NIGERIA: BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT OBASANJO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002117

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, 1.6X6, 1.6X8
TAGS: PREL SNAR ETRD BEXP MASS ECOWAS WCAR XF NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT OBASANJO

REF: A. STATE 122773

B. ABUJA 1547

C. ABUJA 2074

D. ABUJA 2072

E. STATE 143583

F. STATE 146201


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.6X5,
1.6X6, 1.6X8.


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SUMMARY
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1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter and President Obasanjo
discussed a smorgasbord of issues over a lengthy breakfast on
August 24. The President said he would do everything
possible to meet the counter-narcotics benchmarks, but he
admitted that the Nigerian judiciary was broken and offered
to render additional suspects to the U.S. if it would mean
Nigeria's certification. He confirmed that 250 million Naira
had been set aside for the NDLEA in the supplemental budget.
During the breakfast, Obasanjo called the Acting Minister of
Defense and demanded results on security assistance. He
agreed to the UNAMSIL troop rotation schedule requested by
the U.S. Obasanjo offered cautious assent to training for
the four Guinean companies, but warned against actions that
would threaten Qadhafi in the sub-region. The President said
that Nigeria would remain neutral on the replacement of the
ECOWAS Executive Secretary, but strongly implied support for
the Ghanaian candidate. Finally, Obasanjo commented on his
plans for the WCAR, and gave his personal and private
insights into the Middle East conflict. END SUMMARY.



2. (SBU) Ambassador Jeter was accompanied to the meeting by
his Staff Assistant (notetaker). Ahmed Jodu, the Chairman of
the Nigerian Communications Commission and Adobe Obe, the
President's Special Assistant (and an influential advisor)
also attended the working breakfast. In the last few
minutes, Magnus Kpakol, the new Chief Economic Advisor to the
President (and a twenty-year Dallas resident) joined the
early morning gathering.


=====================================
COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
=====================================



3. (C) Ambassador Jeter emphasized that there existed a
perception that Nigeria was off-track on meeting
counter-narcotics benchmarks (Ref C),and passed the
President the non-paper relayed in Ref A. The Ambassador
explained that the certification process was an annual event,
and that Nigeria would have to do more. Drugs had been
discovered on the South Africa Airways/Nigerian Airways
flight to New York, the NDLEA-DEA joint taskforce was
moribund, and while the President had agreed to double the
NDLEA budget, the Embassy had seen no evidence that NDLEA had
received additional resources. Moreover, Nigeria had not
even bothered to answer the FATF survey. Finally, no
progress had been made towards extradition of wanted
fugitives. Ambassador Jeter emphasized that we all knew who
these people were, and that they were making huge amounts of
money, damaging Nigeria's image and harming Americans.



4. (C) In response, President Obasanjo said, "I gave more
money to NDLEA," and picked up his phone and called his
Principal Secretary, Stephen Oronsaye. Confirming that 250
million Naira had been put in the supplemental budget, the
President turned to the Ambassador and said he would speak to
the Minister of Finance to make sure the money was released
to NDLEA quickly. Turning to the SAA/NA flight, the
President thanked the Ambassador for forwarding details on
one of the drug traffickers captured at JFK. He stated that,
armed with that information, he had demanded a full
accounting of those on duty at that time at MMIA (the Lagos
international airport).



5. (S/NF) Turning to the subject of extradition, Obasanjo
said, "Howard, we will do everything we can that you ask on
counter-narcotics, but I have to be honest with you." The
President then went on to explain that he did not think the
extradition process could be fixed. Recognizing the realties
of a moribund judicial system, unresponsive and rife with
corruption, Obasanjo referred to the renditions ("what we did
last year") and offered, "If we need to do that again to be
certified, we will do it." Extending his hands in the air to
thank the Almighty, he remarked, "We got off lightly last
time." Ambassador Jeter thanked the President for his
willingness to cooperate, and said he would pass the offer of
renditions to Washington, but emphasized that the U.S. wanted
to see Nigeria extradite fugitives through a judicial process
with respect for the rule of law and the civil rights of the
individuals concerned. We were worried about human rights.



6. (S/NF) The President said he would speak to the Minister
of State for Justice, a "good man," to see if he could
recharge the effort for a working extradition process. He
also noted that Mohammed Belgore, Chief Judge of the Federal
High Court, and, "one of the most corrupt people in Nigeria,"
had retired. Justice Jinadu would cover the post for several
weeks, and then would retire and be replaced by a new Chief
Judge, who might be more willing to establish an extradition
court. (NOTE: The President did not say who the new Chief
Judge would be, but said he expected a woman to be selected.
END NOTE.) However, the United States would have to
recognize the realities he faced on this issue, the President
emphasized, reminding the Ambassador that he was subject to a
constitutional separation of powers and could not inject
himself into the running of the courts.



