Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
91USNATO1505
1991-04-03 17:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF END OF

Tags:  NATO PREL UR XH 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 031705Z APR 91
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0714
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
CSCE COLLECTIVE
/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 01505 


STATE FOR EUR (RPM, SOV AND EEY)

VIENNA FOR CSBM DEL

USVIENNA FOR USDEF CFE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: NATO PREL UR XH

SUBJECT: NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF END OF
THE WARSAW PACT AND NEW SOVIET RELATIONS WITH
EASTERN EUROPE

REF: MOSCOW 9594

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 01505


STATE FOR EUR (RPM, SOV AND EEY)

VIENNA FOR CSBM DEL

USVIENNA FOR USDEF CFE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: NATO PREL UR XH

SUBJECT: NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF END OF
THE WARSAW PACT AND NEW SOVIET RELATIONS WITH
EASTERN EUROPE

REF: MOSCOW 9594


1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY. DURING TWO NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS
MARCH 26 AND APRIL 2, ALLIES REVIEWED THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NEW SOVIET RELATIONS WITH
EASTERN EUROPE. THE DISCUSSION COVERED BOTH SOVIET AND
VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEIR NEW
SECURITY RELATIONS. MOST SAW THE SOVIETS AS SEEKING TO
AVOID ISOLATION BUT AT THE SAME TIME AS FINDING IT
DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME THE ANIMOSITY OF THE PAST FORTY
YEARS. ONE FOCUS OF DISCUSSION WAS THE NEW BILATERAL
TREATIES WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE NEGOTIATING WITH FORMER WTO
ALLIES. THE FIRST SUCH TREATY WAS INITIALED WITH ROMANIA
AND ACCORDING TO THE GERMANS CONTAINS CLAUSES ABOUT NOT
JOINING ALLIANCES TO WHICH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY HAVE
MADE CLEAR THEY ARE NOT GOING TO AGREE. VARIOUS OTHER
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS AMONG EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS
A SUBSTITUTE FOR CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PACT WERE ALSO
DISCUSSED AND THE IMS GAVE THEIR ANALYSIS. END SUMMARY.


3. IN TWO SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS, ALLIES
DISCUSSED THE IMPACT OF THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT
MILITARY STRUCTURES. A NUMBER OF ALLIES FOUND THE FRENCH
PAPER ON THE SUBJECT (FAXED TO EUR/RPM) TO BE A GOOD
SUMMARY OF IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN
RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

SOVIET VIEWS
--------------

4. THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DRAW
ULTIMATE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE END OF THE
WARSAW PACT. IT WAS CLEAR FROM BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH
THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHAT THEIR PREFERENCES WERE
TO REPLACE THE PACT IN THEIR SECURITY POLICIES. HOWEVER,
IT WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND MOSCOW'S REACTION
AS WELL. THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF THE DETERIORATION OF
THEIR BASIC RELATIONS WITH THEIR FORMER ALLIES. BUT, THEY
ARE LESS CONSCIOUS OF THE REASONS FOR THAT CHANGE AS THEY
BELIEVED EASTERN EUROPE ACTUALLY SAW SOME SECURITY BENEFIT
FROM THE PACT AND TIES TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN ANY CASE,
MOSCOW UNDERSTANDS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR
RELATIONS WHICH MEANS A REJECTION OF THE PAST.


5. THE ISSUE FOR THE SOVIETS IS HOW TO DEVELOP THOSE

RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN POLITICAL DISARRAY.
THE SOVIET MILITARY IS INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TO THE BLATANT
MANIFESTATIONS OF DISLIKE FROM THE FORMER WP ALLIES,
PARTICULARLY AS IT MANIFESTS ITSELF IN TEARING DOWN WAR
MONUMENTS AND OTHER REMINDERS OF SOVIET TROOP PRESENCE.
AT THE SAME TIME, SOME IN MOSCOW ARE AWARE THAT THE VERY
INSTABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TODAY IS PERCEIVED BY
EASTERN EUROPE AS A THREAT.


6. THIS LEAVES THE SOVIETS WITH TWO CHOICES: LEAVE
EASTERN EUROPE TO THE WEST AN ACCEPT ISOLATION OR DEVELOP
NEW RELATIONS ON A MORE EQUAL BASIS. OBVIOUSLY, THE
SOVIETS DESPITE THE ODDS, WILL GO FOR THE LATER SOLUTION.
THIS MEANS THAT THEY WILL TRY TO TAKE SOME STEPS TO REDUCE
EASTERN EUROPEAN FEAR OF THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME
TIME, MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT NATO SHOULD ALSO
DISAPPEAR AND, IN ANY CASE, EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD NOT
DEVELOP TOO CLOSE RELATIONS WITH IT. THUS, THE SOVIETS
WILL SEEK BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH SOME NEGATIVE SECURITY
GUARANTEES AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, MAINTAIN SOME FORM OF
POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITH EASTERN EUROPE EITHER AS A
VESTIGE OF THE PACT OR MORE LIKELY UNDER SOME NEW FORMAT.
THE SOVIET MODEL REMAINS, AS EXPRESSED BY BESSMERTNYKH AT
THE MEETING OF THE PACT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WHICH ENDED
THE MILITARY STRUCTURE, TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH EASTERN
EUROPE AS NEUTRALS ALONG THE LINE OF AUSTRIA AND FINLAND.
THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE FOR THE SOVIETS IS
SELF-ISOLATION.

