Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
96ANKARA813
1996-01-24 16:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

REFAH'S GUL ANALYZES THE TURKISH ELECTIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KISL TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
null
 PTQ7856





 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7856

PAGE 01 ANKARA 00813 01 OF 04 241647Z 
ACTION EUR-01 

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 INL-01 OASY-00 DOEE-00 
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 ------------------12F129 241647Z /38 
P 241647Z JAN 96
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3419
INFO 39WG INCIRLIK AB TU//CC/CV//
USDOCO 6ATAF IZMIR TU//CV//
USDOCO LANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR TU//CV//
USMISSION USNATO 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 
AMCONSUL ADANA 
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT INCIRLIK AB TU//CC/CS/POLAD//
ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000813 

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ANKARA 00813 01 OF 04 241647Z
E.O. 12958: DECL:1/24/05
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL TU
SUBJECT: REFAH'S GUL ANALYZES THE TURKISH ELECTIONS

REF: A) ANKARA 742 (NOTAL) B) 95 ANKARA 12177 (NOTAL)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000813

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CONFIDENTIAL






CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ANKARA 00813 01 OF 04 241647Z
E.O. 12958: DECL:1/24/05
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL TU
SUBJECT: REFAH'S GUL ANALYZES THE TURKISH ELECTIONS

REF: A) ANKARA 742 (NOTAL) B) 95 ANKARA 12177 (NOTAL)


1. CLASSIFIED BY JAMES T. HEG, ACTING POLITICAL
COUNSELOR, EMBASSY ANKARA. REASON 1.5 (B).


2. SUMMARY: ON JANUARY 24, ACTING POLCOUNS AND POLOFF
CALLED ON ABDULLAH GUL, VICE-CHAIRMAN AND KAYSERI
PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY OF THE ISLAMIST REFAH (WELFARE)
PARTY, TO GET THE LATEST REFAH THINKING ON TURKISH
POLITICS. ACCORDING TO GUL:

--REFAH, WHICH WON THE DECEMBER 24 GENERAL ELECTIONS
WITH 21.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, COULD HAVE TALLIED 25-26
PERCENT. HE ATTRIBUTED THE DIFFERENCE TO SEVERAL
FACTORS, INCLUDING: THE LACK OF FEMALE CANDIDATES AND
OTHER POOR CANDIDATE CHOICES; RHETORICAL "EXAGGERATIONS"
THAT MAY HAVE SCARED OFF SOME VOTERS; AND "CLEVER"
MAINSTREAM MEDIA ATTACKS AGAINST REFAH.

--THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF THE (NOMINALLY SOCIALIST)
PRO-KURDISH PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY PARTY (HADEP) ALSO COST
REFAH SOME VOTES. NEVERTHELESS, HADEP'S RELATIVELY POOR
OVERALL SHOWING INDICATED THAT IT COULD NOT CAPTURE THE
HEARTS OF THE "CONSERVATIVE" KURDS, WHO REJECTED LEFTIST
POLITICAL NOSTRUMS.

--MANY OTHER PARTIES WOULD TRY TO ADOPT SOME OF REFAH'S
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, BUT LACK THE
IDEOLOGICALLY-MOTIVATED PARTY CADRE THAT MAKE REFAH'S
FAMOUS DOOR-TO-DOOR TACTICS SUCCESSFUL.

--MOST OF THE MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP) ORGANIZATION, AND
A SIZEABLE CHUNK OF TANSU CILLER'S TRUE PATH PARTY (DYP)
WOULD, ABSENT PRESSURE FROM THE PARTY LEADERSHIP, LEAN
TOWARD A PARTNERSHIP WITH REFAH. A DYP-ANAP PARTNERSHIP
WOULD ULTIMATELY PROVE UNWORKABLE; ANAP WOULD EVENTUALLY
REJECT THE INCREASINGLY STATIST DYP.

