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00THEHAGUE1863 2000-06-22 12:35:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

READOUT ON MTCR DUTCH CHAIR VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Tags:   KNNP PARM PREL HK MC MY SN IR NL MTCRE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 THE HAGUE 001863 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR NP DAS BARKER, NP/CBM (VAN DIEPEN/ROE), EAP
STAE ALSO FOR NEA/NGA, EUR/UBI
PARIS FOR EST DERRICKSON


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2010
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL HK MC MY SN IR NL MTCRE
SUBJECT: READOUT ON MTCR DUTCH CHAIR VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

CLASSIFIED BY A/POLCOUNS ERIC LUNDBERG; REASONS 1.5 (B,D).


1.(C) SUMMARY; THE DUTCH MTCR CHAIR DEEMS ITS RECENT VISIT
TO MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND MACAU A "SUCCESS" IN
THAT IT DEEPENED UNDERSTANDING OF MTCR WITH ALL FOUR
COUNTRIES, PAVED THE WAY FOR FURTHER MTCR CONTACT IN THE
LATTER THREE DESTINATIONS AND REMOVED SOME MALAYSIAN
"MISTRUST" OF THE MTCR. STILL, THE DUTCH PREDICT HARD
SLOGGING WITH KUALA LUMPUR IF BETTER NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT
CONTROLS ARE EVER TO BE REALIZED. THEY ARE MUCH MORE POSITIVE
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND MACAU.
FINALLY, THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMS TO HAVE SAID
NOTHING MISSILE-SPECIFIC IN HIS BRIEF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WMD
ISSUES WHEN MEETING IRANIAN FM KHARAZZI IN TEHRAN. THE
IRANIANS HAVE YET TO RESPOND TO THE DUTCH PROPOSAL, MADE TWO
WEEKS AGO, FOR A MTCR VISIT TO TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER


1. END SUMMARY.


TEXT OF DUTCH MTCR TRIP REPORT FOR FUTURE PARIS POC MTG
(PROTECT UNTIL RELEASE AT NEXT MTCR POC MEETING)


2.(C/REL MTCR - REL TO MTCR UPON LATE JUNE POC MTG CIRCLTN)


BEGIN TEXT OF DUTCH MTCR TRIP REPORT:


GENERAL


IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN BY THE NOORDWIJK
PLENARY, A TEAM OF MTCR PARTNERS LED BY THE NETHERLANDS
CHAIR, PAID A VISIT TO THE TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS SINGAPORE,
HONG KONG, AND MACAU. THE TEAM ALSO MADE USE OF THE
OPPORTUNITY OF BEING IN ASIA TO VISIT MALAYSIA, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE INTERSESSIONAL REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT, AS ORIGINALLY
TABLED BY THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RF).


IN ADDITION TO THE ACTING CHAIRMAN AND THE REPRESENTATIVES
FROM THE NETHERLANDS CHAIR, THE MTCR TEAM INCLUDED
REPRESENTATIVES FROM FINLAND (IN THE PERSON OF THE FUTURE
CHAIRMAN HIMSELF) AND JAPAN, AND WAS JOINED AT A LOCAL LEVEL
BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND
MISSIONS IN THE FOUR CAPITALS.


ASIDE FROM THE MORE GENERAL AIM OF DISCUSSING AND RAISING
AWARENESS OF THE DANGERS OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION AND OF
SUPPLYING INFORMATION ON THE WAYS THE MTCR ADDRESSES SUCH
CONCERNS, THE VISITS TO SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND MACAU WERE
USED TO FOCUS SPECIFIC ATTENTION ON THE ROLE THAT
TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS CAN PLAY IN ACQUISITION EFFORTS BY
PROLIFERATORS TO OBTAIN MISSILES AND/OR SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY
THAT CAN BE USED FOR THEIR MISSILE PROGRAMS. INTERLOCUTORS
WERE ENCOURAGED TO ADHERE TO THE MTCR GUIDELINES, WITH A VIEW
TO COUNTER THESE DANGERS, AND WERE OFFERED ASSISTANCE BY MTCR
PARTNERS IN BUILDING UP AND FURTHER STRENGTHENING THEIR
EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. IN THIS FRAMEWORK AN
OVERVIEW WAS GIVEN OF THE NETHERLANDS EXPORT AND
TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM BY WAY OF AN EXAMPLE OF THE MTCR
GUIDELINES, ALONG WITH SIMILAR UNDERTAKINGS OF A POLITICALLY
BINDING NATURE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF OTHER EXPORT CONTROL
REGIMES ARE INCORPORATED INTO NATIONAL LAW. IT WAS STRESSED
THAT THIS WAS BY NO MEANS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE IDEAL CONTROL
SYSTEM, AND THAT IT WAS OF COURSE UP TO THE MTCR PARTNERS TO
DECIDE HOW TO IMPLEMENT AND INCORPORATE THE MTCR UNDERTAKINGS
AT A NATIONAL LEVEL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN
LEGISLATION AND RESOURCES.


IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERSESSIONAL MANDATE FOR THE VISIT
TO MALAYSIA, THE TALKS WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN KUALA LUMPUR
HAD A MORE GENERAL BEARING, AND NO SPECIAL FOCUS WAS GIVEN TO
TRANSSHIPMENT ISSUES, ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT WAS, UNAVOIDABLY,
TOUCHED UPON IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS.


SINGAPORE


IN SINGAPORE THE MTCR MISSION WAS RECEIVED BY A DELEGATION
LED BY MRS. KHENG HUA ISELI, DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
COMPRISING OFFICIALS FROM THE MFA, THE MINISTRY OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT
BOARD, AND THE CUSTOMS AND EXCISE DEPARTMENT. THE FULL
DELEGATION LIST IS ANNEXED FOR PARTNERS' INFORMATION.


THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES WELCOMED THE VISIT OF THE MTCR
MISSION AND STRESSED THEIR COUNTRY'S GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE
NON PROLIFERATION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE MTCR. THEY
UNDERLINED THAT SINGAPORE FROM ITS PART HAD AN ADEQUATE
SYSTEM OF CONTROLS, BASED ON ITS IMPORT CERTIFICATE AND
DELIVERY VERIFICATION (IC/DV) SYSTEM, REQUIRING PERMITS FOR
THE IM-AND EXPORT OF STRATEGIC GOODS TO AND FROM SINGAPORE.
HOWEVER, AS A COUNTRY THAT IS ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON TRADE,
SINGAPORE WAS FORCED TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN ITS
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND ITS CONTROLS ON TRADE. TOO RIGID A
CONTROL SYSTEM COULD RUN COUNTER TO THOSE COMMERCIAL
INTERESTS. IN THIS FRAMEWORK IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT
TRANSACTIONS ARE ONLY CONTROLLED WHEN A SINGAPOREAN ENTITY IS
INVOLVED IN THE DEAL, AS A CONSIGNOR OR A CONSIGNEE. AS A
RULE, THEREFORE, TRANSSHIPMENT FLOWS FROM A FOREIGN CONSIGNOR
TO A FOREIGN CONSIGNEE ARE NOT CONTROLLED, IRRESPECTIVE OF
WHETHER THE GOODS REMAIN ON BOARD OR ARE DOWNLOADED AT THE
SINGAPORE HARBOR/AIRPORT. IN THE VIEW OF SINGAPORE IT WAS
PRIMARILY THE EXPORTING COUNTRY'S RESPONSIBILITY (AND HENCE
NOT THE TRANSSHIPMENT COUNTRIES') TO CONTROL THAT SENSITIVE
GOODS WOULD NOT FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.




THE CHAIR, FROM HIS SIDE, STRESSED THE VIEW THAT
NON-PROLIFERATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL PARTIES
CONCERNED; EXPORTING COUNTRIES COULD NOT DO IT ALONE, THE
CO-OPERATION OF TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL. A
PEACEFUL AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT WAS A CONDITIO SINE QUA NON
FOR TRADE. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CHOOSING
BETWEEN STRICT CONTROLS AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, THE TWO
SHOULD GO HAND IN HAND.


IN THIS CONTEXT THE QUESTION WAS PUT TO THE SINGAPORE
AUTHORITIES WHETHER SINGAPORE WOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE TO
CONTROL TRANSSHIPMENT CONSIGNMENTS ON REQUEST OF A FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF SUSPICION OF DEVIATION TO UNDESIRABLE
DESTINATIONS, AND WOULD BE ABLE TO SEIZE SUCH SHIPMENTS, IF
THE SUSPICIOUS PROVED JUSTIFIED. THE REPLY WAS THAT THERE
WAS NO LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR STOPPING SUCH TRANSSHIPMENT
CONSIGNMENTS, BUT THAT IN SUCH CASES COOPERATION OF THE
SHIPPING AGENCY COULD BE SOUGHT ON THE BASIS OF PERSUASION.
IT WAS STATED THAT, IN PRACTICE, THIS APPROACH HAD BEEN
SUCCESSFUL.


WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO
REVIEW THEIR EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS AND WOULD, FOR
INSTANCE, CONTEMPLATE INTRODUCING A CATCH-ALL OR AD-HOC
MECHANISM FOR THE LICENSING OF TRANSSHIPMENT TRANSACTIONS,
SIMILAR TO THE NETHERLANDS EXAMPLE, THE SINGAPORE
INTERLOCUTORS AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT THEY BELIEVED THE
CURRENT CONTROL SYSTEM WAS ADEQUATE AND ALLOWED SINGAPORE TO
ENACT ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME,
HOWEVER, THEY DID EXPRESS AN INTEREST IN THE WORKING OF THE
AD HOC LICENSING SYSTEM, AND WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE SOME
FEEDBACK ON ITS FUNCTIONING IN PRACTICES.


THE CHAIR INDICATED THE READINESS OF THE MTCR TO SUPPLY
SINGAPORE WITH ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION AND SUPPORT, AND
PROPOSED ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE CONTACTS ON A
MORE REGULAR BASIS AND THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF A FIXED
POINT OF CONTACT ON BOTH SIDES. ALTHOUGH SINGAPORE DID NOT
REJECT CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE, ITS RESPONSE TO THIS
PROPOSAL WAS RATHER EVASIVE, INDICATING THAT DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS COULD BE USED IF AND WHEN THERE WAS ANY SPECIFIC
NEED FOR FURTHER CONTACTS.


THE VISIT OF THE MTCR TEAM LARGELY REAFFIRMED THE IMPRESSIONS
OF THE JAPANESE COLLEAGUES AFTER THEIR BILATERAL DIALOGUE
EARLIER THIS YEAR (POC DOC 19, OF FEBRUARY 2000): SINGAPORE
EXERCISES A LIMITED CONTROL ON EXPORTS OF STRATEGIC GOODS
FORM ITS TERRITORY, ON THE BASIS OF A BY NO MEANS
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SENSITIVE ITEMS. TRANSSHIPMENT IS, AS
A RULE, NOT CONTROLLED AT ALL. BECAUSE ITS BASIC PERCEPTION
STILL SEEMS TO BE THAT RIGOROUS CONTROLS WOULD HAMPER
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE VERY WILLING TO
IMPROVE ITS CONTROL SYSTEM. HOWEVER, AS ALREADY INDICATED,
THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INTEREST IN A CATCH-ALL, AD-HOC
LICENSING MECHANISM, WHICH COULD BE EMPLOYED IN CASES WHERE
INDICATIONS ARE RECEIVED OF EXPORT/TRANSSHIPMENT TO COUNTRIES
OF CONCERN.
HONG KONG


IN HONG KONG THE MTCR MISSION WAS RECEIVED BY A DELEGATION
LED BY MISS YVONNE CHOI, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR TRADE AND
INDUSTRY. THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION INCLUDED MISS ELIZA
LEE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE TRADE DEPARTMENT, AND
MR. ANDREW WONG, HEAD OF TRADE CONTROLS, CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
DEPARTMENT.


MISS CHOI EXPRESSED HER GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THIS FIRST
OFFICIAL MTCR VISIT TO HONG KONG, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE
MEMBERS OF THE MISSION AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE FUNCTIONING
OF THE HONG KONG CONTROL SYSTEM WITH THEIR OWN EYES. HONG
KONG GREATLY VALUED SUCH EXCHANGES OF VIEWS, AND WELCOMED A
FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF THE TIES WITH THE MTCR IN THE FUTURE.
THE MTCR TEAM RECEIVED PRESENTATIONS OF THE - IMPRESSIVE -
HONG KONG CONTROL SYSTEM ON IM-AND EXPORT, AND TRANSSHIPMENT
OF STRATEGIC GOODS. SERVICES, INCLUDING BROKERING, IN THE
CONTEXT OF WMD PROGRAMS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO LICENSING
REQUIREMENTS.


