THE SOUTH: HIZBALLAH STRATEGIC, TACTICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 005413

PARIS FOR LEAF; LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; NICOSIA FOR ILMG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/09
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IR KISL IS LE
SUBJECT: THE SOUTH: HIZBALLAH STRATEGIC, TACTICAL
DIVISIONS

REF: A) BEIRUT 5373, B) BEIRUT 4669

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DAVID M. SATTERFIELD.
REASON 1.5 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: SPECULATION OVER A FUTURE ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL (UNILATERAL OR THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS) FROM
SOUTH LEBANON HAS GIVEN RISE TO DIFFERENCES AMONG
HIZBALLAH'S SENIOR LEADERS ABOUT THE PARTY'S FUTURE.
THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE HAS COMPELLED THE PARTY TO
BEGIN SPECIFIC PLANNING FOR THE ROLE IT WILL PLAY IN
A POST-PEACE, POST-WITHDRAWAL LEBANON. ITS CHOICE
IS REALLY NO CHOICE AT ALL: WHETHER TO ACCELERATE
ITS DECADE-LONG TRANSFORMATION INTO A LEGITIMATE
POLITICAL PARTY (YET ONE ALWAYS LIMITED BY ITS
SECTARIAN IDENTIFICATION) OR TO REMAIN A FRINGE
ELEMENT IN LEBANESE POLITICS (UNDER EITHER SCENARIO,
WE EXPECT EFFORTS TO INSULATE AND PROTECT HIZBALLAH
TERRORIST CELLS, FOR USE BY IRAN AND SYRIA AS
TRAINERS AND AGENTS OUTSIDE LEBANON).


2. (C) THE RESUMPTION OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN
NEGOTIATIONS HAS INTENSIFIED THE DEBATE WITHIN
HIZBALLAH ABOUT IDENTIFYING AND SECURING ITS FUTURE
ROLE IN LEBANON. IN THIS UNCERTAIN ATMOSPHERE,
HIZBALLAH SECRETARY-GENERAL HASSAN NASRALLAH HAS
REMAINED THE LOCUS OF POWER FOR THE PARTY, AND LEADS
THE MORE PRAGMATIC, POLITICAL WING. HIS DEPUTY,
NA'IM QASSIM, AND MILITARY OFFICIAL MUHAMMAD YAZBAK
LEAD A MORE EXTREME WING TOUTING THE LIBERATION OF
JERUSALEM AS A NEW GOAL TO RALLY THE TROOPS, AND
RESIST ANY TYPE OF REGIONAL NORMALIZATION WITH
ISRAEL.


3. (C) IF PRAGMATISM WINS OUT, AND THIS APPEARS
LIKELY (EVEN WITHOUT SYRIAN URGING),HIZBALLAH FACES
CHALLENGES IN BROADENING ITS BASE, FINDING A NEW
MESSAGE TO INSPIRE SUPPORT, AND TRANSFORMING ITS
PUBLIC IMAGE FROM RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS AND MILITIAMEN
TO RESPONSIVE, LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PLAYERS.
REMAINING TRUE TO ITS ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES WILL MEAN
AVOIDING NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION, AND AUTHORITARIANISM
-- TRADITIONAL FEATURES OF LEBANESE POLITICS. CAN
HIZBALLAH DEVELOP A COHERENT, CREDIBLE AND APPEALING
MESSAGE -- ANTI-NORMALIZATION, SOCIAL GOOD DEEDS,
ADVOCACY OF THE "DISPOSSESSED" -- WHILE MANEUVERING
IN THE SNAKEPIT OF LEBANESE POLITICS? CAN IT
RETAIN ITS POPULARITY AS IT CUTS THE DEALS WITH
LEBANESE POLITICIANS AND SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS THAT GET MPS ELECTED, WITH INEVITABLE
COMPROMISES, AND TARNISHED REPUTATIONS? CAN ITS
OFFICERS DELIVER ON HIGH-HOPES OF REVOLUTIONARY
CHANGE SHOULD ANY ONE OF THEM GAIN A MINISTRY --
ASSUMING THAT INCLUSION IN GOVERNMENT IS DESIRED?


