BASHIR AND THE RCC ON THE EVE OF THEIR SECOND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 02104


E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM PINR ECON EFIN SU
SUBJECT: BASHIR AND THE RCC ON THE EVE OF THEIR SECOND
ANNIVERSARY


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: BESEIGED AND CRITICIZED FROM VIRTUALLY
EVERY QUARTER, AS IT APPROACHES ITS SECOND ANNIVERSARY,
GENERAL OMAR AL-BASHIR'S REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL
NONETHELESS APPEARS FIRMLY IN CHARGE OF SUDAN. THE
RECENT CURRENCY CHANGE, ABOUT AS BADLY BOTCHED AS
ANYTHING THE GOS HAS DONE, REVEALED A POPULATION
TOTALLY COWED. THE OPPOSITION REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND
UNORGANIZED AND MOST POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP IS OUTSIDE
TRY. CONFLICT CONTINUES WITHIN THE RCC WITH
SOME MEMBERS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN OTHERS, BUT BASHIR
HIMSELF IS PROBABLY STILL FIRST AMONG EQUALS. THE
NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLS INTERNAL
SECURITY, THE ECONOMY, AND THE MEDIA, HENCE
CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL POWER, BUT NIF HEAD HASSAN AL
TURABI AND BASHIR SHARE A COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS
GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF PERVASIVE NIF INFLUENCE WHICH
MAY NOT BE AS ABSOLUTE AS IT APPEARS. UNLESS AND UNTIL
THOSE INTERESTS DIVERGE IT WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT TO
ASCERTAIN WHO WIELDS GREATER POWER. END SUMMARY.


3. DESPITE INCREASING CRITICISM FROM EVERY QUARTER
EXCEPT THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT, GENERAL OMAR AL
BASHIR'S GOVERNMENT APPEARS STRONGER THEN EVER. IN THE
WAKE OF THE GULF WAR AND WITH A TOTALLY BANKRUPT
ECONOMY, THE RCC SHOULD BE ON THE DEFENSIVE, BUT IT IS
NOT. ANY DOUBTS ABOUT THE REGIME'S RESILIENCE, HAVE
BEEN DISPELLED BY THE RECENT CURRENCY CHANGE. ALTHOUGH
BADLY EXECUTED, THE GOS ACCOMPLISHED, AT LEAST FOR THE
MOMENT, ITS STATED GOALS OF REDUCING LIQUIDITY, GAINING
SOME CONTROL OVER THE MONEY SUPPLY, AND REDUCING
INFLATION. UNSTATED BUT OBVIOUS GOALS SUCH AS
UNDERMINING THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE MAJOR
OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE SPLA WERE ALSO SERVED.


4. AT THE SAME TIME, DUE TO A SERIES OF ERRORS AND
MISCALCULATIONS, THE CURRENCY CHANGE BROUGHT THE
ECONOMY TO A SCREECHING HALT AND ADVERSELY IMPACTED
VIRTUALLY EVERY SUDANESE. HOWEVER, AGAIN SHOWING THEIR
TENDENCY TO SHRINK TO ANY OCCASION, THE SUDANESE LINED
UP DAY AFTER DAY AT BANKS AROUND THE COUNTRY TO TURN IN
THEIR CASH FOR PARTIAL PAYMENT AND PROMISES. QUEUES
WERE GENERALLY DISCIPLINED AND WITHOUT INCIDENT; IN
SEVERAL CASES SOLDIERS ACTUALLY MARCHED THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION IN MILITARY LIKE FORMATION TO THE BANKS.


5. OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT, WHILE WIDESPREAD AND
INCREASINGLY VOCAL, REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND TOTALLY
UNORGANIZED. ALMOST ALL POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP IS
OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. THE FEW FORMER POLITICAL PARTY
LEADERS STILL IN KHARTOUM ARE SO DISCREDITED THEY POSE
LITTLE THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT. TRADITIONAL
INSTITUTIONS OF REGIME MAINTENANCE SUCH AS THE
MILITARY, POLICE, AND BUREAUCRACY ARE UNDOUBTEDLY
DISENCHANTED WITH THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY ARE SO
THOROUGHLY INFILTRATED WITH LOYAL SECURITY PERSONNEL
AND NIF INFORMANTS THAT THERE IS LITTLE POSSIBILITY
THEY COULD MOUNT ANY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION.


