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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
00HARARE4309
2000-08-03 10:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO

Tags:   PREL  PGOV  CG 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4638

PAGE 01        HARARE  04309  01 OF 02  031034Z 
ACTION SSO-00   

INFO  LOG-00   AF-00    DODE-00  ANHR-00  TEDE-00  IO-00    OIC-02   
      P-00     SS-00    SAS-00     /002W
                  ------------------75B97F  031034Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6758
INFO NSC WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 004309 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS
NANCY POWELL

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH

USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR

OSD FOR MCCONNELL

CIA FOR HOUDEK

LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z

PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG
SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO
PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS

CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR JOHN PRENDERGAST REASONS
1.5 B/D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 004309

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS
NANCY POWELL

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH

USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR

OSD FOR MCCONNELL

CIA FOR HOUDEK

LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z

PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG
SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO
PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS

CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR JOHN PRENDERGAST REASONS
1.5 B/D.


1. (C) THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE FURTHER ANALYSIS
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF SPECIAL ENVOY WOLPE AND
SPECIAL ADVISOR PRENDERGAST REGARDING THE LUSAKA PEACE
PROCESS FOR THE CONGO. IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN
TANDEM WITH LUSAKA 3426.


2. (C) AS THE CLOCK CONTINUES TO TICK TOWARDS THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE REAUTHORIZATION OF MONUC,
IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE ONLY WAY THAT
THE LUSAKA PROCESS CAN BE RESCUED IS IF THE EXTERNAL
SIGNATORIES - ANGOLA, ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA, RWANDA AND
UGANDA - DECIDE TO RAMP UP THEIR COLLECTIVE PRESSURE ON
THEIR RESPECTIVE CONGOLESE ALLIES. ALL OF THEM
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY SHARE A COMMON INTEREST IN
IMPLEMENTING THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, THE BEST MEANS OF
SECURING STABILITY IN THE REGION.


3. (C) FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE COMMON INTEREST THAT
ANGOLA, RWANDA AND UGANDA HAVE IN COUNTERING THE THREATS
POSED TO THEM BY THEIR RESPECTIVE INSURGENCIES OPERATING
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z
FROM CONGOLESE SOIL. OUR MESSAGE HAS RESONATED WITH THE
PARTIES MOST CLEARLY WHEN WE SPELL OUT THE REPERCUSSIONS
OF RENEWED WAR RESULTING FROM THE OBSTRUCTION OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA. IF THE WAR RESUMES, THE
PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES WILL BE THESE INSURGENCIES,
PRINCIPALLY UNITA, EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWA, AND THE ADF. THE
CORE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF ZIMBABWE--AND
TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT NAMIBIA--ARE HARMED AS WELL.
BECAUSE OF THIS DANGER OF ESCALATION, THE EXTERNAL
SIGNATORIES ALL AGREED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR THEM TO INCREASE THEIR
COOPERATION WITH EACH OTHER AND TO INTENSIFY THEIR
PRESSURE ON THEIR CONGOLESE ALLIES IMMEDIATELY. IF NOT,

LUSAKA IS DEAD.


4. (C) OUR MEETINGS WITH ANGOLAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN
OFFICIALS HAVE FURTHER SENSITIZED US TO THE CHALLENGES
OF MOVING FROM INTENTIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION IN SUCH AN
EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY. IN ORDER TO RESTORE A
SITUATION IN WHICH THE SELF-DEFINED INTERESTS OF EACH OF
THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES COME TOGETHER IN A COOPERATIVE
AND SUSTAINED REGIONAL STRATEGY, A GREAT DEAL OF TRUST
WILL HAVE TO BE REBUILT, AND SERIOUS DIALOGUE MUST BE
INITIATED BETWEEN SOME OF THE KEY SIGNATORIES.


5. (C) ANGOLA AND RWANDA HAVE NOT OVERCOME THE SENSE OF
BETRAYAL BOTH FEEL OVER THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 1998.
ANGOLA BELIEVES UGANDA AND THE MLC ARE COOPERATING WITH
UNITA. ZIMBABWE AND UGANDA ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF
EACH OTHER'S MOVEMENTS AND INTENTIONS IN EQUATEUR. AND
RWANDA AND UGANDA ALMOST EXPECT TO BE UNDERMINED BY EACH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 04309 01 OF 02 031034Z
OTHER IN PURSUIT OF THEIR INTERESTS IN THE CONGO.


6. (C) THEREFORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR AN EXTERNAL
SIGNATORIES STRATEGY TO WORK, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THESE
PARTIES TO ADDRESS URGENTLY SOME OF THEIR DEEPER
BILATERAL PROBLEMS. ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES ON A
BILATERAL BASIS WILL PAVE THE WAY TO BROADER AGREEMENTS
AMONG ALL OF THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES.


7. (C) OUR MEETINGS DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS HAVE
DEMONSTRATED THAT THE USG CAN PLAY AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN
BROKERING THESE BILATERAL CONTACTS AND BUILDING THE
CONSENSUS AROUND AN EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY. ALL
FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THE USG CAN AND
SHOULD PLAY THAT ROLE.