4. (C) UNTIL NOW, HIZBALLAH HAS HAD THE BEST OF TWO
WORLDS: IT IS A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PARTY WITH A
STRONG BLOC IN PARLIAMENT, YET IT IS ALSO AN ARMED
MILITIA WHICH GAINS ENORMOUS, CROSS-CONFESSIONAL
POPULARITY FOR FIGHTING OCCUPATION WHEN THE STATE
DID NOT. A LONG ERA, WHICH ALLOWED THE PARTY TO
HAVE ONE FOOT IN THE SYSTEM AND ONE FOOT OUTSIDE
CHALLENGING THAT SYSTEM, IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE. AS
IT UNDERGOES THE DEFLATING PROCESS OF MOVING FULLY
INTO LEGITIMATE POLITICS AND -- MOST IMPORTANTLY --
A CRITICAL DECISION ON RETAINING ITS TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES, THE PARTY MAY FIND IT HAD AN EASIER TIME
FIGHTING THE IDF IN THE SOUTH. THIS CABLE CONTINUES
OUR SERIES ON SOUTH LEBANON ON THE EVE OF CHANGE.
END SUMMARY.

HIZBALLAH: UNITY IN PUBLIC, DEBATE IN PRIVATE
--------------


5. (C) THROUGHOUT THE LEBANESE MEDIA'S DAILY
SPECULATION OVER THE FUTURE PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON, HIZBALLAH HAS
MAINTAINED A PUBLIC POSTURE OF UNANIMITY DECLARING
THAT AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT FUNDAMENTALLY
CHANGE THE MOVEMENT'S STRATEGY AND TACTICS.
HOWEVER, CONVERSATIONS WITH SEVERAL LEBANESE
OFFICIALS AND ACADEMICS TELL A DIFFERENT STORY. THE
SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF HIZBALLAH (PRIMARILY THE SHURA
COUNCIL, THE POLITICAL WING, THE MILITARY WING),HAS
BEEN ENGAGED IN A "VIGOROUS DEBATE," IN THE WORDS OF
ONE AUB POLITICAL SCIENTIST, OVER HOW TO RESPOND TO
AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE STRATEGIC DEBATE HAS
FOCUSED ON HOW BEST TO REMAIN A VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE
PART OF THE LEBANESE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE
SOUTH, AS WELL AS KEY CONSTITUENCIES IN BEIRUT,
SHOULD THE ACTIVE MILITARY RESISTANCE END.


6. (C) THE RESUMPTION OF THE ISRAEL-SYRIA TRACK OF
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY
THE DEBATE WITHIN HIZBALLAH'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP
ABOUT ITS FUTURE ROLE IN LEBANON. IN THIS DEBATE,
SECRETARY-GENERAL HASSAN NASRALLAH CONTINUES TO
MAINTAIN HIS DOMINANCE AS THE DE JURE AND DE FACTO
HEAD OF THE PARTY. HOWEVER, TWO CAMPS HAVE EMERGED
OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL. NASRALLAH AND
THE HIZBALLAH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT REPRESENT WHAT
HAS BEEN TERMED THE "PRAGMATIC" WING OF THE PARTY
THAT WISHES TO DEVOTE MORE RESOURCES TO HIZBALLAH'S
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AGENDA IN BEIRUT, THE BIQA',
AND THE SOUTH ONCE THE IDF/SLA VACATE THEIR
POSITIONS. LEBANESE OBSERVERS DOUBT THAT NASRALLAH
WISHES TO DISMANTLE THE MILITARY WING OF HIZBALLAH,
BUT HE REALIZES HE MAY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE IF THERE
IS A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA.


