S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 002198 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, USUN/W/BOBORR STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH LONDON FOR PFLAUMER PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD, REASONS 1.5 (B),(D) REFS: A) HARARE 2102, B) HARARE 2103 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ZIMBABWEAN JUSTICE MINISTER AND MUGABE CONFIDANT STATES THAT THE VICTORIA FALLS MEETING WAS CALLED IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES TO CONTINUED FORWARD PROGRESS THAT MIGHT HAVE RESULTED FROM CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS SINCE THE RECENT KAMPALA AGREEMENT. ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, HE ASSERTS, ARE PARTICULARLY EAGER TO FIND A QUICK EXIT FROM THE DRC, BUT CAN DO SO ONLY IF IT IS CLEAR THAT UGANDA AND RWANDA ARE ALSO WITHDRAWING. HE REPORTS THAT, AFTER BEING APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE HAD INITIATED CONVERSATIONS WITH THE EX- FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT THEIR RESETTLEMENT IN THE INTERIOR OF THE DRC. HOWEVER, THIS INITIATIVE WAS HALTED WHEN KABILA LEARNED OF IT AND POSED STRONG CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z OBJECTIONS. ZIMBABWE FEELS IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID A RUPTURE WITH KABILA, AND BELIEVES THAT DDRR ISSUES WILL BE EASIER TO ADDRESS ONCE MONUC IS DEPLOYED ON THE GROUND AND IF THERE IS BROADER INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT. HE ARGUES THAT THESE ISSUES ARE MORE EASILY PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, AND URGES THAT THE USG INTENSIFY ITS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN KINSHASA AND HARARE. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING -------------- ¶2. (C) : ON APRIL 21 S/E WOLPE, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD, LT. COL. GADDIS AND ECONOFF NOTETAKER MET WITH EMERSON MNANGAGWA, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT MUGABE, TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO AND THE EXECUTION OF THE LUSAKA PEACE ACCORD. IN A NEARLY 90 MINUTE-LONG MEETING, THE JUSTICE MINISTER COVERED CONSIDERABLE GROUND, AND OFFERED PARTICULARLY CANDID OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE AND ZIMBABWE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH KABILA. ¶3. (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT ZIMBABWE HAD BECOME VERY 
ANXIOUS ABOUT THE INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED ON THE GROUND SINCE THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE/DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. THE VARIOUS PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS AND CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS HAD RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMMITMENT BY THOSE INVOLVED, AND THERE WERE CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z SUSPICIONS THAT SOME SIDES STILL SOUGHT MILITARY GAINS. ZIMBABWE FEARED THAT EVENTS MIGHT BE SPINNING OUT OF CONTROL. ¶4. (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT IT WAS MUSEVENI WHO HAD SUGGESTED THE VICTORIA FALLS MEETING, AND WHO HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DELIVER KAGAME. MUGABE AND NUJOMA HAD PROMISED TO DELIVER DOS SANTOS, WITH KABILA ALSO INVITED. THE IDEA WAS TO HAVE "AN INFORMAL, NON- BINDING SETTING" IN WHICH THE LEADERS MIGHT REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES THAT HAD EMERGED AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS. THE ZIMBABWEANS INTENDED TO PRESS FOR A RENEWED SENSE OF COMMITMENT TO DISENGAGEMENT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL; TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH THE TWO SIDES COULD "VOLUNTARILY MOVE BACKWARD" IN THE SPIRIT OF COMMITMENT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT; AND TO FIND A METHOD OF INSURING THAT AGREEMENTS MADE WERE HONORED. IF THE LEADERS "SEE LIGHT," THEY WILL THEN BRIEF CHILUBA. MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS FOR A PULLBACK. (ANGOLA, HE SAID, HAD VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND WAS NO LONGER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.) HE BELIEVED CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3112 PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z ACTION AF-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /010W -------------- 4EC11C 212008Z /38 P 211945Z APR 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5810 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY NSC WASHDC PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KAMPALA AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMEMBASSY LUANDA AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 HARARE 002198 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, USUN/W/BOBORR STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH LONDON FOR PFLAUMER PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT THAT UGANDA WOULD POSE NO FURTHER PROBLEMS IN MOVING TO DISENGAGE THE FORCES ON THE GROUND, BUT HE WAS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RWANDA. ¶5. (C) ACCORDING