NIGERIA SECURITY AND STABILITY ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002421

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2006
TAGS: PREL ASEC PTER XA
SUBJECT: NIGERIA SECURITY AND STABILITY ASSESSMENT

REF: A. (A) ABUJA 2347

B. (B) SECSTATE 162454


Classified by CDA Tim Andrews for reasons 1.5 (d).



1. (C) Summary: The likelihood of ethnic or religious unrest
in Nigeria in the wake of an eventual U.S. response to the
September 11 acts of terror is high. Such unrest would not
necessarily be targeted at American individuals or
institutions, but American lives and property could be at
risk. Tensions here remain elevated following recent events
in Jos (Ref. A) and Wukari. Demonstrations--either in favor
of or opposing U.S. military actions--could spark renewed
ethno-religious fighting, especially in the Middle Belt, but
potentially almost anywhere. Major Muslim religious leaders
here have unequivocally condemned the attacks on the U.S.
However, many Muslims will be angered over any U.S. reprisal
attack that affects fellow Muslims, especially if there are
significant civilian casualties. Some Muslims can be expected
to stage protests, as they did during the Gulf War and
following our reprisals for the Embassy bombings in 1998.
The GON is willing to protect U.S. diplomats and
installations in Abuja and Lagos, but its ability to do so is
not unlimited. Outside of Abuja and the Lagos Islands, the
GON's means of controlling civil unrest are even less robust.
Recently, the GON has managed to quell serious unrest in Jos
only with the assistance of the military, and then after a
substantial loss of life. End Summary.



2. (C) Nigeria, independent of events in the U.S., has just
suffered another paroxysm of ethno-religious conflict, this
time in normally peaceful Jos (Ref. A). There is always a
potential for violent unrest in Nigeria in those places where
there exist longstanding ethnic or religious disputes. In
the past two years, Kaduna, Abia, Lagos, Nassarawa, Bauchi,
Taraba and now Plateau States have witnessed civil unrest of
varying degrees that has resulted in a substantial number of
deaths and sometimes provoked reprisals elsewhere. Many
Nigerians and expatriates believe that recent violence in Jos
was exacerbated by the terror attacks in the U.S. Whether
that assessment is accurate or not is almost immaterial; the
fact that it is so widely believed creates a potential
danger. Protests over U.S. reprisal attacks could spark a
new round of fighting, there or elsewhere.



3. (C) The most likely venues for large-scale protests in
the North would be Kano, Gusau, in Zamfara State and Kaduna
and Zaria in Kaduna State. Protests could also materialize
in other places, including Jos, Suleja or Abuja. With
political jockeying toward the 2002 and 2003 electoral cycles
underway, members of one party could accuse supporters of
another of having organized an anti-American protest in order
to discredit the second party. There have already been
several apparently fictitious reports in Nigerian and
international media (septel).



4. (C) We believe GON security forces would be able to
contain any demonstration within the parts of Abuja
frequented by official Americans. The potential for civil
unrest in response to a U.S. reprisal is highest in Kano
because it is the largest predominantly Muslim city in the
country, and is home to local and transnational Muslim
radicals who may try to incite crowds to protest a USG
military action. After fuel-price demonstrations 15 months
ago left several dead, the Kano State Government, in
conjunction with the Emir of Kano, the National Police Force
and the SSS, has worked successfully to prevent large-scale
demonstrations and their associated violence. It is unclear,
however, that they would be able to prevent, or to control, a
spontaneous demonstration in the Old City of Kano in response
to U.S. retaliation.



5. (C) The Old City could easily produce a spontaneous
protest numbering in the tens of thousands. USAID/ OTI is
closing its office in Kano and turning over the lease and
equipment to the African Development Foundation in
conjunction with OTI closeout in Nigeria. The USAID/OTI Kano
office was the target of peaceful protests by some Muslims
after a Johns Hopkins family planning program met the
disapproval of local Imams. Even though it will no longer be
a USAID facility after September 30, most Kano residents will
not know that its status has changed. Moreover, ADF is also
an entity of the USG. While this office is a good distance
from the Old City, it could again become the target of
protests, as it is the only institution identified with the
USG north of Abuja. The British Council maintains a large
premises in the Old City of Kano, and that building could be
a target of protests.



