Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
00COLOMBO968
2000-05-08 10:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

LTTE OFFERS TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE

Tags:  MOPS PREL CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 081045Z MAY 00
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7557
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
USMISSION GENEVA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000968 

LONDON FOR SUTPHIN
CINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/10
TAGS: MOPS PREL CE
SUBJECT: LTTE OFFERS TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE

(U) CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD H. SMYTH, DCM. REASON(S):
1.5(D),(E).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000968

LONDON FOR SUTPHIN
CINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/10
TAGS: MOPS PREL CE
SUBJECT: LTTE OFFERS TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE

(U) CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD H. SMYTH, DCM. REASON(S):
1.5(D),(E).


1. (C) SUMMARY. WITH THE SRI LANKAN ARMY HAVING PULLED
BACK TO NEW DEFENSIVE LINES AND A SLOWDOWN IN LTTE
ADVANCES OVER THE WEEKEND ON THE JAFFNA FRONT, THE LTTE
HAS OFFERED A TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE TO ALLOW GSL FORCES
TO "WITHDRAW FROM THE UNFAVORABLE THEATER OF WAR WITH
DIGNITY AND HONOR." THE OFFER PRESENTS THE GSL WITH A
NUMBER OF DILEMMAS AND MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS;
GOVERNMENT SOURCES ARE SAYING THAT THEY ARE "STUDYING
THE OFFER." COUNTRIES ABLE TO ASSIST IN AN EVACUATION,
IF ASKED, ARE GOING TO HAVE TO CAREFULLY EVALUATE THE
RELATIVE PERMISSIVENESS OF THE LTTE OFFER. END SUMMARY.

LTTE PRESS RELEASE
--------------


2. (U) AT 0935(L),THE LTTE OFFICE IN LONDON ISSUED THE
FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE:

BEGIN QUOTE:

"THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) WISHES TO
STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO DECLARE A TEMPORARY CEASE-
FIRE SUSPENDING ALL ARMED HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE SRI
LANKAN ARMED FORCES TO FACILITATE THE BELEAGUERED
GOVERNMENT TROOPS TO BE EVACUATED SAFELY FROM THE JAFFNA
PENINSULA.

"OUR PROPOSED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL COME INTO
EFFECT AS SOON AS THE SRI LANKA GOVERNMENT INDICATES TO
US, WITHOUT DELAY, ITS WILLINGNESS TO OBSERVE THE SAME.
WE CALL UPON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS TO SUPERVISE AND ASSIST THE ORDERLY EVACUATION OF
TROOPS.

"THE LEADERSHIP OF THE LIBERATION TIGERS HAS MADE THIS
DECISION AS A GESTURE OF GOODWILL TO PREVENT ESCALATION
OF VIOLENCE AND BLOODBATH AND TO CREATE A CONGENIAL
ENVIRONMENT FOR SRI LANKAN SOLDIERS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE
UNFAVORABLE THEATER OF WAR WITH DIGNITY AND HONOR.

"WE CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA TO CONSIDER
OUR PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY AND RESPOND POSITIVELY WITHOUT
DELAY. A POSITIVE RESPONSE, WE ARE CONFIDENT, WILL
CREATE CORDIAL CONDITIONS FOR A PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE,
PEACE, TALKS, AND NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR
THE TAMIL NATIONAL QUESTION. WE ALSO WISH TO INDICATE
TO THE SRI LANKA GOVERNMENT THAT IT WILL BEAR TOTAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF HEAVY
MILITARY CASUALTIES IF IT REJECTS OUR PROPOSAL FOR DE-
ESCALATION AND CONTINUES THE WAR EFFORT."

END QUOTE.


CONTEXT
--------------


3. (C) THE MEASURED TONES OF THE STATEMENT --

PARTICULARLY THE EMPHASIS ON AVOIDING A BLOOD-BATH AND
HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF THE CEASE-FIRE BEING A
PRECURSOR TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE "TAMIL
NATIONAL QUESTION" (WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING
INDEPENDENCE) -- SHOULD PLAY WELL WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY INDIA, AS IT WRESTLES WITH
IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO THE JAFFNA
OFFENSIVE.


4. (C) THE OFFER COMES AFTER INDIA HAS REJECTED ARMED
INTERVENTION AND AS THE JAFFNA BATTLELINES HAVE BECOME
RELATIVELY STABILIZED, WITH GSL FORCES ESTABLISHING A
MAIN DEFENSIVE LINE RUNNING SOUTH-SOUTHWESTWARDS FROM
POINT PEDRO TO THE JAFFNA LAGOON. WEEKEND REPORTS OF
COMBAT SUGGESTED LOW- TO MODERATE INTENSITY MORTAR/
ARTILLERY EXCHANGES RATHER THAN INFANTRY OPERATIONS.
BOTH GOVERNMENT AND LTTE FORCES NEED A BREATHER; WITH
ITS RECENTLY ACQUIRED HEAVY ARTILLERY, HOWEVER, THE LTTE
COULD INTENSIFY ITS OFFENSIVE AGAINST LARGELY
DEMORALIZED GSL FORCES AFTER A RELATIVELY SHORT BREAK.


