Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
99DAMASCUS4200
1999-08-09 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

BASHAR'S INTRO TO THE WEST?

Tags:  PREL PGOV SY 
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P 091155Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7588
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004200 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/09
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY
SUBJECT: BASHAR'S INTRO TO THE WEST?
U.S. VIEW OF BASHAR IMPORTANT TO ASAD

REF: A) DAMASCUS 4043, B) DAMASCUS 0997

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASON 1.5 (B)
AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004200

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/09
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY
SUBJECT: BASHAR'S INTRO TO THE WEST?
U.S. VIEW OF BASHAR IMPORTANT TO ASAD

REF: A) DAMASCUS 4043, B) DAMASCUS 0997

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASON 1.5 (B)
AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. A SOURCE CLOSE TO BASHAR AL-ASAD TOLD
US AUGUST 5 THAT PRESIDENT ASAD HAD APPROVED A MIDDLE
EAST INSIGHT MAGAZINE INTERVIEW WITH BASHAR, SCHEDULED
TO BE PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER. THE SAME SOURCE, A BASHAR
LOYALIST, PROBED US ON HOW THE U.S. VIEWED THE HEIR-
APPARENT AND SEEMED INTENT ON HEARING ABOUT HOW TO
IMPROVE BASHAR'S IMAGE WITH THE U.S. IF THE INTERVIEW
COMES OFF, IT MAY SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF A SARG-
ORCHESTRATED "SELL JOB" OF BASHAR TO THE WEST, AND TO
THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR. MEANWHILE, RUMORS INDICATE THAT
BASHAR STILL FACES SOME INTERNAL OBSTACLES, POSSIBLY
AMONG ALAWIS. WE SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE
IMPORTANCE OF OUR POSTURE ON BASHAR IN THE MONTHS TO
COME. END SUMMARY.

MEI INTERVIEW WITH BASHAR?
--------------


2. (C) AN AMERICAN-BASED, SYRIAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE
TIES TO BASHAR AL-ASAD TOLD US AUGUST 5 THAT PRESIDENT
ASAD HAD GIVEN HIS APPROVAL FOR BASHAR TO BE INTERVIEWED
BY MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT (MEI) MAGAZINE, FOR THE SEPTEMBER
ISSUE. THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED BY
BASHAR TO A WESTERN PUBLICATION, ALTHOUGH A LENGTHY
INTERVIEW WITH THE LEBANESE NEWSPAPER AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI
APPEARED IN FEBRUARY (REF B). ACCORDING TO THIS
BUSINESS CONTACT, WHO STATED CREDIBLY THAT HE HAD MET
WITH BASHAR DURING THE PRECEEDING WEEK, IT HAD BEEN
AGREED WITH MEI THAT THE QUESTIONS WOULD BE SUBMITTED IN
ADVANCE AND THAT THE INTERVIEW WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
SARG BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION.


3. (C) THIS CONTACT, A BASHAR LOYALIST WHO SAYS HE WOULD
RETURN TO WORK FOR THE SARG UNDER BASHAR'S DIRECTION,
SAID THAT ASAD IS LOOKING FOR "CERTAIN CONTROLLED
ENVIRONMENTS" IN WHICH TO INCREASE HIS SON'S EXPOSURE
AND STATURE. WHILE THIS CONTACT REMAINS CONCERNED THAT
SYRIA LACKS THE FORWARD-THINKING TECHNO-AND BUREAUCRATS
NEEDED TO EFFECT CHANGE HERE (REF A),HE SEEMS CONVINCED
THAT BASHAR PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO MOVE TOWARDS A MORE
OPEN AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM.

BASHAR NEEDS U.S. BLESSING
--------------


4. (C) DURING OUR EXCHANGE, THIS CONTACT ASKED AS
BLATANTLY AS WE HAVE HEARD THUS FAR HOW THE U.S. VIEWED
BASHAR, AND ASKED FOR OUR ADVICE ON WAYS BASHAR'S IMAGE
COULD BE PROMOTED IN THE U.S. WE ANSWERED THAT A

CONSIDERED OPINION WAS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE FEW AMERICANS
HAD EVER MET HIM, MUCH LESS EVALUATED HIM AS A FUTURE
PRESIDENT. HE ASKED FOR OUR OPINION ON THE UPCOMING MEI
INTERVIEW, WHICH WE SAID WOULD BE USEFUL (AS WALID
MU'ALLIM'S HAD BEEN) IF IT PROVIDED "REAL QUESTIONS AND
REAL ANSWERS," AND NOT OBVIOUSLY PRE-PACKAGED
STATEMENTS.

A LEGITIMACY "VACUUM"
--------------


5. (C) SEVERAL PRO-BASHAR AND/OR U.S-LEANING
INTERLOCUTORS HAVE INQUIRED MORE SUBTLY THAN THIS
ARTICULATE BUSINESS CONTACT ABOUT U.S. VIEWS TOWARD THE
HEIR APPARENT, APPARENTLY LOOKING FOR POSITIVE SIGNALS
FROM US ABOUT OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM. A
FORMER MP WHO MAINTAINS REGULAR CONTACT WITH US AND THE
BRITISH EMBASSY EXPANDED ON THE THEME IN A RECENT
CONVERSATION. HE SAID THE REGIME IS CLEARLY WORRIED
ABOUT A "VACUUM IN LEGITIMACY" AFTER AN ANTICIPATED
PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, SINCE SO MUCH OF ASAD'S
INTERNAL AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDING STEMS FROM
THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS
CRUTCH, ASAD IS INTENT ON SECURING FOR BASHAR THE KIND
OF SUPPORT THAT JORDANIAN KING ABDULLAH RECEIVED FROM
THE U.S. AFTER THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER. SUCH SUPPORT
WOULD WIN FINANCIAL GAINS, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY,
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY FOR THE NEW BASHAR REGIME,
AMELIORATING BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS.

