NIGERIA: VIOLENCE ERUPTS IN KANO, ELSWHERE CALM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002622

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2006
TAGS: ASEC PREL PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: VIOLENCE ERUPTS IN KANO, ELSWHERE CALM

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) &
(d)



1. (C) Summary: Violence erupted in Kano over the October
12-14 weekend for a
multiplicity of reasons, chiefly criminal opportunism and
internal political
rivalries but also including anti-U.S. sentiment over air
strikes against the
Taliban and bin Laden. Twenty-five people were killed, over
200 were arrested
and numerous buildings (mostly shops) were damaged and
looted, according to a
reliable GON source. (Some other sources claim a death toll
exceeding 100.)
The source reports that Kano is quiet but tense. The
military remains in
control of security. This violent scrum is evidence of the
febrile air
hovering over parts of Northern Nigeria. While the military
may provide the
short-term fix, the Obasanjo Administration will have to ply
a sagacious poli
tical strategy to minimize tension or this type of eruption
will be a recurrent
theme. Amcits are safe and none were reportedly caught up in
any of the
clashes. End summary.


--------------
PEACEFUL MARCH, VIOLENT AFTERMATH
--------------



2. (C) After Juma'at prayers October 11, a planned
demonstration of 500-600
protestors, apparently affiliated with the Muslim
Brotherhood, left the Central
Mosque, reportedly chanting anti-U.S. and pro-Bin Laden
slogans. They burned
U.S. flags as well as pictures of President Bush and Foreign
Minister Lamido
who, earlier this week, issued the official GON public
statement supporting
U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan. The protestors attempted to
march towards
Sabon Gari, Kano's predominantly Christian section, but were
thwarted by
police. By 6 PM, the group dispersed without serious
incident. (Comment:
Sparks likely would have flown had the procession reached
Sabon Gari.
Demonstrators knew the potential repercussions of heading in
that area -
indicating they were not averse to confrontation. End
Comment.)



3. (U) Around midnight, roughly six hours after the march
had ended, two small
churches were burned on Kano's outskirts. Around ten a.m. on
Saturday, a large
mob of Muslim "area boys," started toward Kano's largest
market, which lies on
the edge of Sabon Gari. Both Christian and Muslim
shopkeepers attempted to
defend their shops, according to Rev. Zakka Nyam, the
Anglican Archbishop if
Kano. Nyam stated that the thugs did not push into Sabon
Gari even though two
mosques in Sabon Gari were burned in retaliation for the
earlier church arson.



4. (U) By 3 p.m., with the police unable to stifle the
melee, the military
arrived to restore order. The military's use of live
ammunition eventually
dispersed the mob.



5. (U) After contacting several GON sources and eminent
people in Kano, Rev.
Obaje, Chaplain at the Presidential Villa and Chairman of
Nigeria's
Inter-Religious Council, told Ambassador Jeter October 14
that Kano was quiet
but tense. By the time the unrest subsided, 25 people had
died, many more were
wounded, over 200 had been arrested and dozens of shops and
cars had been
damaged. The VOA stringer in Kano, Ahmed Kuablar, confirmed
the extensive
property damage to Poloff, but estimated a death toll
exceeding 100, far beyond
the GON figure. How many casualties resulted from the
military intervention
and the ethnic/religious proportions of the casualty count
are currently
unknown.


--------------
WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
--------------



6. (C) There is no consensus as to what precipitated the
rioting. Rev. Obaje
informed us that many of the arrested were recently imported
to Kano from
Zamfara and Minna. Some claimed their trips to Kano were
subsidized.
Rev. Obaje saw an evil scheme afoot and former Head-of-State
Babangida as its
author. Babangida, he inveighed, would venture to extreme
lengths to discredit
Obasanjo in the North, and keep Obasanjo's Administration
"off balance". Rev.
Obaje contended that the disruption was not directed against
the United
States. He believed Babangida had shipped in ruffians from
outside as well as
funneled money to Kano's militant fundamentalists so they
could incite the area
boys. Obaje complained that Zamfara Governor Sani contributed
to the tumult be
cause of his political blood feud with NSA Aliyu Mohammed, a
native of
Zamfara. Rev. Obaje said Mohammed had been trying to
engineer Sani's
impeachment by the Zamfara State Assembly. Once Sani got
wind of the NSA's
intrigue, the governor has gone into full rebellion,
believing Mohammed's antics bore Obasanjo's imprimatur. Sani
wanted to see Kano ignite, giving Mohammed and, by extension,
the Federal Government a taste of their own machinations.



7. (U) Other observers saw the destruction as nothing but
opportunism devoid
of any religious or political content. Rev. Nyam, Kano's
Anglican Archbishop,
stated the rioting was criminally motivated and not the
product of ethnic or
religious difference.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



8. (C) The truth probably lies somewhere between these two
contending
positions. Not surprisingly, the President's Chaplain would
demonize Babangida
and Sani, two of his chief's most chronic political
migraines. Meanwhile,
Nyan's verdict of pure criminality is too facile and
simplistic.



9. (C) An Amcit in Kano reported that the days before the
outbreak, Bin Laden
posters had appeared throughout Kano. Groups of young men
could be seen
huddled together on street corners praising Bin Laden. Others
were passing out
pro-Bin Laden literature or his picture. One in every four
vehicles plying
Kano's streets had Bin Laden's picture in the rear window.
Clearly there was
significant sympathy for Bin Laden, probably born of long
held resentment
toward the United States and as a show of Islamic solidarity.
As we have
reported before, there is widespread perception in some areas
of the North that
predate September 11, that the United States is both
anti-North and anti-Islamic



10. (C) Conditions in Kano are too complex to attribute the
riot to a single
cause. Kano, a city of millions and Nigeria's largest
predominantly Muslim
one, has large swaths of people living in abject poverty.
While their penury
may be a socio-economic affliction, some view the world and
their condition in
it through a religious prism. For them, their poverty is the
product of an
unholy, unjust system of which the United States sits at the
pinnacle. There
are several militant clerics, many externally financed
"cultural organizations"
and some fundamentalist cells who feed this anti-U.S. gruel
to the disaffected,
particularly the street youth. In their twisted cosmology,
their criminal acts
are legitimate political and religious behavior. This
radicalism makes Kano
more susceptible to sporadic turbulence than most other
Nigerian cities.



11. (C) Our operation in Afghanistan aggravated a
pre-existing condition in
the city. While criminality, poverty, and local political
machinations
probably played the much larger role, that the disturbance
occurred after
Friday prayers and after the anti-U.S. march was probably not
coincidental.
Anti-U.S. sentiment and religious militancy were lesser,
junior partners in this
eruption. Fortunately, GON security gained control before
the situation
worsened. Thus far, there are no reports of violence
spreading to other
Northern cities. While deployment of the military may
squelch turbulence in
the short-term, the GON will have to develop a political
strategy that begins
to neutralize the radicalism currently residing in pockets of
the North. If
not, President Obasanjo will continually face these periodic
eruptions that
blemish his stewardship and undermine Nigeria's quest for
social stability
based on ethno-religious tolerance.
Jeter