Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
93HAVANA6938
1993-11-23 22:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

CUBA: 1993 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Tags:  PTER CU 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 232202Z NOV 93
FM USINT HAVANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5934
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 006938 


S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PTER CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: 1993 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 317207

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 006938


S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PTER CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: 1993 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 317207


1. (C) SUMMARY. THE SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN CUBA
FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EUROPE HAS
IMPOSED LIMITS ON CUBAN CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT
TERRORISM ON ANYTHING LIKE PAST LEVELS. POST IS NOT
AWARE OF NEW EVIDENCE IN 1993 OF CUBAN MATERIAL SUPPORT
FOR ARMED INSURGENCIES. NEVERTHELESS, CUBA MAINTAINS
CLOSE RELATIONS WITH MOST "TERRORIST STATES" AND
CONTINUES TO SERVE AS A REFUGE FOR KNOWN TERRORISTS.
END SUMMARY.


2. (U) MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS. IN AN EFFORT
TO APPEAL TO FELLOW LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, THE
CUBAN REGIME HAS PUBLICLY TRIED TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE. ENDING
SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS IN COLOMBIA WAS SAID TO HAVE
BEEN A PRE-CONDITION FOR FIDEL CASTRO'S VISIT TO
CARTAGENA AUGUST 9-11, AND WAS PART OF THE JUSTIFICATION
THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT GAVE FOR RESTORING DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH HAVANA IN LATE OCTOBER. AS FOR
GUATEMALA, THE OTHER COUNTRY MOST AFFECTED BY FORMERLY
CUBAN-BACKED REBELS, THE OFFICIAL CUBAN PRESS MADE
GUARDEDLY CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS TOWARD THE PEACE
PROCESS THERE DURING THE VISIT OF NOBEL LAUREATE
RIGOBERTA MENCHU TO HAVANA IN EARLY AUGUST.


3. (U) RELATIONS WITH TERRORIST STATES. CUBA HAS
FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH
KOREA, AND SYRIA. ALL THESE COUNTRIES HAVE EMBASSIES IN
HAVANA, AS DOES CUBA IN EACH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
CAPITALS. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND NORTH KOREA ARE
PARTICULARLY CLOSE AND HIGH PROFILE. THE PLO IS ALSO
REPRESENTED HERE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.


4. (U) PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM. THE
REGIME-CONTROLLED CUBAN PRESS IS CAREFUL TO ESCHEW
EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS. NEVERTHELESS THERE
PERSISTS A SLANT SYMPATHETIC TO "NATIONAL LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS" AND SELF-STYLED MARXIST MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE
SHINING PATH. IN ADDITION THE STRIDENT ANTI-U.S. LINE
WHICH PERVADES CUBAN NEWS AND COMMENTARY SPILLS OVER
INTO ATTACKS ON U.S. COUNTERTERROR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS
THE SANCTIONS ON LIBYA, WHICH THE CUBANS HOLD UP AS AN
EXAMPLE OF THE WEST'S "DOUBLE STANDARD. AFTER YEARS OF
ONE-SIDED COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN ISSUES, THE CUBAN
PRESS TREATED THE SEPTEMBER PEACE ACCORD RELATIVELY
OBJECTIVELY.


5. (U) HARBORING/TRAINING FOREIGN TERRORISTS. POST
IS NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN 1993.
BASQUE TERRORISTS WHO SOUGHT REFUGE HERE SOME YEARS AGO
REMAIN, BUT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED THE SPANISH
EMBASSY THAT NO FURTHER ASYLEES WOULD BE ACCEPTED.
SEVERAL THOUSAND FOREIGN STUDENTS FROM FORMER MARXIST
REGIMES LIKE SOUTH YEMEN OR NATIONAL LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE POLISARIO OR THE SUDANESE PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONTINUE TO ATTEND SPECIAL SCHOOLS
ON THE ISLE OF YOUTH. HOWEVER THE MILITARY OR
PARA-MILITARY COMPONENT OF THESE PROGRAMS APPEARS TO
HAVE BEEN REDUCED OR LARGELY ELIMINATED, AND THE NUMBERS
OF STUDENTS HAVE DECLINED, WITH FEW IF ANY NEW ARRIVALS.


6. (U) THERE HAVE BEEN NO PROSECUTIONS OR
EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORISTS MADE PUBLIC IN CUBA IN 1993.


SULLIVAN