(S)ELECTING A LEBANESE PRESIDENT IN 1995: A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 005863


PARIS FOR ALLEGRONE; LONDON FOR TUELLER
ROME PLEASE PASS TO VATICAN

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PHUM KISL KPRP LE
SUBJECT: (S)ELECTING A LEBANESE PRESIDENT IN 1995: A
CURTAIN-RAISER


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: VIRTUALLY EVERY PROMINENT MARONITE POLITICAN
IN LEBANON (AND IN PARIS) HOPES TO SUCCEED PRESIDENT
HRAWI, WHOSE TERM IS SET TO EXPIRE IN NOVEMBER 1995.
FURIOUS JOCKEYING HAS BEGUN, AND A DIZZYING ARRAY OF
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS EXISTS, BEGINNING WITH AN EXTENSION OF
HRAWI'S TERM. THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS WIDELY
VIEWED AS A KEY DETERMINING FACTOR. THE LEBANESE
HISTORICAL REFLEX TO SEEK FOREIGN BACKERS WILL MARK THE
1995 PROCESS: SYRIA WILL BE THE MAIN PLAYER, BUT
CANDIDATES ARE ALSO SEEKING U.S., FRENCH, SAUDI, AND
VATICAN SUPPORT. AS OF NOW, HRAWI, LAF COMMANDER EMILE
LAHOUD, AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. NASSIB LAHOUD
ARE THE FRONT-RUNNERS. THE PRINCIPAL USG INTEREST SHOULD
BE IN URGING THE SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT WITH
ACROSS-THE-BOARD CREDIBILITY, BUT IN PARTICULAR WHO CAN
HELP STEER THE MARONITES TOWARD POSITIVE PARTICIPATION IN
FORMAL POLITICAL LIFE. SEPTEL REPORT WILL "HANDICAP" THE
MOST PROMINENT CONTENDERS. END SUMMARY.

A PRESIDENT IN EVERY MARONITE'S MIRROR
--------------


3. THE SIX-YEAR TERM OF ILYAS HRAWI IS SLATED TO EXPIRE
IN NOVEMBER 1995, AT WHICH TIME PARLIAMENT WILL SELECT A
SUCCESSOR. SHI'I NABIH BERRI AND SUNNI RAFIQ HARIRI BOTH
HOPE ONE DAY TO BE THE FIRST MUSLIM PRESIDENT OF LEBANON,
BUT NOBODY PREDICTS THAT THE NEXT PRESIDENT WILL BE
ANYTHING OTHER THAN A MARONITE.


4. THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF WOULD-BE SUCCESSORS IN THE
MARONITE COMMUNITY. AT A RECENT SOCIAL EVENT FOR
PARLIAMENTARIANS, A DRUZE MP ILLUSTRATED THE POINT WHEN HE
TOASTED "TO THE NEXT PRESIDENT IN OUR MIDST--ALL SIX OF
THEM." THE LIST OF MARONITE "WANNABES" BRIDGES THE GAP
BETWEEN THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND
THOSE WHO BOYCOTTED THE PROCESS, AND RUNS THE SPECTRUM
FROM VIRULENT ANTI-SYRIANS TO THE SHAMELESS SURROGATES OF
DAMASCUS. IN ADDITION TO THE SURFEIT OF WOULD-BE LEADERS
IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH EXILES IN PARIS AS RAYMOND EDDE,
AMINE GEMAYEL, AND MICHEL AOUN WANT TO EITHER GAIN THE
PRIZE OR PLAY KINGMAKER.

THE SYRIAN ROLE, AS USUAL, KEY
--------------


5. REGIONAL REALITIES AND THE PRESENCE OF A PRO-SYRIAN
MAJORITY IN THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT ASSURE THAT SYRIA WILL
HAVE THE DOMINANT VOICE IN THE SELECTION OF A NEW
PRESIDENT. TO DATE, THE SARG HAS NOT TIPPED ITS HAND
ABOUT ITS PREFERENCES. IN LEBANON, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION WILL BE CLOSELY TIED TO THE PEACE
PROCESS, AND THAT THE SARG WILL CALCULATE ITS INTERESTS AS
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL PLAY THEMSELVES OUT.


