EL-SADIQ EL-MAHDI ON THE FUTURE OF SUDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 013851

DEPT FOR NEA/ENA AND AF/E
NAIROBI FOR AMBASSADOR CARNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/06
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC KISL SU EG
SUBJECT: EL-SADIQ EL-MAHDI ON THE FUTURE OF SUDAN

REF: STATE 262749



1. CLASSIFIED BY DCM VINCENT BATTLE, REASON 1.5 (D).
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

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SUMMARY
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2. DRAWING ON REFTEL TALKING POINTS, DCM MET WITH
EL-SADIQ EL-MAHDI IN CAIRO ON DECEMBER 30 TO DISCUSS
HIS FUTURE PLANS, SUDANESE OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, THE
POLITICAL SITUATION INSIDE SUDAN, AND HIS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
(NDA). MUBARAK EL-MAHDI AND THE HEADS OF THE UMMA
PARTY'S CAIRO AND ASMARA OFFICES WERE ALSO PRESENT.
DISCOUNTING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY VICTORY FOR
THE NDA, EL-MAHDI ASSERTED THAT A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN
OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE NIF, COMBINED WITH
ACTIVE, MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION, WAS THE
KEY TO BRINGING DOWN THE NIF GOVERNMENT WITH MINIMAL
VIOLENCE. HE ARGUED THAT SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD
DEMORALIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND DEEPEN EXTANT DIVISIONS
WITHIN THE NIF, WHILE ENCOURAGING OPPOSITION FORCES
INSIDE SUDAN. IN THIS REGARD, HE SUPPORTED OFFERING
A "SOFT LANDING" FOR NIF LEADERS, ANTICIPATING THAT
SUCH A PROPOSITION WOULD FURTHER PROMOTE DISSENSION
IN THE NIF RANKS.


3. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT MANY COUNTRIES, EGYPT
INCLUDED, WERE RELUCTANT TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH
THE NDA'S POLICY OF VIOLENT OPPOSITION TO THE
GOVERNMENT, HE OBSERVED THAT THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN
WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE SUDANESE OPPOSITION'S PLAN
TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. HE ARGUED THAT THE NIF
THROUGH ITS POLICY OF JIHAD WAS PROMOTING INSTABILITY
IN THE REGION, AND SUDAN'S NEIGHBORS MUST RESPOND.


4. REGARDING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, EL-MAHDI AVOWED
THAT INTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE CORE BELIEFS OF THE NIF
WAS ERODING, AND DEEP SCHISMS WERE DEVELOPING BETWEEN
ELEMENTS OF THE NIF. HE EXPECTED A POPULAR UPRISING
TO OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND PREDICTED SUPPORT
FOR SUCH AN UPRISING FROM THE ARMY AND POLICE FORCES,
CITING MANY RECENT EXAMPLES OF DISAFFECTION WITHIN
THE SECURITY FORCES TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT. ON HIS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDA, HE WAS EXTREMELY POSITIVE
ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN THE ASMARA
DECLARATION AND IMPRESSED WITH GARANG'S DEVELOPMENT
FROM A MILITARY LEADER INTO A GENUINE POLITICAL
PLAYER. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WITH THE
RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN KHARTOUM
WOULD ALSO COME PEACE AND NATIONAL UNITY. END
SUMMARY.


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SUDAN'S PROBLEMS HAVE BECOME THE WORLD'S CONCERN
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5. EL-MAHDI BEGAN HIS COMMENTS BY STATING THAT THE
CURRENT REGIME IN KHARTOUM HAS INTERNATIONALIZED THE
INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF SUDAN. BY SPONSORING AND
ENCOURAGING ORGANIZATIONS DEDICATED TO THE VIOLENT
OVERTHROW OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE ARAB
AND ISLAMIC WORLDS, THE NIF HAD THREATENED THE
STABILITY OF THESE COUNTRIES AND FORCED THE WORLD TO
BECOME INVOLVED. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE
UNACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRIES IN SUDAN'S NEIGHBORHOOD,
EGYPT AMONG THEM, TO SIT BACK AND DO NOTHING WHILE
THE NIF ENGAGED IN POLICIES OF JIHAD. HE REALIZED
THAT SOME COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT TO ASSOCIATE
THEMSELVES WITH THE MILITARY GOALS OF THE SUDANESE
OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, HE OBSERVED, THIS WAS NOT THE
ONLY PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THE OPPOSITION HOPED TO
INSTIGATE CHANGE.