ON THE BASIS OF CONTROL LISTS, WHICH MIRROR THE LISTS OF THE
EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES, AND WHICH ARE REGULARLY UPDATED,
SHIPMENTS ARE STRINGENTLY CONTROLLED BY THE HONG KONG
AUTHORITIES. FOR EACH TRANSACTION AN INDIVIDUAL LICENSE IS
REQUIRED. FOR RE-EXPORT FROM HONG KONG, AT ALL TIMES AN END
USE CERTIFICATE AND A RE-EXPORT AUTHORIZATION BY THE
EXPORTING STATE ARE REQUIRED, TOGETHER WITH AN ACCEPTANCE OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF END USE CHECKS. IN THIS WAY THE HONG KONG
CONTROLS COMPLEMENT THE EXPORT CONTROLS OF THE ORIGINAL
EXPORTING COUNTRY. BOTH THE CONSIGNOR, THE CONSIGNEE, AS
WELL AS THE TRANSPORTER ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR UPHOLDING THE
LAW: "ANYBODY WHO HAS A HAND IN THE TRANSACTION CAN BE HELD
ACCOUNTABLE." IN ORDER TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE, THE HONG KONG
AUTHORITIES HAVE EXTENSIVE POWERS OF ENFORCEMENT, TO THE
POINT THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DOMESTIC PREMISES, SEARCHES
MAY BE EFFECTED WITHOUT CUSTOMS ORDER.


VIS-A-VIS THE PRC, HONG KONG MAINTAINS STRICT AUTONOMY AS
REGARDS ITS TRADE CONTROLS: TRADE FLOWS ACROSS THE PRC-HONG
KONG BORDER ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
AND CONTROLS AS TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. EVEN PLA
VEHICLES ARE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT ONE WEEK'S ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION WITH PARTICULARS ON PERSONNEL AND GOODS.


IT WAS UNDERLINED THAT HONG KONG'S COMMITMENT OT STRINGENT
LICENSING AND CONTROLS WAS BORN OUT OF SELF INTEREST. IF
HONG KONG WANTS TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS HIGH TECH HUB, IT
NEEDS TO ENSURE THAT IT CAN ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY INFLOW OF
TECHNOLOGY FROM ITS TRADING PARTNERS, AND THIS IS ONLY
POSSIBLE IF THOSE PARTNERS CONTINUE TO HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE
IN ITS EXPORT CONTROLS, SO AS TO BE SURE THAT THAT TECHNOLOGY
IS NOT RE-EXPORTED T UNDUE DESTINATIONS. SINCE ITS REVERSION
TO CHINA, HONG KONG UNFORTUNATELY NO LONGER FORMED PART OF
THE EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES, BUT IT WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE
TO LIVE UP TO THE EXPORT REGIMES GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS.
FORTUNATELY, IT RECEIVED ADEQUATE INFORMATION AND HELP FROM
PARTNERS TO ENABLE IT TO DO SO.


THE DISCUSSIONS WERE COMPLEMENTED WITH VISITS TO THE LOK MA
CHAU BORDER CONTROL POINT WITH THE PRC, AND THE CUSTOMS AND
EXCISE DEPARTMENT OF THE HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.


IN CONCLUSION, THE MTCR TEAM RECEIVED A VERY FAVORABLE
IMPRESSION OF THE HONG KONG TRADE CONTROL SYSTEM, WHICH CAN
SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS IN THE
WORLD. HONG KONG HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN ADVERTISING ITS
CONTROL SYSTEM, INTER ALIA THROUGH NUMEROUS PRESENTATIONS AT
EXPORT CONTROL SEMINARS, ETC. FOR THE INFORMATION OF
PARTNERS, A COPY OF AN OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM IS ANNEXED.


ONE POINT OF CONCERN WOULD SEEM TO BE THE FACT THAT NOT ALL
IN-TRANSIT CONSIGNMENTS OF SENSITIVE GOODS CAN BE CONTROLLED
AND SEIZED, EVEN IN CASE OF HARD EVIDENCE OF UNDUE GOINGS ON.
THIS IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT FOR IN TRANSIT CONTROLS
A SHORT LIST OF VERY SENSITIVE ITEMS ("SCHEDULE 2") IS USED,
AS OPPOSED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST ("SCHEDULE 1") USED FOR
IM AND EXPORT CONTROLS, AS WELL CONTROLS OF TRANSSHIPMENT
INVOLVING UNLOADING OF THE GOODS. IN THIS RESPECT, THE HONG
KONG SHOWED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE CATCH-ALL AD HOC
LICENSING MECHANISM AS INCORPORATED IN THE NETHERLANDS EXPORT
AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM.