TO THE JUSTICE MINISTER, MBEKI AND CHISSANO WERE COMING TO VIC FALLS FOR A DIFFERENT REASON: TO DISCUSS ZIMBABWE'S LAND QUESTION. MBEKI, HE SAID, HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT HE NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE INFORMAL CONGO DISCUSSIONS. -------------- WHAT TO DO WITH NON-STATE ACTORS -------------- ¶6. (C) AFTER PRAISING ZIMBABWE'S LEADERSHIP IN SECURING THE RECENT KAMPALA AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURING THE JUSTICE MINISTER THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF CONGOLESE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, S/E WOLPE BROACHED THE KNOTTY PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE NON- STATE ACTORS. HE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER IF IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA BY BOLD MOVES ON BOTH SIDES: A DEEPER DISENGAGEMENT AND PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, LINKED TO UNDERTAKINGS BY THE GDRC AND ITS ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NON-SIGNATORY FORCES. WHAT DID ZIMBABWE FEEL IT COULD DO THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE RWANDA AND UGANDA TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING? ¶7. (C) MNANGAGWA RESPONDED FRANKLY THAT THE GOZ HAD NOT YET DEVELOPED CONCRETE POSITIONS ON DDRR, BUT ZIMBABWE DID RECOGNIZE THIS WAS THE CRUCIAL QUESTION. HE SAID THAT TWO MONTHS AGO, AFTER BEING QUIETLY APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE GAVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO ZIMBABWE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN WITH THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE. HE DISCOVERED THAT THE LARGEST PART OF THEM WANTED TO SETTLE IN THE DRC. THE ZIMBABWEANS THEN ASKED THE HUTU FIGHTERS IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DISARMAMENT. IN THE ZIMBABWEAN VIEW, A SOLUTION WAS IN SIGHT: IF THE EX- FAR/INTERAHAMWE ELEMENTS WERE TO SETTLE IN THE DRC, THEY WOULD NOT/NOT BE ON THE BORDER BUT IN THE INTERIOR; THEREFORE, THEY WOULD NO LONGER POSE A THREAT TO RWANDA OR BURUNDI. ¶8. (C) HOWEVER, THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONTINUED, THE DRC LEARNED OF THE ZIMBABWEAN INITIATIVE AND KABILA CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z HAD REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY. THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD THEREFORE TURNED OFF THIS ATTEMPT AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE PROBLEM. THE ZIMBABWEAN IMMEDIATE GOAL, HE SAID, WAS "TO MAXIMIZE ZIMBABWEAN INFLUENCE ON KABILA, RATHER THAN ON THESE FORCES." "WE NEED TO PLAY A ROLE THAT IS APPRECIATED BY KABILA," HE SAID, "SO WE CAN PUSH HIM TO TAKE POSITIONS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY." ZIMBABWE HAD CONCLUDED THAT, GIVEN KABILA'S OPPOSITION TO ANY SUCH DISCUSSION, PUSHING THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ISSUE AT THIS POINT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY IN TERMS OF THE BIGGER PICTURE. (IN AN ASIDE, THE JUSTICE MINISTER OBLIQUELY REFERENCED SOME DISCUSSIONS THE DRC HAD HAD WITH THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT HOW THEIR DEMANDS COULD BE ADDRESSED. HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THESE ELEMENTS AND EITHER UGANDA OR RWANDA.) ¶9. (C) MNANGAGWA AGREED THAT THE DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION HAD TO BE RESOLVED IF LUSAKA WERE TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT, HE SAID, ZIMBABWE COULD NOT BE IN THE LEAD OR SEEN AS THE CHAMPION OF THIS CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3113 PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z ACTION AF-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 OIGO-02 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W -------------- 4EC120 212008Z /38 P 211945Z APR 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5811 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY NSC WASHDC PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KAMPALA AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMEMBASSY LUANDA AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 HARARE 002198 SIPDIS CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, USUN/W/BOBORR STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH LONDON FOR PFLAUMER PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT INITIATIVE. RATHER, ZIMBABWE WANTED TO SEE MORE INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS INVOLVED. ONCE MONUC DEPLOYED, ZIMBABWE WOULD BE LESS SIGNIFICANT AND LESS VISIBLE, AND IT WOULD BE EASIER TO WORK THE DDRR ISSUES. IT WOULD ALSO BE EASIER TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULT DDRR ISSUES IF THEY WERE PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, HE SAID. ¶10. (C) WOLPE OBSERVED, WITH THE JUSTICE MINISTER'S CONCURRENCE, THAT KABILA DID IN FACT APPEAR TO RESPOND TO STRONG PRESSURE. WHY, THEN, WAS ZIMBABWE RELUCTANT TO EXERT THE SAME PRESSURE ON KABILA ON THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE THAT IT HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT? MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A CORE ISSUE FOR KABILA, AND ZIMBABWEANS FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY PUSHED KABILA TOO FAR. KABILA WAS ALREADY SHOPPING AROUND FOR OTHERS TO FILL THE ZIMBABWEAN CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z ROLE, AND THAT HAD MADE THE GOZ EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS. WOLPE NOTED THAT ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT KABILA HAD PURCHASED HAD DONE LITTLE TO IMPROVE KABILA'S POSITION, AND THAT HE REMAINED DEPENDENT 0N THE ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. MNANGAGWA SAID THAT, WHILE THIS MIGHT BE TRUE, KABILA COULD PROVIDE MORE SIGNIFICANT ARMS TO THE NON-SIGNATORY FORCES, AND CREATE HAVOC FOR THE CONGO AND THE REGION. KABILA, HE SAID, HAD EARLIER PROVIDED SOME ARMS TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE, BUT THIS ARMS SUPPLY HAD BEEN LIMITED THANKS TO ZIMBABWEAN INTERVENTION. -------------- HOW ABOUT RESUPPLY AND TRAINING? -------------- ¶11. (C) WOLPE ASKED IF ZIMBABWE AND THE ALLIES MIGHT BE ABLE, IN EXCHANGE FOR A DISENGAGEMENT INITIATIVE BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, TO AT LEAST INSURE THE CESSATION OF TRAINING AND RESUPPLY OF THE NON- SIGNATORY FORCES. MNANGAGWA INITIALLY RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO MANAGE, AND THAT ZIMBABWE HOPED THAT CHILUBA AND MASIRE COULD ASSIST THE PARTIES "IN TALKING ACROSS THE LINES." SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, MNANGAGWA SAID THAT HE BELIEVED A COMMITMENT TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND RESUPPLY COULD IN FACT BE MADE BY THE ALLIES TO UGANDA AND RWANDA. -------------- MASIRE AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z -------------- ¶12. (C) WOLPE TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF MASIRE AND THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE, DESCRIBING THE EFFORTS THE USG HAD BEEN MAKING TO GET KABILA TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE COULD EMERGE IN A STRONGER POSITION BY FULLY EMBRACING LUSAKA AND ACCEPTING MASIRE'S FACILITATION. MNANGAGWA AGREED WITH WOLPE, AND SAID THAT ZIMBABWE HAD MADE THE SAME POINT WITH THE CONGOLESE PRESIDENT. HE SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT MASIRE ESTABLISH A MORE PUBLIC PROFILE, AND THAT HE BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVELY CONSULTING WITH ALL OF THE REGIONAL CAPITALS. -------------- WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? -------------- ¶13. (C) WHEN ASKED BY S/E WOLPE WHAT MESSAGE HE COULD CARRY FROM HARARE TO RWANDA AND UGANDA, THE JUSTICE MINISTER REPLIED: "THAT ZIMBABWE IS ANXIOUS TO SEE A CONCLUSION TO THIS WAR." MNANGAGWA OBSERVED THAT RWANDA AND UGANDA WOULD NO DOUBT SAY THE SAME THING. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE: "BECAUSE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3114 PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z ACTION AF-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /010W -------------- 4EC124 212008Z /38 P 211945Z APR 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5812 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY NSC WASHDC PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KAMPALA AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMEMBASSY LUANDA AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 HARARE 002198 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, USUN/W/BOBORR STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH LONDON FOR PFLAUMER PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA ARE SERIOUSLY WORKING ON A WAY TO PULL OUT." "BUT," HE CONTINUED, "ZIMBABWE CAN NOT GIVE AWAY THEIR GAME TO RWANDA AND UGANDA. THEY HAVE TO BE PULLING OUT AS WELL, AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS NEEDED ON THE GROUND TO SHINE A BRIGHT LIGHT ON ALL THE PLAYERS' ACTIONS AND BE AN IMPARTIAL WITNESS." HOW THE WITHDRAWAL IS STRUCTURED CAN BE WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIPS. IN FACT, MNANGAGWA SAID, A ZIMBABWE MILITARY TEAM HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO MBUJI-MAI TO BEGIN OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR A PULLOUT FROM THE DRC. WHILE THIS WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO BE VETTED AND APPROVED BY THE TOP MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, THEY HAD STARTED THE BALL ROLLING. THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONCLUDED: IF THERE ARE PROBLEMS ONCE THE UN FORCES ARE ON THE GROUND, IT WILL BE FROM RWANDA AND UGANDA, NOT FROM ZIMBABWE. -------------- THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z -------------- ¶14. (C) AS PART OF HIS OVER-ALL PROGNOSIS, THE JUSTICE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT SOUTH AFRICA MAY NOW BE IN A POSITION TO PLAY "A MORE NEUTRAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE" ROLE IN THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT. MNANGAGWA SAID THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD BEEN PUSHING KABILA TO DISTINGUISH SOUTH AFRICA AND