--REFAH'S "ADIL DUZEN" (JUST ORDER) PLATFORM CONTAINED
SOME "EXAGGERATIONS," BUT THE PARTY WAS SERIOUS ABOUT
ITS COMMITMENT TO APPLY ISLAMIC ETHICS TO THE ECONOMY.
REFAH'S "TRUE" POSITION ON TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EU
CUSTOMS UNION WAS SIMILAR TO ANAP'S: THEY WOULD SEEK TO
RENEGOTIATE SOME OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

--REFAH WAS AGAINST EXTENDING OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT,
WHICH CREATES A POWER VACUUM IN NORTHERN IRAQ THAT THE
SEPARATIST KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) EXPLOITS TO

TURKEY'S DETRIMENT. END SUMMARY

--------------
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
--------------


3. (C) IN A MEETING WITH ACTING POLCOUNS AND POLOFF
JANUARY 24, REFAH PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN ABDULLAH GUL SAID
THAT HE HAD EXPECTED REFAH TO WIN 25-26 PERCENT OF THE
VOTE IN THE DECEMBER 24 GENERAL ELECTIONS, RATHER THAN

THE 21.5 PERCENT IT ACTUALLY TALLIED. HE ATTRIBUTED THE
DIFFERENCE TO: THE LACK OF FEMALE CANDIDATES (HE
INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD BE REMEDIED NEXT TIME); THE
PRESENCE OF SOME UNCHARISMATIC OLD-TIMERS ON THE REFAH
CANDIDATE SLATE; "EXAGGERATED" RHETORIC INTENDED TO
CLEARLY DISTINGUISH REFAH FROM THE PACK AND ENERGIZE THE
PARTY CADRE, BUT WHICH MAY HAVE ALIENATED SOME VOTERS;
AND MORE "CLEVER AND INDIRECT" MAINSTREAM MEDIA ATTACKS
AGAINST THE PARTY. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT
PARTIES, WITH THEIR ACCESS TO PUBLIC COFFERS, HAD A
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE REST. TO ILLUSTRATE HIS
POINT, HE CITED FORMER FINANCE MINISTER AYVAS GOKDEMIR,
WHO GUL AND PROVINCIAL NEWSPAPERS CLAIMED WON A SEAT
FROM KAYSERI ON THE DYP TICKET BY LITERALLY BUYING VOTES
WITH PUBLIC CASH.


4. (C) ACCORDING TO GUL, THE CHANGES IN THE ELECTORAL
LAWS BEFORE THE ELECTION HURT REFAH. IN KAYSERI, HE
SAID, REFAH WON 34 PERCENT AND FOUR SEATS IN PARLIAMENT
TO THE 14 PERCENT EACH FOR THE MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP)
AND TANSU CILLER'S TRUE PATH PARTY (DYP). HAD
PROVINCIAL BARRAGES NOT BEEN ABANDONED ALTOGETHER BEFORE
THE ELECTIONS AT THE BEHEST OF THE DYP-LED GOVERNMENT --
WHICH HAD INITIALLY SOUGHT A 15 PERCENT BARRIER -- REFAH
WOULD HAVE SWEPT KAYSERI. GUL NOTED THAT THE BARRAGES
WERE NOT "JUST," BUT EXPRESSED AMUSEMENT AT THE PREVIOUS
GOVERNMENT'S SUDDEN SEARCH FOR EQUITY IN THE FACE OF A
REFAH CHALLENGE.

--------------
THE HADEP FACTOR: THANK GOD THEY'RE LEFTISTS
--------------


5. (C) GUL NOTED THAT THE ENTRY OF THE PRO-KURDISH
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY PARTY (HADEP) INTO THE RACE COST
REFAH SOME SUPPORT IN DIYARBAKIR AND ELSEWHERE, BUT
CLAIMED THAT REFAH'S MISTAKES HELPED CONTRIBUTE TO
HADEP'S SUCCESS IN SOME REGIONS. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT
THE PROVINCIAL REFAH ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST
"WERE RIGHT" TO PROTEST THE REFAH LEADERSHIP'S DECISION
TO RUN RELATIVE NON-ENTITIES AGAINST POPULAR LOCALS.
REFAH, HE SAID, HAD STUMBLED BADLY BY DECIDING AT THE
LAST MINUTE TO DROP A POPULAR KURDISH IMAM FROM THE
DIYARBAKIR SLATE, INDICATING THAT THE PROSPECTIVE
CANDIDATE'S AGGRESSIVELY ACTIVIST STANCE CAUSED SOME
UNEASE AMONG THE PARTY BRASS. HE ASSERTED, HOWEVER,
THAT MOST IF NOT ALL OF REFAH'S EASTERN DEPUTIES WERE
KURDS.