7. (C) A MORE EXTREMIST WING IS LED BY DEPUTY SECGEN
NA'IM QASSIM AND MILITARY COMMANDER MUHAMMAD YAZBAK.
THIS WING WISHES TO MAINTAIN A HARD-LINE AGAINST THE
ISRAELIS BY TRUMPETING THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM AS ITS
"CAUSE CELEBRE," AND AGITATING AGAINST ANY TYPE OF
NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL SHOULD A FUTURE PEACE
TREATY BE SIGNED. THIS WAS EVIDENCED BY QASSIM'S
NOVEMBER REMARKS TO HIZBALLAH SUPPORTERS IN
BA'ALBACK-HERMEL. IN CONTRAST TO NASRALLAH'S PARTY
MAINSTREAM, THIS WING CONTINUES TO ENOUNCE THE GOALS
OF THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS EXPORT TO
OTHER COUNTRIES -- ESPECIALLY LEBANON.


8. (C) HIZBALLAH'S SPIRITUAL LEADER, MUHAMMAD HUSAYN
FADLALLAH, REPRESENTS ANOTHER LEADERSHIP AXIS. HIS
AGENDA LIES IN HIS ASPIRATION TO BE REGARDED AS THE
"MARJA'IYYA" (SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY) OF THE SHI'A OF
LEBANON (AND IDEALLY, THE WORLD). FADLALLAH AND
NASRALLAH ARE OFTEN AT ODDS, AND FADLALLAH HAS OVER
THE YEARS DRIFTED AWAY FROM ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT
WITH THE PARTY -- YET RETAINS CONSIDERABLE MORAL
AUTHORITY OVER ITS RANK-AND-FILE, AND THUS CANNOT BE
IGNORED BY ITS LEADERSHIP. HOWEVER, HE TOO MUST BE
MINDFUL OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PARTY; HIS OWN
AMBITION TO BE REGARDED AS A SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY
REQUIRES THAT HE NOT TAKE SIDES BETWEEN PRAGMATISTS
AND HARD-LINERS.


9. (C) THE PRAGMATIC/HARD-LINE RIFT BECAME PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE WITH FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL SUBHI
TUFAYLI'S "REVOLT OF THE HUNGRY" DURING 1996-1997.
TUFAYLI'S REVOLT WAS A FORK IN THE ROAD FOR
HIZBALLAH OVER ITS FUTURE ACTIVITIES. TUFAYLI'S
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ARGUED FOR MORE MILITANT
ENGAGEMENT IN LEBANESE AND REGIONAL POLITICS --
PRIMARILY INCREASED RESISTANCE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH
-- WHILE THE OTHER SCHOOL ENCOURAGED GREATER
EMPHASIS ON HIZBALLAH SOCIAL AND CHARITABLE
PROGRAMS, AND MORE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE
LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM. QASSIM AND YAZBAK ARE
THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MORE SYMPATHETIC TO TUFAYLI'S
OVERALL STAND REGARDING A MORE MILITANT POLITICAL
AND MILITARY AGENDA, BUT WERE AWARE THAT OPENLY
SIDING WITH THE FORMER SECRETARY-GENERAL MEANT
POLITICAL SUICIDE. THE SQUELCHING OF TUFAYLI'S
REVOLT WITH SYRIAN SUPPORT IS EVIDENCE THAT
HIZBALLAH'S EXTREME FACTIONS DID NOT, AND WILL NOT
PREVAIL.