6. EVEN THE MARONITES NOW JOCKEYING FOR POSITION BELIEVE
THAT THE SYRIAN STRATEGY WILL BE TO LET THE CANDIDATES
STRATCH, JOSTLE, AND ELBOW EACH OTHER TO THE POINT OF
IMPASSE, AT WHICH POINT "BIG BROTHER" WILL STEP IN TO
"HELP" THE LEBANESE SORT OUT THEIR SELF-MADE MESS. IN THE
MEANTIME, DAMASCUS WILL HOST A CONSTANT STREAM OF
CANDIDATES WHO SALLY ACROSS THE BORDER IN HOPE THAT ASAD
WILL GIVE A FAVORABLE WORD, WINK, OR NOD.

THE U.S. ROLE: DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
--------------


7. IT IS AXIOMATIC AMONG LEBANESE THAT THE USG WILL PLAY
A KEY ROLE, EITHER ACTIVE OR PASSIVE, IN THE MAKING OF THE
NEXT PRESIDENT. USG DRUTHERS ARE JUDGED TO BE DEPENDENT
ON THE PEACE PROCESS. THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S.
PLANS TO "SELL OUT" LEBANON FOR THE SAKE OF A
SYRIAN-ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT FEAR THAT THE SARG AND THE
USG WILL COOPERATE TO CREATE A LEBANESE QUISLING WHO WILL
FAITHFULLY EXECUTE SYRIAN DIKTAT.


8. A MORE POSITIVE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT BELIEVES THAT THE
USG, AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT, SHOULD URGE THE SARG TO
EXERCISE ITS INFLUENCE TO GUARANTEE THE SELECTION OF A
PRESIDENT WHO HAS A DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY ON ALL SIDES.
THEY HOPE THAT DAMASCUS WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY BROAD-MINDED
TO SEE THE NEED FOR A UNIFYING FIGURE, IN PARTICULAR
SOMEONE WHO CAN LEAD THE MARONITES TOWARD POSITIVE
PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL POLITICAL LIFE. SUCH SYRIAN
ALTRUISM, HOWEVER, WOULD IN THEIR ESTIMATION BE DEPENDENT
ON A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE PEACE PROCESS.


9. THE MARONITE HARD CORE HOPES THAT A BREAKDOWN OF THE
PEACE PROCESS WILL SOMEHOW LEAD THE USG (AND ISRAEL) TO
SUPPORT A VOCAL OPPONENT OF SYRIA. THEY HOPE TO MOBILIZE
MARONITE COMMUNITIES IN THE U.S. TO PRESSURE THE
ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT "THE LEBANESE POWER OF DECISION"
-- WHICH IN THEIR CIRCLES MEANS RESTORING UNRIVALED
MARONITE DOMINANCE.

OTHER PLAYERS: FRANCE, SAUDI ARABIA, THE VATICAN
-------------- ---


10. MANY MARONITES ARE HOPING THAT FRANCE WILL INVOLVE
ITSELF IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE BY URGING SYRIA OR THE USG
IN A PARTICULAR DIRECTION, OR, IN SOME FEVERED IMAGININGS,
BY RESUMING THE ROLE OF GUARANTOR OF MARONITE POWER.
THOSE MARONITES WHO MAKE THE PILGRIMAGE TO FOGGY BOTTOM
SEEKING USG BLESSING USUALLY STOP OFF IN PARIS TO
PRACTICE THEIR PITCH. THEORIES OF FRENCH PREFERENCES VARY
WILDLY -- FROM BACKING AOUN AND "MARONISME" TO SELLING OUT
CHRISTIAN INTERESTS FOR THE SAKE OF CEMENTING WIDER FRENCH
INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. IN PARTICULAR, MANY
MARONITES FEAR THE WARM RELATIONS BETWEEN JACQUES CHIRAC
AND SUNNI PRIME MINISTER HARIRI.