6. (C) Gusau is a likely spot for anti-American protests,
but at present there is only one American there, a priest.
It is unlikely that the Zamfara state government would permit
a protest that would target the Catholic church in Gusau,
because Governor Sani does not want the public-relations
problems that would ensue. However, political demonstrations
in Gusau have sometimes turned violent there because of
fierce political rivalries. Zaria, the capital of Islamic
learning in Nigeria and home of the Nigerian Muslim
Brotherhood, would likely see some protests centered on
Ahmadu Bello University. There is at least one AmCit in
Zaria.



7. (C) While small protests in Sokoto are possible, there
are few Americans who might be targeted. The Sultan of
Sokoto has publicly condemned the terrorist attack on several
occasions, and would likely work with Governor Bafarawa to
prevent any large-scale protests there. While Kaduna could
have small demonstrations, it is not likely to see
large-scale protests, given its recent experience with
devastating mob-violence. Seven local police stations have
been built in the hotspots in and around Kaduna and are
staffed with paramilitary Mobile Police, who would serve as a
strong deterrent to any major protests. The recent violence
in Jos, the devastating loss of life there and the continued
presence of the military on the streets make it an unlikely
venue for protests. Jos could re-ignite if fighting starts
elsewhere and GON attention and resources are directed
elsewhere; we are not confident that civil authorities can
maintain order in Jos without military support at this time.





8. (C) The large, unplanned and often squalid urban
communities outside Abuja could see demonstrations by
Muslims. Since Abuja, like Jos and Kaduna, has an ethnically
and religiously diverse population, protests here by Muslims
could potentially spark violence driven by tensions over
other, unrelated issues. Fortunately, Abuja is even more
diverse than either Kaduna or Jos, so the potential for a
community polarizing completely (most residents everybody
taking one side or the other in a conflict) is lower.



9. (C) There are several institutions in Abuja identified
with the USG, including the Embassy, USAID's offices and the
American School. The USAID building and the Sheraton and
Hilton hotels (where most American visitors stay) are all
within walking distance of the National Mosque, and could
possibly see protests. However, protests flowing from the
National Mosque have, in the past, been peaceful and remained
in the close vicinity of the Mosque. There are other Juma'at
Mosques in Abuja, but we are not aware of any of them ever
having been the focus or launch point of a protest in the
past. The police maintain a strong presence in Abuja, and
can be expected to protect U.S. diplomatic institutions. It
is more likely that protests, and conflict, would originate
in the densely-populated outlying residential districts,
which we estimate have a collective population of over one
million, mostly recent arrivals.



10. (C) While Nigerians or transnationals could try to
attack U.S. installations or personnel in Nigeria, this has
not happened yet. Short of a targeted attack, the greatest
danger to Mission personnel in Abuja and Lagos, and Amcits
generally, is crime and civil unrest. We met with Amcits in
Kano and Abuja September 20 to discuss security issues, and
are planning to meet with or contact remaining Amcits in the
North and Middle Belt over the coming week. Funds
permitting, Consulate Lagos will send consular officers to
visit wardens Enugu, Calabar, Port Harcourt, Warri, and
Ibadan next week, as well as providing an ACS officer to
support Abuja's outreach and emergency preparedness efforts.
There is no consular officer assigned to Abuja at this time.
Abuja held a Town Meeting for local AmCits on Thursday,
September 20.



11. (SBU) Both Embassy Abuja and Consulate Lagos have taken
all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of
Mission personnel and assets. RSOs at both installations
have requested and received increased support from the
Nigerian National Police and have held emergency preparedness
briefings for all official Americans in the country. These
briefings will expand next week to include the American
schools in Lagos and Abuja. In Lagos, U.S. business
representatives will also be briefed. RSOs constantly
monitor security conditions in their areas and brief Mission
management on any changes in the present security posture of
Mission personnel and assets. RSOs at both installations
have requested and received increased support from the
Nigerian National Police.



12. (C) EACs in Abuja and Lagos are considering tripwires
that might indicate a seriously deteriorating security
environment and will report findings during the week of
September 24. Nigeria's elite is strongly pro-American but
there is a caveat in their support. Among our best contacts
representing Nigeria's elite, there is universal condemnation
of the attack. However, having expressed their condolences,
many of our franker interlocutors -- human rights activists,
lawyers, and journalists, for example, get around to adding
that U.S. policy on certain international issues has
engendered anti-U.S. sentiment in many parts of the world.
Andrews