NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON UNAMSIL ROTATIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002451 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2011 TAGS: PREL MASS MARR KPKO SL NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON UNAMSIL ROTATIONS, 505 AGREEMENT REF: A. STATE 143583 ¶B. ABUJA 2117 ¶C. ABUJA 2289 ¶D. STATE 151930 ¶E. ABUJA 2218 ¶F. ABUJA NI 228 ¶G. STATE 141654 ¶H. ABUJA 2448 Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.5 (b/d) ¶1. (C) CDA Andrews, accompanied by DATT, called on Minister of Defense Danjuma 25 September. After the Minister offered his personal condolences on the attacks against the U.S., and CDA offered his condolences for the victims of the Jos riot, he raised the USG request that Nigeria adjust its troop rotations for UNAMSIL (Refs A-F). Danjuma stated that when he returned from his vacation, he was told of the meeting between Ambassador Jeter and the President and informed that the President had agreed to keep one battalion in Sierra Leone until January. However, Danjuma explained, the MOD had reviewed this and the subsequent request (that Nigeria not replace one battalion leaving Sierra Leone in September),and had determined that the MOU between Nigeria and the UN that governs Nigeria's participation in UNAMSIL did not permit the GON to meet the U.S. request. He added that he had briefed the President on his analysis, and the President had agreed that Nigeria could not make the change without UN consent. The President had agreed to send a letter to the Ambassador explaining this position, and Danjuma provided a copy of the letter. (Text of the letter to Ambassador Jeter, which Embassy has yet to receive in original, is at para. 7.) ¶2. (C) If UNDPKO approached the GON and made the request, would the GON reconsider, Andrews asked? Danjuma replied that Nigeria had already begun to rotate troops, and that some had been airborne (over the Ivory Coast) when told to return (following our initial requests). Danjuma said, "The troops have been at the two airports ready to go for two weeks. I would not want to face them. I would not want to explain to them the kind of game we're playing." When Andrews asked the timing of the planned September rotations, Danjuma was unsure, explaining that that information was with the Chief of Defense Staff. (DATT COMMENT: 65 Battalion rotation began on 17 September but was summarily cancelled and troops called back. The cancellation does not support a Nigeria/UN agreement either, since rotating units after one 
year is a general policy. END DATT COMMENT.) ¶3. (C) Turning to OFR P3, Andrews explained that the 505 Agreement between the U.S. and Nigeria signed in September 2000 would have to be amended to cover some equipment being transferred in Phase 3 (Ref. H). Andrews explained that the MFA had forwarded the Embassy's Note and the proposed response to the Minister's office for approval, which was required urgently. Danjuma said he had not seen the documents. (COMMENT: CDA provided the Minister with another copy. END COMMENT) ¶4. (C) Andrews then told Danjuma that he had been to see the Air Force Minister, Dan Chuke, to request a blanket clearance for medical evacuation in light of OFR P3. (Ref G). Danjuma was unsure if even he could approve such a request, let alone the Air Force, and opined that the request might have to be forwarded to the Presidency for a decision. (DATT COMMENT: MOD was the next stop after seeing Air Force Operations and the Air Force Minister. END DATT COMMENT.) ¶5. (C) Finally, Andrews noted that former PDAS-D McConnell was planning a trip to Nigeria soon, and that OFR and MPRI FY02 would be on his agenda. Andrews noted that Nigeria still had not paid the outstanding $320K for MPRI FY01. Danjuma seemed mildly surprised that the outstanding payment remained an issue. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Its seems clear that MOD and DHQ have driven the reversal of the President's decision to support the initial USG request. Nigerian soldiers are poorly paid, and UN PKO deployments mean equipment and additional salary. The Minister's concerns about informing expectant soldiers that they will not deploy and will not receive additional income are unfortunate but understandable. It is unlikely that the GON would reconsider this position, or would have the ability to reconsider it (due to bureaucratic inertia) in time before rotations occur. The two battalions rotating in (73 and 65) are the units that were originally scheduled for training in OFR P1 but were replaced because of logistical/basing issues. With these two Nigerian battalions rotating in now, there may be room under the UNAMSIL troop ceiling for only two of the three Nigerian battalions being trained in OFR P3. END COMMENT. ¶7. (C) Begin Text: 21 September 2001 UNAMSIL TROOP DEPLOYMENT I write in respect of your meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo on 24 August, 2001 during which you conveyed a proposal from your Government concerning the rotation of Nigerian battalions participating in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). On that occasion, as might be recalled, the President was positively disposed to the US suggestion that one of the Nigerian battalions expected to be rotated out in September be kept until January ¶2002. A further request was subsequently made on behalf of your Government that the Nigerian battalion to be rotated out of Sierra Leone should not be replaced. I am to inform you however the His Excellency's attention has been drawn to the fact that Nigeria's participation in UNAMSIL is governed by conditions spelt out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between it and the United Nations (UN). This agreement requires certain steps be taken before a contributing country can increase or decrease its troop size in UNAMSIL. It will therefore be understood that it will not be proper at this stage for Nigeria to change the composition of its forces in UNAMSIL, as this will amount to unilateral abrogation of the MOU. accordingly, it has been decided that the rotation of Nigerian battalions in UNAMSIL should proceed along the lines earlier arranged with the UN and it is hoped that you will appreciate the difficulty in acceding to the request of the US Government. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and personal esteem. /sgd/ Ambassador A.O. Esan, Ag. Chief of Staff to the President, C-In-C cc: Honorable Minister of Defense Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs End Text ¶8. (U) Freetown minimize considered. Andrews