HAMAS CONSIDERS A NEW MODUS VIVENDI WITH PA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 015545

DEPT FOR NEA, NEA/IAI, AND SMEC

NSC FOR RIEDEL AND COUNTRYMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/08
TAGS: KISL KWBG KPAL PREL PHUM GZ IS PGOV
SUBJECT: HAMAS CONSIDERS A NEW MODUS VIVENDI WITH PA

CLASSIFIED BY POL/C, JOHN SCOTT, REASONS 1.5 (B/D)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT:
--------------


1. (C) IN THE AFTERMATH OF WIDE-SCALE ARRESTS OF HAMAS
ACTIVISTS FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 29 GUSH KATIF SUICIDE
BOMBINGS, SOME OF OUR GAZA CONTACTS ARE STATING THAT
HAMAS IS PREPARING TO ENTER INTO A LIMITED "TRUCE" WITH
THE PALESTINIAN.AUTHORITY (PA). THE TRUCE WOULD APPLY
ONLY TO ATTACKS LAUNCHED FROM OR ON PA TERRITORY BUT
WOULD SUPPOSEDLY ALSO BIND HAMAS LEADERSHIP TO
"PERSUADING" HAMAS FUGITIVES TO TURN THEMSELVES IN UNDER
GUARANTEES OF SAFETY. OTHER CONTACTS POINT OUT THAT
HAMAS HAS ENTERED INTO SUCH AGREEMENTS IN THE PAST AND
DISCOUNT THE EITHER THE POSSIBILITY OR THE EFFICIACY OF
A NEW AGREEMENT. THEY ARGUE THAT EVEN IF THE LOCAL
HAMAS LEADERSHIP IS INTERESTED IN REACHING A NEW MODUS
VIVENDI WITH THE PA, THE OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP REMAINS
INTENT ON KEEPING HAMAS' RADICAL EDGE. THE OUTSIDE
LEADERSHIP, THEY CLAIM RETAINS THE ABILITY TO ORDER
TERRORIST OPERATIONS INSIDE OF ISRAEL AND THE PA-
CONTROLLED AREAS PRIMARILY THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF
SIGNIFICANT HAMAS FINANCIAL RESOURCES. SIMILARLY, OUR
CONTACTS APPEAR TO BE DIVIDED OVER THE LONG-TERM AFFECTS
OF THE RECENT ARRESTS. SOME HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
ARRESTS, WHICH MAY NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS, FAILED TO
INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED "MILITARY NING" AND HAD
A NEGLIBLE IMPACT OF HAMAS OPERATIONS. OTHERS CLAIM
THAT HAMAS IS NOW IN A STATE OF INTERNAL CRISIS ARISING
FROM A LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO WINGS
BECAUSE OF PA AND GOI PRESSURE, INCLUDING THE MOST
RECENT ARRESTS, AND ARGUE THAT AS A RESULT OF THE
PRESSURE, HAMAS WILL HAVE LITTLE OPTION BUT TO RESPOND
"MILITARILY."


2. (C) PUBLIC REACTION TO THE ARRESTS AND TO CONTINUED
PA SECURITY FORCE ACTIVITIES AIMED AT HAMAS IS GENERALLY
NEGATIVE. PUBLIC ANGER APPEARS TO BE LESS A RESULT OF
ACTUAL SUPPORT FOR HAMAS THEN OF RESENTMENT AT ARAFAT'S
PERCEIVED WILLINGNESS TO ATTACK HAMAS IN ORDER TO PLEASE
THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. BUT HAMAS' ABILITY TO CAPITALIZE
ON THE RESENTMENT APPEARS FOR NOW TO BE LIMITED BY THEIR
OWN FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A CLEAR AND VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO ARAFAT'S PRESENT COURSE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


3. (C) ACCORDING TO PALESTINIAN MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS
GROUPS, PA SECURITY FORCES ARE CONTINUING TO SUMMON
SUSPECTED ISLAMIST ACTIVISTS AND TO SEARCH THEIR HOMES.
BUT POLICE ACTIVITIES APPEAR TO BE LOSING THEIR
INTENSITY AND A NUMBER OF LOWER LEVEL ACTIVISTS HAVE NOW
ALSO BEEN RELEASED. THEIR NUMBERS ARE IN ADDITION TO
THE RELEASE LAST WEEK OF ANOTHER FIVE PROMINENT HAMAS
AND ISLAMIC JIHAD LEADERS. ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS
GROUPS, AT LEAST 160, AND PROBABLY AS MANY AS 200,
SUSPECTED HAMAS ACTIVISTS REMAIN IMPRISONED. ACCORDING
TO IMAD FALOUJI, THE ISLAMIST MINISTER OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, THE RELEASES WILL CONTINUE.

