EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 004309 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS NANCY POWELL NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR OSD FOR MCCONNELL CIA FOR HOUDEK LONDON FOR PFLAUMER CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10 TAGS: PREL PGOV CG SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR JOHN PRENDERGAST REASONS 1.5 B/D. ¶1. (C) THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE FURTHER ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF SPECIAL ENVOY WOLPE AND SPECIAL ADVISOR PRENDERGAST REGARDING THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS FOR THE CONGO. IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN TANDEM WITH LUSAKA 3426. ¶2. (C) AS THE CLOCK CONTINUES TO TICK TOWARDS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE REAUTHORIZATION OF MONUC, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE ONLY WAY THAT THE LUSAKA PROCESS CAN BE RESCUED IS IF THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES - ANGOLA, ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA, RWANDA AND UGANDA - DECIDE TO RAMP UP THEIR COLLECTIVE PRESSURE ON THEIR RESPECTIVE CONGOLESE ALLIES. ALL OF THEM ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY SHARE A COMMON INTEREST IN IMPLEMENTING THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, THE BEST MEANS OF SECURING STABILITY IN THE REGION. ¶3. (C) FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE COMMON INTEREST THAT ANGOLA, RWANDA AND UGANDA HAVE IN COUNTERING THE THREATS POSED TO THEM BY THEIR RESPECTIVE INSURGENCIES OPERATING CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z FROM CONGOLESE SOIL. OUR MESSAGE HAS RESONATED WITH THE PARTIES MOST CLEARLY WHEN WE SPELL OUT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF RENEWED WAR RESULTING FROM THE OBSTRUCTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA. IF THE WAR RESUMES, THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES WILL BE THESE INSURGENCIES, PRINCIPALLY UNITA, EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWA, AND THE ADF. THE CORE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF ZIMBABWE--AND TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT NAMIBIA--ARE HARMED AS WELL. BECAUSE OF THIS DANGER OF ESCALATION, THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES ALL AGREED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR THEM TO INCREASE THEIR COOPERATION WITH EACH OTHER AND TO INTENSIFY THEIR PRESSURE ON THEIR CONGOLESE ALLIES IMMEDIATELY. IF NOT, LUSAKA IS DEAD. ¶4. (C) OUR MEETINGS WITH ANGOLAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN OFFICIALS HAVE FURTHER SENSITIZED US TO THE CHALLENGES OF MOVING FROM INTENTIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION IN SUCH AN EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY. IN ORDER TO RESTORE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SELF-DEFINED INTERESTS OF EACH OF THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES COME TOGETHER IN A COOPERATIVE AND SUSTAINED REGIONAL STRATEGY, A GREAT DEAL OF TRUST WILL HAVE TO BE REBUILT, AND SERIOUS DIALOGUE MUST BE INITIATED BETWEEN SOME OF THE KEY SIGNATORIES. ¶5. (C) ANGOLA AND RWANDA HAVE NOT OVERCOME THE SENSE OF BETRAYAL BOTH FEEL OVER THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 1998. ANGOLA BELIEVES UGANDA AND THE MLC ARE COOPERATING WITH UNITA. ZIMBABWE AND UGANDA ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF EACH OTHER'S MOVEMENTS AND INTENTIONS IN EQUATEUR. AND RWANDA AND UGANDA ALMOST EXPECT TO BE UNDERMINED BY EACH CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z OTHER IN PURSUIT OF THEIR INTERESTS IN THE CONGO. ¶6. (C) THEREFORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR AN EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY TO WORK, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THESE PARTIES TO ADDRESS URGENTLY SOME OF THEIR DEEPER BILATERAL PROBLEMS. ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES ON A BILATERAL BASIS WILL PAVE THE WAY TO BROADER AGREEMENTS AMONG ALL OF THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES. ¶7. (C) OUR MEETINGS DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE USG CAN PLAY AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN BROKERING THESE BILATERAL CONTACTS AND BUILDING THE CONSENSUS AROUND AN EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY. ALL FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THE USG CAN AND SHOULD PLAY THAT ROLE. ¶8. (C) MOST URGENT IS THE REQUEST FROM RWANDA TO HELP BROKER A DIALOGUE WITH ANGOLA. OUR ANGOLAN INTERLOCUTORS ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED, AND WILL AWAIT CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4639 PAGE 01 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z ACTION