Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
99DAMASCUS2528
1999-05-24 11:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIAN SUCCESSION: AFTER ASAD THE STRUGGLE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON PHUM PTER SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 241133Z MAY 99
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6517
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 002528 

NICOSIA FOR ILMG, LONDON FOR SUTPHIN, PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/06
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM PTER SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN SUCCESSION: AFTER ASAD THE STRUGGLE
FOR SYRIA MAY RESUME

REFS: A) STATE 68334, B) DAMASCUS 1806,
C) DAMASCUS 1186

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER; REASONS 1.5
(B AND D).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 002528

NICOSIA FOR ILMG, LONDON FOR SUTPHIN, PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/06
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM PTER SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN SUCCESSION: AFTER ASAD THE STRUGGLE
FOR SYRIA MAY RESUME

REFS: A) STATE 68334, B) DAMASCUS 1806,
C) DAMASCUS 1186

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER; REASONS 1.5
(B AND D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) HAFIZ AL-ASAD'S EFFORT TO PREPARE SON BASHAR TO
ASSUME EVENTUALLY THE PRESIDENCY IS INCREASINGLY THE
PRISM THROUGH WHICH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE VIEWED
AND INTERPRETED. THE PROSPECTS FOR A SMOOTH
SUCCESSION ARE A DIRECT FUNCTION OF HOW MUCH TIME ASAD
HAS -- AND HOW MUCH APTITUDE BASHAR SHOWS. GIVEN HIS
AGE AND HEALTH, PRESIDENT ASAD COULD DIE AT ANY TIME;
HIS EARLY DEPARTURE WOULD LIKELY REVIVE THE LONG-
DORMANT STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN SYRIA. ELDEST SON
BASHAR IS FAR FROM A SURE BET TO FOLLOW IN HIS
FATHER'S FOOTSTEPS, AND, IN ANY CASE, WOULD NEVER
ENJOY HIS FATHER'S ABSOLUTE GRIP ON POWER. VICE-
PRESIDENT KHADDAM WOULD LIKELY HAVE A KEY ROLE IN
SUCCESSION. ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, MULTIPLE POWER
CENTERS ARE LIKELY TO EMERGE. AS THE INTERNAL POWER
STRUGGLE DEVELOPS, THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP'S PRIMARY
FOCUS WILL BE ON CONSOLIDATING POWER. WHILE THE
STRUGGLE WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE VIOLENT, THE
TRANSITION FROM ASAD'S RULE COULD HAVE NEGATIVE
RAMIFICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN A COMPREHENSIVE
REGIONAL PEACE, WMD, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND IRAQ. ON
THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. COULD FIND SOME OPPORTUNITIES
TO ADVANCE ITS OBJECTIVES IN THE COMING MONTHS, AS
ASAD FOCUSES INCREASINGLY ON THE LEGACY HE WILL LEAVE
HIS SON BASHAR -- INCLUDING POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF
PEACE TALKS WITH ISRAEL AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH
HIS NEIGHBORS. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO REF A TASKING, WHICH
SOUGHT POST'S VIEWS ON HOST COUNTRY SUCCESSION ISSUES.
THE HEADERS BELOW TRACK WITH THOSE IN THE TASKING.

--------------
TRANSITION LIKELIHOOD/TIMING
--------------


3. (C) GIVEN PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASAD'S AGE (I.E.,
OFFICIALLY 69 AND POSSIBLY OLDER, REF B) AND HEALTH
CONCERNS (I.E., HEART DISEASE AND DIABETES) A
SUCCESSION COULD REALISTICALLY TAKE PLACE AT ANY TIME
AND POSSIBLY WITHIN THE TIMEFRAME OF HIS JUST-STARTED

SEVEN-YEAR TERM OF OFFICE. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS
THAT ASAD'S MENTAL ACUITY AND ATTENTIVENESS ARE BEING
GRADUALLY ERODED BY THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF AGE AND
DISEASE. PERVASIVE SECURITY IN SYRIA HAS MADE IT
DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT
POWERBASES. THEREFORE, IN THE SHORT AND MEDIUM TERMS,
A CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION, BY PROVIDING
ORGANIZATIONAL TIME, WOULD LIKELY SERVE THE INTERESTS
OF THOSE WHO MAY BE INCLINED TO OR BE POSITIONED FOR A
GRAB FOR POWER. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE AND PERHAPS
LIKELY THAT THE SUCCESSION WILL PLAY OUT INITIALLY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS, EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL
SCENARIOS, INCLUDING COUPS AND COUNTER-COUPS, CANNOT
BE RULED OUT.