STILL LACKING SOME CREDENTIALS
--------------


6. (C) MEANWHILE, CONTACTS INDICATE WITHOUT ELABORATING
THAT BASHAR STILL FACES SOME RESISTANCE AMONG THE ALAWI
ELITE, SOME OF WHOM DOUBT THAT BASHAR IS CAPABLE OF
MAINTAINING THE SYSTEM THAT HAS LONG BENEFITED THIS
RULING MINORITY. (INTERESTINGLY, CHRISTIANS AND MOST
OTHER RELIGIOUS MINORITIES HAVE EXPRESSED OPEN SUPPORT
FOR BASHAR IN THE FERVENT HOPE THAT HE WILL MAINTAIN
ASAD'S "LIVE AND LET LIVE" APPROACH TOWARDS MINORITY
RELIGIOUS GROUPS.) WHILE IT IS NO LONGER TABOO TO SPEAK
OPENLY ABOUT BASHAR AS A SUCCESSOR TO HIS FATHER, EVEN
SUPPORTERS FRET THAT HE STILL LACKS A TITLE AND AN
OFFICIAL PLACE IN THE GOVERNMENT/PARTY STRUCTURE. THE
COMMON WISDOM IS THAT A REGIONAL COMMAND MEETING
SOMETIME IN THE FALL WILL FINALLY ELECT BASHAR INTO THE
BA'TH PARTY LEADERSHIP, BUT PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A
MEETING ARE STILL NOTICEABLY ABSENT. WE NOTE AS WELL
THE PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT BASHAR HAS NOT LIVED UP TO
EXPECTATIONS WITH HIS HANDLING OF THE LEBANON FILE, AND
THAT VP KHADDAM IS STILL PERFORMING HIS TRADITIONAL ROLE
AS ARBITER AMONG THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP. FINALLY, IT
IS CLEAR THAT BASHAR CONTINUES TO BE EXCLUDED FROM PEACE
PROCESS RELATED ACTIVITY, WHICH REMAINS AN ASAD-SHARA
AFFAIR.


5. (C) OTHER RESISTANCE MAY COME FROM BA'TH PARTY
STALWARTS GENERALLY UNHAPPY WITH SIGNS OF CHANGE IN
SYRIA AND ASAD'S DECISION TO PURSUE PEACE. A MEMBER OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY POLITBURO CLAIMED THAT IN A RECENT
MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE FRONT, WHICH HE
ATTENDED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BA'TH PARTY
REGIONAL COMMAND DR. SULAYMAN QADDAH MADE OPENLY
CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS AND EVEN SPOKE
RHETORICALLY ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. WHILE
THIS FORMER MP AGREED THAT THIS SENTIMENT WOULD NEVER
STAND IN THE WAY OF ASAD'S DESIRE TO CONCLUDE A PEACE
WITH ISRAEL, HE SAID SUCH COMMENTS REFLECTED A CERTAIN
ELEMENT OF "OLD THINK" THAT WAS RELUCTANT TO EMBRACE
FORWARD MOVEMENT, EVEN WITH BASHAR.


6. (C) COMMENT. IF THE MEI INTERVIEW COMES OFF, IT WILL
MARK BASHAR'S MEDIA INTRODUCTION TO THE WEST, A
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN ITSELF SINCE FEW OFFICIAL
SYRIANS ARE ALLOWED SUCH ENTREE. WHILE IT MAY SIGNAL
THE BEGINNING OF A SARG-ORCHESTRATED EFFORT TO "SELL"
BASHAR TO THE WEST, AND THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR,
IT IS LIKELY TO BE A HIGHLY STRUCTURED AND CONTROLLED
EFFORT. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SPECULATED THAT IF THE U.S.
GIVES BASHAR (AND A NEW MINORITY ALAWI REGIME) ITS
BLESSING, "ASAD WILL SIGN WITH ISRAEL TOMORROW." WHILE
THIS LINKAGE IS TOO BOLD, WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE
HOW IMPORTANT OUR POSTURE TOWARDS BASHAR IS LIKELY TO
BE, IN INCREASING MEASURE, IN THE MONTHS TO COME.


7. (C) THUS FAR, THE BASHAR CAMPAIGN DOES NOT INCLUDE
ACTUAL CONTACT WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS; THERE HAS BEEN
NO RESPONSE TO REQUESTS BY THE AMBASSADOR AND A NUMBER
OF CODELS FOR MEETINGS. OUR WESTERN DIPLOMATIC
COLLEAGUES HAVE HAD THE SAME EXPERIENCE, PRESUMABLY
BECAUSE ASAD DOES NOT WANT POSSIBLY LESS-THAN-EFFUSIVE
ASSESSMENTS TO REACH WORLD CAPITALS. FOR NOW,
THEREFORE, THE ANSWER TO PROBES ABOUT OUR VIEW IS
SIMPLE:

--THE USG HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH BASHAR AL-ASAD.

--DECISIONS ON LEADERSHIP IN SYRIA ARE FOR SYRIANS TO
MAKE, NOT AMERICANS.

CROCKER