Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
96ISLAMABAD8053
1996-09-19 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING

Tags:  PGOV MOPS PREL AF IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 191241Z SEP 96
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2057
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
USIA WASHDC 5806
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BONN 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 
AMEMBASSY ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008053 

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, NEA/NGA, AND EUR/CEN; USIA FOR NEA;
LONDON FOR POL - TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL - ALLEGRONE; ROME
FOR POL - NDEMPSEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/19/06
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AF IR
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING
OPTIONS FOR SOROBI AND HAS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 8005; (B) ISLAMABAD 7971

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008053

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, NEA/NGA, AND EUR/CEN; USIA FOR NEA;
LONDON FOR POL - TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL - ALLEGRONE; ROME
FOR POL - NDEMPSEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/19/06
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AF IR
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING
OPTIONS FOR SOROBI AND HAS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 8005; (B) ISLAMABAD 7971


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR TOM PRICE.
REASON: 1.5 (D).

SUMMARY
--------------


2. (C) MULLAH ABDUL JALIL, THE TALIBAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN
AFFAIR'S ADVISER, TOLD POLOFF AND AARMA THAT VARIOUS
OPTIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR THE TALIBAN'S ATTACK ON
SOROBI. ACCORDING TO JALIL, RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM ARE
"WARM," BUT IRAN IS TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE. JALIL
ASSERTED THAT FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH IS NOT WELCOME IN
KANDAHAR. HE WARNED THE UN SPECIAL MISSION THAT IT
SHOULD NOT SET UP ITS MAIN OFFICE IN KABUL. END SUMMARY.

--------------
OPTIONS FOR SOROBI
--------------


3. (C) POLOFF AND AARMA MET WITH MULLAH ABDUL JALIL, THE
TALIBAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN AFFAIR'S ADVISER, AND COMMANDER
HAJI BASHIR, A MEMBER OF THE TALIBAN'S GREATER SHURA, ON
SEPTEMBER 18. MULLAH JALIL BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY
STATING THAT THE TALIBAN ARE CONSIDERING VARIOUS OPTIONS
ON HOW TO ATTACK SOROBI. SOROBI IS NOW UNDER SIEGE FROM
THE EAST AND THE SOUTH, HE CONTINUED, AND WILL BE UNDER
SIEGE FROM THE WEST SOON. HOWEVER, THE TALIBAN ARE
CAUTIOUS BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT THE KABUL REGIME HAS
FORTIFIED THE SOROBI AREA HEAVILY WITH TANKS AND
ARTILLERY, HE SAID. THUS, THE TALIBAN ARE TAKING THEIR
TIME TO DECIDE ON THEIR BATTLE PLANS. JALIL NOTED THAT
THE KEY TALIBAN DECISION-MAKERS WHO WILL DECIDE NEXT
STEPS ARE MILITARY COMMANDER BORJAN, AND POLITICAL
LEADERS MULLAH MOHAMMED RABBANI AND MULLAH ABDUL RAZAK.


4. (C) HAJI BASHIR, WHO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM
JALALABAD, SAID THAT THE TALIBAN HAD SEIZED AN IMMENSE
AMOUNT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES IN THEIR
TAKEOVER OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE
TALIBAN HAD CAPTURED OVER 150 TANKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS. ACCORDING TO HAJI BASHIR, THE SEIZURE OF THESE
ITEMS, AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION, MEANT THAT
TALIBAN SUPPLY LINES HAD BEEN SHORTENED, AND THEY DID NOT
NOW HAVE TO SEND FOR EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FROM
KANDAHAR. HE ADDED THAT JALALABAD AIRPORT IS IN GOOD

CONDITION; AN AN-32 FROM KANDAHAR ARRIVED THERE ON
SEPTEMBER 17. (NOTE: AS REPORTED SEPTEL, JALIL AND HAJI
BASHIR ALSO SAID TERRORIST TRAINING BASES IN PAKTIA
PROVINCE HAD BEEN CAPTURED, ALTHOUGH THE "ARAB" OCCUPANTS
OF THE CAMPS HAD FLED. THEY HAD NO IDEA OF THE
WHEREABOUTS OF SAUDI FINANCIER OSAMA BIN LADEN. END NOTE.)

--------------
RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM WARM...
--------------


5. (C) ASKED ABOUT PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTS THAT GENERAL
DOSTAM PLANS TO SEND 2,000 SOLDIERS TO KABUL TO DEFEND IT
AGAINST THE TALIBAN (REF B),JALIL WAS DISMISSIVE, AND
EMPHATIC THAT RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM ARE "WARM." HE SAID
HE DOUBTED THAT DOSTAM WOULD EVER ENTER INTO ANY
RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMANDER MASOOD, WHOM HE DOES NOT
TRUST. JALIL ALLOWED THAT THE TALIBAN WERE CLOSELY
SCRUTINIZING DOSTAM'S ACTIVITIES, BUT WERE CONVINCED AS
OF THIS POINT THAT HE HAD NO DESIRE TO TAKE ANY
"AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS" AGAINST THE TALIBAN.

--------------
BUT THE IRANIANS ARE STIRRING UP TROUBLE
--------------


6. (C) HOWEVER, JALIL EVINCED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE
IRANIANS WERE TRYING TO PUSH DOSTAM TOWARD AN
ANTI-TALIBAN ALLIANCE WITH THE KABUL REGIME. EXPANDING
ON THIS POINT, JALIL SAID THE TALIBAN KNEW THAT IRANIAN
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAHUDDIN BORUJERDI IS CURRENTLY
IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF ADVOCATING SUCH AN INITIATIVE (REF A).
HE DOUBTED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS
ENDEAVOUR, BUT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD KEEP TRYING.