6. REGARDING HIS OWN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NDA'S
POLICY OF VIOLENT OPPOSITION, EL-MAHDI NOTED THAT
VIOLENCE WAS "PART AND PARCEL OF THE REGIME'S OWN
INITIATIVES." IT WAS NATURAL, THEREFORE, THAT SOME
SUDANESE WILL MEET FIRE WITH FIRE. HE PREDICTED,
HOWEVER, THAT MILITARY OPPOSITION WOULD NOT SUCCEED
IN OVERTHROWING THE NIF GOVERNMENT ON ITS OWN. HE
ARGUED THAT ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT
ANTICIPATED THAT THIS WOULD COME ABOUT THROUGH A
SPONTANEOUS, NATIONAL UPRISING. SUCH AN UPRISING
WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE, DESPITE LARGE-SCALE
PURGES AND FORCED RETIREMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY AND
POLICE, THERE REMAINED A STRONG "NATIONAL CHARACTER"
WITHIN THESE FORCES WHICH OPPOSED THE NIF. THIS
"WILL DECIDE THE ISSUE IN FAVOR OF AN UPRISING."


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LOYALTY OF SECURITY FORCES
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7. WHEN ASKED TO CITE EXAMPLES OF THIS NATIONALIST
THREAD WITHIN THE ARMY AND POLICE, EL-MAHDI OBSERVED
THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SIX ARMY COUP ATTEMPTS IN THE
LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, REFLECTING AN OBVIOUS
UNEASINESS WITHIN THE ARMY REGARDING THE NIF.
FURTHERMORE, DURING INTERROGATION THE OFFICERS
INVOLVED REFUSED TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE
COUPS, OPENLY DEFYING THE REGIME AND DEMANDING
CHANGE. HE ALSO CORROBORATED OTHER REPORTS THAT THE
POLICE REFUSED TO INTERVENE DURING POPULAR
DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEPTEMBER, FORCING NIF MILITIAS TO
CRACK DOWN ON THE DEMONSTRATORS.


8. HE POINTED TO PERIODIC FORCED RETIREMENTS OF
POLICE AND SOLDIERS AS EVIDENCE OF INSECURITY WITHIN
THE REGIME REGARDING THE LOYALTY OF THESE FORCES.
FINALLY, HE RELATED AN ANECDOTE RECOUNTED BY THE
MESSENGER HE HAD ENTRUSTED TO DELIVER HIS FAREWELL
LETTERS OF CRITICISM TO GENERAL OMAR BASHIR AND HASAN
EL-TURABI. UPON RECEIVING THESE LETTERS FROM THE
MESSENGER, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF INQUIRED IF EL-
MAHDI HAD ESCAPED SAFELY. WHEN INFORMED THAT HE HAD,
THE CHIEF OF STAFF REPORTEDLY SAID "AL-HAMDUL'ILLAH
(PRAISE GOD)." EL-MAHDI ASSERTED THAT THESE WERE NOT
EXAMPLES OF AD HOC REACTIONS; RATHER, THERE WAS AN
ORGANIZED REPRESENTATION OF AN ANTI-NIF VIEW WITHIN
THE ARMY AND POLICE.


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INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THE KEY TO PEACEFUL CHANGE
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9. DURING EL-MAHDI'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DCM, HE
REPEATEDLY RETURNED TO THE LEITMOTIF THAT
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WAS INDUCING PSYCHIC CHANGE
WITHIN THE NIF GOVERNMENT. EVERY EVENT WHICH
HIGHLIGHTED THE FAILURE OF THE NIF REGIME OR SUPPORT
FOR THE SUDANESE PEOPLE VICE THE GOVERNMENT WAS
DECREASING THE MORALE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
INCREASING THAT OF THE OPPOSITION. THIS, IN TURN,
WAS EXACERBATING EXISTING SCHISMS WITHIN THE NIF
ESTABLISHMENT.


10. HE THEREFORE ENCOURAGED EXTERNAL PRESSURE OF
EVERY SORT ON THE REGIME. HE BELIEVED THESE
PRESSURES WOULD CREATE "THE CUMULATIVE AFFECT WE ARE
SEEKING," FURTHER DIVIDING THE GOVERNMENT AND
BRINGING IT CLOSER TO DISSOLUTION. EL-MAHDI
EMPHASIZED THAT THIS POLICY REPRESENTED THE GREATEST
HOPE FOR NON-VIOLENT CHANGE WITHIN SUDAN. IN
RESPONSE TO THE DCM'S INQUIRY ABOUT THE NATURE OF
PRESSURES OUTSIDERS COULD EXERT, HE CITED THE
HARDENING ATTITUDES OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND
PRESSURE FROM OTHERS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) TO RESTORE PEACE AND
DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN AS EXAMPLES OF SUCH CUMULATIVE
PRESSURE.


