NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED DISCUSSES SUDAN, DRC, BURUNDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002562 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RA AND AF/E DEPT ALSO PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY DANFORTH LONDON, PARIS, ROME, OSLO FOR AFRICA WATCHERS CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT NSC FOR FRAZER AND MILLER DIA FOR J.GERHARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2011 TAGS: PREL KPKO CG SU BY NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED DISCUSSES SUDAN, DRC, BURUNDI REF: A. ABUJA 2113 ¶B. ABUJA 2560 (U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by PolCouns and PolMilOff, called on NSA Aliyu Mohammed on October 8. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sule Lamido, the Governor of Kaduna State, Alhaji Ahmed Mohammed Makarfi, Adobe Obe, an advisor to President Obasanjo, and LTC Idris, the NSA's Military Advisor also attended. This message covers their conversation on the Sudan peace process, and Nigeria's mediation efforts on the DROC and Burundi. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The NSA conveyed a message passed to President Obasanjo from Sudanese Minister al-Din requesting the U.S. suspend unilateral sanctions on Sudan. Mohammed explained Nigeria's plan to host conferences of Southern and Northern Sudanese leaders in Abuja next month. The NSA made a strong case for U.S.-Nigeria cooperative efforts to achieve peace in Sudan. On Congo, after an initial attempt at a meeting with Kabila, Bemba and Onusumba failed due to logistical snafus, Nigeria now was working on a second meeting. Finally, the NSA briefly discussed a possible peacekeeping mission in Burundi, and told us that an ailing Mandela had asked Obasanjo to take over as mediator. END SUMMARY. ======================= SUDAN - TOO MANY COOKS? ======================= ¶3. (C) The NSA informed Ambassador Jeter that, during a recent meeting, the Sudanese Minister of Peace, Dr. Ghazi Salah al-Din, had asked President Obasanjo to appeal to President Bush to waive U.S. unilateral sanctions against Sudan (due for renewal on 4 November, according to the NSA). The NSA believed that lifting the sanctions would help the peace process. Mohammed believed Sudan was making an effort to be on the right side of the war against terrorism and was seeking to engage bilaterally with many countries, including the U.S. FM Lamido agreed, noting that Sudan appeared to be under "a new dispensation." The NSA added that al-Din had suggested Special Envoy Senator Danforth travel to Abuja to meet with President Obasanjo when Danforth makes his first trip to Sudan. President Obasanjo would welcome a meeting with Senator Danforth, either before or after he travels to Sudan, the NSA interjected. ¶4. (C) The NSA outlined Nigeria's approach to facilitating the peace process. Nigeria planned to hold two simultaneous conferences in Abuja from 12 to 17 November: one to get the fractious Southern leaders to a common position; the other for the Northern leaders. Once both groups had achieved a workable degree of internal cohesion, the two conferences would be brought under one tent. The goal was to reach a cessation of hostilities, and to come to agreement on a "united Sudan" that would grant significant autonomy to the South through a federation, "like Nigeria's." On matters of health, education and development, the component states would have significant decision-making powers, but in foreign affairs and monetary policy, Khartoum would be paramount, Lamido noted. The Carter Center, the office of the UN Secretary General, Libya, and other interested African states SIPDIS would be invited to have observers at the conference, particularly Sudan's neighbors. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Jeter asked if Sudan were willing to discuss self-determination. Lamido responded that self-determination was a "complicated phrase," and that a more palatable term for Khartoum was "autonomy." Both Lamido and Mohammed contended that some neighboring states had self-interested agendas which they were pushing to the detriment of peace in Sudan. Some states were complicating matters by using phrases like self-determination that only stoked the passions of hard-liners on both sides of the North-South divide. In this regard, it was important to keep the headstrong Garang from acting like a choleric jack-in-the-box who could up-end the entire process. Conversely, the NSA explained, Nigeria had no ulterior motives but was merely seeking to provide a venue where discussions could take place