C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002560

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR INL


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2011
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN KCRM NI
SUBJECT: TFUS01: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED ON TERRORISM


REF: A. STATE 170698

B. STATE 175419

C. STATE 170551

D. ABUJA 2521


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by PolCouns and
PolMilOff, called on NSA Aliyu Mohammed on October 8. Foreign
Minister, Sule Lamido, Kaduna Governor Makarfi, Adobe Obe,
Foreign Affairs advisor to President Obasanjo, and LTC Idris
also attended. This message covers their conversation on
U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism,
including anti-money laundering efforts and the upcoming
bilateral law enforcement meeting. Segments on Sudan, DRC
and Burundi are covered septel.



2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The NSA stated the GON would make a
supportive public statement on U.S. military actions the
afternoon of October 8 (which was done). He took note of the
need for MLAT ratification and the urgent need to bolster
Nigeria's anti-money laundering legal regime. While
supportive of a change in venue for the bilateral law
enforcement meeting, the NSA stated the Minister of Justice
had the final word. END SUMMARY.


===============================
Bin Laden and the U.S. Response
===============================



3. (C) After summarizing his October 7 conversation with
President Obasanjo about the impending military strikes, the
Ambassador emphasized to the NSA that U.S. actions had been
and would continue to be measured. Moreover, the action
against Taliban military targets were coupled with large
dollops of humanitarian support for the Afghani people.
Describing generally the information contained Ref A as
strong evidence of the complicity of Bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida
in the September 11 infamy and previous attacks against the
U.S., the Ambassador stressed that the global reach of the
organization threatened all nations, including Nigeria. NSA
Mohammed, noting that Bin Laden had struck in Africa before
he struck in America, stated that the GON took the threat
seriously. Now that "the heat is on these groups," he was
concerned they would "melt into Af

rica" where the borders
were porous and the banking system lacked controls. President
Obasanjo was talking to other African Heads of State about
the need to improve their abilities to counter this threat,
Mohammed remarked.



4. (C) Ambassador Jeter recalled that one of the September 11
terrorists had apparently been in Nigeria. The NSA responded
the Nigerian visa in the terrorist's passport was a forgery.
Noting that the passport also bore entry and exit stamps, the
Ambassador remarked that the question of why Nigerian travel
entries were in the passport at all needed to be answered.
Shifting the focus from the Ambassador's inquiry, the NSA
offered that the GON would make a statement endorsing the
U.S. military actions. Thanking the NSA, Ambassador Jeter
urged that the statement explicitly tie our action to the
right to self-defense as contained in the UN Charter.
(COMMENT: Press reports on the statement do not mention
reference to the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the statement is
supportive, reiterating that the U.S. is targeting
terrorists, not innocent Muslims. END COMMENT.)


====================================
COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS IN NIGERIA
====================================



5. (C) Discussing Nigeria's counter-terrorism apparatus, the
NSA explained that he chaired a weekly meeting of the Nigeria
Intelligence Agency, the State Security Service and the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Special Nigerian "Task
Force" that has been mentioned in previous reporting.
Additionally, his office was developing a seminar for the
police, customs, immigration, and port officials to increase
awareness of the threat of terrorism. A second seminar was
also being arranged to raise awareness of officials at the
local and state levels. Separately, the President planned to
establish an interagency National Security Commission, but
this would be designed to handle internal security matters
only, such as preventing inter-communal conflicts.


===========================
FAFT - STILL NOT GETTING IT
===========================



6. (C) Remarking that preventing money laundering was
cardinal in the fight against terrorism, the Ambassador
pointed out that Nigeria, decertified by the FATF, was now on
a list of non-compliant countries (Ref C). The current
money-laundering regime, which focused only on monies derived
from the narcotics trade, was insufficient to combat the
financial arm of terrorism. The bank regulatory system was
weak and there was no way to track the funds flowing through
Nigeria, Jeter noted. Moreover, Nigeria had tarried in
responding to the FATF questionnaire. Nigeria needed to move
decisively to cure these flaws in order to maintain its
position in the vanguard against terrorism, the Ambassador
asserted.



7. (C) Surprised the FATF questionnaire had not been
answered, the NSA promised to get the relevant departments to
quickly complete the task. He also requested our help in
identifying the curative measures Abuja must take to overcome
the decertification. The NSA rushed to mention that the
President's plan for an agency to deal with financial crimes
(the Financial Crimes Commission) was being vetted by the
Federal Executive Council (Cabinet) and then would be passed
to the National Assembly for approval. The process should be
completed by year's end, Mohammed offered.



8. (C) In an attempt to save face, the NSA complained Nigeria
had thus far received "zero support from the U.S." to recover
the Abacha funds. Ambassador Jeter responded that the
Embassy's LEGATT was working with his GON counterpart. Now
that forensic documents had been shared with Washington, he
hoped progress would be visible soon. However, Nigeria had
not ratified the 1989 MLAT, which the U.S. ratified in early

2001. The MLAT would ease cooperation in this area, the
Ambassador contended. The NSA, noting that the U.S. took
over 10 years to ratify the treaty, said, "Our Senate will do
it in three months."


=================================
BILATERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MEETING
=================================



9. (C) Explaining that the U.S. law enforcement community's
attention was focused on counter-terrorism, the Ambassador
told the NSA that the U.S. hoped to shift the venue for the
November bilateral law enforcement meeting to Washington.
The NSA stated that he understood but must remain officially
neutral as a venue change would have to be agreed to by the
Minister of Justice.



10. (C) COMMENT: The GON continues to privately and publicly
support U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Recent events have
clearly focused the attention of this government on its own
needs to address this threat. Inertia and lack of
communication and coordination between Ministries
notwithstanding, we will keep pressing and hope to see some
action from the GON, particularly on the money laundering
front. Due to President Obasanjo's penchant for regional
initiatives, we expect that, through ECOWAS or an ad hoc
grouping of African nations, Obasanjo will push for a
political consensus to restrict the ability of terrorists to
operate in the sub-region. END COMMENT.
Jeter