SAUDI ARABIA: 1990 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 10007


S/CT FOR BREELAND

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER KPRP SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1990 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 355397


1. THERE FOLLOWS DRAFT VERSION OF SAUDI ARABIAN
COMPONENT OF THE 1990 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, KEYED TO REFTEL.


2. A) DESCRIBE ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS
INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS
OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM:

- THERE WERE NO GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS FOR TERRORISM
OR TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 1990.

- B) DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION?

- AS THE RESULT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF THREE SAUDI
DIPLOMATS IN BANGKOK ON FEBRUARY 1, THE THAI GOVERNMENT
LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION WHICH RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF
A NUMBER OF THAI SUBJECTS. SAUDI AUTHORITIES PUBLICLY
INDICATED A DESIRE TO QUESTION THE SUSPECTS THEMSELVES
WHEN THE THAI GOVERNMENT COMPLETED ITS INVESTIGATION,
BUT DID NOT FILE A FORMAL EXTRADITION REQUEST.

- C) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS:

- THERE ARE NO DOMESTIC IMPEDIMENTS TO SAUDI
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE
WITH THE SLOW PACE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS NOTED UNDER
ITEM B, BUT THAI OFFICIALS STATED THAT THIS WAS DUE TO
PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE. THAI MUSLIM POLITICIANS ALSO CHARGED THE
GOVERNMENT WITH PERSECUTING THAILAND'S SHIA COMMUNITY, TO
WHICH ALL OF THE DETAINED SUSPECTS WERE SAID TO BELONG,
AND SAID THEY WOULD OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO EXTRADITE THE
SUSPECTS TO SAUDI ARABIA.

- D) DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN
PROSECUTION. THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO,
PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL
NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT AND EFFORTS
BY HOST GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR
TO ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS:

- SAUDI OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO SPEAK OUT STRONGLY
AGAINST TERRORISM AT EVERY APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY.
IN ADDITION TO STRONG STATEMENTS CONDEMNING SEVERAL
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST SAUDIS ABROAD (SEE SECTION G),
THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PUBLISHED A REBUTTAL IN APRIL
TO IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING IN
IT A LIST OF IRAN'S MISDEEDS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS
AND SPECIFICALLY PINNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 1989
MECCA BOMBINGS ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE SAUDI
GOVERNMENT COOPERATED FULLY IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
MURDERS IN THAILAND, INCLUDING SENDING A SAUDI
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM TO BANGKOK AND ALLOWING THAI
INVESTIGATORS TO COME TO SAUDI ARABIA IN ORDER TO
INTERVIEW FAMILIES AND COLLEAGUES OF THE SLAIN DIPLOMATS.

- E) DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS
UNDERTAKEN IN 1990 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING
STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA:

- SAUDI SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR PREVIOUS
LEVEL OF COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
WITH U.S. SECURITY AGENCIES IN 1990 ON INFORMATION
EXCHANGE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS. INTENSIVE, BUT LARGELY
UNOBTRUSIVE, SECURITY PRECAUTIONS RESULTED IN THE HAJJ
PASSING WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE ONSET OF THE GULF CRISIS
IN AUGUST LED TO INTENSIFIED INTERNAL SECURITY, IN WHICH
SAUDI SECURITY PERSONNEL COOPERATED FULLY ON TACTICAL
MILITARY MATTERS WITH U.S. MILITARY SECURITY AGENCIES.
IN ADDITION, STARTING IN MARCH, THE SAUDIS TOOK STEPS TO
TIGHTEN INTERNAL SECURITY BY IMPLEMENTING A PLAN TO
IDENTIFY ILLEGAL RESIDENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND EITHER
REGULARIZE THEIR STATUS OR DEPORT THEM. DUE TO THE GULF
CRISIS, THIS PROGRAM WAS ACCELERATED, TOGETHER WITH A
REVOCATION OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGES HERETOFORE GRANTED TO
YEMENI RESIDENTS IN THE COUNTRY; AS A RESULT, YEMENIS
EITHER HAD TO OBTAIN A SAUDI SPONSOR, AS ALL OTHER
NATIONALITIES HAD PREVIOUSLY DONE, OR EXIT THE COUNTRY.
SAUDI AND KUWAITI SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS WORKED TOGETHER
CLOSELY IN SCREENING REFUGEES FROM KUWAIT FOR POSSIBLE
TERRORISTS TRYING TO ENTER THE COUNTRY IN DISGUISE.

