SUDAN: FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIVIL WAR, TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 006573

FROM EMBASSY KHARTOUM OFFICE
LONDON FOR YOUNG, PARIS FOR MORAN, BRUSSELS FOR JOHNSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/06
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS PINR EAID UN SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIVIL WAR, TERRORISM


1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TO SUDAN TIMOTHY CARNEY.
REASON 1.5(D).


2. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. THE SUDANESE FOREIGN
MINISTER REAFFIRMED TO ME MAY 10 THAT KHARTOUM HAS MADE
A DECISION THAT TERRORIST GROUPS MUST GO AND IS WORKING
TO COMPILE MEMBERSHIP LISTS. HE BELIEVES RENEGADE
SAUDI TERROR FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN NEEDS TO START
TALKING TO WESTERN DIPLOMATS. I REBUFFED HIS ATTEMPT
TO INVOLVE THE U.S. IN RESTORING SUDAN'S RELATIONS WITH
ETHIOPIA AND UGANDA.


3. (C) THE MINISTER ASKED THAT THE U.S. CONVEY TO THE
SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SPLM) LEADER
THAT KHARTOUM IS OPEN TO SPLM IDEAS TO SOLVE THE CIVIL
WAR; THAT THE GOS IS PROCEEDING WITH NO HIDDEN AGENDA,
AND IS OPEN TO VENUE AND PLAYERS TO GET TALKS STARTED.
MY REPLY WAS THAT KHARTOUM MUST MAKE CONCRETE GESTURES
TO BUILD TRUST AND I SUGGESTED SOME WHICH MIGHT BE
TIMED TO THE 20 MAY UNESCO/UNDP MEET ON SUDANESE
HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE NETHERLANDS..


4. (C) THE GOS IS ONLY SLOWLY PROCEEDING TO ACT ON
THEIR HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS OF INTENT TO ANSWER U.S.
CONCERNS ON SUDANESE HAVEN AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.
I SUGGESTED THEY HAVE A WINDOW OF 45-90 DAYS TO PROVE
GOOD FAITH, NOW THAT THEIR NEW CABINET IS IN PLACE.
THE KHARTOUM EFFORT TO START PEACE TALKS WITH THE SOUTH
LOOKS SERIOUS. UNSCR 1054 HAS GOTTEN ATTENTION
THROUGHOUT THE SUDANESE CAPITAL. BUT, IF THE FOREIGN
MINISTER'S COMMENTS REFLECT THE REALITY, KHARTOUM DOES
NOT/NOT GRASP HOW COMPLETELY IT IS UP TO THEM TO CUT A
DEAL WITH THE ETHIOPIANS IF SUDAN HAS, AS SEEMS LIKELY,
SPIRITED THE THREE MUBARAK PLOT TERRORISTS OUT OF
SUDAN. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT

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CIVIL WAR
--------------


5. (C) FOREIGN MINISTER ALI OSMAN MOHAMMED TAHA MET
ME AFTER PRAYERS ON RETURNING FROM THE HAJ VIA MALAYSIA
FRIDAY, 10 MAY, TO TALK ABOUT PEACE EFFORTS WITH THE
SOUTH AND, ON DISMISSING NOTETAKERS, TO MAKE POINTS ON
THE GOS EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO AMERICAN CONCERNS ON
TERRORISM (SEPTEL-NOTAL). AFTER ASSURING HIMSELF THAT
I RECEIVED HIS FAX REPLY TO MY LETTER DETAILING SPLM
REACTION TO THE FIRST MESSAGE FROM KHARTOUM (NAIROBI
4836-NOTAL),TAHA SAID THAT KHARTOUM IS COMMITTED TO
DEMONSTRATING ITS SINCERITY IN REACHING A COMPREHENSIVE
PEACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE SAW SCOPE IN SOME SPLM
REMARKS IN THE WAKE OF THE 10 APRIL "PEACE CHARTER,"
SIGNED WITH THE SPLINTER SOUTH SUDAN INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT (SSIM),TO INDUCE THE MAJOR INSURGENT MOVEMENT
TO JOIN IN. HE SAID THAT THE KEY ISSUES ARE IN THE 10
APRIL ACCORD, WHICH AIMED TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE TO
GET SERIOUS TALKS STARTED. HE WAS ASTONISHED WHEN I
SAID THAT ALL SOUTHERN INTERLOCUTORS EXCEPT LAWYER AND
FORMER SUDANESE VICE-PRESIDENT ABEL ALIER HAD VIEWED
THE PEACE CHARTER AS A "TAKE-IT-OR LEAVE IT" DOCUMENT.
A LAWYER HIMSELF, TAHA AGREED WITH THE CHARACTERIZATION
OF HIS CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WHO HAD EARLIER DESCRIBED THE
EFFORT AS ONE OF "IGNITION."