7. (C) The Ambassador asked the President how he planned to
recruit 40,000 police a year and make sure they had the
training needed to be effective. This was a concern for us
because we recognized that Nigeria had neither the trainers
nor facilities to adequately prepare such large numbers for
effective policing. The President reminded the Ambassador
that he had recently turned over some empty military barracks
to the police. However, he urged Nigeria needed U.S. help,
and asked the Ambassador about police training. "We need
train-the-trainer and training aids for our institutions, and
thought you were going to help us with this," he said.
Ambassador Jeter stated he hoped to have an answer soon on
the police reform program and what U.S. assistance might be
forthcoming.


================
MILITARY MATTERS
================



8. (C) Security Assistance: Ambassador Jeter provided the
President an update on the work of the Embassy with the
Acting Minister of Defense (Army Minister Lawal Batagarawa)
on the Embassy's security assistance program. There had been
real problems with the Ministry of Defense's Legal Director
demanding changes to the text of LOA's that we could not
legally change, and some communications issues, the sum of
which had stalled progress on completing the assistance.
Batagarawa had helped make significant progress, the
Ambassador said. The President, assuming this was a veiled
criticism of Minister of Defense Danjuma, explained that the
one great tragedy of his Presidency had been the illness of
Danjuma. Danjuma, the President said, when he was not sick,
was "the best," and "top notch."



9. (C) Ambassador Jeter clarified, explaining that he had not
meant to say anything negative about Danjuma, only that,
during Minister Danjuma's absence, Batagarawa had been
working with the Embassy on this issue and had been very,
very helpful. The President, smiling, immediately picked up
the phone and called Batagarawa, we thought to compliment
him. Instead, however, he demanded an update and to know why
there was a problem. "Ah! What are you doing? They are
giving us this equipment! Who is the problem? Tell her I
said to sign the papers!" (COMMENT: Later that day,
Ambassador Jeter called Batagarawa to explain that he had
complimented him to the President, and had not tried to go
above his head. Batagarawa thanked the Ambassador, and said
that even if the Ambassador had gone to the President, it
would have been okay, because now he had the word of the
President as ammunition to fix the security assistance
problem in the Ministry. END COMMENT.)



10. (C) OFR ROTATIONS: The Ambassador asked the President if
he would be willing to adjust the schedules of the Nigerian
battalions in Sierra Leone due to rotate out in September,
retaining one battalion until January (Ref E). The President
replied that he would have them both remain until January if
that was what the U.S. wanted. Ambassador Jeter explained
that if one rotated out in September and one in January, the
latter battalion could rotate out with two others due to
rotate in January, and all three could be replaced by the
three OFR phase III battalions. That way, the three OFR
battalions could use their new skills and equipment
immediately without risk of those skills diminishing. The
President willingly agreed, and said he would so inform the
Chief of Army Staff.



11. (C) TRAINING OF GUINEAN ARMY COMPANIES: Ambassador Jeter
told the President of the plans to train four Guinean Army
companies (Ref F). The President immediately reacted
strongly, urging the U.S. to "be careful." He described
President Conte as "just as stubborn" as President Taylor.
Too much power in Conte's hands could cause Qadhafi to
perceive a threat to his client states in the sub-region.
The President remarked that Qadhafi had "one-thousand
aircraft and one-thousand tanks at his disposal." If he
attacked Nigeria, Obasanjo blustered, "I would stop his tanks
and bring down his aircraft with anti-aircraft guns."
However, if Qadhafi attacked Guinea or another state in the
sub-region, Nigeria would not come to their defense.
Moreover, Obasanjo believed, too much power in Conte's hands
was a risk to Liberia, and a vacuum in Liberia would invite
Qadhafi's meddling. Ambassador Jeter explained that training
the four companies was modest, would include intensive human
rights training, require guarantees that the training could
only be used for self-defense, and a commitment the companies
could only cross borders in hot-pursuit. We were helping
Guinea because we wanted the country to be able to defend
itself. Obasanjo said that was fine, but reiterated his
warning to "be careful." (NOTE: Later, Ambassador Jeter
informed the Acting Minister of Defense about the training.
Batagarawa said that the effort was useful, and thanked the
U.S. for its help. END NOTE).


========================
WCAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST
========================



12. (C) Ambassador Jeter thanked the President for his
efforts to make the WCAR forward-looking, particularly in
regards to reparations and slavery. Obasanjo said he would
attend the conference, and would speak publicly on those
issues, but would not take a position on the Middle East
conflict. The conflict was "too complicated," the President
opined. He then asked if Secretary of State Powell would
attend the WCAR. Ambassador Jeter informed the President
that a decision whether the U.S. would attend, and who would
lead the delegation, had not yet been made. Obasanjo began
to say he would like to ask Secretary Powell to be there;
however, he then said he would not ask, because the
ISRAELi-Palestinian conflict, and how it would be handled in
the WCAR, remained unresolved. He recognized that this was a
serious problem for the U.S.