A DEAL IS STRUCK?
--------------


4. (C) ACCORDING TO FALOUJI, THE PA IS ALSO CONSIDERING
LIFTING THE HOUSE ARREST IMPOSED UPON HAMAS SPIRITUAL
LEADER SHEIKH AHMED YASIN IMPOSED AFTER THE GUSH KATIF
BOMBING LAST OCTOBER. ENDING HIS STATE OF ARREST AS
WELL AS CONTINUED RELEASE OF PRISONERS WOULD BE THE
RESULT, ACCORDING TO FALOUJI, OF AN AGREEMENT REACHED
BETWEEN PA AND HAMAS FOCUSSED ON FOUR ISSUES: (1) HAMAS
WILLINGNESS TO END ATTACKS FROM OR ON PA TERRITORY, (2)
HAMAS "HELP" IN "PERSUADING" FUGITIVES, INCLUDING
NOTORIOUS TERRORIST MOHAMMED DEIF, TO TURN THEMSELVES
INTO THE PA UNDER A PROMISE OF "FAIR" TREATMENT
(COMMENT: WE DOUBT DEIF WILL BE IMPRESSED BY THIS
OFFER),(3) AN END TO ANTI-PA INCITEMENT, AND (4) A PA
PROMISE THAT HAMAS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ITS
"POLITICAL" (VICE "MILITARY") WORK. TALK OF A
"CEASEFIRE" HAS ALSO AROUSED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN
ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY CLAIMS BY ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES
CHIEF OF STAFF MOFAZ THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE
"POSITIVE AND RIGHT." FALOUJI QUOTED PA CABINET
SECRETARY TAYYIB ABDUL RAHIM, WHO HANDLES RELATIONS WITH
HAMAS FOR ARAFAT, AS SAYING THAT HAMAS HAD AGREED TO
THESE CONDITIONS IN A MEETING HELD EARLIER THIS WEEK.


5. (C) BUT OTHERS ARE NOT SO SURE. AN AMERICAN
REPORTER WHO RECENTLY INTERVIEWED HAMAS ACTIVIST ISMAEL
ABU SHANAB TOLD POLOFF THAT ABU SHANAB HAD DISCUSSED
WITH HIM HAMAS' ABILITY TO "TERRORIZE" ISRAEL WITH A
HANDFUL OF ACTIVISTS. ABU SHANAB, RELEASED FROM PRISON
SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARREST, EXPRESSED NO REMORSE ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUSH KATIF BOMBINGS ON HAMAS-PA
RELATIONS. SIMILARLY, GAZA REUTERS BUREAU CHIEF NIDAL
AL-MOGHRABI TOLD POLOFF ON NOVEMBER 18 THAT HAMAS
ACTIVISTS HAD REPORTED NO PROGRESS FROM THE SAME MEETING
BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND TAYYIB ABDUL RAHIM THAT FALOUJI
CLAIMED PRODUCED AN AGREEMENT. AL-MOGHRABI NOTED THAT
HAMAS HAD REACHED SIMILAR AGREEMENTS WITH THE PA IN THE
PAST, ONLY TO BREACH THEM WHEN AN ATTACK SUITED THEIR
INTERESTS.

WHOM DID THEY ARREST AND WHAT WAS THE IMPACT?
--------------


6. (C) CONTROVERSY CONTINUES LIKEWISE ON THE QUESTION
OF WHOM THE PA MANAGED TO ARREST AND WHAT THE IMPACT OF
THE ARRESTS WAS ON HAMAS' ABILITY TO OPERATE. A SENIOR
SECURITY ANALYST FOR TITULAR PA SECURITY HEAD MG NASSIR
YUSUF ADMITTED TO POLOFF THAT THE ARRESTS, WHILE BROAD,
HAD NETTED NO ONE FROM THE MILITARY WING. SIMILAR VIEWS
WERE OFFERED BY NASSIR YUSUF HIMSELF, BY FALOUJI, BY
FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER HANI AL-HASSAN, AND BY
THE EDITOR OF THE ISLAMIST WEEKLY, "AL-RESALLAH," GHAZI
HAMAD. AL-HASSAN REPORTED THAT THE DEATHS OF IMAD
AWADALLAH AND OTHERS FROM THE MILITARY WING HAD INDEED
DISRUPTED "POLITICAL" CONTROL OVER THE UNDERGROUND CELLS
FOR A FEW WEEKS, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT SUCH CONTROL HAD
NOW BEEN REESTABLISHED.