MBEKI FROM MANDELA, WHOM KABILA NEVER LIKED. "WE WANT KABILA TO OPEN HIS HEART TO MBEKI," HE SAID. MBEKI, HE ADDED, HAD SO FAR PLAYED IT VERY WELL WITH KABILA. -------------- NO TO REGIONAL SANCTIONS -------------- ¶15. (C) WOLPE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER WHETHER THE LUSAKA SIGNATORIES HAD CONSIDERED THE IMPOSITION OF REGIONAL SANCTIONS ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATORS. MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. IT WAS FAR BETTER AT WORKING AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE AMONG THE PARTIES. -------------- IS THERE A PLAN B? -------------- ¶16. (C) WOLPE ASKED MNANGAGWA IF ZIMBABWE AND THE ALLIES HAD ANY PLAN B IN MIND, SHOULD KABILA IN THE END PROVE WHOLLY IMPERVIOUS TO THE PRESSURES THAT WERE BEING APPLIED? THE JUSTICE MINISTER RESPONDED CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z WITH A SMILE: "THIS IS A DANGEROUS QUESTION." IN ANY EVENT, HE CONTINUED, KABILA APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, AND "WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH HIM." HOWEVER, "KABILA SEES ZIMBABWE AS AN ALLY THAT HAS TAKEN OVER A DANGEROUS PROPORTION OF THE DRC'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THIS MAKES HIM UNCOMFORTABLE." MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT RECENTLY THE ALLIES HAD INSISTED THAT KABILA AGREE THAT ALL FAC FORCES WOULD OPERATE ONLY UNDER CENTRAL COMMAND. HOWEVER, KABILA REJECTED THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHICH IS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED IN THREE PROVINCES; KINSHASA, ORIENTALE AND KATANGA. -------------- MORE USG SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY IS NEEDED -------------- ¶17. (C) WOLPE ASKED IF THE USG COULD BE HELPFUL IN STRENGTHENING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ZIMBABWE, ON THE ONE HAND, AND RWANDA AND UGANDA, ON THE OTHER. MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT ZIMBABWE HAD GOOD LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOTH RWANDA AND UGANDA, BUT THEY WERE INTENTIONALLY BEING KEPT TO A LOW LEVEL FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3116 PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z ACTION AF-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 OIGO-02 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-01 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W -------------- 4EC127 212008Z /38 P 211945Z APR 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5813 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY NSC WASHDC PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KAMPALA AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMEMBASSY LUANDA AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 HARARE 002198 SIPDIS CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E, USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG, USUN/W/BOBORR STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH LONDON FOR PFLAUMER PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG ZI SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT MOMENT. HOWEVER, ONCE THE DECISION WAS TAKEN, THERE COULD BE AN EXPLOSION OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION. THIS WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM. HOWEVER, WHAT WOULD HELP NOW IS IF THE USG WOULD ENGAGE IN MUCH MORE FREQUENT SHUTTLING BETWEEN THE CAPITALS OF KINSHASA AND HARARE, BETWEEN KABILA AND MUGABE.. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) THE REMARKABLE CANDOR OF THE JUSTICE MINISTER -- NOTING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO LUSAKA IMPLEMENTATION OF DDRR; ACKNOWLEDGING HIS OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH, AND REFLECTIONS ABOUT, THE EX- FAR/INTERHAMWE; AND DESCRIBING ZIMBABWE'S DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP WITH KABILA -- IS TESTIMONY TO CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z ZIMBABWE'S URGENT NEED TO FIND A QUICK WAY OUT OF THE DROC. KABILA'S REJECTION OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON DDRR REMAINS A MAJOR HURDLE TO LUSAKA IMPLEMENTATION. IN THE VIEW OF MNANGAGWA, THIS COULD BEST BE ADDRESSED THROUGH BROADER INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. THE ELEMENTS OF AN INITIAL DEAL COULD BE IN THE MAKING, THOUGH, IF THE ZIMBABWEANS WOULD BE WILLING AT SOME POINT TO COMMIT JOINTLY WITH THEIR ALLIES TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE. ¶19. (C) PARTICULARLY STRIKING WAS MNANGAGWA'S REQUEST THAT THE USG ENGAGE IN MORE ACTIVE AND CONTINUOUS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, SPECIFICALLY BETWEEN KABILA AND HIS OWN BOSS, MUGABE. IT WOULD APPEAR ALSO THAT ZIMBABWE'S COMFORT LEVEL WITH SOUTH AFRICA HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH MBEKI'S ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY. ZIMBABWE'S LEANING ON KABILA TO ACCEPT A SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE MAY ULTIMATELY MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO PLAY A MORE SUBSTANTIVE ROLE IN DROC PEACEKEEPING. END COMMENT. MCDONALD CONFIDENTIAL >