SAUDI ARABIA: 1997 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 004701


DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1997 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 223177


1. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS
SET FORTH IN REFTEL.


A. DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY
TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1997, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION RELATING TO TERRORISM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE
GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG IS CONTINUING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR
TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U.S. MILITARY
PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH THE SAG HAS REPORTEDLY DETAINED AND ARRESTED
SAUDI CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING, IT HAS NOT YET BEGUN
PROSECUTION OR TAKEN ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION REGARDING ANY
SUCH PERSONS. THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST CASES OR ACTIONS
THAT CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1997.


B. DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR?
PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
U.S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA. CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL-SAYEGH
ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMB ATTACK. HOWEVER, CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE UNITED
STATES. THE SAG HAS NOW REQUESTED THAT THE USG DEPORT AL-SAYEGH TO
SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAG SEEKS TO QUESTION AND PERHAPS PROSECUTE AL-
SAYEGH FOR HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN THE KILLING OF 19 UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. THE SAG HAS ALSO
REPORTEDLY REQUESTED THAT THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN
PROHIBIT SAUDI BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND SUPPORTER USAMA BIN
LADEN FROM INSTIGATING OR ENCOURAGING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST
SAUDI ARABIA OR ITS WESTERN ALLIES. BIN LADEN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF
HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 1994, ENCOURAGES AND IS BELIEVED TO
PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS IN ACTS OF
TERRORISM AGAINST THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY AND COUNTRIES SUPPORTIVE
OF THE ROYAL FAMILY, SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES. THE SAG IS
REPORTED TO HAVE UNSUCCESSFULLY REQUESTED THAT SYRIA EXTRADITE OR
DEPORT A SUSPECT IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR
QUESTIONING AND POSSIBLE PROSECUTION. THE SUSPECT IN QUESTION WAS
REPORTED TO HAVE DIED WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY IN SYRIA.


C. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S
PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS
WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS NOT ENTERED INTO
EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE
UNITED STATES. (NOTE: EXTRADITION TREATIES EXIST WITH YEMEN AND
EGYPT.)


D. DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION.
THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A
TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.

RESPONSE: THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE,
MINISTER OF INTERIOR, OFFICIAL ISLAMIC CLERGY, AND OFFICIAL NEWS
MEDIA, PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL
TERMS. THE SAG STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE NOVEMBER 1997 LUXOR MASSACRE
IN EGYPT. THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMBING AND HAS ASSISTED THE USG IN ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE
BOMBING. HOWEVER, PRESS REPORTS ASSERTED THAT THE USG EXPRESSED
FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND SUSPECTS.
ACCORDING TO HIGH LEVEL SAG OFFICIALS, THE SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(SHARIA) DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGNERS DIRECT FACE TO FACE ACCESS TO
SUSPECTS.


E. DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1997 BY
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMBING. IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN
SECURITY PROTECTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.
THESE STEPS INCLUDE ASSISTING IN THE RELOCATION OF U.S. DEPLOYED
PERSONNEL AND MANY TRAINING MISSION PERSONNEL TO PRINCE SULTAN
AIRBASE AND ESKAN VILLAGE, LOCATIONS REMOVED FROM POPULATION
CENTERS, AND INCREASING SECURITY MEASURES AT OFFICIAL U.S.
PREMISES. AT A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF ARAB LEAGUE INTERIOR
MINISTERS IN TUNIS, THE SAG ENDORSED A NON-BINDING ARAB LEAGUE
ACTION PLAN TO COMBAT TERRORISM. AT A DOHA MEETING OF THE GCC
INTERIOR MINISTERS, THE SAG AGREED TO INCREASE SECURITY COOPERATION
AND COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AMONG THE MEMBER STATES. AT A MEETING
OF ARAB JUSTICE MINISTERS IN CAIRO, THE SAG JOINED THE OTHER MEMBER
STATES IN CALLING FOR THE ADOPTION OF A PLAN TO ALLOW FOR THE
EXTRADITION AMONG ARAB STATES OF MILITANTS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION
WITH TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE SAG ALSO ENTERED INTO A MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING TERRORISM.


F. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORIST, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS
OR THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC
PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION SANCTUARY AND/OR
PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR
TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON
TERRORISM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES. ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE
THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES
OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR
DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES. NONETHELESS, THERE CONTINUE TO
BE ALLEGATIONS THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN SAUDI ARABIA.


G. HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT
OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? (THE SEVEN
COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S SO-CALLED "TERRORISM LIST" OF STATE SPONSORS
OF TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND
SUDAN.)