11. IN THIS REGARD, HE HOPED TO ENCOURAGE THE
PARTICIPATION OF ARAB STATES SURROUNDING SUDAN IN
THIS POLICY, SPECIFICALLY CITING EGYPT, LIBYA AND
SAUDI ARABIA. HE SUGGESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THEY
JOIN THE FRIENDS OF IGAD. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT ANY
LEADER AMONG THE IGAD MEMBERS COULD ORGANIZE A SUMMIT
TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF REGIONAL STABILITY AND FOCUS
A SPOTLIGHT ON SUDAN'S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES. HE
ALSO AGREED WITH THE DCM THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC
SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN WAS A POWERFUL TOOL FOR
BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SUDAN, NOTING THAT THE
MORE THE REGIME WAS ISOLATED AND PUNISHED FOR ITS
ACTIONS, THE MORE PRESSURE WILL ACCUMULATE. HE
STATED THAT HE INTENDS TO EXPRESS THESE VIEWS IN HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS.


12. FINALLY, HE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH THE LACK
OF INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE SUDANESE
OPPOSITION, CLAIMING THAT IT WAS AMONG THE LEAST WELL
FUNDED OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD. HE NOTED
THAT THERE IS A SENSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
THAT SUDAN HAS BEEN ISOLATED BY UNSC SANCTIONS AND
DIPLOMATIC CONDEMNATION. HE ARGUED THAT THIS IS
UNTRUE: SUDAN RECEIVED ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM MANY
PARTIES, INCLUDING IRAN, IRAQ, QATAR, AND WEALTHY
INDIVIDUAL ARABS (IN ADDITION TO OSAMA BIN LADEN) WHO
AGREE WITH ITS POLITICAL AGENDA. THIS SUPPORT CAN
ONLY BE NEUTRALIZED BY COMPARABLE SUPPORT TO THE
OPPOSITION.


13. THE DCM AGREED WITH THE NEED TO INFLUENCE THE
NIF BY EXERTING "CALIBRATED" PRESSURE. AT THE SAME
TIME, THE US MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN TO DISCUSS ITS BEHAVIOR BOTH AT
HOME AND ABROAD. EL-MAHDI ENCOURAGED THIS DIALOGUE,
NOTING THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY THE
ISSUES. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US POSITION WAS NOT
ANTI-ISLAMIC, NOR WERE WE SUPPORTING SOUTHERN
SECESSION. RATHER, THE US WAS CONCERNED WITH HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. HE ARGUED THAT THE NIF WAS
PRESENTING US POLICY IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT AND TWISTING
THE FACTS TO CLOUD THE ISSUES. EL-MAHDI ALSO
SUPPORTED WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS US EFFORTS TO
PROMOTE A "SOFT LANDING" FOR THE NIF, BELIEVING THAT
ENCOURAGING SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD FURTHER INCREASE
DISSENSION WITHIN NIF RANKS.


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IS THE NIF IMPLODING?
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14. REFERRING TO ALLEGED SCHISMS WITHIN THE NIF, THE
DCM INQUIRED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THESE SCHISMS AND
EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE DEVELOPING. EL-MAHDI STATED
THAT A DEEP DIVISION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN
PRAGMATISTS, WHO PERCEIVED THE FAILURE OF THE NIF
EXPERIMENT AND BELIEVED THAT THE NIF SHOULD
ACKNOWLEDGE THIS FAILURE; AND THE "DOCTRINAIRES," WHO
FEARED THAT ADMITTING ANY FAILURE WOULD DEMONSTRATE
WEAKNESS AND BRING DOWN THE REGIME.


15. HE CITED THE RECENT DEBATE OVER THE BUDGET AS AN
EXAMPLE OF THIS DIVISION. ROUGHLY ONE THIRD OF
CURRENT BUDGET OUTLAYS INVOLVE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR
"PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATIONS," WHICH ARE IN REALITY
NIF BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN FINANCING PRO-GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND ARE RIFE WITH
CORRUPTION. THE CURRENT MINISTER OF FINANCE, AN NIF
PRAGMATIST, REALIZED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT
FUNCTION WITH SUCH A BUDGET AND DEMANDED THAT THE
EXEMPTIONS BE ELIMINATED. A RAGING DEBATE ENSUED
WITH HARD-LINERS, WHO FEARED THAT ELIMINATING THE
EXEMPTIONS WOULD UNDERMINE THE REGIME. TO DATE THIS
ISSUE IS UNRESOLVED. SCHISMS HAD ALSO ERUPTED
REGARDING NORMALIZATION WITH EGYPT AND OTHER FRONT-
LINE STATES, AS WELL AS THE ROLE OF THE ARMY VICE THE
POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THESE
SCHISMS, SOME LEADERS WITHIN THE NIF HAD BEGUN TO
STATE OPENLY THAT SUDAN MUST EMBRACE POLITICAL
PLURALITY, NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBORS,
AND OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION. EL-MAHDI
STRESSED THAT THE MORE EXTERNAL PRESSURE WAS BROUGHT
TO BEAR, THE MORE THESE SCHISMS WOULD GROW.