7. (C) ON THE QUESTION OF TIES BETWEEN HAMAS' POLITICAL
AND MILITARY WINGS, OUR CONTACTS DIVIDED SHARPLY. GHAZI
HAMAD, EDITOR OF THE ISLAMIST "AL-RESELLAH," SAID THAT
RELATIONS WERE "IN CRISIS" AS A RESULT OF RECENT ARRESTS
AND THE APPARENT LOSS OF INFLUENCE BY THE MORE
"PRAGMATIC," INSIDE LEADERSHIP. HAMAD ARGUED THAT THE
ARRESTS, WHILE RANDOM (ALTHOUGH WANTED, HAMAD AVOIDED
ARREST SIMPLY BY STAYING AT A FRIEND'S HOUSE AND
AVOIDING HIS OFFICE FOR A FEW DAYS),WAS COMPELLING
HAMAS TO SHOW THAT IT COULD STILL RESPOND. HAMAD ARGUED
THAT THE GUSH KATIF ATTACK WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE LOSS OF
POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY WING -- YASIN HAD
BEEN DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THE ATTACK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR HIS FUTURE ABILITY TO COME TO A MORE VIABLE MODUS
VIVENDI (FROM HAMAS' STANDPOINT) WITH THE PA.


8. (C) FALOUJI CAST THE PROBLEM IN DIFFERENT TERMS. HE
TOLD US THAT YASIN'S OBJECTIONS TO THE GUSH KATIF ATTACK
WERE NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THEIR ABILITY TO WRECK HAVOC
WITH HIS ATTEMPTS TO IMRPOVE TIES WITH THE PA, BUT
BECAUSE THEY SHOWED THAT THE OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP WAS IN
A POSITION TO ORDER ATTACKS WITHOUT HIS SPECIFIC
APPROVAL. BUT WHILE THERE WERE DISAGREEMENTS, FALOUJI
SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A BREAKDOWN IN
COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN HAMAS OR A CRISIS (AS HAMAD
CLAIMED) IN THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP.

ENDING YASIN'S HOUSE ARREST
--------------


9. (C) AL-HASSAN ALSO REPORTED THAT HE HAD MET YASIN
RECENTLY AND HAD FOUND HIM TO BE IN "HIGH MORALE" AND
OCCUPYING HIMSELF BY READING ISLAMIC HISTORY. THE
WHEELCHAIR-BOUND YASIN POSSESSES ONLY A "BRAIN,
IDEOLOGY, AND WILL," ACCORDING TO AL-HASSAN, AND HAS
LITTLE ELSE TO LIVE FOR OTHER THAN HIS "CAUSE." BUT AL-
HASSAN WARNED THAT THE PROLONGED HOUSE ARREST OF AL-
HASSAN WAS PROVING TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WITHOUT
YASIN AND WITH MOST OF THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP IN AND OUT
OF PA PRISONS OR OTHERWISE "MARGINALIZED," ACCORDING TO
AL-HASSAN, HAMAS' OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP WAS BECOMING MORE
PROMINENT. AL-HASSAN REPORTED THAT YASIN TOLD HIM
DURING THEIR MEETING THAT HE WAS "NOT RESPONSIBLE" FOR
ANY FUTURE HAMAS ATTACKS, IMPLYING THAT HE COULD NOT BE
HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ATTACKS ORDERED FROM THE OUTSIDE.
AL-HASSAN SAID HE WAS URGING ARAFAT TO END YASIN'S
ISOLATION, IF ONLY TO REASSERT THE POWER OF THE LOCAL
LEADERSHIP. FALOUJI ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS PUSHING
ARAFAT TO RELEASE YASIN FROM HIS HOUSE ARREST AND HOPED
FOR RESULTS "VERY SHORTLY."