13. (C) President Obasanjo then shared some of his views on
the ISRAELi-Palestinian conflict. Asserting that he would
not say this publicly, the President believed that Arafat had
made "a huge mistake" by refusing to reach agreement at Camp
David. He never expected the ISRAELis to offer as much as
they did, and all that stood between that offer and Arafat's
demands were certain "small details" relating to Jerusalem.
Arafat should have accepted the deal, Obasanjo declared,
while insisting that discussions continue on unresolved
matters. He then compared Arafat's "mistake" to that of
Saddam Hussein in opposing the U.S. in the Gulf. The
President remarked that, had he been in Hussein's shoes on
January 14, 1991, he would have used the eight-hour time
difference between Baghdad and Washington to hold a victory
rally. Once having claimed victory over the U.S., he would
have withdrawn his forces, still within the eight-hour window.


===============
U.S. INVESTMENT
===============



14. (C) The President asked the Ambassador why so few
American companies were investing in Nigeria. The Ambassador
explained that many American companies saw too much risk, and
did not see enough transparency. The Ambassador referred to
the National Identity Card tendering process, where Polaroid
felt that they, as a part of the Chams, had been unfairly
passed over for SAGEM, the French consortium. Obasanjo
remarked that both he and Ambassador Jeter had been at the
meeting with all of the bidders, and emphasized that no one
company from the Chams consortium had answered his question
of who would ultimately be responsible for the entire
project. The President further commented that American
companies did not need to partner with a Nigerian company in
order to win public contracts. That may have been true under
previous Administrations, he stated, but was not now true.
Ambassador Jeter urged the President to share these views
with the Watts CODEL the following week, to which the
President agreed.


=======================================
THE RACE FOR ECOWAS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
=======================================



15. (C) Ambassador Jeter asked who Nigeria favored to replace
Lansana Kouyate as ECOWAS Executive Secretary, emphasizing
the need for strong leadership of the regional Secretariat.
We wanted to help ECOWAS in a way we had not before, and
strong ECOWAS leadership would determine what we would be
able to do. Obasanjo noted that there were three candidates
in the race. He suggested quiet, behind-the-scenes support
for Ghana's Chambas, but promised public silence until
consensus emerged. (COMMENT: After the meeting, Ambassador
Jeter discussed this point further with Adobe Obe. Adobe
indicated that Nigeria wanted to be careful not to appear as
pre-determining the process by throwing it weight behind one
candidate. Adobe calculated that besides Benin and the
Gambia -- with their own candidates -- only Senegal and Cote
d'Ivoire were likely to pull against Chambas as a consensus
candidate. Adobe opined that some Francophone countries were
focusing on UEMOA at the expense of ECOWAS, and Nigeria was
loathe to give them ammunition by pushing hard for Chambas.
He also observed that France could help keep the Francophone
countries engaged with ECOWAS. END COMMENT.)


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COMMENT
=======



16. (C) During the nearly two-hour encounter, Obasanjo was
relaxed, happy, engaged, even bubbly. Obasanjo's comments on
the role of Libya in the sub-region and the situation in the
Middle East were revealing.



17. (C) Peppering the meal were phone calls out to Ministers
and government officials to confirm certain facts, and phone
calls in from Governors. The Governor of Ebonyi called about
a fatal security incident involving the Mobile Police; the
Governor of Plateau called to talk about a road desired by
Deputy Senate President Mantu. In each case, the President
urged the Governors to use their own authority and resources
before asking for Presidential intervention. Obasanjo seems
to be completely willing to defer Presidential decisions on
issues involving the states, and to push the governors to
exercise their own authority.



18. (C) On the Federal level, however, President Obasanjo has
a tight grip on decision-making, and seems to delegate very
little authority to his Ministers. As a result, we rarely
see a Minister make a decision without first consulting the
President. Unfortunately, this system places a huge burden
on the President himself, while engendering gridlock in the
bureaucratic process. The Embassy's access to the President,
on critical matters is therefore extremely important, and
casual encounters often seem to be the most productive.
However, this access cannot be abused, and we are careful not
to turn every social event into a business meeting.



19. (C) On counter-narcotics, we will now wait and see what
impact this and other recent high-level approaches have on
the GON's efforts in this area. However, we are now sure
that some additional NDLEA resources will be forthcoming, and
are hopeful this will have an impact on the NDLEA's ability
to move closer to its ambitious vision.



20. (U) Freetown minimize considered.
Jeter