NIGERIA: ARMY CHIEF BRIEFED ON OFR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001889

SIPDIS


NOFORN


DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RA BITTRICK
NSC FOR MCLEAN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2011
TAGS: PREL MARR NI MAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ARMY CHIEF BRIEFED ON OFR


REF: USDAO ABUJA IIR 6 871 0381 01


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 23, 3rd Group Battalion Commander LTC
Tim Sherwood briefed Chief of Army Staff, MG Alexander
Ogomudia, on Operation Focus Relief Phase III (OFR P3).
Initially taciturn, Ogomudia quickly turned receptive and
largely positive. During the briefing on basing, Ogomudia
reminded his staff that he had instructed that the 20
Battalion Serti could not participate in OFR P3. However,
after being told that it would be extremely difficult to
change course now that base construction had begun, Ogomudia
relented. Clearly with a mind to the border with Cameroon,
he told his staff that another battalion might have to be
sent to Serti after the 20 Battalion deployed. Ogomudia's
staff raised questions on human rights vetting, the scale of
equipment in OFR and the radios being provided.



2. (C) After the briefing, a relaxed and friendly Ogomudia
received the team in his private office. He suggested that a
Nigerian Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) team attend
training at the three sites. He also thought a visit to
Sierra Leone by a U.S. Special Forces representative and a
Nigerian Officer might be useful to evaluate the training
from Phase I. (See Reftel for USDAO reporting on the same
subject.) END SUMMARY.



3. (U) On July 23, an OFR team composed of the 3rd Group
Battalion Commander LTC Tim Sherwood, 30th Medical Brigade
Commander Colonel Lamez Schoomaker, Major Marc Wisecarver,
Acting Defense Attache Cass and PolMilOff, met with Chief of
Army Staff (COAS),MG Alexander Ogomudia. Ogomudia was
accompanied by several staff officers.



4. (C) After the 10-minute briefing by LTC Sherwood which
included a summary of the POI, and which MG Ogumudia voiced
no objection to the POI, MG Ogomudia turned to his staff and
reminded them that he had instructed that the 20 Battalion
Serti could not participate in OFR P3 because of concerns
about the state of relations with "a neighbor." He asked why
we were proceeding with construction in Serti. Major Cass
exclaimed that we had not been made aware of his decision.
His staff, clearly at a loss to explain the situation, was
silent. LTC Sherwood noted that base construction had been
underway for some weeks, and it would be extremely difficult
to change course now. Ogomudia relented, but told his Chief
of Operations that, while the 20 Battalion could participate,
another battalion might have to be sent to Serti after 20
Battalion deployed.



5. (C) The General Staff asked about the radios the
battalions would receive, noting that they preferred PRC-117
radios over the Motorola radios issued during OFR, Phase 1.
The major complaint was communications security. However,
one of the General Staff noted that this had been resolved by
the UN through issuance of particular frequencies to each
UNAMSIL contingent. The General Staff also asked about the
scale of equipment, noting a disparity between OFR assistance
and UN scale. In particular, they requested APCs vice Toyota
Hi-Lux 4x4s. The ADATT responded that concerns such as these
could be raised with Washington, but that OFR was based on a
limited budget, and it was very unlikely at this point that
the equipment list could be adjusted.



6. (C) The ADATT then took the opportunity to raise the 22
vehicles from Phase I that had yet to be shipped to Sierra
Leone. MG Ogomudia gave a thumbs-up, and said that he had
spoken that morning with the PermSec at the Ministry of
Defense as well as the MOD Chief of Logistics. He noted that
shipping might have to be arranged at the Defense
Headquarters level (read Chief of Defense Staff),but said,
"It,s my soldiers in the rain without tents." He then noted
that either by commercial means, Air Force lift, or "another
route," the vehicles would be shipped.



7. (C) Human rights vetting was then discussed. The Generals
suggested that the U.S. simply provide a list of those who
could not be trained because of their past behavior, and they
would not include them. They added that they did not want a
soldier to be accused wrongly. Major Cass explained that
vetting was a legal requirement of the United States, and was
done with any country that received security assistance
training. PolMilOff explained the process further, noted
that there had not been any soldiers excluded during Phase I,
and assured the General Staff that if a name raised any
flags, the issue would be dealt with privately between the
Embassy and the Chief of Army Staff to avoid any false
accusations. However, the process was the law, was
important, and would have to be observed.



8. (C) LTC Sherwood asked the COAS if he would approve an
Airborne friendship jump. Ogomudia at first misunderstood,
and explained that Nigeria had suspended Airborne training
due to decrepit facilities. He noted that if the U.S. wanted
to assist Nigeria with funding to repair the facilities, that
would be appreciated (but noted that Airborne was not his
priority). After clarification, Ogomudia heartily approved
the idea of a friendship jump.



9. (C) After the briefing, MG Ogomudia received the team in
private. The Army Chief was relaxed and friendly. He
suggested that a Nigerian TRADOC team attend training at the
three sites to provide feedback to him and the U.S. team. He
also suggested that a visit to Sierra Leone by a U.S. Special
Forces representative and a TRADOC Officer might be useful to
evaluate the results of training from Phase I on the ground.



10. (C) COMMENT: Several members of the U.S. team were
stunned when the COAS said he had disapproved training for
the 20 Battalion Serti. From his comments and his tight
facial expression, it was clear that the he was very
concerned about the situation on the border with Cameroon.
Fortunately, Ogomudia showed the flexibility needed for
training to continue.



11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: General Ogomudia, while initially
taciturn, became warm and friendly over the course of the
meeting. At one point, he asked his staff if they had any
other questions. When they were silent, he prompted them
with a smile by reminding them that, "You are on the
receiving end. Mine is just to give the orders." While
Embassy had grown accustomed to new road-blocks being
introduced in the security assistance relationship (POI,
equipment, deployment),a new era of joint-problem solving
seems to have arrived.



12. (C) DAO COMMENT: We view the COAS,s silence following
the POI brief as giving the POI a nod. END DAO COMMENT.
Jeter