SSO-00 INFO LOG-00 AF-00 DODE-00 ANHR-00 TEDE-00 IO-00 OIC-02 P-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /002W -------------- 75B98A 031034Z /38 R 031031Z AUG 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6759 INFO NSC WASHDC USMISSION USUN NEW YORK SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY RWANDA COLLECTIVE SECDEF WASHINGTON DC CIA WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 004309 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS NANCY POWELL NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR OSD FOR MCCONNELL CIA FOR HOUDEK LONDON FOR PFLAUMER CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10 TAGS: PREL PGOV CG SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS FINAL APPROVAL FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS. ANGOLA ALSO MAY BE INTERESTED IN A SIMILAR EXERCISE WITH UGANDA. ZIMBABWE AND UGANDA MAY ALSO REQUIRE SUCH AN INITIATIVE, OR AT THE VERY LEAST FOR US TO CONTINUE TO CARRY MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH AS WE HAVE DONE DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS. ¶9. (C) NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE. THE KEY SIGNATORIES APPEAR SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING SOME DEEPER UNDERSTANDINGS. THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY WILL NOT BE SUSTAINABLE UNLESS SOME OF THESE SERIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES OF TRUST ARE NOT ADDRESSED. ¶10. (C) THE USG'S ROLE CAN AND SHOULD BE A MULTIFACETED ONE. WE CAN ACT AS FACILITATORS FOR THE ACTUAL POL-MIL BILATERAL DIALOGUES, OR AT LEAST PASS IMPORTANT MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH. WE CAN HELP FIND COMMON APPROACHES TO SPECIFIC SECURITY THREATS ON A BILATERAL BASIS. WE CAN OFFER IDEAS ON HOW TO APPROACH OR PRESSURE THE CONGOLESE PARTIES WHEN THEY OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS. WE CAN SUPPORT THEIR DIALOGUE AND THEIR PLANNING FOR DDRR, AN ISSUE THAT ALL OF THEM FEEL DEEPLY ABOUT BUT TOWARDS WHICH THEY HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES. WE CAN OFFER IDEAS ON CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z (AND CONSIDER SUPPORTING) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS TO STRENGTHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS THAT EMERGE FROM THESE MEETINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN CONSIDER HOW THE UNITA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE -- WITH OUR SUPPORT -- COULD HELP MONITOR OR INVESTIGATE ANY ALLEGATION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITA AND THE MLC, RCD, GOR, OR GOU. WE COULD RESURRECT THE IDEA OF SUPPORTING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MONITORS IN KEY AIRSTRIPS IN THE DRC TO ENSURE AGAINST EASY RESUPPLY BY UNITA OR THE EX- FAR/INTERAHAMWE. WE COULD HELP ELABORATE A COMMON STRATEGY FOR SEPARATING THE GENOCIDAIRES LEADERSHIP FROM THE RANK AND FILE MILITIA, A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF WHICH PROBABLY HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH THE EVENTS OF 1994. WE CAN EXPLORE HOW THE UNSC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH ADDRESSING RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE MIGHT WORK TOGETHER IN SOME WAY WITH THE UNITA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO FURTHER COMMON SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION. THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF THE WAYS THAT THE USG CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORTING THE NECESSARY BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A SUCCESSFUL EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY. ¶11. (C) A FINAL CAUTION: SUCH A STRATEGY WILL REQUIRE SOME PATIENCE. OUR MEETINGS AND THE RECENT POLITICAL COMMITTEE SESSION INDICATE A DEMONSTRABLE SHIFT TOWARDS TARGETING ANY SIGNATORY THAT THREATENS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA. BUT THESE REGIONAL LEADERS HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF WORKING VERY SLOWLY IN ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTING PROFOUND SHIFTS IN STRATEGY. ALL OF THEM NOW CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT KABILA IS THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA (WITH J.P. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z BEMBA A DISTANT BUT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT SECONDARY OBSTACLE). BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO MATERIALIZE IN SUPPORT OF DISLODGING THE STATUS QUO. USG ASSISTANCE IN BROKERING BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS WILL IN TURN UNDERGIRD BROADER CONSENSUS - BUILDING AMONG THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES, IN THE CONTEXT OF A PROCESS AND PACE THAT NECESSARILY MUST BE OWNED BY THEM. IRVING CONFIDENTIAL >