IT WAS AGREED THAT DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MTCR AND HONG
KONG WILL BE INTENSIFIED, AND TO THIS END FORMAL POINTS OF
CONTACT WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON BOTH SIDES.


MACAU


IN MACAU, THE MTCR DELEGATION WAS RECEIVED BY A DELEGATION
HEADED BY MR. ANTONIO PEDRO, ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY FOR
ADMINISTRATION AND JUSTICE. THE MACAU DELEGATION FURTHER
INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
ECONOMY AND FINANCE, THE MARINE AND CUSTOMS POLICE, AND THE
ECONOMIC SERVICES.


IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE MACAU GOVERNMENT WAS IN THE PROCESS
OF SETTING UP A NEW, SINGLE CUSTOMS ENTITY WHICH WOULD BE IN
CHARGE OF TRADE CONTROLS. FOR THE TIME BEING, MACAU RELIED
ON A DUAL SYSTEM WHEREBY THE TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION WAS
CARRIED OUT BY THE ECONOMIC SERVICES AND THE CONTROLS ON
TRADE WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE MARINE AND CUSTOMS POLICE.


HAVING SAID THIS, WHAT FOLLOWED AS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT
SEEMS A RATHER WEAK LICENSING AND CONTROL SYSTEM. WITHOUT
GOING INTO DETAILS - THESE WERE NOT SUPPLIED - IT WOULD SEEM
THAT THIS SYSTEM ONLY APPLIES TO THE IM AND EXPORT OF A SHORT
LIST OF "CONVENTIONAL ARMS, MILITARY VEHICLES AND
AMMUNITION." CONTROL WAS DESCRIBED AS STRICT, AND EASILY
ENFORCEABLE, DUE TO THE LIMITED VOLUMES OF GOODS INVOLVED.
THE SYSTEM, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY TO DUAL USE GOODS, NOR TO
TRANSSHIPMENT FLOWS. THE AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE THAT THEY
SYSTEM WAS FAR FROM PERFECT, BUT MENTIONED THAT MACAU ONLY
HAD A SMALL HARBOR, WHICH WAS HARDLY SUITABLE FOR THE
TRANSSHIPMENT OF LARGE CONSIGNMENTS OF ILLICIT GOODS. UNTIL
1995 THERE HAS ALSO NOT BEEN AN AIRPORT, AND AT THE MOMENT
THE NEW AIRPORT WAS NOT USED TO CAPACITY.


IN THE LIGHT OF THE REVERSION TO THE PRC, THE MACAU
AUTHORITIES HAD HAD TO GIVE PRIORITY TO OTHER URGENT NEEDS.
HOWEVER, THEY WERE CONSCIOUS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD OF NON PROLIFERATION, AND WERE
WILLING TO IMPROVE THEIR CONTROLS. FOR THIS, HOWEVER, THEY
NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION FORM THE MTCR PARTNERS.


THE MTCR TEAM, IN RESPONSE, URGED THE MACAU AUTHORITIES TO
AFFORD AS MUCH PRIORITY AS POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHENING THEIR
EXPORT CONTROLS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT TRADE VOLUMES COULD
BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE OVER THE COMING YEARS, AND ALSO
SEEING THE FACT THAT CERTAIN INDICATIONS HAD BEEN RECEIVED
THAT NORTH KOREA WAS ALREADY USING MACAU AS A TRANSSHIPMENT
CENTER. THE MTCR OFFERED ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO MACAU
IN THIS RESPECT. IN PARTICULAR, JAPAN PROPOSED THAT THE
JAPANESE EXPORT CONTROLS EXPERT, WHO WAS CURRENTLY ASSISTING
THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES, WOULD PAY A VISIT TO MACAU AFTER
THE COMPLETION OF HIS TASKS IN JULY. THIS PROPOSAL WAS
GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED. IT WAS DECIDED TO APPOINT MR. NG KUOK
HENG, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF THE MACAU MARINE AND CUSTOMS
POLICE AS POINT OF CONTACT FOR FUTURE CONTACTS WITH THE MTCR.