11. SAUDI ARABIA IS ALSO SEEN AS HAVING A ROLE TO PLAY,
BUILDING ON ITS EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WITH HARIRI. SOME
SPECULATE THAT RIYADH WILL POUR MONEY INTO LEBANON -- OR
EVEN SYRIA -- TO SUPPORT HARIRI'S FAVORITE MARONITE, OR
THAT, CONVERSELY, HARIRI WILL BE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS WHOM
TO SUPPORT. MOREOVER, ONE PROMINENT CANDIDATE, NASSIB
LAHOUD, HAS INDEPENDENT TIES TO RIYADH (SEPTEL). SOME
EXPECT THE USG TO URGE THE SAUDIS TO SUPPORT ITS FAVORED
CANDIDATE.


12. PUNDITS EXPECT THAT THE VATICAN, THROUGH THE
INFLUENCE IT MIGHT EXERCISE ON THE MARONITE PATRIARCH AND
THUS HIS CHURCH, WILL INVOLVE ITSELF DEEPLY. THEY SEE THE
ELEVATION OF PATRIARCH SFAYR TO CARDINAL AS A SIGN OF
VATICAN INTEREST IN GUARDING CHRISTIAN "RIGHTS." THE HARD
CORE HOPES THAT THE POPE WILL PRESSURE THE USG AND FRANCE
TO SUPPORT A "NATIONALIST"; MODERATES HOPE THAT THE
VATICAN WILL STRONGLY URGE MARONITES TO PARTICIPATE IN
POLITICAL LIFE; SOME BELIEVE THAT PAPAL NUNCIO PUENTE'S
ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH HIZBALLAH LEADER FADLALLAH WILL HELP
PRODUCE A PRESIDENT WITH BROAD CREDIBILITY. PUENTE SAYS
THAT, HEALTH PERMITTING, THE POPE WILL VISIT LEBANON IF A
PEACE AGREEMENT IS REACHED: IF THE VISIT HAPPENS, LOCAL
EARS WILL BE KEEN TO SIGNALS OF A VATICAN PRESIDENTIAL
PREFERENCE.

THE MUSLIM CONTRIBUTION
--------------


13. MOST PRESIDENTIAL MANEUVERING, OF COURSE, IS A
STRICTLY MARONITE GAME. MUSLIMS--SHIA, SUNNI, AND
DRUZE--ARE RELEGATED TO SECONDARY ROLES: EITHER TO BE THE
GREEK CHORUS IN PARLIAMENT TO ECHO THE WISDOM RECEIVED
FROM DAMASCUS, AND/OR TO STRIKE DEALS WITH MARONITE
HOPEFULS TO OBTAIN THE POSITIONS TO WHICH MUSLIMS AT THIS
POINT CAN ASPIRE. MUSLIM LEADERS ALREADY HAVE BEGUN
CAUTIOUSLY TO ALIGN THEMSELVES, AS OFTEN AGAINST AS FOR A
PARTICULAR MARONITE. UNTIL NOW, THE HIZBALLAH SHI'A HAVE
NOT DISCUSSED THE RACE OPENLY: INSTEAD, THEY ARE
PREOCCUPIED WITH WHAT SYRIA, AND PERHAPS IRAN, HAVE IN
STORE FOR THEM AFTER PEACE WITH ISRAEL.

EXTENSION FOR HRAWI?
--------------


14. IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, THERE HAS BEEN DISCUSSION OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW PRESIDENT
HRAWI TO EXTEND HIS TERM BY PERHAPS TWO YEARS. DESPITE
PUBLIC DISAVOWAL OF THE IDEA, HRAWI IS WORKING TOWARD THIS
GOAL BEHIND THE SCENES. HE APPARENTLY WANTS TO BE SEEN AS
THE PRESIDENT WHO TOOK OFFICE IN THE MIDST OF TURMOIL,
THEN PRESIDED OVER A PERIOD IN WHICH LEBANON ENDED ITS
CIVIL WAR, MADE PEACE WITH ISRAEL, THEN PUT ITSELF ON THE
PATH TO ECONOMIC REVIVAL. WE HAVE ALSO DETECTED WHAT MAY
BE A NASCENT EFFORT BY HRAWI TO BOOST HIS DOMESTIC
CREDIBILITY BY PUTTING A BIT OF DAYLIGHT BETWEEN HIMSELF
AND DAMASCUS.