HIZBALLAH CONSIDERING FUTURE SCENARIOS
--------------


10. (C) MUCH OF THE TACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE
FUTURE CENTERS ON THE TYPE OF WITHDRAWAL THE IDF
WILL IMPLEMENT, HOW TO RESPOND TO IT, AND HOW TO
MANEUVER IF A SYRIA-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY IS
CONCLUDED. THE ACTIVE MILITARY RESISTANCE HAS BEEN
ONE OF THE KEY PILLARS OF HIZBALLAH'S LEGITIMACY AND
EFFECTIVENESS THROUGHOUT LEBANON AND REMOVING IT IS
LIKELY TO SAP PARTY STRENGTH. AS A RESULT,
HIZBALLAH'S LEADERS HAVE BEEN PONDERING WHAT SOUTH
LEBANON WILL LOOK LIKE WITH AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
COUPLED WITH OVERT, OR COVERT, SYRIAN SECURITY
GUARANTEES. STUDY GROUPS HAVE BEEN FORMED TO
DISCUSS FUTURE POSSIBILITIES. IN PUBLIC, HASSAN
NASRALLAH REMAINS SILENT OVER HOW HIZBALLAH WILL
REACT TO A WITHDRAWAL, OR A FUTURE PEACE TREATY
BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. HIZBALLAH'S REACTION TO
THE RECENT SLA SHELLING OF A SCHOOL IN ARAB SALIM
(REF A) MAY BE TELLING OF THE FINE LINE THAT
HIZBALLAH WALKS IN LEBANESE POLITICS. NASRALLAH WAS
QUOTED ON NOVEMBER 17 AS SAYING THAT THE ATTACK
"DESERVES RETALIATION BY THE RESISTANCE ON
SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERN PALESTINE...HOWEVER, FOR NOW
WE WILL JUST SEND A CLEAR AND FIRM WARNING TO THE
ENEMY." THIS IS BUT THE LATEST EPISODE TO SHOW THAT
THE MILITIA IS ON A TIGHT SYRIAN LEASH, AND WILL LAY
DOWN ITS ARMS WHEN DOING SO SERVES SYRIAN INTERESTS.
THE PARTY THEN FACES THE OBVIOUS CHALLENGE, BEGUN
NINE YEARS AGO WHEN IT ENTERED PARLIAMENT, OF
TRANSFORMING ITSELF INTO A LEGITIMATE AND APPEALING
POLITICAL PLAYER, BUT WITHOUT THE UNIFYING FORCE OF
ACTIVE RESISTANCE. YET ENTERING THE FRAY MORE FULLY
MEANS DEALING WITH THE SMALL COMPROMISES AND
CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE LEBANESE POLITICS SUCH AN
UNDIGNIFIED SPORT.

CONTINUING THE POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH AMAL
-------------- -


11. (C) LIKE ALL OTHER POLITICAL FACTIONS HERE,
HIZBALLAH IS PREPARING FOR THE Y2000 PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS. NABIH BERRI'S AMAL MOVEMENT HAS CAPTURED
THE SUPPORT OF MANY OF THE TRADITIONAL FAMILIES OF
SOUTH LEBANON INCLUDING THE 'USAYRANS AND BAYDOUNS
OF SIDON AND TYRE RESPECTIVELY. THESE FAMILIES HAVE
STRONG TIES TO BEIRUT'S RULING CLASS AND SYRIAN
LEADERSHIP CIRCLES, AND SURPRISING RESILIENCE IN THE
SOUTH AS DELIVERERS OF LARGE BLOCS OF WHOLESALE
VOTES. ONE OPTION FOR HIZBALLAH IS TO COURT THE
NEWEST EMERGING ECONOMIC GROUP IN THE SOUTH -- THOSE
POORER LEBANESE WHO LEFT THE SOUTH AFTER 1978 AND
MADE THEIR FORTUNES IN ABIDJAN, CONAKRY, AND
DETROIT. SOME OF THESE FAMILIES HAVE RETURNED HOME,
OR AT LEAST BUILT PALATIAL SUMMER VILLAS TO LET
PEOPLE KNOW THAT THEY HAVE MADE IT. MANY OF THESE
CITIZENS PUT CASH INTO AMAL'S COFFERS. HOWEVER,
HIZBALLAH COULD WOO THIS CLASS -- ALREADY TAPPED FOR
PARTY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE ORPHANS
AND MARTYRS FUNDS -- TO HELP SUSTAIN A POLITICAL
PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH. THEY COULD BECOME AN
IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE FUNDING SOURCE SHOULD IRANIAN
FINANCIAL RESOURCES DRY UP.