--------------
POTENTIAL NEW LEADERS
--------------


4. (C) SYRIAN SUCCESSION IS CURRENTLY CLOUDED BY THE
PASSING FROM THE SCENE OF MANY ASAD-GENERATION
POWERBROKERS AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW LEADERS FROM
WITHIN A POWER STRUCTURE WITH WHICH WESTERNERS HAVE
LITTLE OR NO CONTACT. IN THE NEARER TERM AT LEAST, IF
ASAD DIES IN OFFICE OR BECOMES PERMANENTLY
INCAPACITATED, THE FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT WILL PLAY A
KEY ROLE. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, IN SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT ABD AL-HALIM
KHADDAM, HOLDS FULL PRESIDENTIAL POWERS FOR UP TO 90
DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME A PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM MUST
TAKE PLACE. IN THIS PERIOD, THE BA'TH PARTY WOULD
RECOMMEND A CANDIDATE TO THE PARLIAMENT WHICH
"DEBATES" THE CANDIDACY AND THEN VOTES ON WHETHER THE
CANDIDATE'S NAME WILL MOVE FORWARD TO THE FINAL STEP
OF A NATIONAL REFERENDUM. (NB: UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, ASAD CAN DESIGNATE A NEW FIRST VICE-
PRESIDENT AT ANY TIME.)


5. (C) BEHIND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, HOWEVER, THE
ALAWI-DOMINATED MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES WILL
PLAY THE KEY ROLE AND LIKELY DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF
SUCCESSION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SENIOR BA'TH PARTY
LEADERSHIP (I.E., THE 20-MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND,
WHICH HAS MILITARY REPRESENTATION). THE SERVICES ARE
THE PRIMARY PILLAR OF THE ASAD REGIME, FOLLOWED IN
DESCENDING ORDER OF IMPORTANCE BY THE BA'TH PARTY,
GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT, GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE SUNNI MERCHANT
CLASS.


6. (C) COLONEL BASHAR AL-ASAD: PRESIDENT ASAD APPEARS
TO BE BETTING THAT HIS FINAL TERM IN OFFICE WILL ALLOW
SUFFICIENT TIME FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO POWER FOR
HIS SON BASHAR. IF ASAD MAKES IT THROUGH HIS SEVEN
YEAR TERM, BASHAR WILL HAVE REACHED THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED PRESIDENTIAL AGE OF 40. THE
TRANSITION EFFORT BEGAN IN EARNEST OVER THE LAST YEAR,
AS WITNESSED MOST DRAMATICALLY IN THE MILITARY-
SECURITY SERVICES, THROUGH A DECISION TO MINIMIZE
CAREER EXTENSIONS AT RANK, THUS ALLOWING FOR INCREASED
MILITARY RETIREMENTS. RETIRED OFFICERS, INCLUDING
SOME REGIME HEAVYWEIGHTS, ARE BEING REPLACED WITH
YOUNGER ONES BELIEVED TO BE LOYAL OR AT LEAST NOT A
THREAT TO BASHAR. BASHAR IS ALSO INCREASINGLY BEING
POSITIONED AS A SYRIAN STATESMAN, HOLDING SEPARATE
HIGH-PROFILE MEETINGS WITH LEBANESE OFFICIALS,
JORDANIAN KING 'ABDULLAH AND, MOST RECENTLY, IRANIAN
PRESIDENT KHATAMI.


7. (C) ASSUMING THE MILITARY TRANSITION IS MOVING
REASONABLY WELL, ASAD WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE PARALLEL
CHANGES IN THE SENIOR BA'TH PARTY MEMBERSHIP. ONLY
AFTER THESE TWO STEPS ARE SUCCESSFULLY UNDERWAY WOULD
ASAD MOVE TO CONSIDER CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CHANGES
TO ALLOW FOR BASHAR TO ASSUME A VICE-PRESIDENCY OR AN
OUTRIGHT EARLY ASSUMPTION OF POWER. THE SUCCESS OF
THIS SCENARIO IS PREDICATED UPON ASAD HAVING THE TIME
AND HEALTH TO COMPLETE THE PREPARATIONS AND ON
BASHAR'S ABILITY TO SEIZE ON THE HEAD START HIS FATHER
IS ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE.