RESPONSE: THE SAG DID NOT MAKE OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS
SPECIFICALLY SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S
TERRORISM LIST REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE. HOWEVER, THE SAG
JOINED IN THE NON-BINDING ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTION TO LIFT UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA DESPITE LIBYA'S
FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
BOMBING OF A PAN AM PASSENGER JET OVER LOCKERBIE, SCOTLAND. THE
SAG ALLOWED LIBYAN AND IRAQI AIRCRAFT CARRYING HAJJ PILGRIMS TO
LAND AT JEDDAH'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND DEPART IN VIOLATION OF
UNSC SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON LIBYA AND IRAQ. THE SAG HAS REPEATEDLY
COMMENTED PUBLICLY THAT ALL PILGRIMS WITH VALID HAJJ VISAS SHOULD
BE RECEIVED BY SAUDI ARABIA, REGARDLESS OF THEIR MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION.


H. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1996, POSITIVE OR
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM,
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE?

RESPONSE: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 1995 AND 1996 GREATLY HEIGHTENED
SAG CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREAT OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM. THE ATTACKS
MET WITH WIDESPREAD OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC CONDEMNATION, AND HAVE
SPURRED GREATER COOPERATION AMONG SAUDI SECURITY ORGANS IN
ADDRESSING INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES. THE SAG HAS ALSO
SUBSTANTIALLY INTENSIFIED ITS DIALOGUE WITH GCC AND OTHER REGIONAL
NEIGHBORS ON COMBATING TERRORISM. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE
SAG CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED WITH SAUDIS AND OTHERS WHO RECEIVED
TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER WEAPONS.
THREE OF THE FOUR TERRORISTS EXECUTED FOR PERPETRATING THE NOVEMBER
1995 BOMB ATTACK IN RIYADH RECEIVED SUCH TRAINING DURING THE AFGHAN
WAR. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT REMAINS VERY CONCERNED WITH A CONTINUED
TERRORIST PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY TERRORISTS UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF USAMA BIN LADIN, A TERRORIST FINANCIER AND SUPPORTER
OF SAUDI ORIGIN. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT BIN LADIN
PROMOTES TERRORISM IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.


I. DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH
RESPECT TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
SPECIFIC U.S. REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR COOPERATION AND
EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS
DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF
THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES,
INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE
SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

RESPONSE: BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG
INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG
BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED HIGH-LEVEL,
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND
SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE
PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES. THIS INTEREST AND
PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 1997. THE USG AND SAG
EXCHANGED INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES
AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE REGION.
CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY
OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED. FOLLOWING THE 1996
KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG FURTHER INCREASED
COOPERATION. FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS FREEH VISITED SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997
TO COORDINATE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER
PRINCE NAIF. THE FBI MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE
OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. WHILE COOPERATION IN 1997 ON THE
KHOBAR TOWERS INVESTIGATION WAS STRONG, IT HAS NOT ALWAYS MET THE
EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS. PRESS REPORTS ASSERTED THAT THE USG
EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND
SUSPECTS. ACCORDING TO HIGH LEVEL SAG OFFICIALS, THE SAUDI
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (SHARIA) DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGNERS DIRECT FACE TO
FACE ACCESS TO SUSPECTS. THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECIFIC COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE USG AND THE SAG REGARDING THE ELIMINATION OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS.
HOWEVER, THE SAG'S REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT
AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL CAUSES.


J. IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR
INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON:

(I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS
COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING,
CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ACT; AND

(II) IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION
DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE
DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH
THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS. IN DOING SO, THE SAG HAS
COOPERATED WITH THE USG AT UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS. HOWEVER, THE
SAG'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN UNEVEN AND HAS NOT ALWAYS MET THE
EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS. WHILE SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI
HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON MANY INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH
BOMBINGS, PRESS REPORTS ASSERTED THAT THE USG EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION
AT THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND SUSPECTS. ACCORDING TO HIGH
LEVEL SAG OFFICIALS, THE SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM (SHARIA) DOES NOT
ALLOW FOREIGNERS DIRECT FACE TO FACE ACCESS TO SUSPECTS.
NONETHELESS, THE USG AND THE SAG CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE
STATUS OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING INVESTIGATION.

(II) THE SAG HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE
OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS. IT MADE AVAILABLE TO
COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST
U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A VERY LARGE
RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL. THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS. THE SAG ALSO
WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE
MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE
U.S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND
DHAHRAN. USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN
CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN
SAUDI ARABIA.


K. IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE
DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS GENERALLY PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON
THREATS DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO
LIAISE CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS
AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM. THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO
THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT
OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE
DETERRENTS.

FOWLER