12. (C) HIZBALLAH WILL HAVE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES IN
COMPETING WITH AMAL. WHILE NABIH BERRI HAS KEPT
MANY OF THE LARGE, TRADITIONAL FAMILIES OF THE SOUTH
IN HIS POCKET, MOST OF THAT SUPPORT IS BASED ON
BERRI'S PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH FAMILY HEADS,
BERRI'S "CULT OF PERSONALITY," AND FEAR OF BERRI'S
WRATH. HOWEVER, THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS SYRIAN
ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES. THEY USUALLY
ENCOURAGE FORMATION OF PRE-COOKED "GRAND ALLIANCES"
AMONG ALL MAJOR, ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL FACTORS,
HOWEVER UNNATURAL SUCH AN ALLIANCE MAY BE. THUS THE
WINNING SOUTHERN TICKET FOR Y2000 ELECTIONS
UNDOUBTEDLY WILL INCLUDE A PRE-DETERMINED NUMBER OF
CANDIDATES FROM BOTH AMAL AND HIZBALLAH, WITH A
SPRINKLING OF TRADITIONAL FAMILY ELDERS, WHO CAN
DELIVER VOTES AND MONEY.


13. (C) HIZBALLAH HAS TRUE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS
THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH, THE BIQA', AND IN THE SOUTHERN
SUBURBS. BUT THE NUMBER OF SEATS IT WILL GAIN IN
THE HOUSE WILL BE A PRODUCT OF THE PRE-BALLOT, BACK
ROOM NEGOTIATIONS WITH BERRI AND SYRIAN MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF FOR LEBANON, GHAZI KANAAN OVER
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE "GRAND ALLIANCE."
KANAAN IS EXPECTED TO RECOGNIZE THAT HIZBALLAH WILL
HAVE EARNED A FEW ADDITIONAL SEATS THIS YEAR (THREE,
SAYS CURRENT SPECULATION: TWO IN THE BIQA' AND ONE
IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS). COMBINED WITH ANTICIPATED
EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT LAHOUD TO CUT BERRI (A MAJOR
OBSTACLE TO REFORMS) DOWN A NOTCH, Y2000 MAY BE A
GOOD ELECTORAL YEAR FOR HIZBALLAH. HOWEVER, THE
RESULTS WILL HAVE ONLY A NOTIONAL CONNECTION WITH
THE PARTY'S VOTE-GATHERING CAPACITY. THEY WILL ALSO
BE A HARBINGER OF THE COMPROMISES AND
DISAPPOINTMENTS, WHICH THE PARTY WILL FEEL AS IT
MORE FULLY ENGAGES ITS ENERGIES IN THE LEBANESE
POLITICAL FRAY. (NOTABLY, OUR AMAL CONTACTS
INDICATE AN EXPECTATION THAT IF A PEACE WITH ISRAEL
PRECEDES ELECTIONS, DAMASCUS WILL HAVE LESS NEED FOR
HIZBALLAH, AND BE MORE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING
BERRI, GIVEN HIS GREATER UTILITY TO SYRIA IN
LEBANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS.)

