Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
97ISLAMABAD3085
1997-04-14 12:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN

Tags:  PGOV PTER KISL PINR AF PK 
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O 141255Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6273
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY ALMATY 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA J5//
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MBABANE 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 
AMCONSUL JEDDAH 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 
AMCONSUL LAHORE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003085 


DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CEN; LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS
FOR POL/RAVELING; MBABANE FOR MALINOWSKI; CENTCOM/CENTPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/07
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL PINR AF PK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN
TALIBAN AND ARE PUSHING FOR PROTECTION OF BIN LADEN

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 2987
(B) ISLAMABAD 2849
(C) PESHAWAR 277


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003085


DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CEN; LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS
FOR POL/RAVELING; MBABANE FOR MALINOWSKI; CENTCOM/CENTPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/07
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL PINR AF PK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN
TALIBAN AND ARE PUSHING FOR PROTECTION OF BIN LADEN

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 2987
(B) ISLAMABAD 2849
(C) PESHAWAR 277



1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DAN MOZENA, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR.
REASONS: 1.5 (C) (D).


2. (C) SUMMARY: IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, HAMED GAILANI, THE
POLITICALLY-ACTIVE SON OF PIR GAILANI, AND MULLAH MALANG, AN AFGHAN
WITH LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY THAT "RADICALS" ARE
GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN THE TALIBAN. THEY PICTURE THE "RADICALS"
AS BEING STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE TALIBAN'S POLICY OF OFFERING SAFE
HAVEN TO FUGITIVE SAUDI FINANCIER BIN LADEN. THEY ADDED THAT SOME
OF THE "RADICALS," INCLUDING "JUSTICE MINISTER" TURABI AND HIGH-
LEVEL TALIBAN ADVISER WAKIL AHMED, WERE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN
CLOSE TO MULLAH MANSOUR, A STRONGLY ISLAMIST RESISTANCE LEADER, WHO
WAS ASSASSINATED IN 1992. END SUMMARY.

"RADICALS" SEEN AS GAINING THE UPPER HAND
-------------- /


3. (C) IN AN APRIL 12 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, HAMED GAILANI,
THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE SMALL NATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN, SAID HE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF "RADICALS"
HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND IN TALIBAN DECISION-MAKING. IN A
SEPARATE APRIL 14 CONVERSATION, MULLAH MALANG, A COMMANDER IN THE
AFGHAN RESISTANCE WITH CLOSE LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, TOLD POLOFF THAT
HE HAD ALSO NOTED A "MORE EXTREME EDGE" TO THE TALIBAN, ESPECIALLY
IN THE PAST MONTH. BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG LISTED THE FOLLOWING
TALIBAN LEADERS AS "RADICALS" WITH INCREASED IMPORTANCE IN THE
MOVEMENT:

-- MULLAH WAKIL AHMED, ADVISER TO TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR.
-- MULLAH TURABI, THE "JUSTICE MINISTER."
-- MULLAH MUTAQI, THE "INFORMATION MINISTER."
-- MULLAH JALIL, THE "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" IN KANDAHAR.
-- SHER MOHAMMAD STANEKZAI, THE "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" IN KABUL.
-- MULLAH SIDDIQI, THE "ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE." (NOTE: SEE REF B
FOR RECORD OF POLOFF'S RECENT MEETING WITH SIDDIQI, IN KABUL.)

STRONG PRO-BIN LADEN VIEWS
-------------- /


4. (C) MALANG TOLD POLOFF THAT ALL OF THESE TALIBAN OFFICIALS ARE

STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE TALIBAN'S POLICY OF PROVIDING SAFE HAVEN
AND PROTECTION TO FUGITIVE SAUDI FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN. IN
PARTICULAR, HE NOTED, TURABI, WAKIL AHMED AND MUTAQI HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED WITH THE PRO-BIN LADEN WING OF THE TALIBAN. ON THE
OTHER HAND, MALANG CONTINUED, ALTHOUGH MULLAH RABBANI, THE TALIBAN
"CHIEF OF THE CARETAKER COUNCIL," AND MULLAH GHAUS, THE TALIBAN
"FOREIGN MINISTER," ARE NOT AGAINST OFFERING HAVEN TO BIN LADEN,
THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL
RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE TALIBAN OF BEING IDENTIFIED WITH BIN LADEN'S
ANTI-SAUDI AND ANTI-AMERICAN POLICIES. HOWEVER, MALANG ADDED,
RABBANI AND GHAUS HAVE "LOST THE ARGUMENT" AND THE TALIBAN HAVE NO
PLANS TO ADJUST THEIR POLICY ON BIN LADEN.