6. (C) THAT HADEP SECURED ONLY 4.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTE
(AND THUS FAILED TO GET OVER THE NATIONAL 10 PERCENT
BARRAGE AND ENTER PARLIAMENT),SAID GUL, INDICATED THAT
HADEP "DOES NOT HAVE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE KURDS." HE
POINTED OUT THAT MOST KURDS NOW LIVED IN WESTERN TURKEY,
WHERE HADEP RECEIVED NEGLIGIBLE SUPPORT. WITH EVIDENT
RESPECT, GUL OFFERED THAT HADEP'S LEADERS HAD INDEED
FOUGHT FOR THE KURDISH CAUSE. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER,
THAT "NONE OF THEM REALLY LIVED LIKE KURDS." THE HADEP
LEADERSHIP'S ROOTS EXTEND BACK TO THE FAR LEFT OF THE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM, WHEREAS THEIR KURDISH CONSTITUENTS
WERE "THE MOST CONSERVATIVE (READ, TRADITIONAL AND
RELIGIOUS) PEOPLE IN TURKEY." GUL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
HADEP RAN IMAMS ON ITS TICKET IN SIIRT PROVINCE, AND WAS
SUPPORTED BY NAKSHIBENDI SHAYKH ABDULMELIK FIRAT (NOTE:
FIRAT WAS RECENTLY ARRESTED AMIDST MUCH PUBLIC OUTCRY
FOR ALLEGEDLY SHELTERING A KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY
MEMBER - PKK - IN 1992. HE IS THE GRANDSON OF SHAYKH
SAIT, WHO LED THE FIRST KURDISH REBELLION AGAINST
ATATURK IN THE 1920S. BEFORE HIS ARREST, PRESS REPORTS
INDICATED THAT FIRAT WAS TRYING TO FORM A NEW POLITICAL
PARTY WITH ISLAMIST INTELLECTUAL AND FORMER REFAH
DEPUTY HASAN MESARCI. END NOTE). GUL SAID, HOWEVER,
THAT HADEP'S TACTICS -- ABSENT A REAL "STRATEGIC" CHANGE
OF HEART -- WERE LARGELY "UNCONVINCING" TO RELIGIOUS
KURDS; PKK LEADER OCALAN, GUL NOTED, ROUTINELY
CONGRATULATED KURDS WHO COMPLETED A "HAJ" -- PILGRIMAGE
-- TO MECCA. HE SUGGESTED THAT HADEP COULD HAVE DONE
BETTER IF IT HAD BEGUN ON THE "CONSERVATIVE" SIDE;
"WE'RE THANKFUL", HE ADDED, "THAT THEY DIDN'T."


--------------
OFTEN IMITATED, NEVER DUPLICATED
--------------


7. (C) GUL SAID THAT, DUE TO REFAH'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN
1994 AND 1995, OTHER PARTIES WERE TRYING TO EMULATE
REFAH'S NOW-FAMOUS ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS, BUT WERE
UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED. "WE," HE SAID, "HAVE TRUE
BELIEVERS" IN THE RANKS WHO WERE WILLING TO DO THE
DAY-TO-DAY CANVASSING AND OTHER POLITICAL WORK FOR
NOTHING IN RETURN. GUL SAID THAT ANAP DEPUTY VEHBI
DINCERLER AND CENTER-LEFT REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY
(CHP) DEPUTY ISMAIL CEM HAD TOLD HIM THAT NOT ONLY DID
THEIR PARTIES LACK AN IDEOLOGICALLY-MOTIVATED CADRE,
PARTY MORALE WAS SO LOW THAT POLITICIANS HAD TO PAY
PEOPLE TO WORK THE LOUDSPEAKERS AND "EVEN TO SIT WITH
THE CANDIDATES" ON CAMPAIGN BUSES. ON THE OTHER HAND,
HE SAID, REFAH SUPPORTERS DID NOT EXPECT SUCH LARGESSE
FROM THE PARTY. GUL POINTED TO THE FACT THAT THE
REFAH-CONTROLLED PAYROLL IN ISTANBUL HAD ACTUALLY
DECREASED FROM 44,000 TO 38,000 EMPLOYEES DURING REFAH
MAYOR RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN'S TENURE; ANKARA HAD
WITNESSED A SIMILAR DECLINE IN THE MUNICIPAL WORKFORCE
UNDER REFAH MAYOR MELIH GOKCEK. DESPITE THIS, REFAH DID
WELL IN BOTH CITIES.