8. (C) FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT ABD AL-HALIM KHADDAM:
WITH THE DEPARTURE OF CHIEF-OF-STAFF HIKMAT AL-
SHIHABI, VP KHADDAM (67) REMAINS ARGUABLY THE MOST
TRUSTED SUNNI IN THE ASAD REGIME. THERE IS MUCH TALK
AND SOME EVIDENCE THAT SOME OF KHADDAM'S PORTFOLIOS --
E.G. LEBANON -- ARE GRADUALLY BEING TRANSFERRED TO
BASHAR. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE KHADDAM STILL
HOLDS A SPECIAL PLACE IN THE CLOSED CIRCLE AROUND THE
PRESIDENT. AS LONG AS KHADDAM REMAINS FIRST VICE-
PRESIDENT, HE ENJOYS PRIDE OF PLACE IN ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION SCENARIO. KHADDAM HAS NO
INDEPENDENT POWER BASE, AND HIS THINKING PROBABLY
ALIGNS VERY CLOSELY WITH ASAD'S AND WITH THE MILITARY-
SECURITY LEADERSHIP. VARIOUS SOURCES INDICATE KHADDAM
MIGHT BE OPEN TO ECONOMIC REFORM BUT, ON THE OTHER
HAND, HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE VERY HARD-LINE ON THE
PEACE PROCESS.


9. (C) KHADDAM, THEREFORE, COULD FULFILL SEVERAL ROLES
FROM A 90-DAY OVERSEER OF TRANSITION TO A TRANSITIONAL
PRESIDENT IN A QUASI-COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP SCENARIO.
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IN POST-INDEPENDENCE SYRIA HAS
USUALLY SERVED AS A PERIOD FOR THE EMERGENCE OF
MULTIPLE POWER CENTERS VYING FOR DOMINANCE. HISTORY
MAY WELL REPEAT ITSELF. IF ASAD'S DEATH TAKES PLACE
FOUR OR FIVE YEARS FROM NOW, KHADDAM MIGHT BE ABLE TO
FINISH OUT ASAD'S SUCCESSION PLANS FOR BASHAR,
ASSUMING BASHAR HAD RISEN TO THE OCCASION. IF NOT,
ALAWI POWERBROKERS MAY ALREADY HAVE BEGUN LOOKING AT
ALTERNATIVES IN WHOM TO ENTRUST THEIR FUTURE.


10. (C) BG 'ASIF SHAWQAT: ONE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES
MAY BE PRESIDENTIAL SON-IN-LAW SHAWQAT (53). AN
ALAWI, SHAWQAT MIGHT WELL BE CALLED THE COMEBACK
PLAYER OF THE REGIME. HE WAS ONCE ONE OF SMI CHIEF
LTG 'ALI DUBA'S MOST TRUSTED SUBORDINATES, BUT FELL
FROM GRACE AND WAS ACTUALLY RETIRED AND IMPRISONED
(1993),SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF REPORTED DEALINGS IN
SMUGGLING AND NARCOTICS, BUT MORE LIKELY BECAUSE ASAD
DID NOT APPROVE OF SHAWQAT'S PLANS TO MARRY HIS ONLY
DAUGHTER BUSHRA. THE SHAWQATS HAVE SINCE PROVIDED
PRESIDENT ASAD WITH HIS ONLY GRANDCHILDREN AND ALL
APPEARS TO BE FORGIVEN. SHAWQAT HOLDS A SHADOWY BUT
POWERFUL POSITION AS HEAD OF AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY
SERVICE THAT CAN INVESTIGATE ANYONE, "FROM CIVILIANS
TO MILITARY OFFICERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER." OUR SLIM
HOLDINGS ON THIS POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT PLAYER INDICATE
THAT SHAWQAT IS TOUGH, EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT, WELL-
READ, QUIET AND A SELF-STARTER. HE OBVIOUSLY ALSO HAD
THE MOXIE TO STAND UP TO ASAD HIMSELF AND FOLLOW
THROUGH ON HIS MARRIAGE TO BUSHRA. IF HE CAN ALSO
STILL COUNT ON 'ALI DUBA'S SUPPORT, IT WOULD BE
ANOTHER PLUS, BUT THIS MAY BE DOUBTFUL SINCE HE HAS
EMERGED AS A RIVAL TO DUBA'S LONG-TIME DOMINANCE OF
SMI. HE IS ALSO REPORTED TO COME FROM A RELATIVELY
MINOR 'ALAWI FAMILY/CLAN, WHICH MEANS HE CANNOT
AUTOMATICALLY COMMAND A STRONG 'ALAWI SUPPORT BASE.


