Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
95ZAGREB4931
1995-12-05 15:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL

Tags:  NOTAG HR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931 

SIPDIS


USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00
TAGS:
SUBJECT: CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL
JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

REF: SARAJEVO 886

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931

SIPDIS


USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00
TAGS:
SUBJECT: CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL
JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

REF: SARAJEVO 886


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY PETER W. GALBRAITH, AMBASSADOR,
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PAGE 02 ZAGREB 04931 01 OF 02 051623Z
REASON 1.5(B) AND (D) .


2. (C) SUMMARY: ON DECEMBER 2 A 30-MEMBER CODEL LED BY
REPRESENTATIVES MOLINARI AND LEVIN VISITED ZAGREB TO
DISCUSS U.S. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR DEPLOYMENT IN BOSNIA.
THE CODEL MET WITH SRSG KOFI ANNAN AND GENERAL JANVIER,
AND LATER WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN. JANVIER SAID THE "THE
WAR IS OVER" AND THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED,
THOUGH FIGHTING CONTINUED AND CASUALTIES MUST BE EXPECTED.
ANNAN AND TUDJMAN DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.
PARTICIPATION. BOTH SAID SEPARATELY THAT WHILE DANGERS
EXIST, NEITHER BELIEVES NATO WILL BECOME ENGAGED IN
RENEWED WARFARE BECAUSE THE SITUATION HAS FUNDAMENTALLY
CHANGED SINCE ALL SIDES HAVE SIGNED ON TO A PEACE
AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

--------------
CODEL MOLINARI MEETS ANNAN AND JANVIER
--------------


3. (C) IN A MEETING AT UN PROTECTION FORCE (UNPF)
HEADQUARTERS, SRSG KOFI ANNAN GAVE AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE
OF PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACE IMPLEMENTATION. HE ARGUED
STRONGLY THAT THE UN HAS LAID A SOLID GROUNDWORK FOR THE
IMPLEMENTING FORCE FOR BOSNIA. GENERAL JANVIER DESCRIBED
THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD
NOT BEEN A COMPLETE HALT TO THE FIGHTING, BUT CURRENTLY
THE UN ENJOYED FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN MOST AREAS OF
BOSNIA, PARTICULARLY IN SARAJEVO.


4. (C) THE REPRESENTATIVES ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH
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PAGE 03 ZAGREB 04931 01 OF 02 051623Z
CONTINGENT WOULD BE UNDER NATO COMMAND AND EXPRESSED
CONCERN OVER COMMENTS BY FRENCH GENERAL BACHELET CRITICAL
OF THE U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATING THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
(REF). ANNAN ASSURED THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE WAS
NO DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF
NATO. HE SAID THAT GENERAL BACHELET'S COMMENTS WERE
UNFORTUNATE AND MARRED HIS OTHERWISE OUTSTANDING RECORD
(AS THE GENERAL WHO LIFTED THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO).
GENERAL JANVIER SAID BACHELET'S COMMENTS WERE HIS OFF-THE-
RECORD PERSONAL OPINIONS AND DID NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF
EITHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY.


5. (C) REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF IFOR AND THE
TRANSITION FROM UN TO NATO CONTROL, ANNAN TOLD THE CODEL
THAT THE ENTIRE UN MILITARY COMMAND WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND
ALL COMMAND FUNCTIONS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO NATO. THE
ONLY REMAINING UN INVOLVEMENT IN BIH WOULD BE HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING WITH AN INTERNATIONAL
POLICE TASK FORCE, AND SUPPORT FOR THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
WHO WILL CONTROL CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES.

--------------
JANVIER: THE WAR IS OVER
--------------


6. (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE CODEL'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE
POTENTIAL FOR U.S. TROOPS GETTING CAUGHT IN RENEWED
WARFARE, ANNAN SAID THAT THE UN HAD RIDDEN OUT THE MOST
DANGEROUS PERIOD AND THAT WHILE THERE WERE STILL PERILS,
NATO TROOPS WOULD FACE A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT
SITUATION; THERE WAS NOW AGREEMENT BY ALL SIDES TO A PEACE
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PAGE 04 ZAGREB 04931 01 OF 02 051623Z
AGREEMENT. JANVIER SAID "THE WAR WAS OVER," HOWEVER THE
FIGHTING IS NOT. BIH WAS STILL DANGEROUS AND THAT MEANT
THERE WOULD BE LOSSES WHICH TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS
MUST ACCEPT. JANVIER EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THERE
WOULD BE NO LARGE SCALE COMBAT BECAUSE NATO FORCES WOULD
BE A DETERRENT TO ANY GROUP TRYING TO START A FIGHT.
HOWEVER, HE WARNED, THERE WOULD BE INCIDENTS AND
RESISTANCE BY SOME ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES AS THEY WITHDREW
FROM AREAS CURRENTLY UNDER THEIR CONTROL.


7. (C) THE CODEL ASKED HOW MUCH CONTROL MILOSEVIC COULD
BE EXPECTED TO EXERT OVER THE BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY CHAIN
OF COMMAND. ANNAN ASSURED THEM THAT MILOSEVIC HAD
SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE, BUT THAT SINCE BOSNIA WAS ENTERING
A PERIOD OF PEACE, MILOSEVIC MUST COMMENT CAUTIOUSLY IN
ORDER TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM WAR CRIMINALS.