QUESTIONS AND DILEMMAS
--------------


5. (C) THE LTTE STATEMENT DOES NOT ADDRESS CERTAIN
ISSUES ESSENTIAL FOR THE GSL'S FULL CONSIDERATION OF THE
OFFER -- AND THEREIN LIES MANY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
DILEMMAS. THE STATEMENT DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER A
PERMISSIVE WITHDRAWAL WOULD INCLUDE ARMS AND EQUIPMENT,
NOR IS ANY TIME-LINE OTHER THAN "SOON" INDICATED.


6. (C) WHILE THE GSL COULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT IN
JAFFNA FOR SOME TIME, THE FORCES' SITUATION IS UNTENABLE
UNLESS SOME IMAGINATION AND FORCEFULNESS IS DEMONSTRATED
AND THE INITIATIVE REGAINED, A SCENARIO UNLIKELY OVER
THE SHORT TERM. WHILE IT MIGHT MAKE SOUND MILITARY
SENSE TO HAVE THE ARMY 'LIVE TO FIGHT ANOTHER DAY,'
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES WOULD ARGUE FOR PRESIDENT
KUMARATUNGA NOT TO GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS THE LEADER THAT
CAPITULATED -- EVEN IN A WITHDRAWAL "WITH HONOR" -- TO
THE LTTE.


7. (C) THE VAGUENESS OF THE LTTE STATEMENT ARGUES
AGAINST THE GSL'S IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER --
BUT EVEN A STATEMENT INDICATING MORE INFORMATION IS
NECESSARY WOULD SIGNAL A WAVERING (WITH ITS POLITICAL
COST) IN THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO HOLD JAFFNA, THE
ONE GREAT MILITARY PRIZE OF KUMARATUNGA'S GOVERNMENT.
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION, LTTE CONDITIONS COULD PROVE SO TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE (TOO SHORT A TIME FRAME, PREEMPTIVE
DISARMING OF GOVERNMENT FORCES, ETC.) THAT A CEASE-FIRE
WOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE, LEAVING THE LTTE ON THE FIELD AS
THE PARTY THAT MAGNANIMOUSLY OFFERED PEACE ONLY TO BE
REJECTED. PERHAPS THE GREATEST DILEMMA OF ALL IS IF THE
GSL ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT COULD NOT
ARRANGE FOR TRANSPORTATION; SRI LANKAN SHIPPING ASSETS
ALONE ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT OF A TIMELY WITHDRAWAL
OF ITS TROOPS.

REACTIONS
--------------


8. (S) IN RESPONSE TO THE BARRAGE OF QUESTIONS FROM THE
PRESS, GOVERNMENT SOURCES ARE PUBLICLY SAYING THAT THE
"OFFER MUST BE STUDIED." ACCORDING TO DATT SOURCES, THE
SRI LANKAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP'S REACTION AS OF LATE
AFTERNOON CAN BE PARAPHRASED AS "NUTS."


9. (C) THE ICRC DELEGATION IN COLOMBO SAYS IT IS
DELIGHTED WITH THE LTTE'S OFFER, WHILE DISTURBED BY THE
SANGUINARY LAST SENTENCE. THEY HAD RECEIVED NO PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF THE LTTE'S OFFER, AND, IN FACT, SAY THEY
HAVE HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE LTTE REGARDING THE
POSSIBILITY AND MODALITIES OF ICRC OVERSIGHT OF A
MILITARY EVACUATION. THEIR IMMEDIATE PLANS ARE TO DO
NOTHING, BUT WAIT AND SEE IF THE GSL AND/OR LTTE COME
DIRECTLY TO THEM WITH A REQUEST TO PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY
ROLE.


10. (C) NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR WESTBORG WAS UNAWARE OF THE
LTTE PRESS RELEASE WHEN AMBASSADOR SPOKE WITH HIM BY
PHONE LATE THIS AFTERNOON. WESTBORG'S IMMEDIATE
REACTION TO THE NEWS WAS THAT IT COULD REPEAT COULD
PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR TALKS BUT HE HAD MANY QUESTIONS.
IF THE LTTE CONSULTED WITH GON REPS IN LONDON OR OSLO ON
THIS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS, NORWAYS MAN
IN COLOMBO WAS LEFT OUT OF THE LOOP.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) WHETHER THE LTTE OFFER IS SERIOUS OR NOT (AND
HERE WE AGAIN NOTE THAT THE LTTE SET THE OFFER UP IN A
MANNER ALLOWING EASY WITHDRAWAL OF THE RUG),THE
ORGANIZATION HAS ALREADY SCORED SOME REAL PSYOPS POINTS
WITH THE TROOPS UNDER THREAT IN JAFFNA AND POTENTIALLY
WITH ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HOPING FOR
A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SRI LANKA.


12. (C) WHETHER THE GSL REJECTS OR ACCEPTS THE OFFER --
AND WE BELIEVE A REJECTION IS MOST LIKELY -- THE OFFER
ITSELF AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE WILL LIKELY FIGURE
HEAVILY IN THE EXTENDED DEFENSE DEBATE SCHEDULED TO
BEGIN IN PARLIAMENT TOMORROW AS WELL AS IN THE
DELIBERATIONS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SRI LANKA HAS
APPROACHED FOR ONE KIND OR ANOTHER OF ASSISTANCE.

DONNELLY