--------------
COALITION-BUILDING
--------------


8. (C) DURING THE CAMPAIGN, GUL SAID, PARTIES HAD A
"DUTY TO SHOW THEIR REAL FACE TO THE PUBLIC." A NEW
REALITY NOW CONFRONTED REFAH, HOWEVER. THE PARTY, HE
SAID, HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS WILLING TO COMPROMISE
-- IT WAS NOW UP TO OTHERS TO DO THE SAME. THE GREAT
MAJORITY OF ANAP'S PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS -- SOME 80
PERCENT OF THE PARTY CADRE, HE ASSERTED -- AND ABOUT
HALF OF DYP, WANTED A PARTNERSHIP WITH REFAH. ABSENT
PRESSURE FROM "MONARCHICAL" PARTY LEADERS, ABOUT 60
PERCENT OF ANAP AND 40 PERCENT OF DYP DEPUTIES WOULD
LEAN TOWARD REFAH, GUL ASSERTED.


9. (C) "ANAYOL" (AN ANAP-DYP PARTNERSHIP) WON'T WORK,"
GUL PREDICTED; ANAP WOULD EVENTUALLY REJECT DYP, WHICH
AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS HAD BECOME MORE OF A
STATIST PARTY. HE ETCHED A PARALLEL WITH THE 1950'S,
WHEN THE STATIST CHP FOUGHT IT OUT WITH ADNAN MENDERES'
OLD DEMOCRAT PARTY (DP). DYP, LIKE THE CHP OF THAT ERA,
DREW ITS CANDIDATES FROM THE STATE BUREAUCRACIES, THE
POLICE, AND THE MILITARY. LIKE THE OLD "ELITIST" CHP,
DYP FELT "ASHAMED" OF THE ACTUAL, LIVE VOTERS IT HOPED
TO ENLIGHTEN THROUGH WESTERNIZATION. MEANWHILE REFAH,
GUL SAID, OWED ITS ELECTORAL SUCCESSES TO A POPULIST
PLATFORM WHICH PROMOTED SUPPORT FOR ISLAM. HE OBSERVED
THAT THE GROWING MAINSTREAM FLIRTATION WITH RELIGIOUS
VALUES REPRESENTED THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY'S "TRUE
FACE." THIS HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT WAS LONG OVERDUE;
CONTINUED STATE PRESSURE AGAINST THE EXPRESSION OF
RELIGIOUS POLITICAL SENTIMENTS WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR
TURKISH STABILITY, GUL ASSERTED.

--------------
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
--------------


10. (C) GUL SAID THAT "ADIL DUZEN" (THE PARTY'S "JUST
ORDER" PLATFORM) WAS LARGELY "PROPAGANDA" THAT FEATURED
TOO MANY OF REFAH LEADER ERBAKAN'S "EXAGGERATIONS."
NEVERTHELESS, REFAH WAS SERIOUS ABOUT ITS COMMITMENT TO
ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES. GUL SAID FOR EXAMPLE THAT MOST
TURKISH CITIZENS ("MYSELF INCLUDED") FOR RELIGIOUS
REASONS WOULD PREFER AN ALTERNATIVE TO LENDING MONEY AT
INTEREST. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT AL BARAKA TURK AND
OTHER PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT USED ISLAMIC
RISK-SHARING SCHEMES IN LIEU OF INTEREST WERE IN FACT
PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM ACTUALLY FULLY IMPLEMENTING THESE
PROGRAMS. THE STATE, GUL LAMENTED, WORRIED THAT SUCH
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES WERE DANGERS TO SECULARISM;
REFAH SAW THEM AS "JUST BUSINESS." (COMMENT: AL BARAKA
TURK'S ANKARA BRANCH DIRECTOR OSMAN KARA RECENTLY
COMPLAINED TO POLOFF THAT EXISTING LAW DID NOT ALLOW
SUCH PRIVATE FIRMS TO MAKE INVESTMENTS ALONG THE LINES
OF STATE BANKS. END COMMENT).