FOLLOWING THIS MEETING, THE MTCR DELEGATION WAS ALSO RECEIVED
BY THE SECRETARY OF SECURITY OF THE MACAU SAR, MR. CHEONG
KUOC VA, WHO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE MTCR VISIT
AND REAFFIRMED MACAU'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE
MTCR TO IMPROVE ITS CONTROLS.


ALL IN ALL, THE MTCR TEAM ESTABLISHED THAT MACAU CURRENTLY
DOES NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROL
SYSTEM. IT IS CONSCIOUS OF THIS FACT AND IS ALSO WILLING TO
STRENGTHEN ITS CONTROLS IN COOPERATION WITH THE MTCR AND
OTHER EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES. IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN FORCED
TO GIVE PRIORITY TO OTHER MATTERS FIRST. HERE OBVIOUSLY LIES
A TASK FOR MTCR PARTNERS. AS STATED, A JAPANESE EXPORT
CONTROLS EXPERT WILL VISIT MACAU SHORTLY.


MALAYSIA


AS STATED, THE MTCR TEAM MADE USE OF ITS PRESENCE IN ASIA TO
ALSO VISIT KUALA LUMPUR. THE DELEGATION WAS RECEIVED BY A
DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS FROM THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, HEADED BY MR. G. HUSSEIN BIN G. HANIFF,
UNDER SECRETARY FOR MULTILATERAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE
MFA.


THE MALAYSIAN SIDE EXPRESSED ITS APPRECIATION FOR THIS FIRST
OFFICIAL VISIT BY AN EXPORT CONTROL REGIME TO KUALA LUMPUR,
AND WAS GRATEFUL TO HEAR ABOUT THE STEPS THAT WERE BEING
TAKEN BY MTCR PARTNER STATES TO COUNTER PROLIFERATION OF
MISSILES AN SENSITIVE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. FROM ITS SIDE,
MALAYSIA AT THE MOMENT DID NOT HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE EXPORT
CONTROL SYSTEM. CERTAINLY, MALAYSIA WAS POLITICALLY
COMMITTED TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND TO THE CREATION OF A WORLD
FREE OF WMD. BUT PUTTING IN PLACE AND IMPLEMENTING A
COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL MECHANISM WAS SEEN AS A DIFFICULT TASK.
MALAYSIA DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE SUCH A
GOAL. THERE WERE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS FOR THE
IMPORT AND EXPORT OF SOME SPECIFIC GOODS AND COMMODITIES,
INCLUDING ARMS, BUT THE CONCEPT OF DUAL-USE GOODS, AS
DESCRIBED BY THE MTCR TEAM, WAS NEW AND NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD
BY MALAYSIA. HOW COULD ONE ESTABLISH THAT CERTAIN CHEMICALS
WERE INTENDED FOR USE IN WMD PROGRAMS, AND NOT FOR INSTANCE
FOR LEGITIMATE FERTILIZER PROGRAMS AND SUCH?


GENERALLY SPEAKING, IT WAS UNDERLINED THAT MALAYSIA WAS
LARGELY DEPENDENT ON ITS TRADE, AND WAS AFRAID THAT A
COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL SYSTEM WOULD RUN COUNTER TO ITS
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, WHICH WERE MALAYSIA'S PRINCIPLE SOURCE
OF INCOME. ITS MAIN PRIORITY WAS TO EXPAND ITS HARBOR
FACILITIES, WHICH WERE STILL VERY MUCH SMALLER THAN
SINGAPORE, AND IT FELT THAT TOO MANY CONTROLS WOULD RUN
COUNTER TO THIS OBJECTIVE.


FROM ITS SIDE, THE MTCR TEAM ONCE AGAIN UNDERLINED ITS VIEW
THAT NON-PROLIFERATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL
PEACELOVING NATIONS, AND THAT REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY
ARE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES FOR ESTABLISHING FREE TRADE
RELATIONS. IN THAT SENSE, EXPORT CONTROLS DO NOT RUN COUNTER
TO COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, THEY ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME
MEDALLION. IT WAS UNDERLINED THAT THE DUTCH EXPORT CONTROL
SYSTEM WAS ONLY ONE WAY TO IMPLEMENT NON-PROLIFERATION
UNDERTAKINGS, AND THAT EVERY COUNTRY WAS ENTITLED TO
INCORPORATE A SYSTEM OF CONTROLS IN SCALE WITH ITS OWN
POSSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS THE NEW
ZEALAND SYSTEM, WHICH WORKED VERY WELL FOR THAT COUNTRY.