7. (C) HAJI BASHIR RELATED THAT THE TALIBAN HAVE HAD
BORDER FLARE-UPS WITH THE IRANIANS IN THE LAST MONTH.
TWICE, HE ASSERTED, IRANIAN SOLDIERS HAVE ENTERED AFGHAN
TERRITORY AND PROCEEDED TO THE AFGHAN BORDER TOWN OF
ISLAM QALA, WHERE THEY ENCOUNTERED TALIBAN RESISTANCE.
IN ONE INCIDENT, HE RECOUNTED, SIX UNIFORMED IRANIAN
SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED WITHIN THE BORDERS OF
AFGHANISTAN. HAJI BASHIR SAID THE IRANIANS WERE LATER
RELEASED WHEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO PREVENT
SUCH INCIDENTS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE.
NONETHELESS, JALIL NOTED, TEHERAN RADIO'S PASHTU AND DARI
SERVICES CONTINUED TO PRESS AN ANTI-TALIBAN MESSAGE,
WHICH INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS THAT THE TALIBAN ARE WORKING
FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

--------------
ZAHIR SHAH IS NOT WELCOME
--------------


8. (C) JALIL SAID THAT THE TALIBAN DID NOT TAKE THE
SEPTEMBER 12 STATEMENT OF FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH THAT HE
WAS WILLING TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN VERY SERIOUSLY. FOR
ONE THING, HE SAID THE FORMER KING IS JUST TOO OLD. IN
ADDITION, NONE OF THE FACTIONS REALLY SUPPORTED THE
FORMER KING, ALTHOUGH SOME--LIKE DOSTAM--CLAIMED THAT
THEY DID. THE BASIC POINT, JALIL CONTINUED, IS THAT AS
FAR AS THE TALIBAN ARE CONCERNED THEY ALREADY HAVE A
LEADER, AMIR MOHAMMED OMAR, AND DO NOT NEED ANOTHER ONE.

--------------
UN SPECIAL MISSION SEEN AS WEAK
--------------


9. (C) JALIL WAS ALSO DISMISSIVE WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE UN
SPECIAL MISSION ON AFGHANISTAN (UNSMA). HE SAID THE NEW
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, DR, NORBERT HOLL, "KEPT PROMISING
SOLUTIONS TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT BUT FAILED TO PRODUCE
ANYTHING." JALIL WAS ADAMANT THAT THE TALIBAN "WANT TO
WORK WITH THE UNITED NATIONS," BUT SAID THEY SUSPECT THE
UN IS "PRO-KABUL" AND ANTI-TALIBAN. JALIL INVITED UNSMA
TO SET UP SHOP IN JALALABAD AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, NOTING
THAT THE SITUATION WAS "SAFE" THERE. HE WARNED UNSMA IN
THE STRONGEST TERMS NOT TO SET UP ITS AFGHAN HEADQUARTERS
IN KABUL IF IT WANTS TO MAINTAIN "A SPIRIT OF
COOPERATION" WITH THE TALIBAN. POLOFF AND AARMA TOLD
JALIL THAT IT WAS IN THE TALIBAN'S OWN BEST INTEREST TO
ENGAGE UNSMA IN A "COOPERATIVE SPIRIT" SINCE IT WAS
WORKING FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN. (COMMENT: RECENTLY
STEPHEN EVANS (PROTECT),ONE OF DR. HOLL'S ADVISERS,
OPINED TO POLOFF THAT KABUL WOULD BE THE ONLY LOGICAL
PLACE FOR UNSMA TO SET UP SHOP--"JALALABAD IS NO LONGER
NEUTRAL, SO ONLY THE CAPITAL REMAINS." END COMMENT.)

--------------
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
--------------


10. (C) JALIL CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE
TALIBAN HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES BASED ON
ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE DURING THE WAR
AGAINST THE SOVIETS. HE ADDED THAT THE TWO ALSO SHARED A
COMMON INTEREST IN HALTING IRANIAN "AGGRESSION," AND HE
URGED USG SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN NOW THAT THEY CONTROL
TWO-THIRDS OF AFGHANISTAN. POLOFF RESPONDED THAT THE USG
DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY OF THE FACTIONS, BUT RATHER SUPPORTS
THE FORMATION OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. IN THIS
SPIRIT, THE USG WANTS TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE TALIBAN
WHENEVER POSSIBLE, POLOFF NOTED.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) JALIL PROVIDED NO HINT THAT THE TALIBAN INTEND
TO WORK CLOSELY WITH UNSMA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN
ADDITION, JALIL APPEARED QUITE CERTAIN THAT THE TALIBAN
WOULD REJECT THE FORMER KING'S OFFER TO RETURN TO
AFGHANISTAN. THIS LEAVES ONLY A CONTINUATION OF WAR--AT
LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, AND JALIL PROVIDED EVERY SIGNAL
THAT THE TALIBAN ARE AIMING FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION TO
THE AFGHAN CONFLICT.


12. (C) IN THE WAKE OF THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY SUCCESSES,
JALIL'S REMARKS ALSO INDICATE GROWING TENSION BETWEEN
KANDAHAR AND TEHRAN. IF THE TALIBAN CARRY THEIR
OFFENSIVE CLOSER TO KABUL, THIS TENSION COULD GROW.


SIMONS