tidler called on Defense
Minister Danjuma October 10 (COL I.D. Pennap, Personal Staff
Officer to the Minister, also attended). Offering his
condolences on September 11, Danjuma revealed that he had
instructed the Chief of Army Staff to update contingency
plans for Abuja. The MOD was noncommittal whether Nigeria
would renew MPRI for 2002. He asked the DATT to discuss
UNAMSIL rotation options with the Chief of Defense Staff.
Nigeria continued to prepare for a Congo peacekeeping
mission, and was preparing to support, but not lead, a
Burundi mission. END SUMMARY.


===============================
MPRI - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE
===============================



2. (U) During a discussion of the upcoming MPRI
In-Progress-Review (which took place on October 12 - septel),
Ambassador Jeter emphasized that MPRI was at a critical
juncture. MPRI's reform assistance was clearly important to
Nigeria's military institutions, but could only be effective
if embraced by the MOD and Services. The Minister agreed,
noting that he and the Service Chiefs would make their joint
recommendation to the President based on the
In-Progress-Review (IPR). He agreed to attend a Presidential
meeting with Generals Saint and Vuono of MPRI, which we hope
to have the week of October 22.


===============
OFR - GOOD NEWS
===============



3. (C) Ambassador Jeter remarked that Operation Focus Relief
Phase 3 (OFR P3) was going exceptionally well. The Army was
providing outstanding support to the DATT and the 3rd Special
Forces Trainers. Clearly pleased, Danjuma declined a trip to
one of the base camps for fear of helicopters, but agreed to
visit the FOB in Abuja with the Ambassador soon. Raising the
MOI, the Ambassador told Danjuma we still awaited the pending
signature or a Nigerian response. The MOD Legal Department
had, for some unknown reason, sent the document to the
Nigerian Defense Intelligence Agency, Jeter explained.
Danjuma, incredulous, could not understand why the Legal
Department transmitted the MOI to DIA, but stated he would
get an answer to us soon. Danjuma stated that he had already
seen the 505 Note, and was confused why it had also not been
completed. He directed Pennap to "chase it."


=================
UNAMSIL ROTATIONS
=================



4. (C) Ambassador Jeter informally asked Danjuma if Nigeria
might consider a 6-month rotation for one of the units now
entering UNAMSIL, with the goal of getting the third OFR P3
battalion into Sierra Leone by April. Danjuma, not willing
to supercede planning by the Services, suggested the DATT
raise the question with the Chief of Defense Staff.


========================
THE WORD ON DROC/BURUNDI
========================



5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about
peacekeeping commitments, Danjuma explained that Nigeria was
committed to send troops to Congo and had designated a unit.
However, delays in reaching a settlement in the DROC had
caused them to stand down. Having served in the Congo in the
1960's, President Obasanjo felt a strong connection and was
committed to participate when a mission began.



6. (C) On Burundi, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and one other
country (Danjuma could not remember which),had begun
discussions on a possible peacekeeping mission. The planning
meetings, which Danjuma expected to conclude soon, would
determine the size of the contingents, and dates of possible
deployment. Deployment might begin in the near future, but
Nigeria would be last to deploy in any rotation. Troops from
Southern African countries should lead since Nigeria was not
sufficiently familiar with the area, Danjuma reasoned.


=========
TERRORISM
=========



7. (C) The meeting concluded with a brief discussion on
terrorism. Danjuma said that unfortunately globalization and
information technology had afforded the terrorists as much
propaganda capacity as the West. He also expressed concern
that the Al-Qa'ida and associated organizations would stop at
nothing to drag ordinary Nigerians into the conflict.
Ambassador Jeter contended that Nigeria's greatest
vulnerability was its oil and natural gas facilities in the
Delta. Actually, said Danjuma, "We worry about Abuja."
Explaining that Abuja had an open and excellent road system,
which was essentially "deserted" at night, Danjuma had tasked
Chief of Army Staff LTG Ogomudia to update Army contingency
plans for the capital.



8. (C) COMMENT: Recently back from a long vacation in Spain,
Danjuma appeared refreshed. This boded well for the
MPRI/IPR, but even after good, open and frank discussions, it
remains unclear whether the Ministry and Services will
support another round of the program. While Danjuma's
mentioning of Abuja as the greatest security concern in the
aftermath of September 11 seems out of step with mainstream
senior GON thinking, we are nonetheless heartened that he is
taking precautions to guard the city and, by extension, the
Embassy. END COMMENT.



9. (C) Freetown minimize considered.
Jeter