6. (C) I RECALLED THE MINISTER'S OWN RECOGNITION OF
THE MISTRUST AND SUSPICION THAT CAUSED TAHA TO SEEK
INTERMEDIARIES TO GET A PEACE PROCESS STARTED. THE GOS
NEEDS TO BUILD TRUST AND A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE MEASURES
APART FROM THE EARLIER SUGGESTION OF A PRISONER
EXCHANGE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. SUCH STEPS DIVIDE IN TWO
CATEGORIES, THOSE DIRECTLY IMPACTING SPLM CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY FIGURES; AND THOSE WHICH AFFECT POPULATIONS IN
THE SPLM-CONTROLLED AREAS AND ALSO IMPACT IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. NOTING THAT BRAINSTORMING
WITH THE PAO HAD ADDED ELEMENTS, I CITED NOTIONS OF:

-- KHARTOUM MEDIA ACCESS FOR SPLM/A LEADER GARANG TO
MAKE HIS CASE;
-- OFFERING SUDANESE PASSPORTS TO MAJOR SPLM FIGURES IN
NAIROBI, CAIRO, LONDON;
-- A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT BASHIR RECOGNIZING
THE DAMAGE DONE, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH, BY THE CIVIL
WAR AND THAT SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES ARE REAL AND MUST BE
SATISFIED.

THE SECOND CATEGORY MAINLY FOCUSES ON RELIEF EFFORTS BY
THE UN OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (UN/OLS). KHARTOUM
COULD:

-- LIFT PROHIBITIONS ON FLIGHT TO 16 DESTINATIONS BY
OLS AND TO 12 DESTINATIONS BY ICRC;

-- PERMIT OPERATION OVER SUDAN OF THE BELGIAN AIR
FORCE-PROVIDED C-130, PROHIBITED FROM SUDANESE AIRSPACE
SINCE MID-1995;

-- OPEN THE CONTROVERSIAL NUBA MOUNTAIN AREA TO OLS
OPERATIONS, STARTING WITH AN ASSESSMENT MISSION AS
EARLY AS THE END OF MAY;

-- CREATE, SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION WITH THE UN, A MIXED
GOS/SSIM/SPLA SECURITY ELEMENT FOR UN BARGE CONVOYS TO
PREVENT ANY LOOTING AS WELL AS TO ENSURE ONLY FOOD AND
RELIEF ITEMS ARE DELIVERED TO DESTINATIONS ALONG THE
NILE.

TAHA TOOK THE AMBASSADOR'S LIST OF POSSIBLE GESTURES,
SAYING THAT HE WOULD LOOK AT THE IDEAS WITH MILITARY
AND SECURITY STAFF, BUT SOME SEEM IMMEDIATELY
ACCEPTABLE.


7. (C) CONCLUDING THIS ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSION, THE
MINISTER ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE CONVEYED
TO THE SPLM. ANY SPLM IDEAS ON PEACE ARE WELCOME. THE
SPLA MUST BE PART OF ANY PROCESS FOR COMPREHENSIVE
PEACE. THE GOS HAS NO/NO HIDDEN AGENDA AND IS NOT/NOT
TRYING TO PLAY INSURGENT FACTIONS OFF AGAINST EACH
OTHER. TAHA BELIEVES THAT IF GARANG COMES IN, PEACE
WILL MATERIALIZE. THE GOS IS OPEN TO VENUE FOR TALKS
AND TO WHO WOULD BE PLAYERS IN ANY TALKS. I SAID I HAD
ASKED THE SPLM TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH GARANG ON MY
RETURN TO NAIROBI AND WOULD CONVEY TAHA'S MESSAGE,
STRESSING THAT KHARTOUM SHOULD MAKE GESTURES SOON,
PERHAPS TIMING SOME TO THE OPENING OF THE 20 MAY
NETHERLANDS CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN MATTERS WHICH IS
A FOLLOW-ON TO LAST SEPTEMBER'S BARCELONA GATHERING
UNDER THE UNESCO "CULTURE OF PEACE" RUBRIC.

