THE SAG-ANC RELATIONSHIP: A YEAR END PERSPECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 20502


LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR FENDRICK
NSC FOR ROBERT FRASURE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL SF
SUBJECT: THE SAG-ANC RELATIONSHIP: A YEAR END PERSPECTIVE


1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
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2. A NEW MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY HAS SETTLED OVER SOUTH
AFRICA FOLLOWING A YEAR OF UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL
CHANGE. AFTER A PROMISING START, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC HAVE BOGGED DOWN. DISTRUST
HAS DEEPENED, FUELED BY ANC SUSPICIONS THAT THE SAG IS
TRYING TO PROFIT FROM ESCALATING TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE.
FOR ITS PART, THE SAG BLAMES THE LACK OF MOVEMENT
TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ANC'S LACK
OF ORGANIZATION AND ON DIVISIONS INSIDE THE MOVEMENT.


3. THESE PROBLEMS ARE MANAGEABLE PROVIDED THE TWO
SIDES DEVELOP A RENEWED SENSE OF URGENCY AND COMMON
PURPOSE EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. THAT IMPERATIVE IS
UNDERSTOOD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE ANC AND THE
SAG, WE BELIEVE. AT LOWER LEVELS THE PERSPECTIVE IS
LESS CLEAR. MANY ANC MILITANTS BELIEVE THEY HAVE
CONCEDED A GREAT DEAL, ESPECIALLY IN AGREEING TO
SUSPEND THE ARMED STRUGGLE, AND OBTAINED LITTLE FROM
GOVERNMENT IN THE TALKS THUS FAR: E.G., THE PRISONERS
ARE STILL NOT FREE, THE EXILES NOT YET HOME, AND
UNPRECEDENTED LARGESCALE VIOLENCE IS CONTINUING.
THE "COMRADES" ARE DEMANDING A MORE AGGRESSIVE ANC
STANCE IN THE YEAR AHEAD. IN THE SAG THERE ARE
ELEMENTS EAGER TO EXPLOIT SUPPOSED SCHISMS IN THE
ANC-SACP-COSATU ALLIANCE. OTHERS APPEAR READY TO CAST
ABOUT FOR DIFFERENT BLACK INTERLOCUTORS AND NEGOTIATE
A NEW CONSTITUTION WITH THEM REGARDLESS OF THE ANC.


4. BOTH SIDES CAN TAKE SOME SMALL COMFORT PERHAPS IN
THAT EXTREMIST CHALLENGES FAILED TO MATERIALIZE IN

1990. TO THE RIGHT, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IS LOSING
GROUND. THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC) DOES NOT
APPEAR TO BE PULLING MILITANTS AWAY FROM THE ANC AS
MANY PREDICTED IT WOULD. WHILE THERE IS PROMISE FOR
PROGRESS IN 1991, THE YEAR IS ENDING ON A LESS
OPTIMISTIC NOTE THAN THE EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 1990 MIGHT
HAVE LED ONE TO EXPECT. END SUMMARY.

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DE KLERK'S THREE-PRONGED OFFENSIVE
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5. THREE DISTINCT PROCESSES WERE EITHER INITIATED OR
INTENSIFIED BY DE KLERK IN 1990:

-- POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF
EMERGENCY, THE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL
ACTIVITY, AND THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND MANY
POLITICAL DETAINEES COMPLETELY CHANGED THE NATURE OF
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS. DE KLERK HAS, IN EFFECT,
GIVEN THE ANC, THE SACP, THE PAC AND OTHERS
UNPRECEDENTED ROOM TO MANUEVER -- AND TO COMMIT
MISTAKES -- WHILE REAPING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
FOR HIS BOLD REFORMISM. CONTROL OF THE LIBERALIZATION
AGENDA, AND THE CONTENT AND TIMING OF REFORMS, HAS
REMAINED ENTIRELY IN GOVERNMENT'S HANDS.

-- THE SCRAPPING OF APARTHEID. HERE TOO DE KLERK HAS
DICTATED THE PACE OF REFORM. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT
BY MID-1991 ALL THE MAIN PILLARS OF APARTHEID,
POSSIBLY EVEN THE POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT, WILL
HAVE BEEN LEGISLATED OUT OF EXISTENCE. WHITES HAVE
ADJUSTED BETTER THAN EXPECTED (SO FAR, AT LEAST) TO
THE REMOVAL OF RACIAL BARRIERS, ALTHOUGH 1991 IS
LIKELY TO SEE EFFORTS TOWARD LOCAL AND INFORMAL FORMS
OF DISCRIMINATION.

-- NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION. AT THE
PRETORIA SUMMIT AUGUST 6, THE SAG AND ANC DELEGATIONS
DECLARED THAT THE WAY WAS OPEN FOR THE START OF
SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY
THEREAFTER, THE SAG-ANC DIALOGUE BOGGED DOWN, AND FOR
THE PAST FOUR MONTHS THE SAG HAS VACILLATED BETWEEN
DIALOGUE WITH THE ANC AND MEASURES TO WEAKEN THE ANC.
DE KLERK CAN PRESS FORWARD ON REFORM AND LIBERALIZE
UNILATERALLY IN 1991, BUT HE WILL AT SOME POINT COME
UNDER PRESSURE TO BEGIN SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS,
EVEN WITHOUT ANC PARTICIPATION (WHICH IN OUR VIEW
WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR). THE ANC WILL CLAIM
NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BEGIN UNTIL PRE-CONDITIONS AND
"STUMBLING BLOCKS" HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND, IN THIS
RESPECT, HAS GIVEN THE SAG UNTIL APRIL 30 TO REMOVE
THEM. IF THEY ARE NOT REMOVED, THE ANC HAS SAID IT
WILL RECONSIDER ITS COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS AND THE
SUSPENSION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

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NEGOTIATIONS BOGGED DOWN
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6. IT IS THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS WHICH MOST
WORRIES OBSERVERS. BEHIND IT LIES AN EROSION OF TRUST
BETWEEN SAG AND ANC NEGOTIATORS AND, TO A LESSER
EXTENT PERHAPS, BETWEEN MANDELA AND DE KLERK
PERSONALLY. THIS EROSION BEGAN IN AUGUST AND IS
CONTINUING. IT IS LINKED TO THE TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE,
WHICH MOST ANC LEADERS FIRMLY BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT
IS EXPLOITING FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL ENDS. MANDELA NOW
CLAIMS THERE IS A SAG "DOUBLE AGENDA" -- NEGOTIATIONS
TO PLACATE PUBLIC OPINION COUPLED WITH A CONSPIRACY TO
DIVIDE AND WEAKEN THE ANC. FROM A SAG PERSPECTIVE,
THE PROBLEM IS THE ANC'S DISORGANIZATION, ITS
INABILITY TO CONTROL ITS FOLLOWERS AND, ULTIMATELY,
ITS RELUCTANCE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND STICK WITH THEM.
RESTORING A MEASURE OF COMMON PURPOSE AND INSTILLING A
NEW SENSE OF URGENCY WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN THE EARLY
MONTHS OF 1991 IF THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS IS TO BE
KEPT ON TRACK.


7. MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES REALIZE THAT THERE IS NO
LONG-RUN ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT
POWER-SHARING. THERE IS NO "RETURN TO THE LAAGER"
OPTION FOR WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. THERE IS NO REAL ARMED
STRUGGLE OPTION FOR THE ANC. IN THAT SENSE, POLITICAL
CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS TRULY IRREVERSIBLE.


8. WHAT HAS BECOME LESS CLEAR IN THE FINAL MONTHS OF
1990 IS WHETHER THE SOUTH AFRICA'S TWO MAIN PLAYERS
WILL RE-ENGAGE PROMPTLY IN EARLY 1991 OR WHETHER THE
NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON HOLD. FOR
THE ANC, RIDDLED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL, FINANCIAL AND
CONSTITUENT PROBLEMS, THERE WILL BE A STRONG EFFORT TO
REFOCUS ITS RESOURCES ON REBUILDING ITS NEGLECTED TIES
TO GRASSROOTS SUPPORTERS AND PROMOTING BLACK UNITY,
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE WEEKEND'S CONSULTATIVE
CONFERENCE. "MASS ACTION" PROTEST WILL FIGURE
PROMINENTLY IN SUCH A STRATEGY. MANY IN THE ANC, AND
MORE ESPECIALLY IN THE SACP, APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT
SUCH MUSCLE-FLEXING IS ESSENTIAL IF THE ANC IS TO HAVE
ANY CLOUT AT ALL AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE SAG,
FOR ITS PART, WILL DEMAND THAT THE ANC DISTANCE ITSELF
FROM BOYCOTTS, STRIKES AND STAYAWAYS WHICH HAVE
VIOLENT POTENTIAL. IF A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION CAN BE
ENGENDERED, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ANC ACTION COULD BE
CHANNELED THOUGHTFULLY INTO PEACEFUL MASS
DEMONSTRATIONS, ALLOWING THE ANC TO FLEX ITS MUSCLE
AND PLACE PRESSURE ON THE SAG, WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE
PROCESS. BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE ENORMOUS RESTRAINT ON
BOTH SIDES.