11. (C) RIF'AT AL-ASAD: BLACK SHEEP PRESIDENTIAL
BROTHER RIF'AT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED A LONG SHOT, BUT
HIS NAME AND TOUGH-GUY REPUTATION STILL RESONATE WITH
MANY ALAWIS. HE IS ALSO AMBITIOUS, NOT ONLY FOR
HIMSELF BUT FOR HIS SONS. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS, WHILE
DISCOUNTING HIS CURRENT INFLUENCE IN SYRIA AND IN THE
'ALAWITE COMMUNITY, NEVERTHELESS WILL SAY THAT HE
CANNOT BE COMPLETELY COUNTED OUT IN ANY SUCCESSION
SCENARIO. SUNNIS, HOWEVER, REVILE HIM FOR HIS ROLE IN
THE HAMA/ALEPPO MASSACRES OF THE EARLY 80'S. HE IS A
SYMBOL OF DIVISIVENESS, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
REPRESSION. RIF'AT'S FORTUNES COULD NEVERTHELESS
IMPROVE IF ALAWI SUPREMACY APPEARED THREATENED AND THE
NEED FOR A HEAVY HAND WAS FELT AND, PARTICULARLY, IF
SUCCESSION OCCURRED EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER AND
BASHAR WAS NOT DEEMED READY. RIF'AT HIMSELF IS
PLAINLY STILL INTERESTED IN LEADING SYRIA AFTER ASAD'S
DEMISE. HE REPORTEDLY MADE THE HAJJ THIS YEAR, WHICH
WAS SEEN AS A MOCKERY BY SUNNIS HERE, AND HE IS AN IN-
LAW OF SAUDI CROWN PRINCE 'ABDULLAH.


12. (C) MAJOR MAHIR AL-ASAD (33): WE SHOULD ALSO NOTE FOR
THE RECORD THAT THE NAME OF ASAD'S PENULTIMATE SON IS BEING
HEARD INCREASINGLY AROUND DAMASCUS. HE IS DESCRIBED
ALTERNATELY AS MORE LIKE HIS FATHER (THAN BASHAR) OR LIKE
HIS UNCLE RIF'AT. THE BANDYING ABOUT OF MAHIR'S NAME MAY
BE AN INDICATION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH BASHAR'S PROGRESS
TO DATE.

--------------
U.S. INTERACTION/BACKGROUND ON U.S. CONTACTS
--------------


13. (C) WE HAVE MADE ANY NUMBER OF ULTIMATELY
UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS, INCLUDING DIRECT REQUESTS BY
DIPLOMATIC NOTE, TO MEET WITH THE MILITARY/SECURITY
AND BA'TH PARTY PERSONALITIES THAT ARE LIKELY TO
DETERMINE AND BE A PART OF SYRIA'S SUCCESSION,
INCLUDING BASHAR. IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THESE KEY
PERSONALITIES ARE OFF LIMITS TO OFFICIAL USG CONTACTS
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, OUR INFORMATION TENDS TO COME FROM
SECONDARY SOURCES. FOR THEIR PART, OTHER THAN
OCCASIONAL PRIVATE VISITS TO THE U.S., THESE
INDIVIDUALS ALSO AVOID OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH U.S.
REPRESENTATIVES EXCEPT IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
MOREOVER, THOSE IN THE MILITARY/SECURITY HIERARCHY
LIKELY VIEW U.S. MOTIVES WITH SUSPICION AND AS A
POTENTIAL THREAT. AS WE HAVE SEEN, THE SECURITY
APPARATUS HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO SYRIA'S
ACQUISITION OF CELL PHONE AND INTERNET TECHNOLOGY. IT
IS INSTRUCTIVE THAT WHILE THE PRESIDENT'S SON MAY BE
THE MOST WESTERN-EDUCATED OF SUCCESSOR CANDIDATES,
THIS FACT MAY ACTUALLY WORK AGAINST HIS SUCCESS IN THE
SYRIAN CONTEXT.