--------------
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
--------------


11. (C) GUL ALSO NOTED THAT ERBAKAN'S OPPOSITION TO
TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION WAS
SIMILARLY "EXAGGERATED" FOR CAMPAIGN PURPOSES. (NOTE:
ERBAKAN PUBLICLY CALLED THE CU "A UNION OF INFIDELS" IN
THE DAYS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RATIFIED
TURKEY'S ENTRY. END NOTE). REFAH'S "TRUE" POSITION, AS
GUL HAD STATED PUBLICLY IN EARLY DECEMBER, WAS SIMILAR
TO ANAP'S. REFAH WOULD SUPPORT ENTRY INTO THE CUSTOMS
UNION, BUT WOULD SEEK TO RENEGOTIATE SOME OF THE TERMS
(PARTICULARLY, THOSE WHICH DEALT WITH TARIFF AND OTHER
TRADE RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES). HE ALSO
REITERATED HIS VIEW (REPORTED REFTEL) THAT REFAH'S
MISGIVINGS ABOUT A TURKISH LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
EVENT OF FULL EU MEMBERSHIP WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE HELD
BY DENMARK AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. GUL
ADDED THAT REFAH WAS NOT OPPOSED TO TIES WITH THE U.S.
AND EUROPE. HE REMARKED THAT THE TYPICAL REFAH MEMBER
HAD SPENT MUCH MORE TIME IN EUROPE THAN IN OTHER ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES.


12. (C) TURNING TO OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT (PC II),
GUL SAID REFAH DID NOT WISH TO SEE SECULAR STATIST
GOVERNMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; HE OBSERVED THAT SADDAM
IN IRAQ AND ASSAD IN SYRIA WERE BOTH BAATHISTS, NOT
MUSLIMS. REFAH, HE OBSERVED, HAD ALWAYS OPPOSED PC II,
WHICH HE SAID CREATED A POWER VACUUM IN THE NORTH AND
FUELED TURKEY'S PROBLEMS WITH THE PKK.

--------------
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME...
--------------


13. (C) COMMENT: GUL (WHOSE NAME MEANS "ROSE" IN
TURKISH) IS THE PARTY OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR PUTTING
THE BEST POSSIBLE SPIN ON THE IMAGE THAT ERBAKAN WOULD
LIKE TO PRESENT TO WESTERNERS -- THAT IS, THAT REFAH IS
AN ISLAMIC VERSION OF EUROPE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS.
MANY OF HIS REMARKS STRESSED THE REFAH PARTY'S ROOTS IN
MAINSTREAM TURKISH POLITICS GOING BACK TO THE 1950S. HE
IS A THOUGHTFUL, CANDID OBSERVER AND APPARENTLY SINCERE
BELIEVER IN THE ISLAMIST MESSAGE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS
THAT GUL, EVEN AT A RELATIVELY YOUNG AGE AND LEVEL OF
EXPERIENCE (HE WAS FIRST ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1991)
IS ATTEMPTING TO BUILD UP A FIEFDOM WITHIN REFAH BASED
ON THE SUPPORT OF OTHER YOUNG, LIKE-MINDED DEPUTIES AND
OTHER OFFICIALS. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO WATCH HOW
(AND TO WHAT EXTENT HE IS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY) HE HELPS
MANAGE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RELATIVELY WORLDLY PARTY
MEMBERS WHO WANT TO REACH A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE WEST,
AND THE MORE RADICAL AND CONFRONTATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN
REFAH.

GROSSMAN