A CABINET SEAT TO SWEETEN TRANSITION?
--------------


14. (C) HIZBALLAH'S RELATIONS WITH THE GOL HAVE
FURTHER FUELED DEBATE WITHIN ITS SENIOR LEADERSHIP
ABOUT THE FUTURE. HIZBALLAH FIRST BEGAN ITS LONG-
TERM INVESTMENT IN LEGITIMACY WHEN IT ENTERED
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, AND PARLIAMENT, IN 1992.
THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, NOT BEEN OFFERED A CABINET SEAT
-- IN PART BECAUSE OF RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE
HARIRI AND HOSS GOVERNMENTS TO BRING THEM IN AND IN
PART DUE TO STRONGLY EXPRESSED U.S. OPPOSITION.
PRESIDENT LAHOUD HAS COURTED THE PARTY (IN PART TO
ANNOY NABIH BERRI, IN PART BECAUSE IT SEEMS POPULAR,
AND IN PART BECAUSE HE THINKS IT WILL MAKE IT EASIER
FOR HIM TO MANAGE THE PARTY LATER). MUCH OF
HIZBALLAH'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AGENDA PARALLELS
LAHOUD'S -- ANTI-CORRUPTION, ADDRESSING SOCIAL
PROBLEMS, AND CREATING VIABLE STATE INSTITUTIONS.
IN APRIL, LAHOUD SPOKE AT "THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
TO SUPPORT THE RESISTANCE" EMPHASIZING THAT THE
RESISTANCE IS NOT LIMITED TO A SINGLE PARTY, BUT IS
PART OF A MUCH LARGER NATIONAL MOVEMENT.


15. (C) THIS ONGOING DANCE WILL RAISE EXPECTATIONS
THAT THE PARTY WILL BE OFFERED A CABINET SEAT, TO
RECOGNIZE ITS ROLE IN LIBERATING THE SOUTH AND AS A
SWEETENER AS THE MILITIA DISARMS (THIS WAS THE
TACTIC USED IN 1991 WITH MOST OTHER LEBANESE
MILITIAS, AT THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR). BUT IT IS
NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER NASRALLAH IS PREPARED TO TAKE
THE PLUNGE OF ENTERING THE CABINET -- THEREBY ENDING
HIZBALLAH'S ABILITY TO DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IT MAY NOT APPROVE. IN
GOVERNMENT, HIZBALLAH WOULD FACE AN INEVITABLE
PROCESS OF COOPTION. IT WOULD BE DIRECTLY
CHALLENGED TO PROVE THAT IT CAN DELIVER ON ITS
PROMISES FOR SOCIAL WELFARE AND CHANGE, YET WOULD
HAVE LITTLE REAL AUTHORITY, GIVEN THE CONSTRAINED
NATURE OF LEBANON'S CABINET SYSTEM.


16. (C) WITH RESISTANCE GONE, HIZBALLAH WILL HAVE TO
ADAPT TO A DIFFERENT POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN
THE SOUTH, AS WELL AS BEIRUT. HIZBALLAH WILL DEVOTE
MORE RESOURCES TO ITS POLITICAL WING (A TREND
ALREADY UNDERWAY). IT HAS DROPPED -- BUT NOT
REPUDIATED -- ITS CALL FOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (A
NON-STARTER IN A LAND OF MINORITIES). HIZBALLAH HAS
REACHED OUT TO CHRISTIAN PARTIES AND THE MARONITE
PATRIARCH TO PROMOTE ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN LIKE
ANTI-CORRUPTION AND TAX REFORM, AND POLITICAL
DIALOGUE. THIS PROCESS OF "DE-DEMONIZATION" OF THE
PARTY AMONG CHRISTIANS IS WORKING, IF THE
INFATUATION OF MANY OF THE MARONITE PATRIARCH'S
ADVISOR WITH THE DIALOGUE IS ANY GUIDE.


17. (C) BUT WHAT WILL BE THE NEW MAINSPRING FOR THE
PARTY? ABSENT THE UNITING FORCE OF MILITARY
RESISTANCE OR OF A CREDIBLE AGENDA FOR ISLAMIC
CHANGE IN THIS PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, WHAT WILL BE
HIZBALLAH'S MESSAGE? UNDOUBTEDLY, IT WILL FOCUS ON
OPPOSING NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL, ON ANTI-
CORRUPTION AND FAMILY VALUES, AND ON ADVOCACY OF THE
POOR AND DISPOSSESSED SHI'A OF THE SOUTH, BIQA', AND
BEIRUT'S SOUTHERN SUBURBS (THE ORIGINAL PLATFORM
INSPIRING FORMATION OF AMAL MOVEMENT). HIZBALLAH
CAN MORE CREDIBLY PROMOTE THESE OBJECTIVES THAN ANY
OTHER PARTY IN LEBANON. HOWEVER, THE SECTARIAN
NATURE OF LEBANESE POLITICS, REFEREED BY SYRIA,
MEANS ANY SHI'A PARTY WILL HAVE ONLY ON A NARROW
PIECE OF THE PLAYING FIELD. UNDER THIS CONDITION,
IT CANNOT ASPIRE TO NATIONAL LEADERSHIP.