--------------
THREATS TO STABILITY
--------------


14. (C) INTERNAL: THE PRIMARY THREAT TO STABILITY IS
INTERNAL, WITH A BREAKDOWN OF 'ALAWI COHESION AND THE
ABILITY TO WORK THROUGH AND WITH SUPPORTIVE SUNNIS
BEING PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS POSSIBILITY. HISTORY
SUGGESTS THAT A POWER STRUGGLE COULD DEVELOP AMONG
SENIOR ELEMENTS OF THE SARG, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT'S
FAMILY. HAFIZ AL-ASAD HAS RULED IN DAMASCUS LONGER
THAN ANY LEADER SINCE MU'AWIYAH FOUNDED THE UMMAYAD
DYNASTY IN 661, BUT HE IS VERY MUCH THE EXCEPTION IN
SYRIAN POLITICS. ACCORDING TO ONE HISTORIAN, THE
PERIOD FROM SYRIA'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1946 UNTIL ASAD
SEIZED POWER IN 1970 WAS MARKED BY "ONE OF THE WORLD'S
HIGHEST RECORDS FOR MILITARY PUTSCHES AND COUPS."
WHILE DESTABILIZING, MOST OF THESE COUPS WERE,
FORTUNATELY, RELATIVELY BLOODLESS WITH VIOLENCE
CONFINED TO THE PLAYERS AND THEIR IMMEDIATE
SUPPORTERS.


15. (C) IF AMBITION AND SELF-INTEREST CAN BE BALANCED
AND CONTAINED THROUGH BACKROOM NEGOTIATIONS,
COLLECTIVE SUPPORT OF A SUITABLE CANDIDATE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS, STABILITY WILL BE LARGELY
PRESERVED. INDEED, THE QUICK ATTAINMENT OF A NEW
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM WILL PROBABLY BE THE KEY TO
SYRIA'S INTERNAL STABILITY. IF SYRIA'S TRANSITION
LEADERS FAIL IN THIS REGARD, THE POST INDEPENDENCE
HISTORY OUTLINED ABOVE SUGGESTS THAT ANY EXTRA-
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER STRUGGLE OR COUP WOULD BE
RELATIVELY QUICK AND CONFINED BUT PRONE TO REPETITION
UNTIL A NEW POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM WERE REACHED.


16. (C) MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND SUNNI-'ALAWI FRICTION:
A SUCCESSION THAT IS NOT SETTLED QUICKLY COULD BE SEEN
BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) (REF C) OR OTHER
INTERNAL ACTORS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TEST THE REGIME,
FURTHER COMPLICATING THE SUCCESSION. THE SARG-MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD ENCOUNTERS OF THE 70S-80S PROVIDED THE
ONLY WIDESPREAD CIVIL CONFLICT IN RECENT SYRIAN
HISTORY. ASAD BIOGRAPHER PATRICK SEALE HAS POINTED
OUT THIS STRUGGLE WAS MORE THAN A SECULAR-ISLAMIST
CONFRONTATION, "BEHIND THE IMMEDIATE CONTEST LAY THE
OLD MULTI-LAYERED HOSTILITY BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE
BA'TH, BETWEEN SUNNI AND 'ALAWI, BETWEEN TOWN AND
COUNTRY." WHILE THE MB UPRISING WAS UTTERLY CRUSHED,
THE CAUSATIVE ISSUES ARE STILL PRESENT AND THE MB
ITSELF LIKELY HAS MANY CLOSET SYMPATHIZERS IN SYRIA.
MOREOVER, THE BRUTAL 1982 EXTERMINATION OF UP TO
25,000 SUNNIS AT HAMA BY (MAINLY) 'ALAWIS IS FOREVER
SEARED IN THE MEMORY OF MOST SUNNIS AND IS A
CONTINUING OBSTACLE TO RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
MAJORITY SUNNIS AND THE 'ALAWI-CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT.
BEYOND THE MB, OTHER INTERNAL THREATS COULD APPEAR IN
A POWER VACUUM SUCH AS A RISE IN SYRIAN KURDISH
NATIONALISM OR THE FRACTURE OF SOCIETY ALONG ECONOMIC-
SOCIAL LINES.