16. TURNING AGAIN TO THE UNSC SANCTIONS, EL-MAHDI
STATED THAT, PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, HE HAD BEEN
ENCOURAGING THE GOVERNMENT TO COME UP WITH CREATIVE
WAYS TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF THE UN. HE ARGUED
THAT THE THREE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO ASSASSINATE
PRESIDENT MUBARAK WERE SYMPTOMS, NOT THE CAUSE OF
SUDAN'S PROBLEMS. RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THESE
INDIVIDUALS AND INSISTING THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER
INSIDE SUDAN, EL-MAHDI HAD ARGUED THAT THE GOS OFFER
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE UN DEMONSTRATING
THEIR COMMITMENT TO COMBATING TERRORISM AND
RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS. SUCH CBMS SHOULD INCLUDE
DISMANTLING THE TERRORISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND
DISCUSSING WHY THIS APPARATUS EXISTED.


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ARMY REFUSES TO ENGAGE NDA
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17. REFERRING TO REPORTS ON BBC RADIO ON 12/30 THAT
AN UPRISING HAD ERUPTED NEAR THE BORDER CITY OF
KASSALA, THE DCM REQUESTED FURTHER INFORMATION.
WHILE UNAWARE OF THE INCIDENT, MUBARAK EL-MAHDI BROKE
IN TO SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FOCUSING ITS
EFFORTS IN THIS AREA DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF NDA
FORCES INSIDE THE SUDANESE BORDER, AND HAD RECENTLY
SENT A BRIGADE TO OUST THE NDA FROM THE REGION. THE
BRIGADE HAD ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED GHOST MANEUVERS IN
THE AREA, REFUSING TO ENGAGE THE NDA WHILE REPORTING
TO KHARTOUM THAT THE OPPOSITION FORCES HAD RETREATED
INSIDE ERITREA. HE DID NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS A
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE EVENTS AND THE REPORTED
UNREST.


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TRAVEL PLANS: CAMPAIGN FOR SUPPORT
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18. TURNING TO HIS FUTURE PLANS, EL-MAHDI STATED
THAT HE HOPES TO TRAVEL SOON TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THEN
BACK TO ERITREA. IN THE NEAR TERM HE HOPED TO VISIT
OTHER FRONT-LINE STATES. ULTIMATELY, HE INTENDED TO
VISIT THE US (ONCE THE NEW CABINET WAS CONFIRMED AND
SWORN IN),THE UK, AND OTHER EU NATIONS TO ELICIT
MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION. NOTING THAT EL-
MAHDI HAD MENTIONED LIBYA AS A POSSIBLE SUPPORTER OF
THE OPPOSITION CAUSE, THE DCM QUESTIONED WHETHER
LIBYA COULD INDEED PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE. EL-MAHDI
AGREED THAT LIBYA HAD OF LATE BEEN MORE A HINDRANCE
THAN A HELP, OBSERVING THAT LIBYA HAD BEEN PROVIDING
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR THE NIF. HOWEVER, HE ALSO
OBSERVED THAT THE NIF HAD REPAID THE FAVOR BY
SUPPORTING RADICAL LIBYAN ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO
THE GOVERNMENT. HE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT LIBYA
WOULD ULTIMATELY ALIGN ITSELF WITH THE EGYPTIAN
POSITION, WHATEVER THAT TURNED OUT TO BE.


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RELATIONS WITH NDA, GARANG
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19. EL-MAHDI ASSERTED THAT THE ASMARA DECLARATION
WAS "ONE OF THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SUDANESE
OPPOSITION." THE FORMATION OF THE NDA REPRESENTED
TWO IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS: A) AGREEMENT BY ALL
PARTIES ON BASIC PRINCIPLES; AND, B) A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NORTHERN OPPOSITION AND THE
SPLM ON A FUTURE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN SUDAN. IN
THE LAST TWO UPRISINGS AGAINST DICTATORSHIPS IN
SUDAN, IN 1964 AND 1985, THE REGIMES WERE TOPPLED BUT
THE CIVIL WAR CONTINUED. EL-MAHDI EXPRESSED OPTIMISM
THAT, BASED ON THIS ALLIANCE, FOR THE FIRST TIME
SUDAN COULD SEE BOTH DEMOCRACY AND PEACE AT THE SAME
TIME.


20. AS FOR HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH JOHN GARANG, EL-
MAHDI NOTED THAT HE HAS ONLY MET GARANG TWICE, ONCE
IN 1986 AND AGAIN LAST WEEK. HE COMMENTED ON A
REMARKABLE EVOLUTION IN GARANG'S PERSONA IN THE
INTERIM PERIOD. WHILE IN 1986 GARANG WAS FOCUSED
SOLELY ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE, HE HAS BECOME
MULTIDIMENSIONAL, WITH A STRONG COMMAND OF THE
DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF HIS POSITION.


21. ASMARA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.


WALKER