NIGERIA: DEBT NEGOTIATIONS STALL; PLANS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001375

SIPDIS


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED


PARIS ALSO FOR OECD
E for WMCGLYNN
EB/IFD/OMA FOR PREID
STATE PLEASE PASS TO EX/IM FOR DSOMERVILLE, DSCHNEIDER
AND ROBINSON


E.O. 12958: DECL: 16JUN11
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEBT NEGOTIATIONS STALL; PLANS FOR
AN EXPANSIONARY SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET DENIED


REF: A) CARRIG-MULLINAX 12JUN01 EMAIL,
B) STATE 97771, C) STATE 79460,
D) TURNER-CARRIG 3MAY01 EMAIL,
E) HESS-ARIKAWE LETTER DATED 3MAY01


Classified by Ambassador Howard F Jeter; reason 1.5B/D


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) At meetings in Abuja June 11 and 12, senior
GON economic policy-makers were thoroughly pessimistic
regarding near term prospects for achieving consensus
on the U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Debt Agreement required
to implement the December 2000 Paris Club
rescheduling. A.S. Arikawe, Debt Management Office
Chief, opined that the GON would request a three-month
extension on Paris Club bilaterals so that the U.S.
and nine other creditor nations might "develop
reasonable positions" on debt relief. Policy-makers
were dismissive of press reports that the GON intended
to double its spending for 2001. Nevertheless,
Principal Secretary to the President Steve Oronsaye's
logic for contending that a 130 billion naira
"supplementary budget" would have "absolutely zero"
net effect on capital spending for the year is as
opaque for us as it is for the IMF. End summary.



2. (U) TDY U.S. Treasury Advisor Lisa Cook and
Economic Section Chief met June 11 with Principal
Secretary to the President Steve Oronsaye and Director

SIPDIS
General of the Debt Management Office Mr. A.S. Arikawe
for discussions regarding a debt swap for environment
clean-up initiative (Ref B and Septel).



3. (U) In subsequent side-bar conversations with
EconChief, the GON interlocutors commented on the
state-of-play regarding the Bilateral Debt
Rescheduling Agreement (Refs C, D and E) and a rumored
supplementary budget that media reports held would
double the expansionary 2001 spending plan approved
already by the National Legislature.


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Bilateral Rescheduling Agreement
--------------



4. (C) Arikawe was thoroughly pessimistic on
prospects for a near-term and successful conclusion to
U.S.-Nigeria negotiations regarding the bilateral debt
rescheduling agreement required to implement the
December 2000 Paris Club rescheduling. He declared
several USG provisions within the agreement
"unacceptable to Nigeria" and "impossible" to fulfill
because they were "too contentious." Arikawe declined
to identify any provisions he found unacceptable,
beyond those concerning payment of "reasonable
expenses" incurred in contract enforcement actions and
unilateral suspension rights as already noted in para
6, Ref C.



5. (U) However, Arikawe promised (for the third time
since our initial request shortly after his May 3
meeting at the Department with Treasury, State and
Eximbank officers) to provide the GON position in
writing by a date certain. This time his self-imposed
delivery date is Monday (or Tuesday) June 18 (or 19).



6. (C) Arikawe volunteered that the U.S. is not the
only creditor with which the GON has serious
differences. He said nine other bilateral agreements
were similarly stalled. In a June 12 follow up
conversation, Arikawe summarized the negotiations'
state-of-play by noting that Nigeria planned to
request a three-month extension for negotiations so
that Paris Club creditors might have time to "develop
reasonable positions" on debt relief.


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Expansionary Supplementary Budget Denied
--------------



7. (C) Oronsaye opened the discussion regarding a
supplementary budget on his own volition. He
acknowledged that, indeed, there would be a
supplementary budget. However, he averred, press
reports describing official sources as confirming the
President's approval of a supplementary budget
doubling the spending already programmed for 2001 were
"irresponsible and thoroughly false." He estimated
that the supplementary would not exceed 130 billion
naira (vice the 894 billion in some press reports) and
insisted that none of the supplementary would derive
from "new" appropriations.



8. (C) According to Oronsaye, the supplementary
budget is merely an "administrative necessity"
mandated by the Constitution and it would have an
"absolutely zero" net effect on capital spending this
year. As he described it, there is a need to
"prioritize" spending on power production and the
provision of water to rural areas. To move these
projects to the head of the spending queue, he
continued, requires National Assembly approval since
the Assembly already had approved capital spending for

2001.



9. (C) Comment. We found Oronsaye's explanation of
the need for a supplementary budget unconvincing and
June 12 shared his logic with IMF ResRep R. van Til.
He, too, was puzzled by Oronsaye's comments, but
pointed out that it is the spending total, not how the
GON cares to characterize its genesis, that counts as
the bottom line. The IMF, he allowed, is more
concerned that Nigeria remains "off track" on
virtually all indicators set out last summer for
policing the now moribund Stand-By Arrangement. And,
he said that although Article 4 consultations with the
GON (in preparation for the June 29 report to IMF's
Executive Board) were scheduled to conclude on Friday,
June 15, much work still remained to be done. End
comment.


Jeter