17. (C) THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY COULD BE ANOTHER
ISSUE COMPLICATING SUCCESSION. THE SARG HAS BEEN ABLE
TO MAINTAIN AN OVERALL STANDARD OF LIVING THAT, WHILE
ERODING, KEEPS THE POPULACE PACIFIED IF NOT HAPPY. IF
THE SARG CANNOT MAINTAIN THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF
LIVING FOR SYRIANS, POPULAR DISCONTENT COULD PROVIDE A
MORE VOLATILE ATMOSPHERE FOR SUCCESSION. IT IS NOT
HARD TO ENVISION A SCENARIO IN WHICH ISLAMISTS TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF A DISTRACTED SARG AND ECONOMIC UNREST TO
PROMOTE VIOLENT CHANGE. IN THIS SITUATION 'ALAWIS AND
SECULARIST SUNNI'S WOULD FIND ALLIES AMONG BOTH THE
DRUZE AND VARIOUS CHRISTIAN GROUPS WHO WOULD ALL FEEL
THEIR INTERESTS THREATENED BY AN MB RESURGENCE.
LONGER-TERM STABILITY IS THREATENED BY THE FACT THAT
MOST SYRIANS FEEL LITTLE CONNECTION WITH THEIR
GOVERNMENT. IF THERE IS RESIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE
REGIME THAT ACTS AS A STABILIZING FACTOR, IT IS
THROUGH THE PERSONALITY AND RECOGNIZED STATURE OF
HAFIZ AL-ASAD. NEITHER BASHAR NOR OTHER CONTENDERS
WILL HAVE THIS SUPPORT.


18. (C) EXTERNAL: IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, A DRAWN-
OUT SUCCESSION ALSO RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVES BY
EXTERNAL ACTORS, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMBINED WITH
INTERNAL UNREST. THE PERIOD FROM SYRIA'S INDEPENDENCE
UNTIL ASAD TOOK POWER WAS ALSO NOTABLE FOR THE
PERVASIVENESS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE
PERENNIALLY STRUGGLING GOVERNMENT. IN THE 50S, IRAQ,
EGYPT, LEBANON, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ALL MEDDLED
ACTIVELY IN SYRIAN AFFAIRS. NURI SAID'S IRAQ SOUGHT
UNION; EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA SOUGHT INFLUENCE; AND
KING 'ABDULLAH OF JORDAN ENVISIONED A HASHEMITE-
DOMINATED GREATER SYRIA, EVEN LEBANON HAD A HAND,
THROUGH THE MACHINATIONS OF THE LEBANESE-BASED
LEADERSHIP OF THE SYRIAN SOCIALIST NATIONALIST PARTY
(SSNP) -- THE MAIN RIVAL FOR INFLUENCE TO THE BA'TH
PARTY AMONG SECULAR NATIONALISTS IN SYRIA UNTIL 1955.
BRITAIN, FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION ALSO COMPETED FOR INFLUENCE AS SYRIAN
GOVERNMENTS CAME AND WENT IN RAPID SUCCESSION.
WESTERN PRESSURE TO JOIN THE BAGHDAD PACT BACKFIRED,
DESTABILIZING THE COUNTRY AND EVENTUALLY CATALYZING A
HASTY UNION WITH EGYPT, WHICH IN TURN OPENED THE DOOR
TO INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE.