6. ONLY THE NIF SUPPORTS THE REGIME AND THEY HAVE
PROFITED HANDSOMELY FROM THEIR COLLUSION. AS NIF
OFFICIALS ARE QUICK TO POINT OUT, THEY WERE THE ONLY
PARTY IN OPPOSITION WHEN BASHIR TOOK OVER IN JUNE

1989. CONSEQUENTLY THEY WERE THE LOGICAL CHOICE TO
ASSIST THE NEW GOVERNMENT. (FYI: SEVERAL SUDANESE
STILL CLAIM, WITHOUT EVIDENT PROOF, THAT THE COUP WAS
ENGINEERED BY THE NIF TO THWART SADIQ AL MAHDI'S PEACE
EFFORTS. END FYI.) NIF MEMBERS OR SYMPATHIZERS NOW
OCCUPY KEY POSITIONS IN THE BUREAUCRACY, MEDIA, LABOR,
ACADEMIA, JUDICIARY, MILITARY, AND SECURITY
ORGANIZATIONS. BASHIR'S GOVERNMENT HAS ADOPTED ALMOST
EVERY MAJOR NIP POLICY FROM FEDERALISM, AND
ISLAMICIZATION OF EDUCATION TO THE RECENT ADOPTION OF
OF A NEW PENAL CODE TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM TURABI'S 1988
PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA. LONG A POWERFUL
FORCE IN BANKING AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THEY NOW
CONTROL WHATEVER PROFITABLE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY TAKES
PLACE IN SUDAN. NIF MEMBERS WERE VIRTUALLY UNAFFECTED
BY THE CURRENCY CHANGE; HAVING BEEN FOREWARNED, THEY
TURNED THEIR CASH INTO GOLD, COMMODITIES, OR HARD
CURRENCY PRIOR TO THE CHANGE. THE NIP, HOWEVER, IS NOT
A MONOLITH AND SOME MEMBERS EXERCISE GREATER INFLUENCE
THAN OTHERS.


7. ONLY LIBYA JARS THE RCC-NIP EQUILIBRIUM. QADHAFI
HAS CRITICIZED BASHIR FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA
AND THE MIXING OF RELIGION AND POLITCS, TWO KEY NIF
POLICIES. LIBYA HAS ALSO MOVED DECISIVELY AGAINST
FUNDAMENTALISTS AT HOME, AND LIBYAN RECONCILIATION WITH
EGYPT, OFTEN CITED B/ NIF MEMBERS AS THEIR ARCHENEMY,
MITIGATE AGAINST NIP INFLUENCE. MOST BELIEVE ONLY
LIBYAN INFLUENCE KEEPS BASHIR FROM DECLARING SUDAN AN
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. THE NIF SEEMS TO BE BANKING ON
SUDAN'S EMERGING RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO COUNTER
LIBYAN INFLUENCE, WHICH IS BASED PRIMARILY ON GOS
DEPENDENCE FOR BOTH OIL AND ARMS. ALTHOUGH THE
IRANIANS ARE ASSERTING THEMSELVES IN CULTURAL,
EDUCATIONAL, AND RELIGIOUS AREAS (ALL EXCLUSIVELY NIF
SPHERES),THEY HAVE YET TO COMPETE WITH THE LIBYANS IN
SUPPLYING OIL OR ARMS.


8. COMMENT: CONFLICT CONTINUES WITHIN THE RCC BETWEEN
THOSE MEMBERS WHO STRONGLY FAVOR NIP POLICIES AND THOSE
WHO PREFER A MORE SECULAR STATE. TWO RCC MEMBERS WERE
RECENTLY DISMISSED (OR RESIGNED DEPENDING ON WHOM YOU
CONSULT) FOR THEIR DISSENTING OPINIONS. THE THREE
SOUTHERNERS AND OTHER MODERATES APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE
IF ANY INFLUENCE, LEADING MOST OBSERVERS TO CONCLUDE
THAT TURABI AND THE NIF, OPERATING IN A POLITICAL
VACUUM, CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT COMPLETELY. NIF
INFLUENCE IS CERTAINLY GREAT, BUT BASHIR SEEMS STILL IN
CONTROL. BECAUSE HE IS A PROPONENT OF NIF POLICIES, IT
IS UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT HE IS HIS OWN MAN, AS TINY
ROWLAND SUGGESTS. UNTIL HE AND TURABI COME INTO
CONFLICT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH
POWER TURABI ACTUALLY WIELDS. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS
BASHIR AND TURABI AGREE ON THE AGENDA FOR THE GOS,
CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM OVER A MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE, POLICY
ISSUE IS UNLIKELY.

CHEEK