and was seeking the support of the UN, U.S. and EU for this effort. (COMMENT: The statement about pristine non-interest does not entirely ring true. Nigeria is trying to cast itself as an important catalyst in African diplomacy. Moreover, with an Islamic North that usually wields national power and a fractious Christian South, there is a certain impressionistic similarity between the two states that beckons to the Nigerians as they grapple with their own internal conflicts. END COMMENT.) ======================= DROC - A MISSED MEETING ======================= ¶6. (C) The NSA stated that "Baby Kabila" (as President Obasanjo calls him) briefly had visited Nigeria for a meeting with Bemba, Onusumba and President Obasanjo on October 2. However, the other two were no shows. Recounting the events that led to the abortive meeting, the NSA explained that Onusumba had been unable to make an airline connection from Brussels. Bemba had therefore decided not to come to Abuja, fearing he would be accused of striking a secret deal if he met Kabila alone. Kabila had a short meeting with President Obasanjo. Meanwhile, all three agreed to try again. The GON hoped to arrange the discussions for 12-13 October. ¶7. (C) Responding to Ambassador Jeter's question whether the NSA expected any breakthrough, the NSA struck a much more positive note about President Kabila than in the past (Ref A). The NSA described Kabila as intelligent and as having a vision for his country that would lead him to make compromises. However, the NSA cautioned, the Kabila government only controlled Kinshasa and its environs. Additionally, Kabila was surrounded by his father's henchmen who did not embrace all of Kabila the Younger's more progressive ways. ================================== BURUNDI - A NEW ROLE FOR OBASANJO? ================================== ¶8. (C) Ambassador Jeter asked whether President Obasanjo had asked the National Assembly's permission to send troops to Burundi, as reported in the Nigerian press. The NSA stated that Burundi had sought Nigeria's assistance, and thus Army Minister Batagarawa had visited Burundi the previous week. As a result, Nigeria, along with two other countries (South Africa and possibly Senegal),were considering sending peacekeeping forces there. Obasanjo needed approval from the Nigerian legislature. More significantly, the NSA stated that President Mandela had asked President Obasanjo to take over his role as mediator. (COMMENT: Obasanjo himself later told Ambassador Jeter, however, that he would not take over Mandela's role but would work more closely with Mandela on the Burundi problem than he has done in the past. END COMMENT). ¶9. (C) Lamido observed that President Mandela was "tiring and not well" and wanted out of the process but did not want his exit to create a vacuum in the peace process. Thus Mandela had to seek a personality with high stature to fill his role. The NSA did not indicate if President Obasanjo had agreed to Mandela's request. (COMMENT: During a later conversation, the SA to the Army Minister told PolMilOff that he and his Minister had in fact met in Arusha last week. He was jetting off with his Minister (Lawal Batagarawa) to meet again with the same cast of characters, this time on October 11 in Pretoria. He expected a Head of State meeting would take place in South Africa in the near future, but was unsure who would attend. END COMMENT.) ¶10. (C) COMMENT: In its quest to be a preeminent Continental actor, Nigeria continues to play a useful role, such as the recently negotiated Abuja agreement on Zimbabwe, and has had some successes, such as the recently negotiated peace in Sierra Leone. ¶11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: NSA Mohammed clearly signaled Nigeria's willingness to work with us on Sudan. Washington and Abuja's interests in Sudan generally coincide. In tandem, we could do much to advance the process as well as to demonstrate the utility of a stronger U.S.-Nigeria partnership in Continental peacekeeping matters. ¶12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: If we do not work together, this will complicate the Sudanese process and throw dirt on the foreign policy aspect of our bilateral relationship. Working with Nigeria will also lessen the perception that our latest efforts in Sudan are faith-based and perhaps even anti-Islamic, a perception that we must assiduously guard against at this time. Consequently, it would be extremely useful for Senator Danforth to meet President Obasanjo soon in order to coordinate efforts on the Sudan, preferably before the Senator travels to Khartoum. END COMMENT. Jeter