COMING TO TERMS WITH CHANGE
--------------


18. (C) HIZBALLAH IS NOT LIKELY TO FADE ONCE ISRAEL
WITHDRAWS, BUT IT WILL FACE THE SAME TYPES OF
CHALLENGES THAT OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL ENTITIES
FACE, AND THE IN-BUILT INHIBITING FACTOR OF
REPRESENTING ONLY ONE RELIGIOUS SECT AMONG 17 IN
LEBANON. CHALLENGES INCLUDE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL
RIVALRIES WITHIN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY AND SYRIAN
DOMINATION OF LEBANESE POLITICS. BROADENING ITS
BASE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT AND TRANSFORMING ITS
PUBLIC IMAGE FROM RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS AND MILITIAMEN
TO RESPONSIVE, LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PLAYERS WILL
REMAIN THE PARTY'S KEY CHALLENGES FOLLOWING AN
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE
REGION HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS TRANSFORMATION FROM
EXTREMISM TO THE MAINSTREAM, IN EGYPT, JORDAN, AND
TURKEY. REMAINING TRUE TO ITS ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES
WILL MEAN AVOIDING THE NEPOTISM, CORRUPTION, AND
AUTHORITARIANISM OF TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POLITICAL
PARTIES. HIZBALLAH WILL HAVE TO MANEUVER MORE
ACTIVELY IN THE SNAKE PIT OF LEBANESE POLITICS, AND
MAY WELL FIND IT HAD AN EASIER TIME FIGHTING THE IDF
IN THE SOUTH.


19. (C) THIS PROCESS IS LIKELY TO CREATE A PARTY
THAT FINDS ITS SELF-INTEREST REQUIRES MODERATION,
NOT EXTREMISM, AND INSULATION FROM PARTY TERRORIST
CELLS AND TERRORIST ASSOCIATIONS WHICH IRAN AND THE
HIZBALLAH LEADERSHIP ITSELF MAY SEEK TO PRESERVE IN
LEBANON TO ADVANCE AIMS ABROAD. SHOULD HIZBALLAH
FIND A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. -- OR SIMPLY OUR
RECOGNITION AS A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL/SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION -- IN ITS INTERESTS (AT PRESENT, ALL
INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE GROUP HAS NO INTEREST IN
CONTACT WITH THE USG, EVEN IF WE WERE WILLING),IT
WILL HAVE TO ABANDON ALL INVOLVEMENT WITH TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES HERE AND ELSEWHERE, ON ITS OWN PART AND
THROUGH ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER GROUPS.


20. (C) AS WITH IRAN ITSELF, HIZBALLAH WILL SEEK TO
MAINTAIN ITS DUALITY OF CONDUCT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.
AND AS WITH IRAN, WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE TO MAKE
CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED -- INCLUDING THE GOL -- THAT
THE U.S. WILL NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN AN
"ACCEPTABLE" HIZBALLAH AND THE HIZBALLAH WHICH IS
INVOLVED IN TERROR. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE
CONCERNED AT GROWING EVIDENCE THAT HIZBALLAH'S
INVOLVEMENT -- IN COORDINATION WITH IRAN -- WITH
GROUPS SUCH AS HAMAS AND THE PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD
IS INCREASING, NOT DIMINISHING AS A RESOLUTION OF
SOUTH LEBANON AND AN END TO THE LEBANESE RESISTANCE
RAISON D'ETRE APPROACHES.

SATTERFIELD