IN CONCLUSION, THE CHAIR EXPRESSED ITS HOPE THAT IT HAD BEEN
ABLE TO CONVINCE THE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES OF THE URGENT NEED
TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE AIM OF COUNTERING THE PROLIFERATION
OF MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY AND THAT THE VISIT WOULD
INSPIRE THEM TO LOOK INTO THE IMPROVEMENT OF MALAYSIA'S
EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. THE MTCR WAS READY TO
PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION TO THIS END,
AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A FRAMEWORK COULD BE ESTABLISHED
FOR FUTURE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MTCR AND MALAYSIA, ESPECIALLY
INCLUDING AT THE EXPERT LEVEL. TO THIS END IT WAS AGREED
THAT THE MULTILATERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE MFA
COULD ACT AS THE POINT OF CONTACT ON THE MALAYSIAN SIDE.


IN GENERAL, THE MTCR TEAM FELT THAT THE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES
WILL NEED A GOOD DEAL OF CONVINCING IN ORDER TO IMPROVE
MALAYSIAN EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. IN THEIR HEARTS,
THEY BELIEVE RIGID CONTROLS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE
UNWILLING TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER, AND IN THAT REGARD SEEMED
GENUINELY INTERESTED IN THE AD HOC MECHANISM, AS DESCRIBED IN
THE OVERVIEW OF THE DUTCH EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM. FOLLOW UP
TO THE MTCR VISIT BY MTCR PARTNERS IS CRUCIAL IN THIS RESPECT.


PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS


THE MTCR TEAM CONSIDERS THAT ITS OUTREACH MISSION TO ASIA CAN
CERTAINLY BE DEEMED TO HAVE FULFILLED ITS PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE
OF INFORMING THESE COUNTRIES ABOUT THE MTCR AND ITS
OBJECTIVES, AND TRYING TO INVOLVE THEM CLOSER IN THE REGIME'S
NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS.


OF COURSE THIS WAS HARDLY NECESSARY IN THE CASE OF HONG KONG,
THE FACT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME AN OFFICIAL MTCR MISSION
MADE THE EFFORT TO TRAVEL TO THE HONG KONG SAR WAS OBVIOUSLY
GREATLY APPRECIATED, AND CAN ONLY HELP TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN
HONG KONG'S RESOLVE TO UPHOLD AND WHERE POSSIBLE STRENGTHEN
ITS ALREADY IMPRESSIVE EXPORT AND TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. AS
FOR MACAU, THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT THE MISSION WAS
CERTAINLY APPRECIATED, AND IT HAS WITHOUT A DOUBT BEEN ABLE
TO RAISE THE AWARENESS - AND WILLINGNESS - ON THE SIDE OF
MACAU AUTHORITIES OF THE NEED TO IMPROVE ITS CONTROL SYSTEM.
THE SINGAPOREAN AUTHORITIES ON THE WHOLE GAVE THE IMPRESSION
THAT IT WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE SOME EFFORT TO CONVINCE THEM TO
TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO IMPROVE THEIR CONTROL SYSTEM,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE CONTROL OF TRANSSHIPMENT FLOWS
THROUGH SINGAPORE. HOWEVER, THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT IT
CLEARLY CONVEYED THE MESSAGE THAT THE MTCR WANTS THEM TO
ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT MORE STRINGENT EXPORT AND
TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS. FINALLY, THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT
AS FAR AS MALAYSIA IS CONCERNED, THE MISSION SEEMS TO HAVE
BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN TAKING AWAY SOME OF THE MISTRUST THAT MAY
HAVE EXISTED VIS-A-VIS THE MTCR, AND HAS AT LEAST SUCCEEDED
IN OPENING A CHANNEL FOR FUTURE DIALOGUE WITH THE MALAYSIAN
AUTHORITIES.


THE MTCR TEAM BELIEVES THAT ITS VISIT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE
NECESSARY FOLLOW-UP IN THE (NEAR) FUTURE, ESPECIALLY IN WAY
OF BILATERAL VISITS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL AND OF INVITING THEM
TO PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE SEMINARS OR MEETINGS IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE ROUND TABLE MECHANISM.


END REPORT TEXT






SCHNEIDER