DEALING WITH HAMAS
--------------


10. (C) AL-HASSAN OFFERED A SIMILAR ASSESSMENT OF THE
WYE AGREEMENT TO THAT FOUND IN A HAMAS MEMORANDUM ON THE
SAME SUBJECT. THE WYE PLANTATION MEMORANDUM WAS
BASICALLY A "SECURITY MEMORANDUM" RATHER THAN A
POLITICAL DEAL. (COMMENT: THIS VIEW IS WIDESPREAD IN
GAZA.) HE EMPHASIZED THAT HAMAS WAS A POLITICAL PROBLEM
AND COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY PURELY SECURITY-RELATED
MEANS. A PROBLEM, HE NOTED, THAT IRONICALLY PLAGUED
HAMAS ITSELF WHICH ALSO SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A "MILITARY"
SOLUTION ON THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
DISPUTE. AL-HASSAN DESCRIBED YASIN AS TAKING A LONG-
TERM VIEW OF HIS SITUATION. "THESE MEN THINK IN TERMS
OF 25 YEARS, NOT A FEW WEEKS. THEY HAVE NO EXPECTATIONS
FOR TOMORROW," AL-HASSAN COMMENTED. AT THE SAME TIME,
HE NOTED THAT PA OFFERS OF A TRUCE TO HAMAS WOULD LIKELY
BE REJECTED. THE PA HAD CONVINCED HAMAS NOT TO TAKE
"MILITARY" ACTIONS IN THE PAST, BUT HAD SUFFERED
GRIEVOUS LOSSES, INCLUDING MUHI AL-DIN AL-SHERIFI, THE
AWADALLAH BROTHERS, AND OTHERS. AL-HASSAN CONCLUDED
THAT THE PA HAD MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN THE PAST TO
DESTROY HAMAS (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT THESE
OPPORTUNITIES WERE). THE SOLUTION NOW WAS TO ISOLATE
HAMAS POLICALLY BY MAKING PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS.


11. (C) FALOUJI ALSO SAID HE WOULD PUSH ARAFAT TO END
YASIN'S HOUSE ARREST. BASING HIS COMMENTS ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT HAMAS HAS IN FACT OFFERED A "CEASEFIRE"
(AN ASSUMPTION OTHERS HAVE CHALLENGED, SEE PARA 5),
FALOUJI CLAIMS THAT THE PA MUST NOW SHOW ITS WILLINGNESS
TO MEET HAMAS HALF-WAY BY RELEASING MORE PRISONERS AND
ENDING YASIN'S HOUSE-ARREST. TO DO OTHERWISE, FALOUJI
CLAIMED, WOULD BE TO OPEN THE DOOR FURTHER TO HAMAS'
OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP, WHICH, AS ARGUED AL-HASSAN, WAS
GAINING GROUND AT YASIN'S EXPENSE THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF
HAMAS FINANCES. FALOUJI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PA WAS
WEIGHING AN OFFER FOR HAMAS PARTICIPATION IN SOME
CABINET DELIBERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR FORMULATING THE PA
POSITION AND PLANS FOR THE POSSIBLE DECLARATION OF A
PALESTINIAN STATE NEXT MAY. IN AN ASIDE, FALOUJI
COMMENTED THAT HAMAS WOULD MOVE PART OF ITS JORDANIAN
LEADERSHIP TO SYRIA. FALOUJI SAID THAT MUSA ABU MARZOUK
AND KHALID MESHAL WOULD REMAIN IN JORDAN, AS THEY CARRY
JORDANIAN CITIZENSHIP. MOHAMMED NAZZAR AND OTHERS WOULD
LEAD THE MOVE TO DAMASCUS. (COMMENT: WE HAVE SEEN
NUMEROUS REPORTS OF A HAMAS MOVE TO DAMASCUS BEFORE. SO
FAR, NO MOVE.)

COMMENT:
--------------


12. (C) THROUGH THE GUSH KATIF ATTACK (WE EXCLUDE THE
LATER JERUSALEM BOMBING FOR WHICH ISLAMIC JIHAD CLAIMED
RESPONSIBILITY) AND SUBSEOUENT CRACKDOWN, A RENEWED
DEBATE OVER HAMAS AND THE FUTURE OF HAMAS - PA TIES IS
TAKING PLACE IN GAZA. THIS DEBATE APPEARS TO REVOLVE
AROUND AT LEAST TWO OUESTIONS THAT ADMIT NO EASY ANSWER:
(1) WHO CALLS THE SHOTS IN HAMAS (THE INSIDERS VS.
OUTSIDERS ISSUE) AND (2) WHETHER THE RECENT WAVE OF
ARRESTS HAS DONE ANYTHING TO DISRUPT RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL WINGS OF HAMAS. AS IS
APPARENT FROM THE FOREGOING, GAZANS THEMSELVES,
INCLUDING ISLAMISTS, HAVE ARRIVED AT DIFFERENT ANSWERS
TO THESE OUESTIONS.