15. THE LEBANESE SAY THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE SENT
CONFLICTING SIGNALS ON THE ISSUE OF EXTENSION, AND THAT
THE ISSUE MAY DEPEND ON THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS.
THE THINKING IS THAT, IF THE PROCESS STALLS, HRAWI WOULD
REMAIN IN OFFICE, AND THE QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENCY, LIKE
SO MANY OTHER ISSUES, WOULD REMAIN BLOCKED UNTIL THE SHAPE
OF REGIONAL POLITICS BECAME CLEAR.


16. THERE ARE CONFLICTING REPORTS ON HOW PM HARIRI,
SPEAKER BERRI, AND OTHER GOL FIGURES VIEW AN EXTENSION OF
HRAWI. HARIRI AND BERRI DISLIKE HRAWI, BUT FEAR THAT A
NEW, STRONGER PRESIDENT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE PREROGATIVES
THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARVE OUT. PREDICTABLY, TO THE
EXTENT THAT AN EXTENSION OF HRAWI WOULD ALSO HELP FREEZE
THEM IN PLACE, THE IDEA IS ATTRACTIVE. IN THE ULTIMATE
ANALYSIS, THEY WILL WAIT FOR SYRIA'S DEFINITIVE SIGNAL ON
THE ISSUE.


17. INTERESTINGLY, THERE ARE VIRULENT OPPONENTS OF BOTH
HRAWI AND SYRIA WHO SUPPORT AN EXTENSION. THEIR THINKING
IS THAT THE ENEMIES OF SYRIA SHOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR
EFFORTS ON THE 1996 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SEEKING
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND GUARANTEES. THE NEW,
PRESUMABLY LESS SYRIAN-INFLUENCED PARLIAMENT WOULD THEN
ELECT A PRESIDENT UNDER LESS SYRIAN SWAY.

THE USG INTEREST
--------------


18. THE USG'S VERY ACTIVE, UNSUCCESSFUL SUPPORT IN 1988
FOR MIKHAEL DAHER PROVIDES A CAUTIONARY LESSON FOR THE
1995 PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS. ACTIVE USG BACKING
FOR A PARTICULAR CANDIDATE WOULD PROBABLY SET IN MOTION A
SERIES OF REACTIONS THAT WOULD DAMAGE THE CHANCES OF
"AMERICA'S CHOICE." THAT SAID, IT WOULD BE ALMOST
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE USG TO KEEP SILENT ABOUT THE SELECTION
PROCESS: IF EXTENSION OF HRAWI REMAINS A LIVE ISSUE, WE
WILL BE ASKED AT LEAST FOR COMMENT. IF A NEW PRESIDENT IS
TO BE CHOSEN, WE WILL BE ASKED FOR OUR INPUT EVERY STEP OF
THE WAY. PRESUMABLY, AT A MINIMUM, WE WOULD LIKE TO
ASSURE THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT IS NOT HOSTILE TO USG
INTERESTS.


19. UP TO THIS POINT, EMBASSY HAS ANSWERED INQUIRIES BY
AVOIDING NAMES AND SAYING THAT WE HOPE A NEW PRESIDENT
WILL FIT A CERTAIN PROFILE: HE/SHE SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO
FINDING WAYS TO RECONCILE THE VARIOUS LEBANESE COMMUNITIES
WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE NEEDS OF THE COMING ERA OF
PEACE. HE/SHE SHOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY WITH ALL SIDES, AND
IN THIS SENSE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS OVERLY TIED TO ANY
FOREIGN SPONSOR. HE/SHE SHOULD ALSO VIEW AS A PRINCIPAL
TASK ENCOURAGING THE MARONITES TOWARD MORE ACTIVE,
POSITIVE PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL LEBANESE POLITICAL LIFE.
IF THE TREND TOWARD CHRISTIAN NON-PARTICIPATION CONTINUES
OR DEEPENS, THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL RECONCILIATION AND
STABILITY--WITHIN AND PERHAPS EVEN BEYOND LEBANON'S
BORDERS--ARE POOR.

SCHLICHER