EASTERN EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR NEW SECURITY RELATIONS
-------------- --------------


7. THE NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THE PERCEPTION AMONG EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF A SECURITY VACUUM WITH THE DEMISE OF
THE PACT. HE ARGUED THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR IMPACTS OF THE
PACT'S END WILL BE EASTERN EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR NEW
SECURITY STRUCTURES. REVIEWING A DISCUSSION THE DUTCH
EMBASSY IN WARSAW HAD WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
OFFICIAL TOWPIK, THE DUTCH REP SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE
OPTIONS FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: JOINING NATO,
NEUTRALITY, AND USING CSCE STRUCTURES. IN HIS REVIEW OF
THESE OPTIONS, TOWPIK INDICATED THAT FOR VARIOUS REASONS
NONE WAS APPROPRIATE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO
THE SENSE OF VACUUM, THE POLES BELIEVED THEY SHARED WITH
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. NATO AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THE
SOVIET UNION HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IMMEDIATE MEMBERSHIP IN
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE NOW. THE THREE
COUNTRIES REJECTED NEUTRALITY BECAUSE IT SUGGESTED A
BUFFER ZONE OR "CORDON SANITAIRE," WHICH WAS NO GUARANTEE
OF SECURITY, BUT RATHER A GREATER RISK. FINALLY, CSCE
INSTITUTIONS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE
SECURITY.


8. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE POLES WOULD TRY TO DEVELOP
BILATERAL TIES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS INCLUDING GERMANY AND
THE SOVIET UNION. BUT TOWPIK HAD NOTED TO HIS DUTCH
INTERLOCUTOR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY SEEKING
CLAUSES IN ITS BILATERAL TREATY WHICH WOULD LIMIT POLISH
INDEPENDENCE. THE NETHERLANDS REP CLOSED HIS PRESENTATION
BY NOTING THAT THE POLISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAD
SUGGESTED THAT IN THE SHORT TERM POLAND WOULD HAVE TO
PRACTICE ARMED NEUTRALITY.


9. IN DEVELOPING THEIR NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS, THE
HUNGARIANS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GOOD
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD TRY TO MEET SOME
SOVIET CONCERNS IN THE BILATERAL TREATY, THE GERMAN REP
ADDED. AT THE SAME TIME, HUNGARY WOULD SEEK TIES BOTH
WITH OVERALL WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS LIKE NATO AND THE EC AS
WELL AS SMALLER REGIONAL GROUPS LIKE THE PENTAGONALE.
WHILE THEY RECOGNIZED THAT, IN SOME CASES, THESE GROUPS
DID NOT HAVE A SECURITY PURPOSE, HUNGARY DID BELIEVE
MEMBERSHIP IN A NUMBER OF GROUPS WITH WESTERN TIES AIDED
THEIR SECURITY. THE HUNGARIANS, UNLIKE THE POLES, TRIED
NOT LIKE TO USE THE TERM SECURITY VACUUM BECAUSE IT
IMPLIED THAT THERE WERE DISADVANTAGES TO THE END OF THE
WARSAW PACT, WHILE THE HUNGARIANS CLEARLY SAW THE END OF
THE PACT AS A NET SECURITY BENEFIT. HUNGARY ALSO WANTED
TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ANY PAN EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS.


10. THE UK REP NOTED THAT THE MORE THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES REDEFINED THEIR SECURITY THE MORE IT APPEARED TO
ISOLATE THE SOVIET UNION. ALLIES HAD RECOGNIZED THE
DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS PROCESS, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD
USE THESE WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT
THEIR ISOLATION TO LIMIT THE WEST AND SPECIFICALLY NATO
TIES TO EASTERN EUROPE. THE POLES, DURING BRITISH FOREIGN
OFFICE MINISTER HOGG'S TRIP TO WARSAW, WERE AWARE OF THE
SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THEY REMAINED INTERESTED IN
DEVELOPING TIES INCLUDING MILITARY LINKS TO NATO. THEY
RECOGNIZED THAT MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOW BUT DID
NOT WANT TO RULE IT OUT AS AN ULTIMATE EVENTUALITY, EITHER.

BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE SOVIETS
--------------


11. THE GERMAN REP NOTED THAT AS PART OF LOOKING FOR NEW
SECURITY RELATIONS, THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE
WILLING TO SIGN NEW TREATIES WITH MOSCOW. IN THAT
CONTEXT, HE NOTED THAT DURING THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER'S VISIT THERE, THE MINISTER HAD INITIALED THE
TEXT OF THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN BILATERAL TREATY. WHILE THE
TEXT HAD NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC ITS CONTENTS WERE OF HIGH
INTEREST BECAUSE IT WOULD BE THE MODEL FOR TREATIES WITH
THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES. IN FACT THE SOVIETS
HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED THESE TREATIES, WHICH WERE
TO REPLACE THE WP AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES
UNDER IT, TO BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME FOR ALL THE FORMER WP
ALLIES.


12. THE GERMAN REP REPORTED THAT THEIR EMBASSIES IN
MOSCOW AND BUCHAREST BOTH AGREED THAT THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN
TREATY CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING SECURITY CLAUSES:

--COMMITMENTS BY BOTH NOT TO JOIN ALLIANCES DIRECTED
AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY;

--COMMITMENTS NOT TO LET THEIR TERRITORIES BE USED TO WAGE
WAR AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY;

--COMMITMENTS NOT TO PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE OR OTHER
SUPPORT TO STATES WAGING WAR AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY;

--AGREEMENT TO BASE THEIR SECURITY ON THE COLLECTIVE
SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER;

--AGREEMENT TO INFORM EACH OTHER OF A PERCEIVED THREAT TO
THEIR RESPECTIVE SECURITIES;

--AGREEMENT ON IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS IN THE CASE OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST EITHER PARTY.


13. THE GERMAN REP SAID THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER KVITSINSKY HAD DEFENDED THE TREATY AS A SIGN OF
GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS AND NOT AN ATTEMPT TO REVIVE THE
PACT. THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT THE ERA OF MILITARY
PACTS WAS OVER AND CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT ITS EVENTUAL
EVOLUTION WOULD BE THE END OF NATO AS WELL.


14. THE GERMAN REP ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE CLAUSES IN
THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY WENT WELL BEYOND ANY WHICH BONN
ANTICIPATED OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD
ACCEPT. HE NOTED THAT UNTIL THE INITIALING OF THE
ROMANIAN TREATY, THE SOVIET/HUNGARIAN AGREEMENT WAS
THOUGHT TO BE FARTHEST ADVANCED. ANTALL WAS EXPECTED TO
GO TO MOSCOW TO SIGN IT AT THE END OF APRIL. HOWEVER, THE
GERMAN REP INDICATED THAT HUNGARY WOULD AS SOON HAVE NO
TREATY AS SIGN A TREATY WITH SUCH FAR REACHING CLAUSES.


15. THE U.S. REP SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY SURPRISED
WITHTHE CONTENT OF THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY WHICH HIS
GERMAN COLLEAGUEHAD DESCRIBED. DRAWING ON REFTEL, HE
AGREED THAT OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES WERE UNLIKELY TO
BE WILLING TO GO AS FAR, AND NOTED THAT AS MUCH AS 25
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET/HUNGARIAN TREATY REMAINED
BRACKETED. FROM REFTEL, HE DESCRIBED THE SOVIET INTEREST
IN THIS NEW GENERATION OF TREATIES AND THE HOPE THAT THEY
WOULD ALL BE SIMILAR AND WOULD BRING SOME OF THE FORMER
WARSAW PACT GUARANTEES AND CONSULTATIONS INTO THE NEW
RELATIONS.


16. THIS EXCHANGE LED TO A VIGOROUS DISCUSSION AS TO WHY
THE ROMANIANS HAD ACCEPTED SUCH CLAUSES AND WHAT THE
EFFECT WOULD BE ON OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE
SPANISH REP NOTED ROMANIA, BUT ALSO BULGARIA'S SHAKY
ECONOMIES WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE
DUTCH REP AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEW BILATERAL
TREATIES AND SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD EFFECT THE ENTIRE
PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION. HE ALSO REMINDED THE
COMMITTEE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR AFANASSIEVSKY HAD
PROPOSED TO THE SYG THAT NATO "ENDORSE" IN SOME WAY THESE
"SECURITY" CLAUSES IN THE NEW BILATERAL TREATIES. IF THEY
WENT AS FAR AS THE ROMANIAN TREATY APPARENTLY DID, THAT
WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE. AND IN ANY CASE, NATO SHOULD NOT
BE SEEN AS INTERFERING IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THESE TREATIES.


17. THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT SHE AGREED THESE NEW
SECURITY TREATIES WERE AN IMPORTANT NEW FACTOR AND NATO
SHOULD FOLLOW THEIR DEVELOPMENT CLOSELY. IT WOULD, SHE
SUGGESTED, BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO
INCLUDE THE CONCEPTS IN THESE TREATIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF
THE OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.


18. PAPER CIRCULATED (COPY FAXED TO EUR/RPM).

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

--VISIT TO POLAND BY MR. HOGG, MINISTER OF STATE AT
THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 17-19 MARCH 1991.

KORNBLUM