AFGHANISTAN: ENGAGING THE SAUDIS ON THE TALIBAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 214855


LONDON FOR TUELLER, PARIS FOR RAVELING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/06
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF RS
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ENGAGING THE SAUDIS ON THE TALIBAN

ROME FOR DEMPSEY; MOSCOW PLS PASS TO INR A/S GATI

REFS: A) STATE 204146 (NOTAL) B) STATE 204251 (NOTAL)
C) STATE 203329 (NOTAL) D. ISLAMABAD 8520 (NOTAL)
E) RIYADH 4122


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ROBIN L. RAPHEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DOS. REASON: 1.5(D).


2. (C) GID DIRECTOR PRINCE TURKI RECENTLY HELD MEETINGS IN
WASHINGTON WITH THE NSC AND CIA AT WHICH HE DISCUSSED,
AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS, THE TALIBAN PHENOMENON, AND EXCHANGED
ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS ABOUT THE MOVEMENT. THE DEPARTMENT
IS VERY INTERESTED IN ENGAGING REGULARLY WITH THE SAUDIS ON
THEIR POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.


3. (C) EMBASSY RIYADH IS REQUESTED TO INITIATE PERIODIC
HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS SO WE CAN GET A
BETTER ASSESS THEIR VIEWS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF THEIR CONTACTS OR INFLUENCE
WITH THE TALIBAN. WE WANT TO ASK THE SAUDIS TO ENGAGE WITH
THE TALIBAN CONSTRUCTIVELY ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US SUCH
AS TERRORISM--CLOSING THE MILITANT TRAINING CAMPS AND
EXPELLING OSAMA BIN LADEN.


4. (C) WE ALSO WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO USE
WHATEVER INFLUENCE THEY MAY HAVE WITH THE TALIBAN TO PRESS
THEM TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH AND TO REACH A
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH MASOOD AND DOSTAM TOWARDS
BUILDING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
CONTINUING THE FIGHTING IS DESTABLIZING TO THE REGION AND
RISKS AN ETHNIC DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY. THE RUSSIANS AND
THE CENTRAL ASIANS HAVE ALL REACTED STRONGLY TO THE
PERCEIVED TALIBAN THREAT. POST SHOULD INQUIRE AS TO SAUDI
PLANS TO ENGAGE WITH THE TALIBAN AUTHORITIES IN KABUL.
POST MAY WISH TO DRAW ON GENERAL TALKING POINTS TO BE SENT
BY SEPTEL, PREVIOUS GUIDANCE IN REFS A AND B AND THEN FOCUS
ON THE SUGGESTED POINTS BELOW.


5. (C) SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:


RUSSIAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN CONCERNS

-- THE RUSSIANS AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES HAVE ALL
CONVEYED TO US THEIR CONCERNS OVER THE TAKEOVER OF KABUL BY
THE TALIBAN AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF TALIBAN RULE IN
AFGHANISTAN FOR REGIONAL STABILITY.

-- THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVES NORTHWARD,
PARTICULARLY TOWARD THE TAJIK BORDER. IN RESPONSE,
PRESIDENT YELTSIN CALLED A SUMMIT OF THE CIS STATES THAT
WAS HELD IN ALMATY OCTOBER 4-5.

-- THE SUMMIT CALLED ON THE AFGHAN RIVAL PARTIES TO STOP
THE FIGHTING AND TO NEGOTIATE. THE CIS LEADERS WARNED
THAT THEY WILL TAKE MEASURES TO REINFORCE THEIR BORDERS,
AND THEY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO "TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES"
SHOULD AFGHANISTAN'S HOSTILITIES SPILL OVER THE BORDER.


URGE AN END TO THE FIGHTING

-- WE RECENTLY SPOKE WITH A TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVE IN
ISLAMABAD. WE URGED THE TALIBAN IMMEDIATELY TO REACH A
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH BOTH DOSTAM AND MASOOD.

-- WE ARGUED THAT AN EXPANSION OF THE FIGHTING INTO
NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN WOULD COMPOUND THE ANXIETIES OF
AFGHANISTAN'S NORTHERN NEIGHBORS WHO ALREADY PERCEIVE THE
TALIBAN TO BE A THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY AND WAY OF LIFE.

-- WE ALSO WARNED THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING COULD
PRECIPITATE AN UNWANTED INTERVENTION BY RUSSIA, IRAN, OR
SOME OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD
NOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF EITHER THE TALIBAN OR
AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE.

-- THE TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE
TALL BAN HAVE "NO PROBLEM" WITH EITHER DOS TAM OR THE AFGHAN
TAJIKS. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT TRUST MASOOD AND INSISTED HE
WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH. DOSTAM WOULD NEED TO DISARM
HIS FORCES AS PART OF A DEAL WITH THE TALIBAN. AT THE
PRESENT TIME, THE TALIBAN ARE NOT PLANNING TO PUT ?RESSURE
ON THE HAZARA SHIAS.

-- THIS RESPONSE IS LESS THAN REASSURING TO US AND OTHERS
WHO FEAR THE SPREAD OF GREATER INSTABILITY IN THE REGION
AND WHO BELIEVE THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION IS NOT A LONG TERM
SOLUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT
HAS WITH THE TALL BAN TO STRESS THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING
INVITES GREATER INSTABILITY, POSSIBLE ACTIVE INTERVENTION
BY FOREIGN POWERS AND RISKS AN ETHNIC DIVISION OF THE
COUNTRY.


TERRORISM

-- WE ALSO SEEK YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN
ENCOURAGING THE TALIBAN TO CLOSE TERRORIST/MILITANT
TRAINING CAMPS IN TERRITORY THEY CONTROL AND TO EXPEL NON-
AFGHANS INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES.

-- WE HAVE HEARD CONFLICTING REPORTS ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF
OSAMA BIN LADEN. HE MIGHT STILL BE IN TALIBAN-CONTROLLED
TERRITORY. WE HAVE CONVEYED TO THE TALIBAN AND OTHER
AFGHAN LEADERS THAT THE PRESENCE OF OSAMA BIN LADEN IS NOT
HELPFUL TO AFGHANISTAN.


FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH

-- ON ONE FINAL MATTER REGARDING FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH,
WE WISH TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION ON HIS POSSIBLE RETURN TO
AFGHANISTAN. WE DO NOT OPPOSE HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO
AFGHANISTAN TO HELP REUNIFY THE COUNTRY.

-- IN FACT, WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE EFFORTS OF ANY
INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL AFGHANISTAN
UNDER A STABLE, REPRESENTATIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.


TALBOTT