5. (C) ASKED WHY BIN LADEN IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE "RADICALS,"
MALANG REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE
RADICALS SEE BIN LADEN AS A "LEARNED MUSLIM," WHO CAN QUOTE FROM
THE KORAN AND HADITHS (SAYINGS OF THE PROPHET). IN ADDITION, THEY
FEEL HE IS OWED RESPECT BECAUSE HE HELPED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS. FINALLY, MALANG OBSERVED, THE
"RADICALS" ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THE FUNDS THAT BIN LADEN PROVIDES
THE TALIBAN.

THE "MANSOUR" GROUP
-------------- /


6. (C) BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG ASSERTED THAT MOST OF THE TALIBAN
"RADICALS" WERE AFFILIATED WITH AN AFGHAN RESISTANCE PARTY LED BY
NASRULLAH MANSOUR. GAILANI TOLD POLOFF THAT MANSOUR WAS ORIGINALLY
THE DEPUTY TO MOHAMMED NABI MOHAMMEDI, THE LEADER OF HARAKAT-I-
INQILAB-I-ISLAMI (HII),BUT LEFT THE PARTY TO FORM A BREAKAWAY
FACTION IN 1981. THE ISSUE THAT LED TO THE HII SPLIT, ACCORDING TO
GAILANI, WAS NABI'S BELIEF THAT MANSOUR HAD GROWN "TOO
INTERNATIONALIST" IN HIS ISLAMIC BELIEFS. HE NOTED THAT MANSOUR
WAS ASSASSINATED BY UNITS LOYAL TO HEZB-I-ISLAMI (HEKMATYAR) IN
1992, AND ADDED THAT WAKIL AHMED, TURABI, AND SIDDIQI, IN
PARTICULAR, ARE CONSIDERED "PROTEGES OF MANSOUR."

"MANSOURIS" SEEN AS LESS ANTI-IRANIAN"
-------------- /


7. (C) NOTING THAT MANSOUR SPENT A NUMBER OF YEARS IN IRAN IN THE
1980S, MALANG TOLD POLOFF THAT THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE CONSIDERED
"MANSOURIS" (AS SUPPORTERS OF MANSOUR ARE KNOWN) ARE CONSIDERED TO
BE LESS ANTI-IRANIAN THAN OTHER TALIBAN. EXPANDING ON THIS POINT,
HE EXPLAINED THAT SINCE "MANSOURIS" ARE MORE ISLAMIST IN
ORIENTATION AND LESS NATIONALISTIC, THEY DO NOT HOLD THE STRONG
ANTI-IRANIAN BELIEFS COMMON TO OTHER AFGHANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE
PASHTUNS FROM WESTERN PROVINCES LIKE KANDAHAR, HELMAND, URUZGAN,
AND FARAH. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE PRO-IRANIAN, HE CONCLUDED,
BUT SIMPLY THAT "MANSOURIS" ARE MORE WILLING TO TALK TO THE
IRANIANS.

A TALIBAN "REFORM COMMISSION"
-------------- /


8. (C) NEITHER GAILANI NOR MALANG BELIEVED THAT THE TREND TOWARD
WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS THE "RADICALIZATION" OF THE TALIBAN WOULD EBB
IN THE NEAR-TERM. BOTH NOTED THAT THAT THEY HAD HEARD THAT MULLAH
TURABI WAS NAMED THE HEAD OF A "REFORM COMMISSION" BY TALIBAN
LEADER MULLAH OMAR IN MARCH. FROM THIS POSITION, MALANG COMMENTED,
IT IS BELIEVED THAT MULLAH TURABI NOW MAINTAINS A GREAT DEAL OF
INFLUENCE ON PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION. IN
ADDITION, SINCE IT WAS REPORTED THAT TURABI WAS CHOSEN FOR THE POST
PERSONALLY BY MULLAH OMAR, IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE IS NOW, ALONG
WITH MULLAH WAKIL AHMED, ONE OF OMAR'S CLOSEST ADVISERS, HE STATED.

COMMENT
-------------- /


9. (C) BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG ARE KNOWLEGEABLE CONTACTS ON
AFGHANISTAN; MALANG, IN PARTICULAR, APPEARS TO KNOW A LOT ABOUT
TALIBAN PERSONALITIES AND DECISION-MAKING. THEIR ASSERTION THAT
"RADICALS" IN THE TALIBAN HAVE BEEN GAINING INFLUENCE HAS BEEN
REPEATED BY OTHER OBSERVERS, INCLUDING GENERAL PAYENDA, DOSTAM'S
REPRESENTATIVE IN PAKISTAN (REF A). BIN LADEN'S ASSOCIATION WITH
THE PURPORTEDLY ASCENDANT "RADICALS" IS POTENTIALLY OF GREAT
CONCERN, ESPECIALLY IF IT MEANS THAT BIN LADEN IS ABLE TO EXPAND
HIS INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN.


SIMONS