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NO REAL CHALLENGE TO THE NATS AND THE ANC
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9. DESPITE THESE UNCERTAINTIES, BOTH THE ANC AND SAG
HAVE AT LEAST ONE IMPORTANT SUCCESS TO CELEBRATE AS
THE YEAR DRAWS TO A CLOSE. POLITICAL THREATS FROM
BOTH THE FAR RIGHT AND FROM THE FAR LEFT PROVED MUCH
LESS FORMIDABLE THAN ORIGINALLY FEARED. THIS VICTORY,
UNFORTUNATELY, IS PARTLY OFFSET BY UNPRECEDENTED
VIOLENCE.


10. A SERIOUS CONSERVATIVE PARTY CHALLENGE TO DE
KLERK HAS YET TO MATERIALIZE. CP LEADERS HAVE FAILED
TO COME UP WITH PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO DE KLERK'S
REFORMS. OCTOBER POLLS SHOW THE CP SLIPPING BACK TO
ONLY 25 PERCENT OF THE WHITE VOTE WHILE THE NATIONAL
PARTY SUPPORT ROSE TO SLIGHTLY OVER 50 PERCENT. IN A
PINCH, DE KLERK COULD PROBABLY COUNT ON THE BACKING OF
ALMOST ALL THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY VOTES. HIS
POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE WHITE ELECTORATE, AND WITHIN
THE NATIONAL PARTY, IS STRONGER THAN EVER.


11. SIMILARLY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS
THAT THE ANC IS LOSING SUPPORT TO MORE MILITANT BLACK
ORGANIZATIONS ON THE LEFT SUCH AS THE PAC. WHILE THE
ANC HAS DOUBTLESS LOST SOME SUPPORT (RECENT
INDEPENDENT AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED POLLS BOTH
INDICATE THAT BLACK SUPPORT FOR THE ANC HAS SOFTENED
CONSIDERABLY),THESE APPEAR TO BE LOSSES TO APATHY OR
INDIFFERENCE, NOT DEFECTIONS TO THE PAC. DESPITE
THESE SETBACKS, THE ANC'S PRE-EMINENCE AMONG
OPPOSITION GROUPS REMAINS UNQUESTIONED. MOREOVER, ANC
LOSSES CAN BE MADE UP QUICKLY. OPTIMAL FROM MANDELA'S
POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE A STRATEGY WHICH TRANSFORMS
PEACEFUL MASS ACTION INTO INCREASED LEVERAGE AT THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE.

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SAG SCORES IN WORLD CAPITALS
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12. IN ONE CRITICAL AREA IN 1990, SAG GAINS WERE ANC
LOSSES. FOR MANY YEARS THE DIPLOMATIC QUARANTINE OF
SOUTH AFRICA BY MOST OF THE THE THIRD WORLD AND
COMMUNIST BLOC WAS A KEY INGREDIENT IN
ANC-ORCHESTRATED PRESSURE ON PRETORIA. IN 1990 THE
QUARANTINE CRUMBLED. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS CLAIMS IT IS UNABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE MANY
CONTACT OPPORTUNITIES ON OFFER. THE LOSS OF ITS VETO
OVER MANY FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTACT WITH PRETORIA
IS A BLOW TO THE ANC. THE LIFTING OF AT LEAST SOME
SANCTIONS BY WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IS AN INEVITABLE NEXT
STEP IN 1991, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE WEEKEND'S EC
DECISION TO LIFT THE BAN ON INVESTMENT IN SOUTH
AFRICA. THE ANC HAS NOT MOVED DECISIVELY TO SET NEW
TERMS UNDER WHICH IT WOULD APPROVE A LIFTING OF
SANCTIONS, AN OMISSION WHICH FURTHER REDUCES ITS
LEVERAGE WITH THE SAG. (OLIVER TAMBO WAS OBVIOUSLY
AWARE OF THIS WHEN HE ASKED THE ANC CONSULTATIVE
CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE SANCTIONS ISSUE, BUT
THE MILITANT ASSEMBLY, WEARLY OF TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE AND
DISTRUSTFUL OF THE SAG, REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION OF
LIFTING SANCTIONS.)

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COMMENT
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13. NO ONE EXPECTED THE SAG AND ANC TO BE ON A QUICK
AND STRAIGHT COURSE TOWARDS POWER-SHARING NEGOTIATIONS
BY THE END OF 1990. THE LOSS OF BOTH MOMENTUM AND A
CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION IS NEVERTHELESS A
DISAPPOINTMENT. IF THIS DEADLOCK PERSISTS BEYOND
MID-1991, THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THAT THIS UNEASY
PARTNERSHIP WILL TURN OPENLY CONFRONTATIONAL. THE
MAIN REASON FOR OPTIMISM IS THAT NEITHER THE SAG NOR
THE ANC HAS ANY PLAUSIBLE LONG-TERM OPTION OTHER THAN
NEGOTIATIONS. WE STILL BELIEVE THEY WILL SEIZE THIS
OPTION, BUT THE WAY AHEAD WILL BE ROUGH. END COMMENT.


SWING.