8. (C) MOST URGENT IS THE REQUEST FROM RWANDA TO HELP
BROKER A DIALOGUE WITH ANGOLA. OUR ANGOLAN
INTERLOCUTORS ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED, AND WILL AWAIT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ4639

PAGE 01 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z
ACTION SSO-00

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 DODE-00 ANHR-00 TEDE-00 IO-00 OIC-02
P-00 SS-00 SAS-00 /002W
-------------- 75B98A 031034Z /38
R 031031Z AUG 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6759
INFO NSC WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 004309

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS
NANCY POWELL

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH

USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR

OSD FOR MCCONNELL

CIA FOR HOUDEK

LONDON FOR PFLAUMER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z

PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG
SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO
PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS

FINAL APPROVAL FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS. ANGOLA ALSO
MAY BE INTERESTED IN A SIMILAR EXERCISE WITH UGANDA.
ZIMBABWE AND UGANDA MAY ALSO REQUIRE SUCH AN INITIATIVE,
OR AT THE VERY LEAST FOR US TO CONTINUE TO CARRY
MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH AS WE HAVE DONE DURING THE PAST
FEW WEEKS.


9. (C) NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE. THE KEY SIGNATORIES
APPEAR SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING SOME DEEPER
UNDERSTANDINGS. THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY WILL
NOT BE SUSTAINABLE UNLESS SOME OF THESE SERIOUS
BILATERAL ISSUES OF TRUST ARE NOT ADDRESSED.


10. (C) THE USG'S ROLE CAN AND SHOULD BE A MULTIFACETED
ONE. WE CAN ACT AS FACILITATORS FOR THE ACTUAL POL-MIL
BILATERAL DIALOGUES, OR AT LEAST PASS IMPORTANT MESSAGES
BACK AND FORTH. WE CAN HELP FIND COMMON APPROACHES TO
SPECIFIC SECURITY THREATS ON A BILATERAL BASIS. WE CAN
OFFER IDEAS ON HOW TO APPROACH OR PRESSURE THE CONGOLESE
PARTIES WHEN THEY OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS. WE CAN SUPPORT
THEIR DIALOGUE AND THEIR PLANNING FOR DDRR, AN ISSUE
THAT ALL OF THEM FEEL DEEPLY ABOUT BUT TOWARDS WHICH
THEY HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES. WE CAN OFFER IDEAS ON
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z
(AND CONSIDER SUPPORTING) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS TO
STRENGTHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY BILATERAL OR
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS THAT EMERGE
FROM THESE MEETINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN CONSIDER HOW
THE UNITA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE -- WITH OUR SUPPORT --
COULD HELP MONITOR OR INVESTIGATE ANY ALLEGATION OF
COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITA AND THE MLC, RCD, GOR, OR GOU.
WE COULD RESURRECT THE IDEA OF SUPPORTING THE DEPLOYMENT
OF MONITORS IN KEY AIRSTRIPS IN THE DRC TO ENSURE
AGAINST EASY RESUPPLY BY UNITA OR THE EX-
FAR/INTERAHAMWE. WE COULD HELP ELABORATE A COMMON
STRATEGY FOR SEPARATING THE GENOCIDAIRES LEADERSHIP FROM
THE RANK AND FILE MILITIA, A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF WHICH
PROBABLY HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH THE EVENTS OF 1994. WE
CAN EXPLORE HOW THE UNSC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE CHARGED
WITH ADDRESSING RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE MIGHT
WORK TOGETHER IN SOME WAY WITH THE UNITA SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE TO FURTHER COMMON SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN THE
REGION. THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF THE WAYS THAT THE USG
CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORTING THE NECESSARY BUILDING
BLOCKS FOR A SUCCESSFUL EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY.


11. (C) A FINAL CAUTION: SUCH A STRATEGY WILL REQUIRE
SOME PATIENCE. OUR MEETINGS AND THE RECENT POLITICAL
COMMITTEE SESSION INDICATE A DEMONSTRABLE SHIFT TOWARDS
TARGETING ANY SIGNATORY THAT THREATENS THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA. BUT THESE REGIONAL LEADERS
HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF WORKING VERY SLOWLY IN ACTUALLY
IMPLEMENTING PROFOUND SHIFTS IN STRATEGY. ALL OF THEM
NOW CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT KABILA IS THE PRIMARY
OBSTACLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA (WITH J.P.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 04309 02 OF 02 031034Z
BEMBA A DISTANT BUT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT SECONDARY
OBSTACLE). BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME FOR SPECIFIC
ACTIONS TO MATERIALIZE IN SUPPORT OF DISLODGING THE
STATUS QUO. USG ASSISTANCE IN BROKERING BILATERAL
UNDERSTANDINGS WILL IN TURN UNDERGIRD BROADER CONSENSUS
- BUILDING AMONG THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES, IN THE
CONTEXT OF A PROCESS AND PACE THAT NECESSARILY MUST BE
OWNED BY THEM.

IRVING

CONFIDENTIAL

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