8. (C) THE CODEL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF
GENERAL MLADIC AND WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM. JANVIER OPINED












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NNNNPTQ7823





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PAGE 01 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z
ACTION H-06

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 DS-00 EUR-01 TEDE-00 IO-00 ADS-00
OIC-02 SS-00 DSCC-00 /009W
-------------- 05F285 051623Z /38
O 051535Z DEC 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8251
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECPOLAD//
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
DIA WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931

SIPDIS


USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00
TAGS:
SUBJECT: CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL
JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

THAT MLADIC'S DEPUTY GENERAL GERO IS A LIKELY CANDIDATE,
BUT IS LARGELY AN UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, GERO HAD ACCEPTED THE
DAYTON ACCORD. REPRESENTATIVES ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN
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PAGE 02 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z
ABOUT THE MUJAHADEEN AND THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS.
ANNAN SAID THAT THERE WERE ONLY AN ESTIMATED 700 PRESENT
IN BIH, INTEGRATED INTO BOSNIAK UNITS. HE SAID IT WAS THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOBH TO GET THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY
IN THE ONE MONTH SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT.

--------------
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN
--------------


9. (C) WITH HIS TYPICAL HISTORICAL SWEEP, PRESIDENT
TUDJMAN TOLD THE CODEL THAT THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WAS THE CLASH OF WESTERN, EASTERN, AND
MUSLIM CIVILIZATIONS. THE UNEQUAL BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG
THEM WAS THE REASON FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT
NOW A NEW BALANCE WAS BRINGING AN END TO THE WAR AND THE
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA. AT
DAYTON, HE SAID, IT WAS OBVIOUS THE SERBS WANTED AN
AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY KNEW THERE WAS NO CHANCE TO WIN IF
THE WAR CONTINUED. TUDJMAN ANSWERED CONCERNS ABOUT THE
DANGER TO U.S. FORCES BY SAYING THAT WHILE SPORADIC
FIGHTING IS LIKELY, THE SERBS' DESIRE FOR A SOLUTION WOULD
TRANSLATE INTO NO SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION TO IFOR.


10. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE FORCE, TUDJMAN
RESPONDED THAT A LARGE FORCE WAS NOT NEEDED IN EASTERN
SLAVONIA (ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED U.S. PARTICIPATION AT THE
HEAD OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION),BECAUSE THE
SERBS HAVE AGREED TO REINTEGRATION. BOSNIA REQUIRED A
LARGE PRESENCE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE DEEP DIVIDE
BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND SERBS. WITHOUT A LARGE FORCE, NEITHER
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PAGE 03 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z
SIDE WOULD LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS. HE SAID THAT UNDER
CURRENT CONDITIONS THE 5:2:2 ARMS RATIO (FRY:CROATIA:B-H)
WAS ACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER, A DIFFERENT RATIO MIGHT BE
NECESSARY LATER.


11. (C) CODEL MEMBERS ASKED TUDJMAN ABOUT THE MUJAHADEEN
PRESENCE AND IF THE GOC WOULD ASSIST IN THEIR
IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL. TUDJMAN SAID IT WAS NOT KNOWN
HOW MANY ARE PRESENT IN BOSNIA, PERHAPS 3-4,000. HE HAD
LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE SINCE THEY
COMMANDED LITTLE TRUST ON THE PART OF LOCAL MUSLIMS. HE
OPINED THAT THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE OVERWHELMING FORCE
OF IFOR. DEFENSE MINISTER SUSAK ADDED THAT THE GOC WOULD
"HELP THE MUJAHADEEN LEAVE."


12. (C) TUDJMAN SAID THAT THE GOC WOULD COOPERATE WITH
THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL AS LONG AS THE PROCEEDINGS
REMAINED UNBIASED. HE ASSURED THE CODEL THAT THE GOC
WOULD EXERT LEVERAGE OVER THE BOSNIAN CROATS TO STOP
LOOTING AND BURNING IN AREAS THAT ARE DUE TO BE RETURNED
TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS. HE ADDED THAT TENSIONS IN BIH ARE
COMPLEX AND THAT ALTHOUGH ISOLATED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
CONTINUE, THE BOSNIAKS AND CROATS HAD SUCCEEDED IN
PREVENTING WIDER CONFLICT THROUGH THE FEDERATION.


13. (C) WHEN ASKED WHY THE U.S. SHOULD PARTICIPATE ON THE
GROUND AND NOT JUST PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND AIR
POWER, TUDJMAN SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS THE LAST REMAINING
SUPERPOWER AND MUST BE THE FOUNDATION FOR A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION; THAT IS A ROLE THAT CANNOT BE ESCAPED. THE
TROUBLES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN
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PAGE 04 ZAGREB 04931 02 OF 02 051623Z
ISSUE, BUT EUROPE HAD NO POLITICAL UNITY AND COULD NOT
DEAL WITH SUCH A COMPLEX ISSUE AS BOSNIA.


14. (U) CODEL MOLINARI DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE PRIOR
TO DEPARTURE FROM ZAGREB ON DECEMBER 3.


15. (U) SARAJEVO -- MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

GALBRAITH






















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