13. (C) FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS THERE DOES SEEM TO BE A
GROWING CONCERN THAT HAMAS' OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP
INCREASINGLY DESIRES TO BLOCK PA - HAMAS RAPPROCHEMENT.
THIS IS PRESUMABLY BECAUSE AN UPTICK IN PA - HAMAS
RELATIONS WOULD REDUCE OUTSIDE CONTROL OVER HAMAS BY
GIVING THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP A COUNTER-WEIGHT TO THE
OUTSIDE. THE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN BETTER TIES MIGHT ALSO
PROVE TO BE A RATIONALE FOR SUSPENDING US OF HAMAS' MOST
POTENT WEAPON: THE ABILITY TO MOUNT TERRORIST
OPERATIONS. SUCH ARGUMENTS ARE PARTIALLY CONVINCING,
BUT NOT TOTALLY SO GIVEN THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF HAMAS'
POLITICAL STRENGTH DERIVES FROM ITS POSITION INSIDE GAZA
AND THE WEST BANK AND THUS CANNOT BE TOTALLY IGNORED BY
ANY ASPECT OF ITS LEADERSHIP. HAMAS' ROLE IN THE
PALESTINIAN DIASPORA IS MUCH WEAKER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE,
FATAH'S. IT WOULD ALSO APPEAR THAT HAMAS WOULD LOSE A
GREAT DEAL OF ITS POPULAR SUPPORT IF IT WERE TO LAUNCH
AN ATTACK NOW, GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF A RENEWED CLOSURE
IMPOSED BY THE GOI.


14. (C) ON THE SECOND QUESTION CONCERNING THE EFFICIACY
OF THE RECENT ARRESTS, MOST OF OUR CONTACTS (WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF HAMAD),BELIEVED THAT THE EFFECT WAS
NEGLIBLE. IF WE CAN BELIEVE AL-HASSAN'S STORY OF
YASIN'S HIGH MORALE WHILE READING ISLAMIC HISTORY OR ABU
SHANAB'S REMARKS TO THE AMERICAN REPORTER ENDORSING THE
USE OF TERROR TO "CONTROL" ISRAEL, THERE SEEMS TO BE
LITTLE QUESTION OF AN ORGANIZATION IN A DEEP CRISIS.
SEEN FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, THE PERENNIAL
OUTSIDER/INSIDER QUESTION BECOMES ONE OF EMPHASIS RATHER
THAN ONE WHICH DETERMINES HAMAS' OVERALL DIRECTION.


15. (C) AS A FINAL POINT, FALOUJI'S COMMENT THAT "HAMAS
WILL NOT DISAPPEAR" SEEMS TO US RELEVANT. THE PA IS
INCURRING SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC ANGER BECAUSE OF ITS
CRACKDOWN, LESS BECAUSE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HAMAS THAN
BECAUSE THE CRACKDOWN IS PERCEIVED TO BE BOWING TO
ISRAELI AND U.S. DICTATES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PA
PROBABLY REALIZES THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO WHAT IT CAN
DO AGAINST HAMAS FROM A PURELY SECURITY POINT OF VIEW,
GIVEN HAMAS' DEEP-ROOTEDNESS IN SOCIETY AND GIVEN THE
VIEW OF VIRTUALLY ALL GAZANS, INCLUDING FATAH STALWARTS,
WHICH ACCEPTS HAMAS' RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL
ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF TERRORISM. YET IT IS PROBABLY ON
THE POLITICAL LEVEL WHERE THE PA STANDS THE BEST CHANCE
OF WINNING ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST HAMAS. FIRST, THE PA
WILL CLEARLY BENEFIT FROM THE PRESENT UPSURGE IN THE
PEACE PROCESS, EVEN IF THIS PROCESS BRINGS LESS THAN
MOST PALESTINIANS BELIEVE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO. SECOND,
HAMAS HAS FAILED TO DEFINE A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO
ARAFAT'S COURSE OF ACTION. PA PRESSURE AGAINST HAMAS,
ESPECIALLY IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE GUSH KATIF
BOMBING, WAS ACCEPTED BY MOST GAZANS AND SERVED AS A
USEFUL REMINDER TO ALL PALESTINIANS THAT HAMAS'
TERRORIST ACTIONS THREATEN THE INTERESTS OF ALL
PALESTINIANS. BUT PA EFFORTS AGAINST HAMAS TO BE
CREDIBLE WITHIN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, MUST CONTAIN A
POLITICAL COMPONENT, AS AL-HASSAN SUGGESTED, AS WELL.

WALKER