Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
97ANKARA8752
1997-09-03 08:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

A "SPECIAL TEAM" VIEW ON THE PKK, OHAL,

Tags:  PREL KISL PHUM PINS TU 
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P 030828Z SEP 97
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5128
INFO USEU BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 
AMEMBASSY BONN 
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ5/ECPOLAD//
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/USDP/ISA:EUR//
ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 
CTF NORTHERN WATCH INCIRLIK AB TU//CC/CS//
AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY LONDON
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008752 


LONDON FOR TUELLER
PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL:09/03/17
TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PINS TU
SUBJECT: A "SPECIAL TEAM" VIEW ON THE PKK, OHAL,
AND ISLAMIC SENTIMENT IN THE TNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008752


LONDON FOR TUELLER
PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL:09/03/17
TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PINS TU
SUBJECT: A "SPECIAL TEAM" VIEW ON THE PKK, OHAL,
AND ISLAMIC SENTIMENT IN THE TNP


1. CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS MARC SIEVERS,
AMEMBASSY ANKARA. REASON: 1.5(B)(D).


2. (C) SUMMARY: ON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 2, POLOFF
DISCUSSED THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK),
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM OF THE "STATE OF EMERGENCY"
REGIME (OHAL),AND RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS IN THE TURKISH
NATIONAL POLICE (TNP),WITH A MEMBER OF THE ANTI-
TERRORIST "SPECIAL TEAMS" POLICE FORCE. THE OFFICER
HAS CLOSE TIES TO SEVERAL OF POLOFF'S SOURCES
AND CONTACTS IN THE ISLAMIST/RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY,
INCLUDING PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIST REFAH
(WELFARE) PARTY OF NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND A LOCAL
SHAYKH OF THE NAKSHIBENDI TARIKAT (ONE OF THE
WIDESPREAD BUT ILLEGAL SUFI ORDERS JUDGED BY THE
MILITARY AS A PARTICULARLY DIRE THREAT TO TURKEY'S
SECULAR KEMALIST INSTITUTIONS). END SUMMARY.

--------------
PKK AND OHAL
--------------


3. (C) THE OFFICER, WHO ONCE SERVED IN THE COMMANDO
FORCES OF THE TURKISH JANDARMA, JOINED THE SPECIAL
TEAMS IN 1994, SERVING IN VARIOUS AREAS OF KURDISH
SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY UNTIL HIS RECENT TRANSFER TO
ANKARA. DURING HIS YEARS IN THE SOUTHEAST, HE HAD
WITNESSED A DECLINE PKK OPERATIONS, HE SAID. HOWEVER,
THE PKK WAS STILL QUITE ACTIVE AND WAS NOT ON THE
VERGE OF BEING ELIMINATED AS A MAJOR FORCE IN THE
REGION. THE OFFICER ADDED THAT THERE WAS A WIDENING
RIFT IN THE PKK RANKS BETWEEN THOSE WHO EXHIBITED
UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT OF THE PKK LEADERSHIP'S
TRADITIONAL MARXISM, AND THE INCREASING CADRES OF
RELIGIOUS SYMPATHIZERS. IF LEFT TO FESTER, THIS COULD
POSE A PROBLEM FOR THE PKK IN THE FUTURE, HE OBSERVED.


4. (C) ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, THE YILMAZ
GOVERNMENT'S TENTATIVE PROPOSALS TO END THE OHAL
REGIME IN THE SOUTHEAST AMOUNTED TO A COSMETIC CHANGE
THAT WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY RESTRICT THE SECURITY
FORCES' REGIONAL DOMINANCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. BY
WAY OF EXAMPLE, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT ALTHOUGH THE OHAL
FORMALLY HAD BEEN LIFTED IN MARDIN PROVINCE, NOTHING
HAD CHANGED ON THE GROUND. (COMMENT: MARDIN WAS
DROPPED FROM THE LIST OF OHAL PROVINCES DURING THE
TENURE OF THE PREVIOUS REFAH-LED GOVERNMENT. REFAH,
WHICH LONG HAS VISCERALLY OPPOSED THE STATE OF
EMERGENCY REGIME, HAD HOPED THAT MARDIN WOULD SERVE AS
A SYMBOL OF THE PARTY'S COMMITMENT TO ENACT REFORMS
FOR ITS KURDISH CONSTITUENTS. SHORTLY BEFORE TAKING
POWER IN JULY OF 1996, HOWEVER, REFAH SOURCES
INDICATED TO POLOFF THAT THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HAD
MADE CLEAR TO THE REFAH LEADERSHIP THAT THE MILITARY
WOULD HAVE THE FINAL SAY ON ANY PROPOSALS CONCERNING
THE OHAL. THE MILITARY'S REPEATED "RECOMMENDATIONS"
IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING THE OHAL REGIME, AND THE
ERBAKAN GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE TO THE GENERALS'
DEMANDS, GENERATED CONSIDERABLE DISCONTENT IN THE
REFAH RANKS. THE EXPERIENCE WITH LIFTING OHAL IN
MARDIN PROVINCE ALMOST CERTAINLY WAS SOMETHING OF A
DRY-RUN FOR THE MILITARY. ACCORDING TO A VARIETY OF
REPORTING, THE GENERALS HAVE GIVEN THEIR BLESSING TO
THE YILMAZ GOVERNMENT'S TINKERING WITH OHAL -- NOW
THAT REFAH IS SAFELY OUT OF POWER AND, PRESUMABLY, NOT
IN A POSITION TO CAPITALIZE ON ANY GOT REFORMS IN
THE SOUTHEAST. END COMMENT.)

--------------
ISLAM AND THE POLICE
--------------


5. (C) ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, THE TNP, UNLIKE THE
MILITARY LEADERSHIP, WAS "COMFORTABLE" WITH THE
RELIGIOUS INCLINATIONS OF SOME OF ITS MEMBERS. THE
TNP DID NOT CONDUCT ROUTINE PURGES OF RELIGIOUS COPS
FROM THE RANKS, HE SAID. THE TNP TOP BRASS KNEW
BETTER: SUCH ACTIONS WOULD BE MET WITH WIDESPREAD
HOSTILITY BY RANK-AND-FILE OFFICERS. WHILE THE TNP
WAS BOUND TO OUST FLAGRANT RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZERS,
THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE LATTITUDE GIVEN TO THOSE WHO
KEPT A RELATIVELY LOW PROFILE, THE OFFICER EXPLAINED.


6. (C) THE OFFICER COMMENTED THAT THE TURKISH POLICE'S
STANDING IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC VARIED FROM
NEIGHBORHOOD TO NEIGHBORHOOD. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IN
SINCAN (AN ANKARA SUBURB NOTORIOUS FOR ITS ISLAMIST
SYMPATHIES),THE LOCALS "KISS OUR HANDS," AND
RECOGNIZED THE TYPICAL POLICE OFFICER AS "ONE OF THE
PEOPLE." BY CONTRAST, IN BASTIONS OF KEMALIST
SECULARISM SUCH AS THE UPSCALE ANKARA NEIGHBORHOODS OF
CANKAYA AND GAZIOSMANPASA, POLICE ROUTINELY WERE
GREETED WITH DISDAIN. (COMMENT: THESE ATTITUDES
PROBABLY ARE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE MORE A MATTER OF
SOCIAL STATUS THAN PURE POLITICS. END COMMENT.)

RICCIARDONE