19. (C) BECAUSE OF SYRIA'S STRATEGIC GEOPOLITICAL
POSITION, IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT SUCH A
TURBULENT STATE OF AFFAIRS COULD RECUR. IN A
PROLONGED SUCCESSION STRUGGLE, SYRIAN ISLAMISTS MIGHT
BE EMBOLDENED BY ASSISTANCE FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES
RANGING FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO USAMA BIN LADIN; IRAQ
MIGHT SEEK INFLUENCE THROUGH ITS BA'THIST CONNECTIONS
OR SEEK TO DESTABILIZE THROUGH INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AND SABOTAGE; AND SOME LEBANESE ACTORS COULD ALSO SEE
A WEAKENED AND DESTABILIZED SYRIA AS THE KEY TO
REVERSING DECADES OF STRONG INFLUENCE IN LEBANESE
AFFAIRS BY DAMASCUS. MOREOVER, SYRIA'S OPEN DOOR TO
FELLOW ARABS -- NO ARAB NEEDS A VISA TO SYRIA -- COULD
BECOME A LIABILITY. OFTEN DESCRIBED AS "CARDS" TO BE
PLAYED, THE PRESENCE OF 366,000 PALESTINIANS
(INCLUDING MANY REJECTIONIST GROUPS),IRAQI KURDS, AND
OTHER ELEMENTS COULD BECOME SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
INSTEAD, ESPECIALLY AS LINKS TO OUTSIDE AGENTS OF
INFLUENCE. NOT LEAST, THE THREE NON-ARAB REGIONAL
POWERS -- TURKEY, ISRAEL AND IRAN -- ALL CONSIDER THAT
THEY HAVE IMPORTANT POLICY EQUITIES IN SYRIA, AND ALL
HAVE SOME CAPACITY FOR AFFECTING SYRIAN AFFAIRS.

--------------
U.S. INTERESTS
--------------


20. (C) IN A SUCCESSION/TRANSITION PERIOD (AS WE HAVE
BEGUN TO SEE) SYRIAN LEADERS' FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE
REGIME SURVIVAL AND CONSOLIDATION OF POWER. IN THE
SYRIAN CONTEXT, THIS WILL NOT BE A PERIOD FOR NEW
THINKING OR TAKING RISKS, BUT FOR CONSERVATIVE
ADHERENCE TO LONG-STANDING PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES.
CONSEQUENTLY, SUCCESSION PARTICULARLY, IN THE SHORT
AND MEDIUM TERM, IS NOT LIKELY TO BRING POSITIVE
SYRIAN MOVEMENT ON KEY U.S. INTERESTS SUCH AS
CONCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL PEACE; CONTROLLING
WMD; COUNTERING TERRORISM OR ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS.

-------------- --------------
WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO NOW?: U.S. ACTIONS/TIMELINE
-------------- --------------


21. (C) IF SUCCESSION IS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE A SYRIAN
GOVERNMENT READY TO UNDERTAKE BOLD INITIATIVES, IT MAY
BE THAT THE PERIOD PRIOR TO TRANSITION OFFERS
IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES. SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT
ASAD DOES NOT WANT TO HAND OVER A COUNTRY WHICH HAS
ADVERSARIAL RELATIONS WITH ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS. WITH
THIS POSSIBILITY AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL IN
MIND, THE U.S. MAY FIND OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE ITS
OBJECTIVES OVER THE COMING MONTHS, AS HAFIZ AL-ASAD
FOCUSES ON PREPARING FOR THE SUCCESSION IN SYRIA. THE
PEACE PROCESS IS ONE OBVIOUS AREA. IT MAY BE SOME
TIME BEFORE ANOTHER SYRIAN LEADER WOULD BE ABLE TO
CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION SUFFICIENTLY TO CONCLUDE AND
IMPLEMENT A PEACE AGREEMENT. CONCLUDING A
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WOULD OPEN ALSO OPPORTUNITIES TO
ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND WMD.
ON IRAQ, SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR CURRENT UN POLICIES IS
MAINTAINED PRIMARILY DUE TO THE FELT NEED TO INSIST ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTIONS SO THAT SYRIA CAN
SIMILARLY INSIST THAT ISRAEL RESPECT UN RESOLUTIONS.
A NEW REGIME MAY BE LESS DISCIPLINED IN THIS REGARD
THAN ASAD'S SYRIA, AND THUS MORE LIKELY TO BE SWAYED
BY THE MOOD OF THE ARAB STREET AND THE PERCEIVED
SUFFERING OF IRAQIS UNDER UN SANCTIONS.

CROCKER