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POLICY ON TERRORISM
--------------


8. (C) TAHA DISMISSED NOTETAKERS TO TALK ABOUT THE
PROCESS HE INITIATED DURING A 6 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH
THEN AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN AND MYSELF JUST BEFORE THE
U.S. DIPLOMATIC STAFF WITHDREW OFFSHORE. I TOLD HIM
WASHINGTON CONTINUES SKEPTICAL, ALL THE MORE SO GIVEN
THE FAILURE OF KHARTOUM TO TAKE VERIFIABLE STEPS ON THE
ISSUE OF ITS HAVEN AND SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS. CITING
THE PRESIDENT'S 30 APRIL CREDENTIALS PRESENTATION
REMARKS TO THE NEW SUDANESE AMBASSADOR, I UNDERSCORED
THAT ACTIONS ARE NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN DIALOGUE,
SAYING THAT A 45-90 DAY WINDOW IN TIME IS NOW OPEN
WITHIN WHICH THE GOS CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS
INTENTIONS ARE REAL.


9. (S) TAHA REPLIED THAT A DECISION TO FORCE
(TERRORIST) ORGANIZATIONS TO GO IS IN PROCESS. HE
REFERRED TO SPECIFICS CONCERNING EGYPTIAN TERRORISTS,
SEEMING TO CONFIRM DIPLOMATIC SOURCES WHO TOLD ME THAT
A LIST OF 39 EGYPTIANS HAVE GONE AT SUDANESE REQUEST.
I STRESSED THE NEED TO VERIFY SUCH MATTERS WITH
INFORMATION ON PASSPORTS AND DESTINATIONS.


10. (C) IN DISCUSSING SPECIFICS, TAHA RAISED THE CASE
OF RENEGADE SAUDI FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN. AN MFA
CONTACT HAD EARLIER TOLD ME THAT THE MFA WAS
INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING BIN LADEN TO ACCEPT A TIME
MAGAZINE INTERVIEW (PUBLISHED IN THE 6 MAY EDITION).
TAHA MUSED ABOUT GETTING THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS TO ENTER INTO CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AS
PART OF BRINGING THEM TO SEE MATTERS IN A DIFFERENT
WAY. HE RECALLED THE CASE OF THE FOUNDER OF THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD WHO HAD ENTERED INTO CONTACT WITH A BRITISH
GOVERNMENT ARABIST IN EGYPT IN THE 1940S. NASSER HAD
CITED THE CONTACT TO DISCREDIT THE BROTHERHOOD IN HIS
1954 CONFLICT WITH THE ORGANIZATION, TAHA SAID, NOTING
THAT THE HISTORY ECHOES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ISLAMIST
ORGANIZATIONS TO THIS DAY. HE MOOTED PUTTING USAMA BIN
LADEN IN CONTACT WITH WESTERN EMBASSIES. COMMENT:
WHILE I TOSSED MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, A FINE ARABIST,
OUT OF THE TROIKA, I BELIEVE WE WOULD DO BETTER TO WORK
ON GETTING BIN LADEN INTO SAUDI HANDS THAN COUNTING ON
HIM TO CHANGE HIS STRIPES THROUGH DIALOGUE WITH
WESTERNERS. END COMMENT

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REGION AND THE UNSCR
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11. (C) CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE INCREASINGLY
VOCIFEROUS NEW PARLIAMENT, TAHA BEGAN MORE OR LESS
THINKING OUT LOUD ON HOW TO DEAL WITH UNSCR 1054 AND
THE POOR STATE OF RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS ETHIOPIA AND
UGANDA. HE ARGUED THAT NOW IS NOT THE MOMENT FOR SUDAN
TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THEM AS SUCH AN EFFORT WAS
UNLIKELY TO BE WELL-RECEIVED. HE ASKED IF THE U.S.
COULD SOUND OUT POSSIBILITIES. I REBUFFED THE NOTION,
TELLING TAHA THAT SUDAN HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DO
SO, AND THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NOTABLY THE TERRORISM
DIMENSION, MEAN THAT KHARTOUM MUST WORK DIRECTLY WITH
ADDIS, PRIMARILY, ALL THE MORE SO AS IT APPEARS GAMES
HAVE BEEN PLAYED WITH THE THREE SUSPECTS, NOW SEEMINGLY
OUT OF SUDAN.

ASMARA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED


BRAZEAL