- F) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL
AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC
POUCH AND OTHER PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM;
SANCTUARY EXTENDED TO TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS
AND/OR THE PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF SUCH GROUPS; HOST
GOVERNMENT TRAINING OR THE PROVISION OF TRAINING SITES TO
TERRORIST GROUPS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON TERRORISM ISSUES
IN INTERNATIONAL FORA:

- THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE POLITICAL OR
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HAS
REPEATEDLY SPOKEN AND VOTED AGAINST TERRORIST ACTS IN
INTERNATIONAL FORA. SAUDI ARABIA MAKES A CAREFUL
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND SUPPORT FOR
THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A LEGITIMATE
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. SAUDI ARABIA RECOGNIZES
THE PALESTINIAN "STATE" AS A GOVERNMENT, AND SUPPORTS THE
INTIFADA BOTH POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY. IN 1990 IT
CONTINUED TO BE ONE OF THE PLO'S LEADING DONORS.
HOWEVER, IRRITATION OVER THE CURRENT PLO LEADERSHIP'S
SUPPORT OF IRAQ DURING THE GULF CRISIS APPEARS TO HAVE
ENDED SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THAT ORGANIZATION FOR THE
PRESENT. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DECRIES ACTS OF TERRORISM
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIAN
CAUSE. SAUDI ARABIA IS NOT A KNOWN SANCTUARY FOR
TERRORISTS, NOR DOES IT MISUSE DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO
SUPPORT TERRORIST GROUPS.

- G. HAS THE HOST COUNTRY MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS
IN FAVOR OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY (CUBA, IRAN,
IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA AND SYRIA) ON A TERRORISM ISSUE?

- NO. IN FACT, SAUDI AUTHORITIES REPEATEDLY
CONDEMNED TERRORISM, BOTH IN THE CASE OF THE KILLINGS OF
SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND IN GENERAL TERMS, AT INTERVALS
THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

- H. DECRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1989,
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST COUNTRY'S ATTITUDE
TOWARDS TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. WHAT IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE?

- THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SAUDI
ARABIA'S ATTITUDE REGARDING DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM SINCE 1989. SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE NEVER
SUPPORTED TERRORISM BY EXTREME PALESTINIAN FACTIONS (AS
OPPOSED TO THE INTIFADA, WHICH THEY CONSIDER A LEGITIMATE
EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND MEANS
OF PROVIDING PALESTINIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION),AND
TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST PERSONS AND PROPERTY CONTINUE TO
BE CAPITAL CRIMES UNDER SAUDI LAW. MOREOVER, SAUDI
ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND
ITS CONSTITUENT GROUPS DIMINISHED MARKEDLY AS A RESULT OF
THE CURRENT PLO LEADERSHIP'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S INVASION
OF KUWAIT. OFFICIAL CONCERN ABOUT ATTACKS ON SAUDI
OFFICIALS AND PROPERTY OVERSEAS CONTINUED TO DEEPEN IN
1989-90 AS THE RESULT OF THE THAILAND KILLINGS, THE
MURDER OF A SAUDI DIPLOMAT IN BEIRUT (OCTOBER 1989),
BOMBINGS OF SAUDI OFFICIAL CARS IN ANKARA (IN OCTOBER
1989 AND JANUARY 1990),ONE OF WHICH RESULTED IN THE
MAIMING OF A SAUDI DIPLOMAT, AND THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING
(AS PART OF AN EXTORTION ATTEMPT) OF A SAUDI AIRLINES
FLIGHT FROM ISLAMABAD IN NOVEMBER 1989.

FREEMAN